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INTRODUCTION
 
Background 
The purpose of evaluation in AID is to provide information on 
project and program performance to derisionmakers. In recent years, 
the concern with channeling project performance information to decision­
makers has increased considerably. Pressures for increased information 
stem, in part, from three developments. 
Shrinking Resources Limitations on resource availability require 
that resources have maximum impact at minimum cost. Within AID,
 
there have been increasing requests for information on ways to
 
maximize impact with available resources and on the efficacy and
 
costs of dlternative development strategies.
 
Questioning of AID's Impact Both foreign aid advocates and critics
 
alike have raised questions concerning the impact of AID-assisted
 
projects on beneficiaries and AID's longer term contribution to 
institution building and human resource development. Thus, project
 
performance information is increasingly sought and used to provide
 
evidence of program impact and effectiveness and to present more 
persuasive justifications for various programs and funding levels. 
Concern with Learning the Lessons of Development Concerns have 
been raised that AID is not learning from past mistakes or building 
on clear successes. Project designers and project officers are now
 
increasingly asking "what works?" and requesting information that
 
identifies project and program elements critical for success. 
All of these developments have presented a single challenge to AID 
-- the challenge of providing concise, timely, and accurate information 
on project performance to decisionmakers. 
The Asia Bureau has tended to approach this challenge primarily
 
through two means.
 
One approach has been through the use of the ST/DIU data base (DIS
 
-Development Information System) which provides abstracts of all project 
or program evaluations. The other more common approach is the ad hoc use 
of a single, recent evaluation for guidance in decisionmaking concerning
 
the future of an individual project. 
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For reasons too well known to need discussion here, both of these
approaches have particular deficiencies. In short, the use of the
ST/DIU data base frequently results in an abundance of irrelevant information,
while the use of single evaluations for decisionmaking fails to provide
a 
broader contextual or comparative perspective concerning project
impact and effectiveness.
 
Thus far there has been no systematic attempt to compile projectperformance information for decisionmakers in a 
way that represents the
middle ground between these two approaches. This compilation of evdluationsummaries is an effort to begin to address this need.
 
Purpose This volume is a compilation of summaries of 50 evaluations and
studies conducted for the Asia Bureau between 1978 and 1980. 
 The purpose
of bringing together summaries of recent evaluations isto provide
concise and accurate information on project performance to Asia Bureau
decisiormakers at all levels -- from project designers and project andprogram officers in' the missions, to project reviewers dnd senior
decision and policymakers inWashington.
 
Contents 
The summaries are arranged by sector so that needed information
on recent experience in any one particular functional 
area can be
quickly reviewed. 
 In addition, for each evaluation summary, a project
identification data sheet has also been prepared in order to bring
together essential project information. The summaries are bound with
loose-leaf rings so that copies of the material from individual 
sectors
can be made available to technical and project officers responsible for
that sector, while the entire collection can be used by program and
policy planning offices. Copies of the full 
reports are available for
consultation from the Asia Bureau Office of Development Planning (Room
3208 NS) or can be ordered from ST/DIU.
 
Assembling this first collection proved more difficult and the
present result less satisfactory than originally anticipated for a
number of reasons. 
 First, the summaries included here are not "executive
summaries." 
 At the time the 1978-1980 evaluations were undertaken,
there was no requirement inthe Asia Bureau, as there isat the present
time, for evaluation reports to include executive summaries. Each
report, therefore, had to be reviewed individually to extract the information
which most closely approximated an executive summary. 
Unfortunately, in
many cases, even the pages extracted still do not present a 
self-contained
overview given the loose organization of some of the reports inquestion.
Second, many of the evaluations undertaken during this time period do
not provide quantitative or qualitative data on issues of current concern
to decisionmakers: impact on beneficiaries, institution building, humanresource development or technology transfer. Finally, few summariesaddress the policy implications of the conclusions reached nor identify 
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specific elements of project or program design and implementation that 
are critical to project outcome. All of the above categories of information 
are particularly useful -- if not essential -- at various levels of 
deci si onmaki ng. 
Despite these deficiencies, it is still hoped that this initial 
compilation will provide useful evaluation findings on recent AID-assisted 
projects - especially to those involved in project design and review. 
The deficiencies of the summaries, moreover, underscore the importance 
of the Asia Bureau guidance (conveyed to Asia Missions via State 63232, 
attached, and re-emphasized during the 1981 Asia Bureau Evaluation 
Workshops) that, to facilitate distribution and broaden utilization, all 
evaluation reports should include a two-page executive summary, followed 
by a succinct statement of major conclusions and recommendations. This 
guidance has been supported by all Asia Missions. To facilitate adherence 
to this guidance, a sample format for the executive summary, project 
identification data sheet, and conclusions and recommendations has been 
developed by the Asia Bureau and is attached to this report. Cluser 
adherence to the recommended format will permit the Asia Bureau to make 
more thorough summaries and concise conclusions of Asia Bureau evaluations
 
available to all missions and bureau offices in the future.
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FACESHEET-FOR SPECIAL-EVALUATION
 
F.BASIC PROJECT IDENTIFICATION DATA 
A. Countri B.Project Title (orea rops Improvement Research Cente 

SCIRIC Proiect 
-. Life of Project Funding1.AID: (Loan or Grant) $5,000,000 (1974)
: 

')that Donut 
lost Co.ntry Counterpart Funds 
TOTAL $ Z.. 
G. Project Design 
1. In-House (Name, Positiol) 
not stated 

2. Contractor (Name, Firm, Contract No.) 
not stated 

I. Previous Evaluations (Include Title, Type and Date) 
not stated
 
II. BASIC EVALUATION DATA 
A. Evaluation "itle B.Evaluation Date 
Evaal:tion of AID Loan 
8--08June 
 6, 1978 
1. DirectHireEvaluation Cont not statedG.nil 
C.Project Number D. Active Life of Project:
 
not stated 1. ProjectAgreement igned 
F 74e 
2. Approved Project Conplation Date PACO) Fy 78* 
F Rn1. MonaiblesMion Oficll
~~1. not statedM ission D irector "n t s a e
 
2. Project Officear (Name, Position) 
3.Other 
H. Implementation 
1.Hot Country Agmncyniee) 
Office of Rural Development (Ministry of Agricultur

and Forestry), as well as CIRC
2. Contractor (Name,Firm, Contract No.) 
not stated
 
C.Type of Evaluation 
. D. Project Period Covered by Evaluation, 
n going project
 
F.Purpose(s) of Evaluation d yG. Initiated By 
travel 
per diem (SEE attached sheet) 
 not stated
 Contract 
3. Other 
TOTAL 
 S -------------
H.Evaluation Team Composition 
1.Direct Hire 
a. Name b. Prnmt PosItion 
Dr. R. Desrosiers, USAID Ret.
 
Dr. K. Kopf, USAID Ret.
 
Dr. J.M. Yohe, AID/Washington
 
_ 2. Contac: a. Name of Organization (Ifany) 
Ca. Name(s) of Persons 
1. Other Responsible AID end Ho Country 

. 
Peronnef(Neme. Poltion) William E. Paupe, USAID/ 
Neboysha R. Brashich, Program Officer, Ed
Gales, Chief, Office of Development Loans
SAID/K. 
Also, Dr. Kim, In Hwan, Director 

al, ORD. 
Mr. Shin, Dong Wan, Directo. 
-/Dr. Paul C. Lippold, Co-Director, CI C.Mr. Kim, Joon, Director, Saemaul Leaders 

ASIA/DP/E: S/8 Training Institute 
. Area of Expertise 
b. Contract No. 
d. Area(s) of Expertise 
Evalustion Coordinator 
_I_ 

_ 
__ur_
TypedName 
Position 
Due
 
Evaluation of AID Loan 489-T-088 
 page two
 
F. Purpose: Assess the USAID loan in increasing the quality of life
 
through increases in crop production as well as farmers' incomes.
 
Purpose(s).of the evaluation are to describe major accomplishments of CIRC
project and the Office of Rural Development (ORD's ) major goals, weaknesses,

and problems, with an eye toward the imminent ending of foreign assistance.
 
Project Activity Completion Date ir / according to page 15. However 
page 77, authors state that the current AID Loan is scheduled to terminate
 
on September 30, 1980.
 
V. RECOMMENDATTONS
 
A. 	 Imiprove the salaries of research personnel to make them
 
competitive with those paid to university staff of comparable
 
status. This should have the highest priority possible. 
B. 	 Revise the personnel system of ORD to provide two parallel 
­
ladders for advancement, one for active research workers and
 
the other for management. The system should provide for the
 
advancement of research workers to grades and salaries equal
 
to those of management personnel. 
C. 	 Start an all-out program for the training of research personnel 
in the use of the English language, beginning with people newly­
inducted into the ORD Service. 
D. 	 Start a crash program for the training of subject-matter special­
iots in plant pathology and entomology in order to alleviate 
critical shortages in these specialities. Provide for wider 
cooperation at the project level between discipline and crop­
oriented scientists. 
E. 	 Provide for a centralized biometrics unit which: (1)will supply 
advice and assistance to all research workers on design, data 
collection, and interpretation of the results of the experiment&, 
and (Z) will provide a computerized data analysis service. 
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?. Provide for the close coordination of all ORD libraries under 
the leadership of the central ORD library facility and provide 
an adequate and guaranteed budget to ensure the exchange of 
'knowledge within ORD. 
-
G. Organize the management of several support service facilities 
(library, centralized biometrics /computer service unit and 
centralized laboratory) under the office of the Deputy Director 
General. 
H. ORD budget be increased by December, 1978 to include CIRC 
supplementary budget for reoearch, apartment house operation 
as appropriate, and cover salaries and administrative costs of 
CIRC supplementary personnel appointed and regurarized to full 
ORD status. 
X. Continued emphasis should be placed on soybeans amd potatoes. 
The program on soybeans has not been emphasized' within ORD 
to the degree of its importance as a food crop izr the country. 
3. The cropping systems activity should be formally established 
iv ORD as a section within the Research Bureau asor a 
Division in the Crop Experiment Station. 
K. The reinaining recommendations of the KASS Report pertaining 
to livestock improvement in Korea, with assistance from ORD, 
should be implemented. 
- 86 ­
L. 	 Korea should be recognized as a middle-income country that
 
can now assist developing countries in some technical fields.
 
M. 	 Korea should seek participation in the Title XII Program on 
an innovative triangular cooperation basis involving institutions 
in the United States, Korea and other LDCs. This proposal 
should be presented to the BIFAD Board. 
N. 	 All I.D. Committee deliberations must be presented in both 
English and Korean, or else the contribution of the expert 
consultants may be lost. 
0. 	 All CIRC research program changes after I.D. meetings and 
steering committee approval should be approved through the 
respective I.D. Committees. 
P. 	 Upon termination of this project, CIRC personnel should be 
regularized and given permanent status. All research projects 
should also be.continued by the ROKG. 
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E IMiTEGEATE CEREA PROJECT 
- MEPAL -
Report
 
of 
Mid-ter= Evaluation 
October - November, 19T9 
AIlb- -ASIA-

FACESHEET FOR SPECIAL-VALUATION
 
I. BASIC PROJECT IDENTIFICATION DATA 
A. Country B. Project Title 	 C.Proect fu',d er D. Active Life of Project: 
PA 1. Project Agreement Signed FY 76iPAL Integrated Cereals Project not stated 2- Approved Project Con1pletion Date (PACD) FY
E. LIe of Project Funding F. Responsible Mission Officials 
/ 	 ID: (Loan or Grant) ?,699,000* 1. Mission Directornot stated
ther Donor 
 2. Project Officers (Name, Position)3. Host Country Counterpart Fund@ 3. Otheir 
TOTAL $
 
*Budgeted for 1st 3 years of 5 year project
 
G. Project Design H. Implementatlon1. In-Iause (Name,Position) 1. Host Country Agency(iee) 
not stated 
 Ministry of Food and Agriculture (MFA)
 
2.Contractor (Name,Firm,Contract No.) 2.Contractor 
-(am,
Fwm,Cmtraa,No.)
 
not staled 
 not stated
 
I.Previous Evaluations (Include Title. Type and Date) 
1977 	and 1978 annual reviews
 
II. BASIC EVALUATION DATA 
A. Evaluation Title B. Evaluation Date C.Type of Evaluaton D. Project Period Covered by Evaluation 
INTEGRATED CEREALS 
 (Oct 22-Nov. 2)

PROJECT -NEPAL- Oct-Nov. 1979 Mid-term (3rd year 
 9/76-9/79
 
uof" 5Evaluation Cost 	 year projiect)F. Purpos(s) of Evaluation G. Initiated By

"lirect Hire 
 not stated
 
travel (SEEattachedsheet)
 
-a. per diem (SEE attached sheet) not stated

2. Contract 
3. Other 
TOTAL 
 $ 
H. Evaluation Team Composition 
1. Direct Hire 
a. Name b. Present Position e. Area of Experti. 
D.R. Pickett, Agriculture Officer, USAID/N

Jack Ryan, Assistant Program Officer, USAID/N
 
2. Contrac : a. NWme of Organization (ifany#) b. Contact No.
RADS: Internatioal
 
grcul tura ve)pment Service (SEE attached sheet)
, c. Name(s) of Perons d. Area(s) of Expertig. 
I. Other Responsible AID and Host Country J. Evaluation Coordinator
Personnol (Name,Position)
 
D.R. Pickett, Ag.'Officer, USAID/N 
 Signature
Tnck 	Ryan, Assistant Program Officer, 
 Typed Name\ID/N 
 T Nm
 
Position 
S.B. Nepali, Director General, Department

ofA riculture and Prolect Director te
 
ASIA/DP/E: 6/80 
page 	two
 
Integrated Cereals Project-Nepal-

The current evaluation concentrated more attention on technical
 F. Purpose: 
 It
 
aspects of the project with less consideration of operational matters. 

measures current progress toward project objectives: 1) cropping systems
 
research, 2) national rice improvement program, 3) national maize dfvelopment
 
program, 4) national wheat development program.
 
H. Evaluation Team Composition:
 
HMG
 
K.P. Khatmi, Ministry of Finance
 
Jagdish Upadhyaya, Planning Commission
 
B.K. 	Thapa, AIC
 
S.B. 	Nepali, Director General, Department of Agriculture, and Project Director
 
A.M. 	Pradhanang, Deputy Director General, Crop Science
 
A.N. 	Bhattarai, Deputy Director General, Extension and Training
 
International Institutes
 
E.E. 	Saari, CIM!YT Regional Wheat Representative, Cairo
 
T. Izuno, CIIMYT Regional Maize Representative, New Delhi
 
H.G. 	Zandstra, IRRI, Head Cropping Systems Program, Los Banos
 
IADS
 
D.S. 	Athwal, Program Officer, New York
 
A.I1. 	Moseman, Representative, New York, Review Team Leader
 
Gray III, Assoc. Director for Agricultural Sciences, The Rockefeller
C..C. 

Foundation, New York
 
W.H. 	Freeman, ICP Project Supervisor, Kathmandu
 
SUNMAY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Agriculture in Nepal provides about 66 percent of the gross national
product and 75 
 percent of the export earnings for the Kingdom. Approxi­
mately 94 percent of the 13 million people of Nepal depend on agriculture
for their livelihood.
 
An estimated 60 percent of Nepal's population resides in the Hills,
on small farms that are intensively cultivated for a subsistence-levelproduction. Farmers are now extracting a maximum output f-om their land,labor and other input resources. Production of food grains and other
agricultural products in Nepal has been increased in the past through
expansion of acreage, primarily in the Terai but also in the Hills. Thelitter has Caused serious deterioration of the nation's agricultural
resource base, through excessive deforestation, accelerated erosion, andirreparable damage to the already limited arable soils resource base. 
Agricultural productivity in Nepal, as measured in terms of yields perhectare, is declining for a number of major It has becomecrops. clearly
evident in the past decade that improved production technology must beutilized if Nepal is to meet future needs for food grains and ,ther agri­cultural commodities. This is true for the Terai as well as for the Hills. 
Agriculture in the Hills of Nepal presents formidable limitations toimprovement because of the varied and complex growing conditions. The
numerous microclimates-with highly variable soil, moisture, temperature,
and solar combinations prevailing within small farming areas-requires newproduction technology specifically suited to each farming site. This limitsthe usefvllness of technology introduced from external sources, whether frominternational agricultural research orcenters from neighbo5ring countries. 
Nepal has no alternative other than to establish a strong national

capability for modern agricultural research, to generate a continuous 
 supply
of improved technology that will increase output from present arable lands.This was recognized in the planning of the Integrated Cereals Project (ICP)by His Majesty's Government (HMG) and USAID in 1973-75. In view of theneed to improve production in the Hills the ICP is set up on a "farming
systems" approach, to develop technology that will provide the fine tuningfor already intensive farming practices. The Project is designed to work
closely with farmers, to develop a better understanding of the biological,
economic, and social constraints, in order better to plan research anddevelop technology to fit what need, andfarmers want, can use. 
Of the five cropping systems research sites that have been establishedfour are in Hill areas, at andbari, Lele, Pumdi Bhumdi, and Chauri Jahari.The fifth, at Sukchaina and Dhobini, is in Parsi District in the Terai.This is consistent with the strong emphasis by HMG recentin years toimprove productivity and level's of living for the 60 percent of the nation's 
people that live in the Hills. 
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I 
The ICP is strongLy production oriented, with at-wention to the genera­
tion of technology; its verification, testing and hdaptation at the five
 
cropping ystems research sites, and evaluation-with cooperating farmers­
in farmers ' fields. 
A major continuing deficiency in Nepal's agricultural research capa­
bility is the lack of experiment station facilities in the Hills. The four
 
cropping systems research sites are helping to fill 
 this gap, by furnishing
 
an essential Link in the process of evaluating and fitting new technology
 
to the numerous agroclimatic conditions in the Hills.
 
The present evaluation of the ICP is essentially the mid-term review,
in the third year of the five year term project. Considerable progress has 
been made in dev,.loping facilities, training manpower, staffing, establishing
the cropping systems sites, and in realigning research objectives. The cur­
rent evaluation, therefore, concentrated more attention on technical aspects
of the project, with less consideration of operational matters. 
The members and key participants in the review are listed in APPENDIX I,
and the schedule of visits is presented I APPENDIX I. 
1. Current Status-Progress Toward Project Goals 
The ICP has been under way for only three years, a brief period in 
which to put into operation a system that is nationwide in scope and that
embraces all functions from the research to produce new technology through
its verification and adaptation to ensure its value and acceptability by
farmers. This mid-term review of tbe Project took into account the msani­
tude of the task of putting together the staff, facilities, operational 
concepts and procedures, geographical linkages, and the ultidisciplinary
and multi-institutional relationships that must combine into a working 
system. The review also considered the soundness of the basic concept­
to integrate attention to major comdity improvement programs and a more 
comprehensive farming systems approach. 
Substantial progress has been made in establishing facilities and the 
five cropping system sites-which have been operating for two years-and
the Project is beginning to function as the continuum that was intended. A 
minimum of three to four years is necessary to develop improved technology
and to test its adaptation to specific farming conditions, to ensure that 
the new technology can be depended upon to improve productivity with mini­
mum risks to farmers. The confidence of farmers in the new technology
offered to them is critical not only to the ICP but, more important, to 
the EMG. 
The concentration on the farming systems research and informatiom base 
as the central point for identifying the kinds of new technology that will 
be useful-and for furnishing well tested, reliable materials and practices 
- iv ­
to those responsible for extension-is a system that was conceived for Nepal.It is unique in agricultural development, and results to date provide assur­
ance that the system will be effective. The studies on physical and socio­
economic environments of the sites have led to land use classirication
within the sites that relates clearly to variations in farmers' cropping
practices. This clessificatiov, together with the growing understanding
of existing cropping patterns, their productivity, management practices

used by farmers, and the potentials and constraints for use of improved

technology, furnishes a base for agricultural growth and for accelerated
 
production. programs hitherto not available in Nepal.
 
There are continuing constraints with respect to manpower, the estab­lishment of the cropping systems in
research the institutional structure ofthe DOA to ensure its stability and permanence, and the inadequate research
attention to improvement of varieties and production practices for crops
such as grain legumes, oilseeds, finger millet, barley, potatoes, and others.However, the cropping sy3tems component of the ICP is well launched, it isbecoming the focal point for guiding the development and use of improved
technology--as was intended-and it should be of increasing benefit to
Nepal's agricultural development from this point onward. 
The national commodity research and development programs for rice,

maize and wheat have been strengthened substantially during the three years

of the project. Facilities at the respective central research stations 
are
coming up reasonably well on schedule and the improved multidisciplinary
staff teams are producing research results that are markedly superior to 
those of only two years ago. 
Four new rice varieties, ranging in maturity from 110 to 140 days
offer greater potential for yield, disease resistance, and insect resis­tance than varieties now grown by farmers. Expanded breeding and testingprograms for temperate zone rice varieties appear especially encouraging inproviding new varieties for the Hills. The review team observed substantial
spread of new rice varieties, not only in the Teral but also in the valleys
and Hill locatic :s between Bhairawa and Pokhara. The farmer field trials,

cropping systems 
site resbarch, and the minikits (distributd in 1979 to3200 farmers), have combined to accelerate farmer interest and use of the 
new varieties. 
The national maize program has been strengthened appreciably withimproved facilities and manpower. Constraints persist with respect to com­pletion of the laboratory building, staff housing, irrigation and drinkingwater supplies at Rampur-but good work is going on. There is a recognized
need for shorter duration varieties and the task of breeding for resistanceto dowry mildew and other destructive diseases is being emphasized. Research 
on production practices is showing that a 45 to 90 Kg. tpplication of nitro­gen is sufficient and that the maize crop generally does not respond tophosphorus and potash applications during the Kharif season. Phosphorus isnot needed for the harif maizi crop, and potash is also unnecessary. The
maize minikit program appears to be particularly well conceived and operated, 
and the response from .armers is exceptionally good, i.th 70 percent ormore of the farmers reporting back on their evaluation of the improved

technology distributed in the miniklts.
 
Wheat production has essentially doubled in Nepal in the past decade,from 233,000 metric tons ten years ago to the estimated current productionof 454,000 metric tons. However, this results from expansion of acreage,
and yields per hectare have remained low and relatively constant at about1.2 tons over this ten year period. The introduction of early, diseaseresistant varieties has permitted expansion of the wheat area, particularlyin the Terai where farmers sow wheat after the rice crop is harvested inOctober or November. One factcr, however, that contributes to the constantlow yield of wheat is the frequently delayed planting of the crop when riceharvest is late. It has been determined that wheat yields are reduced byabout 20 percent if sowing is delayed to Decmeber 15 and by as much as 50percent if sowing occurs on December 30. 
There is an urgent need for further strengthening of the wheat research program to meet well recognized and particularly stubborn constraints toproduction. The high sterility of the wheat crop in the Eastern Terai per­
sists and is particularly damaging to the improved variety NL 30. The

causal factors are not understood 
and must be tackled through more intensive,multidisciplinary team investigations. The discovery of the Karnal ')untdisease in the Western and Far Western Terai in 1979 poses a new seriousthreat to wheat production in Nepal since the variety UP 262 and many otherpromising new arevarieties succeptible to the disease. 
Progress in selecting varieties better suited to the Hills has beenlimited due to the lack of suitable research station facilities in the Hills.where selections can be made. This constraint is not unique to wheat but
continues to limit effective development of improved crop varieties and
management practices for rice,also maize and the numerous other crops

important to Hill farmers.
 
In summary, the review team found the status of the program and the progress toward project goals to be good. The generation of new technology,its evaluation through the newly established cropping systems sites, andthe potential extension of adapted, reliable new technology into appropriate
channels for prompt farm use is becoming systematized to a degree that isvery satisfactory for a project in the third year of operatiou. There are

still growing pains and constraints but none 
 that are unusual or that wouldbe difficult to resolve. The base is being well established for a systemthat will be increasingly beneficial to agricultural production in Nepalin the next two years of duration of the project and that hopefully willprovide for an expanded program to serve farmers throughout Nepal more
effectively in suceeding years.. 
2. Recommended Immediate Enhasis of the Project 
It is recognized that a period of five years, the time span of the ICP,is an inadequate period for establishing a fully operative and well staffed 
-vi ­
research and development system. The term required for training and
building a complement of qualified multidisciplinary manpower usually

extends over 10 years or more. The information that is b~ing developed
through the cropping systems research sites is indicative but not suffi­ciently replicated over time to be fully reliable. At least two to threemore years of results will be needed to build a base for recommendations
 
with reasonable confidence.
 
Although the technology evaluation process is still in the develop­
ment and early maturity stage the review team and ICP personnel are awarethat there is urgent need to utilize the best information and materials 
­nowavailable to support efforts to increase Nepal's food grain production.The limited pre-monsoon sbowers and subsequent light monsoon in 1979 have
caused zerious food grain deficits. 
As EM moves forward with accelerated
 
crop production programs in the 1979-80 seasonscrop the ICP should be
expected to be involved in a supporting role to the agencies responsible

for the production campaigns.
 
The report of the review team presents information on some, of the typesof technology inputs that might be furnishcd by the respective 'rice, maize
and wheat research programs and through the cropping systems sites. Theearly use and application of technology that is still in the evaluation and
verification stage-with respect to specific farming conditions-.presents

some risk, but risk that would be justified under the current critical food
 
supply situation.
 
3. Future Directions of the Project 
Many of the substantial investments to improve agriculture in Nepal
during the past 25 years, by HMG and external agencies, have not had the
impact or continuing benefits anticipated because the individual projects
were not covered into the institutional structure of Nepal. Also, 
 projectstended to be established and operated at a funding level that could not becontinued with ME resources as external support was dininished and withdrawn. 
The review team feels that the ICP is conceptually sound, well designedto meet Nepal's unusually complex and varied farming conditions, and shouldbe seriously considered rs a continuing base for agricultural technologygeneration and use. The current project will conclude its five year termin 1981. In order to ensure maximun effective continuity of a program forimproving farming systems and productivity in Nepal through sound,technology-based a system it would be desirable for attention to be givenpromptly, jointly by EKG and USAID, to actions to be taken to effec­ensure
tive continuity of activities albng the lines of the ICP. 
4. Recommendations
 
Ths review report identifies a number of constraints to the Project as
well as opportunities for redirection of research and accelerating theimpact of the ICP on agricultural production in Nepal. The following actions
should be considered for priority attention: 
- lii ­
a. Actions should be taken to bring the ICP to its intended 
level of effective operation by expediting construction of facil­ities, the scheduling of manpower development, and provision of 
permanent EKG staffing for the project. 
b. Give sepcial emphasis to the strengthening of the Cropping
Systems Research Program (CSRP) at the five sites now estab­
lished, to further improve the procedures for testing and

adapting new technology to ensure its suitability for different
 
agroclimatic situations and acceptance by farmers. 
 The possi­
bility of adding a new cropping systems field site in the
 
Inner Terai, in the Chitwan Valley, also should be explored. 
a. Expand the CSRP by establishing more effective linkages
with selected area development projects, such those at Lumle,as 

Pakhribas, Gandaki, Janakpur, and others.
 
d. Expand the studies on soil fertility and agronomic research
in the CSRP to relate fertilizer use more precisely to sit

requirements and to efficient 
fertility management in various 
cropping sequences.
 
e. Include attention to livestock in a broader approach to
 
farming systems research, recognizing that animals are an inte­
gral component in farming throughout Nepal.
 
f. L Set up a national coordinated Farming Systems Research
 
Program (as a successor to the CSRP) with the same permanence
 
as the national commodity research programs, with full-time 
coordinating leadership and full-time, permanent positions for
 
the staff.
 
g. Give attention to research for improving varieties and pro­
duction practices for barley, millets, grain legumes, 
 oilseeds,
potatoes, and other .crops that importantare in cropping systems

in different areas of Nepal.
 
h. Concentrate greater attention on pilot production programsin a few selected farming areas, to determine the potentials for 
new technology to increase production and to gain further experi­
ence in working relationships with farmers, Regional Directors,
DADO's, the AIC, ADB, AMS, IAAS and other concerned agencies. 
L. Consolidate the information and experience of the ICP, and 
especially the CSRP site results, to furnish the base for 
accelerated crop production programs. 
J. Place increased emphasis, and support, on the recent initia­
tives by the rice, maize, and wheat programs to develop varieties 
better suited to temperate zone conditions and to the various 
miaroclimates of thn Hills. 
- viii ­
k. Develop multipurpose regional stations for breeding, selec­
tion, and critical evaluation of new varieties and production
 
practices for rice, maize and wheat, to serve farmers in the
 
Hills. Guidance with respect to needs and potential sites is 
furnished in the report "A Study of Hill Agriculture in Nepal," 
of November 1974.
 
1. Continue to develop the interactions and cooperation betwern
 
the CSRP, the National Commodity Programs, and the Discipline
 
,Divisions 	of the Department of Agriculture to maximize cross 
references with respect to critical problems and to new tech­
nology developments.
 
m. Strengthen those aspects of the national comodity programs 
as required to tackle continuing stubborn, high priority con­
straints, including the high sterility of wheat in the Eastern 
Terai, the threat of Karnal bunt of wheat, the downy mildew and 
other diseases of maize, and other problems as identified in the
 
review report.
 
n. Take positive steps to ensure close collaboration with the 
Seed Production and Input Storage Project that is being tottab­
lished in the AIC, to ensure expeditious production of high 
quality seed of improved crop varieties adapted to the various 
farming areas of Nepal. 
o. Arrange for prompt joint consideration, by appropriate rep­
resentatives of the HMG and USAID, of actions to be taken for 
continuation of the ICP, with such modifications as may be 
desirable, to ensure maximum benefits from the experience and 
investments in strengthening Nepal's capabilities for technology­
based agricultural development. 
p. Give further careful consideration to the establishment of a 
Nepal Council for Agricultural Research, to provide the kind of 
national institutional capability that is serving effectively for 
agricultural development in India, Indonesia, the Philippines and 
other countries of Asia. These organizations provide for active 
involvement of all agencies concerned with agricultural development 
in the planning, implementation, and evaluation of research to
 
increase agricultural production, and its prompt and effective use 
by farmers. 
-im ­
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of the project was retarded during 
the first 
Although iraplementation n t a t i on has accelerated and the overall the rate of implet1.5 years, is now 83 percent (Table 1).
 level of accompliblunt 

* Oveall Acconimlishment1_. Loan
Table 

Percent
%
Cost 
 overall
of
of
(In Accomplish-Accomplish-14illic.j Loan ment mert () 
45 100 )
 
1) Infrastructure 2.25 

29 95 )
 
2) Equipmeat 1.41 

3) Manpower 9 1000.44 83%a) In-country 37 )11 
b) International 0.56 

4) Technical 6 230.30Assistance 
.04
 
5)1:-_= _: 
100
$5.00 

i/ To be committed for additional 
equipment.
 
* Accrued expenditure basis.
 
and 	 the technical assistance componentsOnly tlL, 11itterhtiond] trat,i-;g 
slitLdule at this time. Hlowevrt, as a resultremain seriously urhind 
of program guidelines for the use of Technical Assistance,of the devclopm1Lnt 
it appears likely that the remaining funds in that component can be used 
as designed. The outlook for utilizing the international training funds 
remains poor unless the GOP procedures can be modified to reflect current 
funds is under discussion.costs. Reprograwaning of some 
to the sratus of project inputs are as follows:
Details as 

A. 	Infrastructure
 
1. 	Loan financed - Reimbursement of $2,194,399 has been made for 
92 units completed with 2 units eligible for reimbursement of 
987. complete. Overall completion is 99/..
$55,050 now 

scheduled for2. 	GOP Financed - t19.44 million of 52.16 million 
support of infrastructure has been disbursed; P24.99 million
 
is under costruction and t5.31 million bidded and/or ready for 
construction. 
an estimated cost of3. 	Of the total infrastructure scheduled at 

t68.96 ,illion (approximately $9.32 million), 897 has been
 
completed and/or is under construction.
 
B. 	Equipment
 
- of $1.410 million allocated for commodity1. 	Loan Fininced 
procurement, $1.404 million or 997, has been committed in contracts. 
Approximately $1.28 million of equipment has been delivered to 
Manila and research centers with additional items in transit.
 
4.69 million allocated has been used.
2. 	GOP Financed - 82% of the 

The tO.864 million balance still subject to bidding is awaiting
 
the 	release of funds.
 
C. 	Manpower Development
 
1. 	In-country Academic
 
training of
Of the $440,000 scheduled, all has been committed to 

a shortfall of
26 Ph.D. and 106 M.S. candidates. There will be 

a result of increased costs. It is
approximately $76,369 as 

uncommitted funds in theanticipated this will be made up from 
international training component.
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2. internatio-.al 1 r,,ing 
-'Of th,. $560,00,) 5chuLculed fur Ph.D., refresher/upgrading and 
short tunzv oblSval tion/worl.shop training, approximately 225,000 
-has bee conltted and $209,000 disbUrsed, leaving a balance of 
approximacly 335,000 unconmuitted. 
D. Teclrical Assistance 
Of the $303,000 allocated, two contracts have been executed for a
 
total ui $66,663 or approximately 23%. A number of additional 
have been identified in the Technical Assistance Prog­
ran rece-ntly ivimulat, d by PCA!RR and drL" contracts for $52,000 
have been revictied and approved by USAIj. 
./consultantls 
£.valuation Tlethedology 
to assess the progress of implemenLation,
The purpose of this evaluation was 

identify constroiiits to iraplementation, and reconur.end measures to eliminate 
and/or minimize identified constrainlts rather than to attempt an in-depth 
overall assessricit emphasizing attainment of project purpose and goals 
of developing research capability.given the long-term nature 
Therefore, this methodology was limited to maasur-ments of progress 
versus the original timetable, the actual financial support received by 
the project versus the approved project budget and assessing the time­
liness and adequacy of supplies, materials, equipment versus the 
project timetable. Also, there was a general examination of other 
project implementation.problems/difficulties encountered ia the 

The evaluation was carried out by a joint GOP-USAID team consisting
 
of representatives from PCARR, the Itinistry of the Budget, the National
 
an initialEconomic and Development Authority and USAID. PCARR prepared 
report which was reviewed, discussed, and modifted by the evaluation
 
tea- dur.iag z:.re orNi sessions Ln September and October, 1979. Data 
were project planning, commitment, contracting and other relevant sources 
visits had been made, the team determineddocuments. Since by-monthly site 
the time and costs for additional visits were not justified.
 
III. External Factors 
There have been no major changes in project setting except those in
 
GOP priorities strengthening the implementing government agency, 
A. To begin with, PCARR's position as the lead agency responsible for
 
prog­developing, coordinating, programming and evaluating research 
rams has been greatly strengthe:ted by the COP through the issuance 
of the following Presidential Decrees:
 
V( r6DB1. 1. D. *,. 4:, .'1.t c, dttached \I - to for better tccozIi­
nati . at.wn,in cI~ntliL piooram in the country; 
2. 	P. .l. expandd the functions of PCARR to include 
3. 	-p. . . 1?",9 .,ic. Lranted authoriLy to PCAR'. to generate 
.foreiou iundn f,,r research; and 
P. 	1. . ,,ieh provided fo. incentives and administrative) 158"24. 	
reforms to pto,-ite produccivity and eificiency in scientific and 
technulolcal lLbUarch. 
Thr 	first t;:o derces enabled PCAR to: 
' (a) Review all research program proposals in agriculture and natural 
"\- reo,Lrces (refcr to Annex C). 
the 	Ninistry of the Bludgez for(b) RcecoaLiend rc &ccrch proposals to 

- funding.
 
,/In addition PC',,, has established a program whereby the research 
at three year intervals inarep riorities were dcL loped and updated 
coL oAnaucc with all reluvani GOP agcocic. at both the regional and 
levels as ,,ell as educational institutions and the private , national 
over 600 scientists, policy and, implementing repreentatives
y- sector. 
-

participate in this exercise. t 
their suppoct by increasing PCAR's budget
The 	GOP has dciikolrn5Lratcd 

was 	 one ofto support their e)%panded functions (Table 6) and PCARR 
the 	new budget processthe few G(P agencies to succesbfully cope with 

which was a factor in obtaining increased Ludget support.
 
IV. Inputs
 
1. 	Infrastructure
 
a whole, there was minimum change in the research related
As 	
that what was originally programned has been
infrastructure so 

a 16 month delay in
fully imtle1ieited. The.major constraint was 

the initial release of funds thereby delaying both loan and GOP­
O.ther delays were due to PCARR's
 i 	financed --tructures for one year. 

unfamiliarity with FAR Agreements and USAID approval procedures, a
 
shortage of PCARR and U1SAID en6ineers, inclement weather and short-term
 
These problems have since been resolved.
shortages of materials. 

2. Cu. ,,.itV Pr,zur ',at 
to two years against the Here ther.± ' ,c e ,,1',o dcl.y, amounLing of PCkrI' s and the s underestima1tiOnorigilal sch~IulL, de to AID' 
and steps involved 
wilh myriad details 
centers' capaCit, LO copu These problem. ran~ud 
under %I.) rutulations.with proc,,rmi..c 	 cent e r E-neccs-,ary for at researchrefcreace catalo:gfron lack of 	 PCAR1's unLamiliarity
and specification,idLlti f cationcol~nodity 	 betweun planning entities coordinationAni to inadequite 	 financedwith IfIB'h 	 all lo,,unearlyBudget. Nevertheless,of theand the %iini=try 	 and due to experiencein contractsbeen conrnittedha-, uov 	 willprOCurtMent 	 loan funded procure-mentthat fuLiruit i., believedgained, 
a m -nimufl of delay..
proceed with 

3. 	 Manpower Uev.lopl ent
 
with only minor modification of
 has proceededIn-counLtry trainling 	 converted to six M.S.voreFour Ph.D. slots the oLilglal schedule. 	 There will be11"2 scholais. 
slots, chIanlbing the total of 130 
to 
at the PACD since the academic 
a small nu:,,bcr ot scholars yet 	enrolled 

the PACD.
n ALCS 4 months afte±r year ter 
lag behind schedule for atotraining has continued 	 Ph.D.Internationil 	 identify qualifiedIt was not posbible to number of reasons. 	 by the end of thefor 3 year3that could be releasedcandidatLs 	 TBRD loan whiich was approvedanthe loan becaubeofsecond year 
earlier had provided the opportunitis 
necessary for available
 
Short-term and refresher type training 
has been
 
candidates. 	 approval and documentation by the lengthy nomination,restrained 	 inadequate COP-approved levels and theby the GOP process r 'qird 	 a number of
has discouraedwhichallowance\ of per diqem/livig 	 level below 
and which repiesents a from participantingcandidates 
that adequaLL to provide basic 	
needs.
 
Tech iicai4. 	 -
PCARR has been unable to take advantaged 
of this component because
 
trained and equipped staff have 
only recently been established as 
a
 
But no PCARR has been able to 	ini­of delays trintioned.result 
tiate consultancius for identified 
research areas and pro3ect
 
and completed before 
which should all be contracteaev;luatious 
the PACD.
 
V. Outputs 
The planned outputs for the 
project were: 
1. 

the COP agenc-y for developing,
 
e) Consolidation of PCARR as 

coordinating, prograniing and 
evaluating research policy 
and
 
programs.
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b) ,Ih fuu centers adequately staffed and equipped and 
ou, welt planned research programs.Larrying 
for PICARR in cooperation withc) All information system 
to researchersUPLB, SEA:t.CA and IRRI to provide timely access 

at the various cenLers.
 
output in related organiza­and quality ofd) Improved quantity 
such as other centers and training institutions.tions, 
Significant progress has been made in upgrading facilities and 
limited
 
returned

personnel from the four centers are in training and/or recently 
have initiated research programs in thefromu training. All centers 
them under the priorities established with their commodities assigned to 
participation (see lable 9). Development of those activities planned 
for the centers are nearly complete but it i. recognized that 
envisaged
 
staff gain
development will continue to evolve over several years as 

essential experience and additional needs are addressed.
 
Since its establishment in 1973, PCARR's Scientific Literature 
Service
 
(SLS) has expanded to service 30 libraries in the PCARR Research Station
 
as well as other
the SLb include A.,anNetwork. Journals provided by 
To further intensify scientific information dissemi­foreign editions. 

nation, PCARR has produced many publications and has conducted seminars, 
workshops and conferences utilizing books, journals and library 
the Loan Project which amountedprovided through
.,reproduction equipment 
to approximately $250,000.00 (see Table 8).
 
and coopi-

Research priorities have been established for other centers 

rating stations and research is underway (see Table (9). Staff from
 
other centers are receiving training, both in-service and 
in the academic
 
Working agreements have been developed with private sector
 
research units as well. Altogether, the quantity and quality of 
on­
pr_Jects have increasen as well as being focused 
upon
 
program. 

Sci- -escrc 

recognized that development of
 priority problems. However, it is 

experienced research personnel will require years and that the 
conduct
 
of replicated and duplicated field trials require several 
growing seaons
 
to obtain valid results. Although significant progress has been 
made,
 
time.
it would be premature to anticipate impact at this 

VI.* Purpose
VT. I 
Although progress towards EOPS cannot be concisely determined 
at this
 
time, there are indications of progress supporting the validity 
of
 
the project design. For example, in-service training for staff at
 
regional centers and cooperating stations in the preparation 
of
 
research proposals and statistical analysis of research data 
have
 
submit better rcscarch proposals as
 improved the ability of staff to 
well As to analyze agricultural results for improved reporting.
 
I4 
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efforts to mct regional and national The prioriLizing kt rebuarch 
and an e>panded and improvedLArcIh funding supportn,,ds, inctuarced re have all contributeds~rvice to regional centersscientific !iteraturc at otherthe target centers as well as to improving rLearcl, Lfforts at 

centers.
 
VII. Goal
 
also not pertinent at this time but a
 Evaluation of project goals is 

,'modest surplus has been achieved in the Philippines' 
rice production
 
some of these gains
 
and near self-sufficicticy in corn production 
and 

the direct result of research coming in part 
from
 
are recognized aq 

PCARR's efforts. An accelerated program 
of research on root crops is
 
underway, directed to food, feed and alcohol 
production. Many other
 
expanded effurts could be cite- but are properly 
left for a more in­
depth evaluation.
 
VIII. Beneficiaries
 
Experience in both developed and dewVloPing 
areas has demonstrated a
 
k significant lag time between research finoing6; 
and wide scale adop­
id terracing
\ tion by pLoducers, e.g., hybrid corn in the U.S. 12 yva:c; It would be extremeii pre­
and contour farming in the U.S. 18 years. 

mature to expect wide-spread devel)pment and acceptance 
of new
 
is widely
this stage. Nevertheless, it 
technology by small producers at 

acknowledged that new and improved technology 
is neither transferred
 
indigenous research capability.
 
or developed in the absence of an 

Efforts under this project are directed to developing 
that capability.
 
the necessary time and
 
There are good reasons to assume that givei a
 
other essential conditions (market incentives, 
credit, supplies), 

majority of the small Filipino producers, and in time 
consumers, will
 
ben e fit. 
IX. Unplanned Effects
 
at this time.
Not pertinent 

X. Lessons Learne
d fr,
 
1. 'Plan a realistic time frame for achieving 
research results and
 
It is irrational to
 
for development of research capabilities.
( 
anticipate any sinificant research findings 
in less than 5-10 
a well developed environment, there is usually
 
-years and even in 

-an 8-12 year lag time between initial research 
findings and a
 
* 
 It will likely take longer
 
:.significant impact at the farm level. 
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developing areas characterized by low educational levels
 
and limited co-municationpoorly developed marketing systems 

impact
networks to achieve 
2. Indigenous research capability cannot be developed more 
rapidly
 
Therefore, training
than the development of the research personnel. 

sbould be one of the first taska undertaken as both training 
and
 
experience are essential to research competency.
 
3L. Recognize that the AID procurentent regulations contain a 
myriad 
details aud that host-country implementing agencies will need 7 -of to move1-2 years to beco e familiar with them betore being able 
a year of additional 
a timely manner on procurement. Allow aboutin 
AID procurement.time for host-country procurement over direct 
and approval procedures are much2 '' 4. Recognize that the AID review 

believed and that the- time
 more time consuming than coatnsnly 
required is exponentially related to the number of offices 
involved
 
in the review and approval procedures. Every effort should 
be made
 
limit reviews and approvals to an absolute
 to minimize paper work, to 

minimum both within AID and the host-government, and to 
seek other
 
avoid unnecessary costs 
measures to streamline the system in order to 

resulting from non-productive delays.
 
the host­for international training unless5. Eliminate loan funding 
government can presenc a system that provides adequate subsistence
 
levels for participants. 
be used for support ofloan funds can6. Provide a procedure whereby 
critical research studies in the developing country on 
an ad hoc
 
basis. 
Project officer should maintain contact with budget/financial
7. 

personnel of host-country implementing agency through his 
counter-

Contacts
 
partto identify potential counterpart funding problems. 

the budget request preparation periode- !=s ortent during 
and again durxng period of finalising the work and financial 
plans.
 
XI. Special Comments
 
program management implications atorThere are no significant policy 

this time.
 
The following are titles of relevant Tables attached:
 
Plan (Thousand Pesos)Per ImplementationTable 2. Fund Requirement 
Overall Accomplishment of the Infrastructure Project.
Table 3. 

Comparison of Loan I In-Country Manpower Development
Table 4. 

Program Against Actual Implementation.
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Table 5. 

Table 6. 

Table 7. 

Table 8. 

Table 9. 

Comparison of Loan I International Manpower Development
 
Program Against Actual Implementation.
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Suntiry of Research Proposals Submitted to PCARR
 
Evaluation Mechanism (1972-78) by PCARR Divisions
 
PCARR's Major Publications (As of 1978)
 
Research Responsibilities of Loan Assisted Research
 
Centers.
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F. Purpose: "This report is an end-of-project review to evaluate project
 
accomplishments and failures relative to stated goal, purpose, and expected
 
outputs of the project as per the project design summary (logical framework).
 
In addition, suggestions are made regarding methods for evaluating USAID 
projects. Finally, suggestions are made for USAID support for future aquaculture 
projects in the Philippines." .. 
1. SUIMARY 
The AcLuaculture Production Project (APP) was undertaken by the Government 
of the Philippines (GRP) with assistance from the United States Agency for Inter­
national Development (USAID). It was initiated July 1, 1974, and terminaLed Sep­
tember 30, 1978. The APP was a follow-up to the Inland Fisheries Project (IFP) 
that started in 1971 and ended in 1974. All told, a total of 27 participants

received training (see Appendix B). When the project is considered in whole from
 
1971 to 1978, and when all factors are considered, the project was highly suc­
cessful, and the GRP and USAID should be commended.
 
The physical plants of both the Freshwater Aquaculture Center (FAC) and 
Brackish Water Aquaculture Center (BAC) are excellent. Major problems at the 
BAC such as a poor access road and bridge, lack of potable water, and the neces­
sity to generate electricity at the station are in the past. A consid.rable
 
amount of effort was needed in developing both facilities, and progress in re­
search was somewhat curtailed initially. With facilities at both FAC and BAC now
 
virtually finished research should progress as planned.
 
The personnel at both FAC and BAC are very capable, highly motivated, and
 
are doing a commendable job in research. Their salaries are still low but are
 
now competitive with their peers in certain other organizations. A major con­
cern is that staff at both FAC and BAC are overloaded and that they are spread­
ing themselves too thin. Additional staff should gradually be added.
 
It should be emphasized that research should be continued to meet the
 
needs of the fish farmer and increase the nutrition of the poor. There may at
 
times be a tendency for research to follow the interests of an individual. For
 
the most part, however, research is definitely on target. Exanmples are rice/fish

and survival of milkfish fry. Publications and extension bulletins have been 
produced that are filling a real need; the importance of publication, especially

extension bulletins, cannot be overemphasized. Important data must continue to
 
be published and not be lost in annual reports.
 
Funding of both FAC and BAC is on solid ground. Both Centers, because of 
their good reputations, are attracting grant funds from other organizations such 
as PCARR, ICLARM and SEAFDEC. The BAC has a semi-autonomous budget fr1,m the Uni­
versity of the Philippines (UP). Support of the FAC by Central Luzon State Uni­
versity (CLSU) is good. The NSDB, which has given grant funds to FAC and BAC, is 
now also giving institutional (block) funding. 
Graduate training has been a very productive spin-off from the APP. The 
CLSU College of Inland Fisheries was founded in 1976. FAC staff teach the 
courses. It offers graduate training in fisheries/aquaculture. The UPCF insti­
tuted a graduate program in November 1974 with BAC/SEAFDEC staff as teachers. 
Training sessions held by FAC, BAC, and BFAR have been frequevt, varied in 
subject matter, and have served the needs of a wide range of people, particu­
larly farmers. 
1 
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Extension has progressed in Regions V and ;I. Extension workers are moti­
vated and have good rapport with cooperators and farmers. Fish farmers inter­
viewed spoke very highly of the extension workers and were most happy with re­
sults in their ponds. A major problem listed by farmers is a lack of finger­
lings for stocking. Other problems are shortages of fertilizer and financing.
Extension workers list lack of adequate transportation as their major problem.

BFAR plans to assist extension workers to obtain motor bikes. There are good

research/extension linkages at the regional level but stronger and formal link­
ages are needed at the national level.
 
The educational background of extension workers varies considerably. Ex­
tension workers are not always well qualified and have received their training

from various places. They do, however, take refresher courses as new technology
 
develops. The Freshwater Fisheries Development Project, which has training as
 
a major element, should help greatly to upgrade competence.
 
The BFAR plans to use the model of extension in Regions V and VI for ex­
pansion of its extension program of the other eleven regions. It is suggested

that extension be expanded to one region at a time rather than all regions at 
once because of the high cost and shortages of resources. Extension programs
 
now exist in the regions but at a low level.
 
Proj ect Accomplishments
 
According to the logical framework in the APP project paper the project

accomplished only part of its stated goals. There are two reasons for this.-

First, current data were nor available on which to make an adequate judgment.

In come cases 1976 data were the latest available. Therefore, it is suggested

that final analysis of the log frame with future projects be postponed until
 
data are available. Since the log frame is objective in nature, final evalua­
tion of it could be made by USAID personnel. Second, it is assumed that new
 
technology would move quickly to the farmer level. This did not occur because 
much of the new technology was generated only two years ago. This period of,
 
time is not long enough for new technology to move from researcher to farmer.
 
In future studies it is suggested that evaluation of new technology be made_at
 
the cooperator level. Such evaluation should be a good indicator of the accep­
tance of new technoogy and whether or not it is successful. In our evaluation
 
of the APP, we relied on interviews with a few cooperators to make an assess­
ment.
 
While the goal and purpose were difficult to assess in the log frame, out­
puts and inputs were not. Generally, they were met as outlined in the log
 
frame.
 
Transferability of techniques and procedures from the APP is possible to
 
other developing countries. However, the sequence of the project components

and the intensity of each effort must be studied carefully for each country.

For example, if available technology exceeds application, then the extension 
component might be given first priority or vice versa. 
The GRP through BFAR should continue to play the leadership role in ad­
ministration of fisheries. Extension techniques learned from the pilot studies
 
in Regions V and VI are programmed by BFAR in the other regions. It is 
3
 
suggested that other regions receive strengthened extension cervices one at a 
time to have the most impact. It is doubtful that BFAR has the funds and exten­
sion workers to begin full-fledged extension programs in the other eleven
 
regions at once. 
BFAR should make every effort to improve research/extension linkage at the 
national level. This linkage seems adequate at the regional level.
 
USAID correctly assessed that rack of fry and extension workers trained
 
in hatchery management are major limiting factors in rice/fish culture and
 
aquaculture in general. The Fisheries Sector Study fo- the Philippines (1977)
 
documents this in detail. The Freshwater Fisheries Development Project is most
 
timely and its implementation is highly recommended. 
USAID's involvement in an artisan fisheries (municipal fisheries), with 
elements of mariculture, is a'-o recommended. The GRP has emphasized time and 
time again its desire to help the artisan fisherman. 
41/
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMENDATIONS
 
A. Overall Evaluation of Project
 
The project was a definite success. High output and achievement were ob­
tained t e to AID fun-ding. G8l7"oEputs have greatly increased during the
last two years. This can best be shown by additional inputs of money into the
 
overall project, exemplified by the increased NSDB funding.
 
The GRP has demonstrated its support inmany other ways. Examples include
 
recognition of the FAC and BAC as the national centers for freshwater aquaculture

and brackishwater aquaculture, respectively. The Presidential Decree 704 further
 
strengthened the government's role in fisheries. 
One component of the decree
 
placed extension as the responsibility of BFAR.
 
The project has several very desirable spinoffs not programmed in the
 
PROP. Among them were the formation of the College of Fisheries at CLSU and
 
the graduate training program of the UPCF at BAC. 
 Both programs were due to
 
the vision of the FAC, BAC, UP, and others. This graduate-level training will
help to provide badly needed personnel for fisheries/aquaculture in the
 
Philippines.
 
Further interest in fisheries began--the formation of other fisheries/

aquaculture programs such as SEAFDEC and ICLARM. 
Most important is the linkage

established betweeai 4he FAC and ICLARM and the BAC and SEAFDEC. 
ICLARM ispro­
viding major funding for FAC in cooperative research in agro-aquaculture (i.e.,

pig/fish and duck/fish). SEAFDEC likewise has a 
major input of funds to the
 
graduate training program involving BAC and SEAFDEC staff.
 
Both FAC and BAC are well staffed, and the staff are well qualified and

motivated to produce effective mission-oriented work. The only concern is that

the staff may be overworked. Originally FAC and BAC staff were concerned mainly

with research. Concomitant with this duty was the time expended in facility

development. 
It is suggested that as the reasearch and graduate-trainirg pro­
grams expand additional staff will be required.
 
Facilities of both FAC and BAC are truly excellent and virtually completed.

It is suggested that emphasis be placed on utilization and maintenance of exist­ing facilities. With completion of facilities, research outputs should increase
 
significantly.
 
Research is being conducted that is germane to the APP-to increase nutri­tio-a of the poor. It cannot be overemphasized, however, that a strong research/

extension linkage must exist for this to be accomplished.
 
Research and extension personnel inrcraction and coordination at the

worker's level is satisfactory. This can be increased by formalizing the coor­dination at the central administratl-in (Manila) level and at the Zield level.
 
Research proposals should not only be reviewed by professional peers but also
by the extension staff with responsibilities that relate to the particular re­
search effort. 
This could be achieved by a rather specific memo of agreement at

the agency level and by establishment of a program review committee.
 
24 
Major limiting factors affecting the economic growth of the fish farmers
are: 
1) inadequate financing, 2) supplies of fingerlings for stocking, 3) sup­plies of fertilizer and other materials, and 4)
access to available technology.
 
The planned GRP/USAID follow-up Freshwater Fisheries Development Project
focuses upon the major limiting factors and should be very effective in gaining
application of the available technology which can result inwidespread oppor­tunities by fish farmers for increased profits and better family nutrition. The
Freshwater Fisheries Development Project iswell conceived; application is
feasible and all contacts with extension staffs in the pilot regions indicate
strong support for the planned follow-up effort.
 
The APP included a strong extension dimension that was to be implemented
after establishment of the research center. 
Thus, the extension function really
became functional only in 1976. 

the extension function are sound. 
The basic concepts and program directions of
The fact that the extension function is in
one agency (BFAR) and its research base (BAC and FAC) is in another organization
will demand continued attention toward effective coordination.
 
It is difficult to determine the number of exLension workers that are
needed in a given region; it seems, however, that program effectiveness is
presently more limited by opportunities for adequate training of extension
workers and by limited mobility of extension workers than by the number of ex­tention workers. 
Attention should be given to more intensive, practical train­ing of extension workers. 
The morale, dedication and enthusiasm and attitude
of each extension worker contactcd was very high and is certainly commendable.
There has been less than one percent ,nnual turnover in the extension staff. 
A
promotion system or career ladder is in place.
 
Extension activities at the BAC and FAC should be encouraged but limited
to "on-site" training activities for extension workers and farmers. 
However,
research scientists should be encouraged to travel and participate in BFAR co­ordinated farmer and extension worker training efforts. 
Research scientists
should be encouraged to author and co-author (with extension specialists) exten­sion publications. 
Writing of such publications should be viewed as "publica­tions" and be equal to journal articles in staff evaluation.
 
No attempt to duplicate extansion efforts carried out by BFAR should be
attempted by the BAC and FAC or SEAFDEC.
 
Extension specialists should be actively involved in applied research
when possible and should coordinate effective field .esting efforts in the
various regions with the scientists at the RAC and the FAC.
 
The extension publications available atkinds and number this date are well written butare very limited because of budget constra .nts.tion on milkfish culture is The publica­out of print and it is not being reprinted pres­ently because of costs.
 
Considerations for giving publication a
seems appropriate. higher priority in the budget
The one published extension newsletter iswell done and
useful. 
Two more have been written but have not been printed as of this date.
Support for publication could be met by simple low-cost outline type production
guidelines. This publication need should be addressed in the new Freshwater
Fisheries Development Project.
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There is considerable variation in regional climatic and production con­ditions in the Philippines. Extension specialists and workers should be encour­aged to do effective and thorough field verification of research data produced
in the centers and elsewhere. 
Minimum public facilities or adequately con­trolled private cooperator facilities will be needed to achieve such research
 
verifications.
 
Documentation and reporting of extension activities are adequate. 
A pro­gram for evaluating the effectivenese of extension activities is needed. 
Methods
for effective evaluation of regional and national extension efforts should also be
 
given priority.
 
Equipment for water analyses, for use by extension workers, is limited and

needs prompt attention.
 
Many of the supplies and vehicles supplied by USAID were reported to be in
poor condition when received and maintenance costs have been excessive.
 
Emphasis on adequate training of extension workers before deployment in the
field should be continued. A structured plan for such training should be devel­oped and adhered to. 
To date some workers have received only 10 days with others
receiving ns much as 30 days. 
 The teaching outlines that have been proposed for
training sessions seem well designed and adequate.
 
B. Suggested Methods for Improving
 
the Project Evaluation Process
l. Strict interpretation of successful project completion with res
 
to the variable indicators was not possible in 
some instances because of the
 lack of available data.
 
2. Final evaluation of the APP log frame output could be made by AID and
GEP officials when data are available and added as a supplement to final reports.
 
3. Firm scheduling of a review team far enough in advance to allow for
v total of 3 weeks time for travel, information gathering and report writing Is
 
needed.
 
4. Agencies should continue to gather pertinent needed information and
reports in advance of team arrival. 
5. The time it takes for new technology to go from researcher to exten­sion worker to cooperator to farmer is probably much longer than most people
realize. 
It may take ten or more years before new technology is practiced by
farmers. 
It is suggested that increased production in kg/ha and other tangible

evidence be evaluated at the cooperator level. 
This then will be a good indi­cator of whether or not new technology is successful. Further, reliable data /will be much easier to obtain when compared at the ceperator level. Long-termevaluation of a 
project could be made at the farmer/consumer level after the 
 V
project has had sufficient time to function.
 
I 
26 
C. Transferability of Techniques and Procedures
 
of the APP to Other Developing Countries
 
1. 'Themodel of the APP focused upon development of (a)research capa­bilities, (b)manpower training, (c)extension programs, and (d)administrative
 
support..
 
2. In the Philippines, the APP appropriately placed initial emphasis onthe development of the research capability and on manpower development.. This -­was followed by implementation of the extension component.
 
3. Application of the APP procedures and components should be applicable
to most developing countries with fisheries and aquaculture potential. However,
the sequence of the project components and the intensity of each effort must be
studied carefully in each country. 
For example, if available technologf exceeds

,pplication, then the extension component might be given first priority, or
vice versa. Effective administrative support will always be a key to effective
implementation of project components.
 
In the transfer of APP procedures to other countries, ample initial studies
should be made with the people to be affected (current and potential fish
farmers) in order to determine problems, identify priorities, and establish the
sequence of emphasis for establishing the desired components of a development

project.
 
D. 	GRP's Continued Effort/Direction
 
in Aquaculture
 
The GRP's role in aquaculture has good focus. Particularly evident is

continued support of FAC and BAC.
 
BFAR is the designated agency to administer fisheries programs in the GRPo
Its role in extension is a particularly important one. 
Gradual expansion of
extension programs in other regions (besides Regions V and VI) is
now a part 	of
BFAR's plan. It is doubtful that full-fledged extension programs can begin Inall regions at once. 
It is suggested that strengthening of extension be done to
 one region at a time to more fully utilize available resources (funds, person­
nel, etc.).
 
BFAR should continue to play a leadership role, melding together all as­pects of fisheries, particularly research/extension linkage.
 
USAID has correctly assessed that the lack of fry and inadequately
trained extension workers are the most important limiting factors for providing
the needs of freshwater fisheries development. The follow-up GRP/USAID Fresh­
water Fisheries Development Project should alleviate these major obstacles.
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E. USAID's Future Role in Aquaculture
 
in the Philippines
 
The proposed follow-up Freshwater Fisheries Development Project focuses
 
upon two of the major existing problems in aquaculture and should be Imple­
mented.
 
The presently conceived outputs of the new Freshwater Fisheries Develop­
ment Project are achievable under the GRP and USAID operational framework. The
 
basic output will be (1) a strengthened and expanded freshwater fish fry produc­
tion and distribution system, (2) a strengthened and expanded extension effort
 
in the target region (Central Luzon), (3) stronger research-extension coordina­
tion, and (4) a coordinated freshwater fisheries production and marketing infor­
mation collection and distribution system.
 
USAID should keep abreast of problems and opportunities to help the most
 
disadvantaged fish farmer or segments of the aquculture industry. 
Specific

examples in which USAID assistance may be needed include: 
 (1) milkfish fry col­lection and survival; (2) clam, oyster and mussel culture; (3) tilapia produc­
tion; and (4) acid soil problems in brackish water fishponds.
 
Another area defined again and again by the GRP as a major interest is
 
the artisan fisheries (municipal fisheries). The interest of the GRP in artisan
 
fisheries is well documented in the 1977 report, "The Philippines: Fisheries
 
Sector Study." It is suggested that USAID consider support to artisan (munici­
pal) fisheries, especially with elements of mariculture.
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THE INTEGRATED AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION
 
AND MARKETING PROJECT (IAPMP)
 
Introduction
 
This is an evaluation report on the Integrated Agricultural
 
Production and Marketing Project (IAPMP) of the Republic of the
 
Philippines. 
Launched in 1977-78, the Project is expected to rim for
 
a total of five years. It is funded jointly by the United States Agency
 
kor tntetfiational Development (USAID), ihrodgh grant and loan funds, and
 
the Government of the Republic A 
 he hili~pries (G"u). The Xansas
 
State University serves as a contractor to assist in the implementation
 
of the Project.
 
Recently, a number of American and Filipino consultants was asked
 
by the GRP to serve as a Team to evaluate the IAPMY, essentially to
 
assess overall progress and to see whether opportunities exist for
 
improvement during the remainder of the life of :he Project.
 
The Evaluation Team members were as folltw
 
Dr. Fernando A. Bernardo
 
President, Visayas State College of Agriculture
 
Dr. Gelia T. Castillo
 
Professor, Rural Sociology
 
University of the Philippines at Los Bafios
 
*Dr. James W. Cobble
 
Dean Emeritus, Resource Development
 
University of Rhode Island
 
*Dr. Jose D. Drilon, Jr.
 
Director General, Philippine Council for Agriculture
 
and Resources Research
 
Dr. Lehman B. Fletcher
 
Professor, Economics
 
Iowa State University
 
Mr. Manuel Lim
 
President, JVA Manapement Corporation
 
Mr. Howard Ream
 
Professor, Agronomy
 
Univ-.sity of Wisconsin
 
Mr. William J. Wren
 
USAID, Washington
 
*Co-Chairman
 
Although behavioral and personality problems were perceived, the
 
Team concentrated its attention on program dimensions. 
This was its
 
interpretation of its mandate. 
Moreover, the team recognized that any
 
organization tasked to implement complex a program as IAPM.P is bound to
 
have behe',ioral and personality problems and that such problems are
 
better resolved or minimized internally as the organization proceeds
 
with implementation.
 
The team first attempted to understand IAPMP in order to obtain a
 
reading of legitimate project expectations. 
It then appraised the
 
progress and the problems, made observations and formulated recommenda­
tions.
 
For these purposes, the team was furnished by the IAPM Project
 
staff with ample documents. The information derived from these was
 
supplemented by interviews conducted at the Ministry of Agriculture, the 
Central Luzon State University and its project area, and the University 
of the Philippines at Los Baflos. (A list of persons interviewed 
appears in Annex A.)
 
Considering the time available to it (roughly 2-1/2 weeks), the 
Team limited itself to the examination of four area: 
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1. Policy Thrust,
 
2. Technological Packaging and Extension Thrusts,
 
.- Academic Thrust, and
 
4. Overall Project Management.
 
This report partly reflects this approach. Initially, it pre­
sents comments on the project design--the project concept, components$
 
linkages and objectives. 
 It then proceeds briefly to offer observations
 
and recommendations which are grouped into (1) observations and recommen­
dations relative to the project thrusts and (2) observations and recom­
mendations which cut across all thrusts.
 
On March 15, 1979, the team verbally reported to the IAPM Project
 
staff, USAID officers and Minister Arturo R. Tanco, Jr. of the
 
Philippines. 
The exchange of information and ideas which resulted,
 
contributed additional perspectives which have been included in this
 
report.
 
EXECUTIVE SM-ARY AMD RECOMMENDATIONS 
The team concluded that the original design of the project is
 
still highly relevant to the present state of agricultural development
 
in the Philippines and that if it is successfully implemented, the
 
project cen make an important contribution to the institutionalization
 
of a complex system which is designed to improve the lot of the
 
country's small farmers.
 
Although init.al delays were encountered and project implementa­
tion is therefore slightly behind schedule, good progress is now being
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made in all of the four "thrust" areas (national policy, academic, tech
 
pack, and extension/outreach). 
 It was noted that there had been some
 
tendency on the part of the various thrusts to pursue their programs
 
more or less independently. The team sees an urgent need for even much
 
more time and attention to the integration of and coordination among the
 
thrusts. However, the team iecognizes the benefits, on the whole, that
 
accrue to the project from having the Overali Project Coordinator also
 
performing other important jobs in the Ministry of Agriculture. The
 
latter provides him a strategic leadership position, administrative
 
access to and communication linkage with relevant cooperating agencies
 
and institutions. In view of these advantages, the team recommends that
 
he be relieved of responsibilities which are unrelated or marginal to
 
IAPM Project so that greater attention could be focused on the overall
 
implementation and integration of the Project.
 
Initial delays in the staffing of the Kansas State University
 
(KSU) contract have now been overcome. The evaluation team hopes that
 
KSU will be able to provide a suitably-qualified replacement for the
 
current team leader, whose tour of duty will be over this coming
 
August, and that no hiatus in project activity will be permitted to
 
develop.
 
A summary of the team's detailed recommendations follows.
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RECOMMendATIONS
 
NATIONAL POLICY TPRUST
 
1. 
 Crystallize the plans for institutionalizing a two-pronged policy
 
development system both for short-term crisis management and for
 
long.-tetm policy research needs.
 
2. 	 Identify the indicators which will be used to evaluate progress
 
towards that system.
 
3. 	 Define total sector data needs for Oolicy and program formulation.
 
4. 
 Develop a staff development program for the information sub-system.
 
ACADEMIC THRUST
 
1. 	 Review the need for developing separate curricula for master and
 
bachelor degrees.in "Food Systems" as against "Food Systems"
 
simply 	being major fields in existing degree programs.
 
2. 
 Seek 	inputs from private agribusiness and cooperatives (the target­
ted job marketb) in curricula development.
 
3. 	 Decrease target output of HS Ag Econ graduates with major in
 
agricultural marketing from 50 to 30.
 
4. 	 Increase target output of ES Ag with major in marketing from 25
 
to 35/40.
 
5. 
 Expand thrust to include training of extension students and agents
 
in technological packaging.
 
6. 	 Where possible, training at the MS leval should be done at UPLB or
 
any other university in the country.
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7. Where possible, training at the Ph. D. level should be done at
 
the UPLB or any other university in the country, but with an
 
opportunity to take a year of course work abroad, credited towards
 
the Ph. 	D. degtee, to minimize inbreeding.
 
8. 	 Increase time allotment for international training to 16 months
 
for ELS and 36 months for Ph. D.
 
9. 
 Increase stipend from $300 to $700 per month for post-doctoral
 
fellowships abroad, reducing number of slots if necessary.
 
10. 
 Inventory current and proposed in-country degree and non-degree
 
training programs of UPLB, CLSU, BAEcon, BAEx and others, and 
check the fit of these programs within the objectives and activi­
ties of IAPMiP. 
11. 	 Consider in-cc - short-training programs involving local and 
foreign trainors in lieu of some foreign fellowship slots. 
12. 	 Encourage and support field trips, observation tours and first­
hand exposure to places and projects in-country, which will pro­
vide experiences relevant to IAPM Project purposes.
 
TECHNOLOGICAL PACKAGE THRUST 
1. 	 Activate the tech pack advisory committee to provide overall 
policy and technical guidance. 
2. 	 Examine once again the conceptualization and oper4ting plan for 
the Food & Feed/Grains Processing Center in the conte-t of 
IAPHP's objectives and CLSU'U expected capabilities and plans 
for the future.
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3. 	 Determine soon the future consultant needs for CLSU in view of
 
the forthcoming completion of the incumbents
 t tour 	of duty.
 
4. 	 Review the feasibility of the proposal for students' cooperatives'
 
to operate the university farm and processing center, and study
 
alternative approaches.
 
5. 	 Consider other sources of technologies suitable for the four (4)
 
pilot areas of BAEx and relate these to the work going on at
 
CLSU.
 
6. 	 Include in the technology packaging some technologies suiLable
 
for subsistence purposes as a cushion for the small farmer against
 
market failure.
 
7. 	 Strengthen the integrative aspects or linkages among production,
 
processing, and marketing in any tech pack.
 
8. 	 Instead of the term tech pack, adopt the term technology packaging
 
to emphasize the process rather than the comdity.
 
.XTENSION/OUTREACH THRUST
 
1. 	 Appoint a specific coordinator for the entire thrust.
 
2. 	 Concentitalize and operationalize as one thrust, the sub-project 
activ-'ties of the extension delivery system, the agribusiness and 
market assistance centers and cooperatives development which are
 
now being pursued independently of each other.
 
3. 	 Expand the Extension Delivery Systems Committee to include re­
presentatives from the Academic and Tech Pack Thrusts and from 
KSU. 
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4. 	 Consider greater functional fusion of the Tech Pack and Extension/
 
Outreach Thrusts with respect to identification, development and
 
pilot tcsting of potential technologies.
 
5. 	 Develop staffing pattern for both thrusts particularly for the
 
operating manpower of the food, feed and grain processing center.
 
OVERALL
 
Planning 
1. 	 In a host country contract, a different pattern and quality of re­
lationship among AID, KSU and GRP has to be developed. This would 
require on the part of the contractor, an acute cross-cultural
 
sensitivity and co.scious seeking of opportunities to play their
 
technical assistance role in a more imaginative manner. Given 
this 	new era in the host country-contractor relationship, all
 
parties must face up to these new demands. Since the term of the 
KSU Team Leader is to expire in August, the search for and re­
cruitment of the 	next KSU Team Leader has to be initiated immediately 
with these above considerations in mind. The leader has to take an
 
active professional and progra~matic role. Likewise, the consul­
tants 	where applicabliB, could be more effective if they towere 
take greater initiative in the exercise of their technical ex­
pertise role.
 
2. 	 Where it would be advantageous to do so, IAPMP should tie in with
 
PCARR, 	 and other projects such as the National Extension, Aqua­
culture Productior/Fisheries Development, Small Farmers' Irriga­
tion, etc., for reasons of possible input from or output through 
them. 
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3. 	 Build in a regular feedback vechanism from small farmers to the
 
institution and agencies within Tech Pack, Extension/Outreach
 
and Academic Thrusts.
 
.4. 	 Develop a monitoring and evaluation scheme which will identify
 
and 	define suitable indicators and appropriate methodology to
 
measure progress at the impact level.
 
5. 	 Review support operations in the spirit of giving maximum support
 
from available peso and dollar resources to project implementation.
 
6. 	 For an early spin-off, consider the possibility of replicating
 
IAP14P at the regional level utilizing regional universities as a
 
base.
 
ORGANIZATION AND STAFFING
 
1. 	 Make appropriate arrangements in order that the Overall Project 
Coordinator may devote more time not only to provide leadership 
for project implementation but also to strengthen organizational 
and functional linkages. 
2. 	 Reorganize the Executive Committee on two levels:
 
a. 	Retaining the present structure to discuss project policies,
 
meeting quarterly or as the need arises;
 
b. 	Creating a working group of task forces to tackle operating
 
problems, meeting at least monthly.
 
3. 	 Analyze the functions of all committees in the project to identify 
unnecessary overlaps. 
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4. 	 Hire a capable Filipino administrative officer for the KSU
 
Office to take care of the tedious, but essential complexities of
 
administrative details, in order to permit the Team Leader and
 
his assistant to assume a more active professional leadership
 
role.
 
5. 	 Hire additions to the 14A Management Staff with expertise in fruits
 
and vegetables, cereals and other crops.
 
DIRECTION AND CONTROL
 
1. 	 Solve whatever problems remain so that KSU can establish formal
 
relationships with other US universities to augment the scope and
 
quality of expertise available for long-term and short-term consul­
tant positions.
 
2. 	 Do whatever is necessary to 
facilitate placement of participants
 
sent for graduate training at a variety of US institutions.
 
3. 	 Settle all questions of costs (direct and indirect) between KSU
 
and GRP, with appropriate AID concurrence, on a business-like
 
basis.
 
4. 	 All parties involved in the IAPMP should now concentrate their 
energies on working together in a professional collaborative
 
manner to achieve the success of the project to which all are
 
committed.
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G. Hickey, ASIA/TR/SHRD/AID/WMr. Richard Kriegel, Rural Development Officer, USAID, Colombo
Mr. Charles H. Antholt, Agricultural Development Officer, USAID, Colombo
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REVIEW TEAM:
 
Dr. C.R. Panabokke, Deputy Director Research and Project Director
 
Mr. A.S.Ranatunge, Senior Research and Training Officer, Agrarian Research and Training
 
Institute .... .
 
Mr. M. Jayapalan, Deputy Director, Ministry of Agricultural Development and Research
 
Dr. Marcos R.-Vega, Deputy Director General, IRRI
 
Dr*. J. Ritchie Cowan, Regional 'iaison Scientist, IRRI
 
Dr. Walter L. Griffeth, IRRI Field Trials Specialist
 
Mr. James E. Wimberly, IRRI Team Leader
 
Dr. Wayne H. Freeman, IADS, Nepal and Chaiman of Review Team
 
7. Suu-aary and Recn -.,tJd,aLions 
A. Summary: 
The review team met from 21 to 25 may for the purpose of reviewingthe pro3ect on Picc Research of the Departm.nent of Agriculture,finanued by USJ;D unde.r loan No. 383-T-O16 and implemented by IRRIthrough an agreemcnt be-ween GSL and the Internetional Rice researchInstitute. The projE_:t his completed 2 years of a 5 yoar period.Thu rtview team was recraerted to review t-he work that had beenunderw~ay daring this erlod; assess the progress made: modificationsthat that m'ight be needed to -uhieve cbjectivv-s; and consider new
direct icn that right kc '.ur-ue-d in order to =re rapidly or more
 
effectively increast 
 rice 
-oductlon in Sri Lanka. 
,The tea.m strongly end.-r3- the r-coject and proposed that the project
be continued ess(.ntial]v in 
 its l.resent sccpe. Deficiencies anddelays in implementation of the project were recognized especially
in technical assistance to the zeld Trialsprogram, degree training,staof recruitment, and equipment procurement. Appropriate corre&ioisf ne ac16-b-,ai5 appoint:Ttfd--Xv-e 6 - and it would appearachievem"xent of project objectJve. can be realized. The teamconsid-red the various inputs to the project and suggested that some
minor rrdiflcatics ipau.I b d~sirable In techr.ical assistance,
trai.ng and co:=zditier. Thesa modifications would need to be
reflected in allocating fur..s for the remninder of the project period. 
The team feels that. the project has made substantial progress in RiceResearch. The problems farmers have had with insects like brown planthopper require the development of varieties with built-in plantprotection to these insects. 
The team observed materials in thefinal stages of testing that would offer farmers an opportunIty toreduce costs of insect controL. by combining insect resistance with 
other pest control measures.
 
The Resource Capability Survey program has made sbstantial andsignificant progress in developing land characterizations that will
enable the varietal ir4rovement group to more effectively tailor
varieties to fit specific conditions, by utilizing these
classifications in the process of varietal identification. Suchclassifications will also be useful to the Cropping Systems research
team as they conduct research in farmers' 
 fields to identify newpatterns to Increase production through new crops and greater croppingintensity. The system will be of tremendous assistance to theextension personnel as they can relate recommendations to the
capabilities of a farmer's lands. 
Cropping Systems research on rice-based cropping systems has made anexcellent bEginning in gen'rating information which could be of valueIn increasing cropping intensity by the introduction of new crops 
in croppln7 pttzr.ns or b., Jnc-re,.qirj prcctzrtian of existir.patterns. Coz stiainrts to prru,.action have born reported hick torescar-h stnt ionr wh'.rb rroblen-oriented research can seek sC!utionsto these prcklm.s. Wh,_evex pas3iie the Cropping Systcms program
as. well a-- extv...sjo should 
be us" as a priza-y rescurce Inidentifying the ;,-nos of ,,arletiesneeded. 
The tt-az recognizoa a. necd to ln.olve rural socio]ogists and
econc.xists in lientifying cor,:,:,.ints to rce pro3uction and the
e loltation of new Lropping systems. 
Meenb to imnleLent these
studles shr.uld be eyplored anO lir&Yages with '!RI's network on a'ro­
ecewv-mic rer~arch slsuld 
be znle. 
Decentrallzation 
-:f Field Tri:l a-!:-..Ln, th-.z to rtgioi,a stations
"-'-s to relate 
-uch triels to r-r: location-rpe,-ic1.c nvironw-Lts in thepi'.-ess of identifyrni varletirs for fa r..rs' '..e. These triels form animpo rtat omponent i.n thc evalaticn prnzess for the i 1-T.~fica+on ofvar-ctic and c-.cicn parA-aaz- of practices tD e'.plolt thclr jctential.
Lacy of c'Jffclent staffing of 
-stafor the pro
.s.foteprJectia:'tor ro slou the research effort of the project. This has -entrue of rer.cdent ;.ecialists tz be supplied by ".have bmen1*.RI as wcl! ar ]oalstaff where suituble r:rsminel could not he 1deitift d for a n'=bero: po .rt ane lccarions. Nevertheless, the re,.tarch program asconceptualized has maude S-: ifcant pr.gress it. impleenring the urrkplans developed for the fcur zerarch areas. A proprlnte expanrion incta.fing s.hr uld be n~de to provide for a conceitr,,teei breceding effortin the Lartern ritc. gzwaln. region and _a better balance to th program
 
at Maha Illuppallama.
 
The technical asfiitaun-ce for Rice Research as projected for thr balanceof the contract should be continued as originally planned. Techn-calassistance to the'Field Trials program should be extended for 36 person
months which will require an extension of 12 person months 
 for this 
position.
 
Procurement of commodities have been delayed for various reasons,
but the team was gratified to note that most of 
the funds availablehad been committed and orders placed for the equipment. 
The long term training component has been slow to be implemented andconsideration needs to be made to possibly extend the period in orderto fit the long term training into the contract period. 
The tear views with sympathy the question of rapport to dependentsto enable them to a-company staff memhers on long term study programs.USAID should seriously considesr moans of providing support for this 
purpose. 
Short term training is well on schedule and even more funds couldbe utilized in this activity. 
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The team visited research stations at Bomb',wcla, Eatala-v3D, aha 
Illuppallezr and the C.-rxal Agricultural ke4rearch Institute at 
Peradeniya. The team obzczved Field Trials plots 'in the wet zonednd had an opportunity tu be briefEd on land classifications as we 
travelled from one plare to another. 
The team was briefed by staff at the various locations and at Maha
IllupAllam they had an opportunity to get repoits from the site 
coordinators from the cropping systems sites. 
r..ortant discussions were held with the Director cf Agriculture,
Mr. Earl JayasE&,erk, on May 24 regarling project a..Ltivites and 
achievements related to projects and programs of 	the Department of 
Agriculture.
 
'B fecomr-ndat ions: 
From these observations, discussions and study of reports .provided
to the team, the team has r.ade the following reconendations. 
1. 	 A closer linkage between breeders and the regional adaptivetrials agronomists s.ould be developed and the li:es of 
operation and resronsibility clearly dcfJred in order to 
identify varieties for unztable environ=-ntz of bog soils, 
half bog soils, ranfed chena and rainfed uplands. 
2. 	 In order to in6rease the effectiveness of the vdrietal 
improvement team, pr3vision stould be made to provide
adequate and appropriate facilities at CWRI for mass rearing 
of gall midge. 
3. Because of the great potential for increasing rice production
in the dry zone through improved agronomic crop management,
the department should Intensify Its research efforts b-y the 
Identification of strong leaders and new additional personnel
in agronomic research. More agronomic assistance is neededin the varietal Improvement program. A stronger agronecic 
program is needed to better utilize and maximize the efforts 
of the varietal Improvement program. 
4. 	 The Field Trials program is an Integral part of the process

of developing recommended practices for the use of new
 
varieties on specific land elements as Identified by the
 
Reeource Capability Survey. To more effectively utilize
 
these trials It is recommended that the policy decisions
 
taken in August 1918 should be implemented to make Field
 
'Trials 	the zes, nsibility of each regional station on a
 
phased basis beginning with Sombuwela, Batalagoda, Naha
 
Illuppallama and CARI 
 in the Maha season 1979/60. In order
 
to 	implement this change, present staff, vehicles and 
*quipment would be reassigned, new staff needs assessed and 
recruited, and an agrnnomLt ass.gned to ,&rk withIRRI resid nt spfciali qt. 
the 
. The project is generating an aLyandance of valuable research
ir.fornution that needs to be analyzed,presented surmarizedin literature andof ure
.farmers. to extensinn personnel andIt is reco:design, prograjing ended that the prcject prvvide for theand 1r1,lerentatlondisscmiating this infornition. of a system of
The information
also include audi-vismal system should 
s.oucd suj.Iy a 
facililies and activities. 1RIccmmui.-.tionn c-al on a C ::zs ltancybass the.e plans.to develcp 
6. The revised ap:rcach tc Fleli Trials coupled Urith the expandedadaptive reseaLch progra= env1is.ned in the WV:xd Bank
Agr'cultural Exteni.r, and Adaptive
an opportunity for dcveloping 
Re arch Project provides
rm-.- effective :nkagebetwren GSL/IRRI and thE GSL extension program.
linkages and research Similarly,support should Le developed with theintegrated water mancgGf..nt projects being sponsored by AID.
7. The team endorues the training schedule which has been developed.,
It does however recommend ti at appropriate budget arrancementsbe made to accomdare addit!onal training. 
a. In view of the emperience obtained during thetwo firstyear of the project and of other changesprovided opportunities which 
project not existing at the time the%as developed and signed,
'that the team reconendsthe GSL/InIj contract be amended to permit M.S aswell as Ph.D candidates to pursue their degree training
in Western or Asian universities. 
Selection of personnel
for degree training and choices of institutions and
courses of study will 
be the mutual responsibility of
the Project DEirector and the ZRRI Team Leader.consideration should be provided to staff "n le-adership
 
Special 
roles. 
In the meantime, however, in keep,witth
current policy, I'sMS degree training tocountries will be be done in developedremoved from IP
-Itis recommended Is responsibilities.that GSL
AID funds employ other avonues to utilizefor MS degree students already tdeutfeedortraining in countries outside of Asia. 
b. In order to more effectively support the research efforts
It is recommended 
 that non-degree tr4±ningprovided should beto lower level staff such as farm superintendents,farm manager, agricultural Instructors, research assistants,Ltboratory technicigns and statistica assistants.of additional becauseefforts 
term training 
in adaptive research additional short
1s required for the Field Trials personnel.
Extension personnel should be amongtraining so this group to xeceivethat linkages with extension may more easily be 
establisa,9 and im.lerented. 
8. 	 The review team ncted the n-ed for additicnal clerical,
secretarial and accountino assistance in the 	offico of theProiect M.naaer in or-!er to insure suoth nanacement of the
arolect. Pro;'1sion for rucn vas not anticloated when the
orliinal budoet wa3 orcoared. The cormittee recoaniyed the
need for consideration of sach sjnL-,rt staffino. It is
recor-,ended that thoue resuonsile for the rrolect z arementtako into account this neS whun ew1uatina the mid crolectbadaetina and rnriorities. 
9. 	 It Js reco,-ry.nded that the technIcal assistance as projected

and bu-1geted be continued. The alove recotrindations will

require modifications and re-aliccation of funds to 	provide forthe 	extension by one person year tte 	Field Trials consultant,
additional staff assistance for 	the Project Directoroi coumodites 
and 	additional training. 
10. 	 Rural sociologists can significantly contribute to the RiceResearch and 	Crc'ping Systems program. It is suggested that
consideration be given by the project to utilize rural 
bociologists as part of the research team in support of theconstraints studios progran and in identification of technological
packages desired by farmers. 
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THAILAND SEED DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
 
Second Year Evaluation
 
Summary
 
The evaluation of the second year's operations of the Thailand--

Seed Development Project was conducted during the period of September 5,
 
1978 through October 10, 1978. 
 The Evaluation Team found that the overall
 
achievement of the Project so far has not been up to expectation. 
The
 
progress to date fell short of the planned implementation target in most
 
aspects of the Project. The actual outputs o the Project in terms of the
 
amount of seed produced, processed, and distributed as well as the training
 
of the Project personnel and farmers were below planned targets. 
The
 
construction and procurement aspects of the Project were one to two years
 
behind schedule. 
Itwas also doubtful that the existing seed distribution
 
procedures could benefit the majority poor farmers on a continuing basis.
 
The Evaluation Team found that the achievement of the Project
 
was hindered by three main obstacles: the government bureaucratic red tape;
 
the lack of a good coordination system among the implementing agencies;
 
and the lack of experience in the seed business on the part of the Project
 
personnel. Recommendations of the Team to help improve the performance of
 
the Project focus on the areas of forward pl&nning of production, 
decentralization of decision making, and adoption of business-like procedures. 
Inview of the dedicated and hard working personnel at the implementation
 
level together with their gradually built up experience, the Evaluation Team
 
-iv­
believes that a lot of Improvement is feasible especially if recomuendationi­
by the Team are seriously covsidered and efforts are made tG carry them out.
 
However, in order to enable the continued development of the use of good
 
seed to bear effects on the increase in agricultural productivity, private 

-
investment in the seed development project of similar nature should be
 
promoted.
 
wV­
XII. Conclusions 
The Evaluation Team found that the SDP has failed to achieve the 
purpose output and input schedules outlined in the PP. The progress to date 
fell short of the planned implementation target in most aspects of the 
Project. Delays were due mainly to the bureaucratic red tape and the 
inexperience of the SDP personnel. Though the slow progress of the SDP may 
be acceptable based on the government standard, it is far from being totally
 
satisfactory when viewed from the commercial perspective.
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The Team believes that the SDP personnel at the implementa­
tion level are dedicated, conscientious persons .who are desirous of
 
making the Project a successful one. The progress can be sped up if the
 
Seed Executive Committee and the Seed Implementation Committee address
 
themselves to the more serious problems as the Team views them. 
Of all
 
the recommendations the Evaluation Team is of the opinion that the
 
following items must be given immediate attentioni
 
(1) Delegation of authority to key psrsonuel responsible
 
for day-to-day operations *o make decisions and see that they are carried
 
out. 
(2) insist on regular Executive Committee and Implementation.
 
Committee meetings, at least on a monthly basis, to find solutions to
 
problems.
 
(3) MOF should be given help in terms cf both trained staff
 
members and money in developing and carrying out a sound seed sales
 
program which can get the seed to farmers effectively.
 
(4) Selection of candidates for training abroad, especially
 
for those who will receive degree training, must be done as funds provided
 
by the AID Grant must be committed within less than 18 months from now.
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Over-View of Procress of the Seed Development 
Project

I. 

The Seed Development Project has been faulted in both
 in September­one in July 1977 and one 
project evaluations, 

a July 1979 project audit for failure
well as
October 1978 as 

to develop in accord with the implementation 
schedule and
 
some descriptive specifications in the original 
Project Paper
 
Much of the delay in implementation has its 
origins

(PP). 

in the bureaucracy in the RTG and AID.
 
The Seed Development Project was the first loan project
 
in Thailand requiring host 	country procurement 
of technical
 
There were no precedents. Technical
 assistance and equipment. 

assistance contract negotiations were prolonged 
and exasperating.
 
Equipment procurement and construction contracts were 
delayed,
 
Much 	has been learned in the RTG
 two years.
some 	as much as 

and USAID at the expense of the Seed Development 
Project.
 
The evaluations and audit of the Project judge progress
 
The various components described
 
against projections in the 	PP. 

in the PP were and remain valid and the Project has followed
 
these descriptive segments in essentially all 
the major details,
 
for the role of the Marketing Organization for 
Farmers
 
save 	 The PP
 
(MOF), marketing of seed, and implementation timing. 

It did not expect that all the delays
took-an_.optimistic view. There were delays and progress
that could happen woiil-d happen. 

was disappointingly slow judged against the optimistic 
projec­
tions in the PP, especially at the time of the 
September 1978
 
evaluation.
 
Judged against the status of the seed program/industry 
in
 
the start of the Project, and against seed projects
Thailand at 

funded by AID, World Bank, UNDP and FAO in a host 
of other
 
in developing a seed program/industry in
 ress
counzries, :-c7 

ceen 	exceptional.
Thailand has 

are being
Some 	3,000 MT of seed of six crops
(1) 

173 tons were produced at
 produced in FY 80. 

the start of the Project in FY 76.
 
evidenced
 (2) 	Farmers have confidence in the seed as 

by 300 MT sales in small lots (1-10 bags) at the
 
Many of the farmers
Phitsanulok Center in 1979. 

traveled to the Center by bus and bought seed 
3
 
months in advance of the planting season, because
 
they were afraid the seed supply would run out 
if
 
All corn seed, approximately
they 	waited longer. 

now sold out some two months before
 1,000 tons, is 

Demand' is now far exceeding'
planting begins. 

production capacity.
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Some 3,500 contract farm families 
are organized in
 
(3) 	
groups to produce seed, receiving 
supervision and
 
advice, and greater income than 
if they were grain
 
they 	were before the Project in FY 
75.
 
producers as 

Some 	200 contract farm families 
were organized at
 
that 	time.
 
A Seed Division with a dedicated 
staff oE some
 
(4) 	
250 in the Department of Agricultural 
Extension
 
(DOAE) has been established under 
the AID Seed
 
Development Loan to manage 
RTG seed activities and
 
There was
 
promote the seed industry in 
Thailand. 

no Seed Division in 1977.
 
Four 	very exceptional Seed Centers 
have been
 
(5) 	 Minor improvements
 
established and are operational. 
are in place and are
 
will 	be needed but the Centers 

operational showcases of the 
DOAE and AID assistance.
 
The Project has provided a base for 
assistance from
 
(6) 	 The Japanese have financed a 5th 
seed
 
other donors. corn.
 
center with a capacity of 500 
tons, mainly for 

also under operational control 
of the DOAE
 
It is 	
This assistance has complemented
Seed 	Division. 

EEC is negotiating to provide 
a 6th
 
the Project. 

seed center or a series of small 
Centers in the
 
area not covered by present 
project
 
South, an 

activities.
 
in operation,
 
(7) 	Private companies are emerging, 
two are 

67o are constructing facilities 
and two more are 
a 
in
 
the advanced feasibility stage, 
undoubtedly as 

result of the examples in the 
Seed Development
are looking
Still other private companies
?. ject. 

into the feasibility of establishing 
seed businesses.
 
The Seed Development Project has assisted 
the
 
private companies in technical 
matters, training and
 
determine the
 
in providing information needed 
to 

feasibility of a private seed 
business in Thailand.
 
No private companies were willing 
to enter the
 
It is
 
business at the time of Project initiation. 

projected that the private sector will be producing
 
at least 5,000 tons of seed by 
FY 1982.
 
a mechanism for supply
 
The Project has served well as 
(8) 	
of seed for special projects, especially during
and
(floods, drought, etc.) 

emergency situations area are enormous.
 
its potential contributions in 
this 

-t
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(9) Experience has been gained, 
people trained, that
 
will be reflected in improved 
efficiency and
 
effectiveness in both the 
public and private seg­
ments of the emerging seed 
industry.
 
a result
 being established as 

The program/industry 

of the Project greatly increases 
the flexibility of
(10) 

the MOAC to shift crop 
production in accord with
 
changes in climatic and economic 
(internal and
 
world market) conditions through 
the introduction
 
of new varieties and crops.
 
Within the elapsed time 
of the Seed Development 
Project,
 
made more progress in establishing 
a seed program/
 
familiar
Thailand b'as 

industry tiran any of the 
developing countries we 
are 

with, many of which were assisted 
bv a much higher level of
 
The RTG
 
concentrated technical assistance. 
funding and more 

and USAID can and should 
be pleased with what has 
been accom-

Given even the same rate 
of progress in the next 
2-3
 
plished. 
in the past 2-3 years, Thailand 
will have the outstand­
years as in the region, save perhaps 
for India
 
ing seed program/industry FAO and
 initiated in the mid-1950's. 
a base for regional
 
already looking at Thailand as
where a program was 
are
others 
 development.
 
training and workshops in 
seed program/industry 

serious- confront the developing
 
cency. Many~problems4,_some problems such as-waste
 
seed program/induscry in Thailand: 

The outstanding progress 
made should not lead to 
compla­
disposal, management, and 
seed distribut-ion and marketing.
 
solvable and must be dealt 
with
 
however, are 
These problems3
expeditious ly.-
The most sericus dilemma 
for Thailand's seed program/
 to
 
consider that the establishment 
of a seed program/industry
 
A seed industry does

industry would be for the 
RTG, USAID and other donors 

the end of this Project. ewihtese 0 
It -^is always developing in accord
 complete at year. rtoth
is develop in 6 or 1010 year ...
not ._
notcdevelopeint6tor

=,ing situation in agLu
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siuto nariculture which 
the seed
 
with the changin High level RTG interest 
and support of the
 
And, continued
industry serves. continue. 

seed program/industry in Thailand 
must 

interest in the program by 
international donors, including
 
equally important for long 
term success of thke effort.
 
USAID, is 
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Proress of the Seed
 
Ma'or Problems Confronting
II. 

ect
Development Pro j 

and cull seed,
 
The disposal of waste miF.terial
1. 

Waste material,
particularly at Phitsanulok 
where processing has been underway
 
is a critical problem.
for a number of years, as grain
 
cull seed, out of condition 
seed that must be sold 

is occupying badly needed
 Rather it 
is not 	being disposed of. 

storage space, encouraging rat 
and insect infestation and
 
drain on the working capital 
account
 
causing a severe 

because the non-sale of waste 
seed (grain) has eliminated one
 This
 
source of replenishment for 
the Working Capital Account. 

problem is becoming acute now 
that four other seed centers
 
are operational.
 
2. The marketing and disribution of processed seed has
 
not been a major problem to date since the level of seed
 
production has not "strained" 
the rather ad hoc distribution
 
some complacency that could 
be
 
led to
This has 	 Seed
system. 	 operating. 

disastrous now that five processing 
plants are 

must be promoted and marketed 
through a planned system of
 
The MOF was 
expected to play 
the lead role in
 
distribution. 
 Alternative arrangements must 
be
 
this effort but has not. 

made immediately.
 
issue than requires immediate
 
3. 	The price of seed is an 

Costs of production are exceeding 
returns from
 
attention. 

seed sales causing a severe drain 
on the working capital account.
 
The working capital-account cannot 
be maintained long at -present
 
In addition, the emerging private 
sector cannot compete
 
prices. 	 Low DOAE seed
 
with the highly subsidized DOAE 
seed prices. 
It has been
 
prices will discourage private 
sector expansion. 

shown rlac f-rers will pay premium 
orices for quality seed.
 
program 	now that some
 
Rapid expansion of the seed 	 The Seed
4. 

is being achieved may be tempting. 
deree 	of success 
 to 2,000 tons
 
Division could be "pushed" into 
producing 1,500 

This would be
 
of processed seed annually at 
each seed center. 

one to 	two year period will be 
necessary for the
 
A
a mistake. 

Seed Division staff to gain experience 
and knowledge in the
 
management and technical aspects 
of seed production, processing,
 
-and distribution operations. Rapid expansion 
of production at
 
this point would be at the expense 
of seed quality and this,
 
the seed
 
in the 	long run, would be a great 
disservice to 

Farmer 	confidence in improved 
seed must be dpveloped
 
industry. 	 Rather than rapid
 
and it cannot be done with low 
quality seed. 

expansion in the public sector, 
private sector expansion should
 
be promoted.
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III. Prolect Design Changes 
(MOF)

of arketing Orgaization for 
Farmers 
i. The Role the 
Original project design envisioned 
a major MOF role
 
This has not and, it now
 
in the Seed Development 
Project. 
The Department of Agricultural
 come 
to pass. 

appears, will not 

in
Extension (DOAE) Seed Division 
will be the primary agency
 
a seed program/industry 

involved in the development 
of 

Components of the project including 
multiplication
 
Thailand. 

of foundation seed through 
contract growers, management 
of the
 
Working Capital Account, 
processing of multiplied 
seed, and market­
and distribution of seed 
will be responsibilities 
of the
 
ing 
DOAE through the duration 
of the project and we expect there-

The Department of Agriculture 
(DA) will be responsible
 
The MOF will-/
after. 
 the ;,for production of foundation 
seed and inoculum. 
as one ofbut onlyin the projectto participatecontinue 
primary agencies involved 
in the 	seed distribution 
system.
 
Targets
Seed Production
2. 

Based on experience to date 
and projected demand for 
seed the production targets 
for processed seed for Year 
VI
 
follows.

will be revised as 

2,050 MT
from 3,000 to
Rice 
 1,300 MT
from 1,600 to
Corn 
 450 MT
from 2,200 to
Soybean 
 525 MT
from 1,200 to
Peanut 
 150 MT
450 to
from
Mungbean 
 75 MT
 
Sorghum from j 200 to 
from 8,650 to 4,550 MT
 Totals 

(Japanese and EEC) funded Seed 
Centers
 
Other donor 

and the private sector will 
more than make up the target
 
"shortfall" caused by this revision.
 
-

o
Pom tion/Marketin
 
3. 	 Increased Emphasis on 
Seed 
a potential major problem 
As previously noted there 
is 
are
 
Section
with distribution of seed 
produced now that five plants 

a Seed Promotion/MarketingTo deal with this 
operating. This section,
 
should be established°at each 
Seed Center. 
the start, would
 
two seed technbrd]g1sts at 

promote the use of good seed 
through extensive field activities
 
the Center by working closely 
with and
 
in Provinces adjacent to Promotional activities
 
probably one or 

field
training Amphoe and Tambon 
Agents. 	 leaflets, 

could include the use of radio, 
TV, newspaper, 
 Section
 
The Seed Promotion/4arketing
farmer meetings, etc. 

of each Seed Center could 
work with the field extension 
staff
days, 
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to plan seed needs one year in advance so the Center 
Chief could
 
schedule his production in an orderly manner.
 
A similar section should be established at the DOAE
 
Seed Division headquarters to deal continuously with 
other
 
the MOF, A.D, Social Welfare Department,
agencies such as 
 etc. to
 
Crop Promotion Division, Cooperative Federation, 

establish and project their seed requirements in time to
 
planning of Seed Division production. The
 permit proper 

DOAE Seed Division's Promotion/Marketing Section would also
 
coordinate and support the Seed Promotion/Marketing efforts
 
of each Seed Center.
 
4. Increased EmDhasis on Seed Program/Industry Management
 
correctly been placed on establish-
Emphasis to date has 

ing an institutional arrangement for management of 
a seed
 
program/industry, e.g., contracting for technical assistance
 
and equipment, getting approval for and recruiting 
staff,
 
etc. These activities will continue
 construction of facilities, 

Now that the "system" is, to a large
but at lesser intensity. 
 function effectively.

extent, in place it must be managed to 

DOAE management, training plans and rechnical assistance 
must
 
effective management system for
 focus on development of an 

the seed program.
 
5. Priva-.e Sector Emphasis
 
The private sector is beginning to participate in
 
seed production and supply operations--the seed industry.
 
This in -j!vementshould be encouraged and promoted by the RTG
 
and particularly by che DOAE Seed Division.
 
6. 	Working Capital Account (WCA)
 
Procedures
This fund will be controlled by the DOAE. 

accounting
developed for implementation of the WCA, e.g., 

, must be
 procedure., inventory control, seed sales, etc 

the needs of the Seed Division and, more
 developed to serve 
 simply
importantly, the various Seed Centers rather than to 
The WCA should be
 
meet the requirements of the AID Loan. 

a permanent fiscal mechanism to
 developed and established as 

serve the needs of the DOAE Seed Division.
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List of Recommendations
IV. 

The following recommendations are 
made to the Royal
 
assure progress of the Seed
 
Thai Government and the USAID to 

Development Project and the seed program 
industry in Thailand.
 
General Recommendations
A. 

That all waste material, cull seed, 
out-of­
1. 

(much of which presently has no value)
 
condition seed, etc. 

that have accumulated at the Seed 
Centers be disposed of
 
immediately by establishing easily 
implemented procedures.
 
Waste mater.Lal, cull seed, etc. 
produced in the Centers should
 
be disposed of on a regular basis, 
at least every two months.
 
Existing waste material should 
be disposed of and disposal
 
1980.
 
procedures operating by June 
30, 

(MOF)
 
That the Marketing Organization 
for Farmers 

2. a primary outlet
 
be disengaged from the Project but continue 
as 

The DOAE Seed Division will have 
primary
 
for Project Seed. 

of the Seed 
Centers.
 
and operation 

Section be
 
responsibility for Project implementation 
including ownership
 
That a Seed Promotion/Distribution
3. 

established at each Seed Center 
and in the Seed Division's
 
central office.
 
That seed production costs be 
compared with seed
 
4. 

cover costs, particularly in the
 
prices and prices raised to 

soyt asns. . * * case of corn and 
That Project seed production targets be 
revised
 
5. 
account delays in facility development, do-.ward to take into 
of personnel and management, the erntry 
relative inexperienZe 
of the private sector and to permit 
scheduling of prcruction
 
based on market forces rather 
than project targets. Original
 
targets will be met easily by 
the total Seed Division operations
 
and the private sector. 
That the Seed Division's management 
style be
 
6. 
 phase of the Project is 
altered, now that the "building" phase into deal with the "operating"complete, toessentially A reorganization of the See6 
which the Project is now moving. 

Division may be appropriate.
 
(DOAE and DA) continue to encourage 
and
 
7. That RTG 

assist private sector participation 
in the seed industry.
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8. That the RTG and USAID document the economic
 
benefits of the Project to contract seed producers and seed
 
users to produce information and data needed in planning for
 
the future development of the seed industry in Thailand.
 
B. Seed Production Recommendations
 
1. That for the duration of the Project, all seed
 
production activities including seed procurement from contract
 
seed producers be the responsibility of the DOAE rather than
 
the MOF.
 
2. That the DOAE should as a matter of policy select
 
seed growers as near to the Seed Centers as possible to reduce
 
transport costs, facilitate supervision-and inspection and
 
assure that seed quality is maintained.
 
3. That a new and more reasoaable set of quality
 
standards for purchase of seed ftom contract growers be developed.
 
4. That the DOAE should no longer require contract
 
farmers to rigorously "hand pick" the seed before it is L,. 
purchased, and that all seed produced by contract growers '., 
that meets establishe-standards be purchased by the DOAE. 
5. That a trial system of installing "official
 
purchasing" at the Seed Center truck scale be tried and that
 
the present system which requires two "committees" be reviewed
 
and simplified as possible.
 
6. That the DOAE buy high quality foundation
 
in an "unclean" state from the DA for processing in DOAE
 
plants prior to distribution to contract growers so as to
 
relieve DA of the tedious task of hand cleaning seed and
 
maximize use of DCAE's seed facilities.
 
7. That the DOAE produce an extra generation of
 
peanut and soybean seed to reduce the requirement on DA for
 
foundation seed of these low multiplication ration seed kinds.
 
8. That the production of seed be done through
 
contract farmer growers as is presently being done and not
 
through the establishment of government operated seed farms.
 
9. That in addition to the four established seed
 
centers, two sub-centers, one at Chiang Mai and one at Kalasin,
 
be established.
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C. Implementation Recommendations
 
That a full-fledged seed certification program
1. 

time but rather emphasis given to
 not be implemented at this 

establishment of a basic seed control system that would protect
 
both the farmer and the legitimate private sector seed
 
companies.
 
That implementation of th: new accounting/manage­2. 

designed by SGV Na Thalang
ment procedures for the DOAE as 

Company be implemented as rapidly as possible and extended 
to
 
include all DCaE Seed Division activities.
 
That the DOAE continue its programs to make
3. 

quality seed available to the smaller farmers.
 
4. That in-country training programs on management,
 
quality control and seed marketing/production be implemented in 
the latter with assistance from Mississippi /'CY 80 and CY 31, 

State University AID technical assistance cooperative agreement,
 
5. That a study tour (two weeks) of four to five
 
Seed Division, high-level officials and the Senior Seed Industry
 
to DOAE be made to Iudonesia to observe the
Consultants 

operations of Indonesia's National Seed Corporation, particularly
 
its network of private dealers and packaging of seed in small
 
containers. The remainder of the third country training should
 
for more in-country training
be cancelled permitting use of funds 

or other suitable training programs.
 
6. That implementation of the participant training
 
program be continued until it is completed.
 
7. That the project consultant program be revised
 
to provide for a 2nd inoculent consultation and a seed marketing/
 
promotion consultation with the other consultations programmed
 
as needed for handling under the Mississippi State University-
AID/DSB centrally funded cooperative agreement.
 
That Dr. Billy 11.Gregg, MSU Serior Seed Specialist,
8. 

be extended through December 1981 and that Mr. George Dougherty,
 
Seed Processing Specialist, be extended until June 1981.
 
That the SGV Na Thalang management/accounting
9. 

to assist the
 
contract continue at least through December 1980 
firmly establish the newly designed management and
DOAE to 

accounting system.
 
10. That funds presently committed by USAID for the
 
planned including that
Seed Development Project be expended as 
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that followingearmarked for the Working Capital Account and 
review of the Working Capital Account in late CY 1980 a
 
decision be made regarding the need for additional funding
 
beyond the present loan.
 
11. That the RTG increase staffing of the DOAE Seed
 
Division particularly at the Lampang and Chai Nat Seed Centers.
 
That the Seed Executive Committee consider
12. 

assist

establishment of a small operational sub-committee to 

with day-to-day project implementation problems--this in
 
addition to the existing Seed Implementation Committee.
 
13. That a system be established for periodic involve­
ment of USAID top management in review sessions with the Director
 
General of DOAE and the Director of the Seed Division.
 
14. That the terminal disbursement date for the project
 
be extended to December 1982 to allow for installation and
 
initial operation of all equipment, particularly that for the
 
inoculation component.
 
15. That USAID maintain an interest in seed program/
 
industry development in Thailand even after termination of the
 
project and continue to support development through (1) provision
 
of additional training opportunities for Thai seed workers
 
as funds are available, (2) support of DOAE and DA requests
 
for technical assistance and initiating actions needed to
 
obtain technical assistance under relevant centrally funded AID
 
contracts and cooperative agreements, (3) assistance
 
given to the seed program/industry in the event of the surfacing
 
of serious problems or impediments to progress.
 
D. Inoculum Reco~mendations
 
1. That the inoculum production targets be reduced
 
to coincide with projected seed production and farmers demand.
 
2. That procurement of the inoculum production
 
equipment be expedited.
 
3. That a close relationship be established between
 
the DA Soil Microbiology Division and the AID centrally funded
 
NIFTAL program.
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THAILAND .SEED DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
 
(AID Loan 493-T-017)
 
STATUS REPORT - JULY, 1979
 
- This report is an attempt to review the past history

of the Seed Project\(both successes and failures), 
to outline
the current status, to discuss problems and propose possible

solutions, and to suggest some future actions. 
 It was
initially prepared for use in an internal USAID review of
the Seed Project and subsequently expanded. The report was
finalized following the USAID review.
 
I. BACKGROUND
 
The Seed Project has suffered more than its share of
problems, delays, bureaucratic hang-ups, etc. And, it has

not lived up to the goals proposed in the Project Paper.
This is largely because of unrealistic planning. The goals

of the Project were set forth assuming (or so it would seem)
that full staff would be available for each segment of the
Project as needed. However, at the time the Loan Agreement

was signed there was not even, officially, a Seed Division.
The Project, in reality, did not have a home. 
Because there
 
was not a Seed Division, no personnel allocations could be

made from the Civil Service Commission nor could permanent

personnel assignments be made.
 
For some time the Seed Project was run, on the Thai

side, by one person 
- the current Seed Division Director.
In time personnel from other Divisions of DOAE were assigned
to work, on a temporary basis, on Seed Project activities.
 
Many of them have remained.
 
Establishment of a Seed Division was not a condition
precedent to disbursement as it probably should have been.
For many reasons, mostly internal-political factors in both
the MOAC and other RTG Agencies and the Thai bureaucratic
 process, the Seed Division was not officially established by
the Cabinet until late 1977. 
Only at this time could the

Project actually start to function.
 
DRAFTING OFFICER: O/RD:T Ooper:ps,
 
INITIAL DRAFT: 6/29/79
 
FINAL DRAFT: 7/16/79
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During this same period, USAID was in a phase-out
status and primarily concerned with completing Project-
Papers and entering into Loan Agreements for projects yet to
be obligated. The "official" USAID attitude was that the RTG
had reached the point that it was capable of implementing
projects including all necessary procurement actions.
USAID's role would be mainly an approval process. 
For some
parts of the RTG, e.g., 
DTEC, USAID's attitudes might have
been partly valid; but not for the great majority of agen­cies. 
 Present implementation problems in most projects,
especially those involving outside procurement actions,

substantiate USAID's error.
 
What USAID was doing, in the case of the Seed Project,
was expecting the impossible. 
DOAE, and more particularly
the Seed Division, was facing a task, in terms of procure­ment, which makes up a major part of the Loan, that thay had
no idea how to deal with. 
USAID Project Officers were only
slightly more skilled. 
The MOAC does not have a central
procurement office, at least not for the 
type involved in
this Project. 
That leaves each Department, in reality each
Division, on its own. 
Lessons learned have little carry
over. 
This is exemplified by the fact that the Special
Projects Division of DOAE now is going through the same
process and learning the same lessons.
 
Also to be taken into account is the fact that the Seed
Pro~ect was one of the first Loans to be implemented.
Neither USAID nor the MOAC had any idea what they were
facing. In the past clearances were easily obtained. 
It was
USAID money. 
Now it was RTG money and subject to all the
RTG bureaucratic procesues. 
Few people knew what they were.
As an example, DOAE officially advised USAID that it would
be ready to sign the contract with MSU almost immediately
upon conclusion of negotiations. However, when it reached
the Office of the Under-Secreta.y for approval, he insisted
it be approved by Department of Public Prosecution. 
Public
Prosecution will only review contracts in the Thai language.
DOAE spent considerable time and expense on translation.
Then came the problem of clauses in the Loan Agreement which
USAID requires but which are contrary to Thai regulations.
The list could go on and on. 
The Chief of the Seed Division
spent literally days for a period of more than six months
moving contract approval along. 
This obviously took time
away from other activities. 
Equipment procurement approvals
are almost as 
time consuming.
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As a final note, the MSU Senior Seed Specialist advised
shortly after his arrival, and later in an official report,
that had the personnel and procurement actions envisioned in
the PP taken place as planned the Seed Project goals were
obtainable, in a developing country 

- over a period of tento twelve years.-.... 

. ..... 
II. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION AND CURRENT STATUS
 
During the past several months the Project Officer and
Assistant Project Officer for the Seed Project have visited
all of the Seed Processing Centers at least once and have
observed seed multiplication and seed buying activities in
areas both adjacent to and far from the Centers. 
 In all
cases Seed Project activities were discussed with Seed
Division personnel, other Extension officers and participating
farmers. Observations made and results of discussions will
be contained in subsequent sections of this report.
 
During the same time period the Seed Project has under­gone an exhaustive audit by AAG/EA. 
USAID has just received
a copy of the final draft and the report itself should be
issued by the end of July. 
This report will also address
some of the points and recommendations contained in the

audit report.
 
After a review of the 1978 Evaluation Report, AID/W has
raised several questions and made requests for information
(STATE 145353). 
 An interim response (BANGKOK 21277) was
sent advising that this report was to be prepared and would
be addressing many of the points raised. 
Those which would
not be addressed were answered in the interim reply.
 
The Seed Project is a highly complex undertaking
involving many diffecent activities, some of which are very
sophisticated. 
Each of these, as well as some elements,

e.g., 
staffing, which affect all Project components, are
 
discussed below.
 
A. Foundation Seed Program
 
The Foundation Seed Program is onn of the less
problematic Project components. 
The primary problem has
been one of coordination between DOAE and DA in terms of
both ordering and taking delivery of seed on time.
situation has improved as The
 the Project implementers have
gained experience. 
In the past lack of adequate storage
space was one reason for DOAE not taking delivery of founda­tion seed as scheduled. Completion cf the Seed Processing
 
q
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is on its way and a proce-sing plant is being constructed.
 
Seed Project personnel assisted with tha equipment speci­
fiCations and building plans. Staff will be trained at the
 
Project Seed Centers. Like in the Seed Project, the firm
 
will contract with farmers in the vcin.-ty of the processing
 
center to produce the seed. The farmers will be provided
 
with seed, credit, etc. by the firm.
 
Five other companies, some multinational, are
 
seriously considering and are currenly investigating pros­
pects for involvement in the aead business.
 
III. GENERAL COMMENTS
 
The Seed Project has been plagued by problems. But,
 
this is not just the fault of the RTG. AID shares the
 
responsibility. RTG failure to supply personnel, budget and
 
other resources, etc. as scheduled, has been well documented.
 
AID lack of attention to the Project has not, except for
 
mentioned in the MSU Senicr Seed Speciaiat's annual report
 
and more recently by the AAG/EA.
 
The PP, prepared by AID, imposed an impossible imple­
mentation schedule considering RTG capabilities in several
 
areas and the AID attitude cf mrinimal participation.
 
Also not documented, w th the exception of some mention
 
in the MSU advisor's reprts, are ProCect successes. Both
 
Evaluation Reports and the AAG/EA Audit do not mention them.
 
Failure to do so in the 1978 Evsluatizn Report was called to
 
the attention of the rest of the team by Dr. Lloyd Frederick 
but the team members finalizing the Report decided not to 
include a "success" sectlor., It w! be included as a part
 
of the 1979 In-House Evaluaticn. The past year has shown
 
tremendous improvement. Things are movingl,
 
The quality and dedication of most of the Seed Division
 
staff is very high. Long hard work has produced results.
 
Activities in the field have gone very well considering
 
what there has been to work with. The probiems have been and
 
will continue to be bureaucrat!c and mostly at the national
 
level. The Project will be able to produce and process the
 
seed. The rest is up to the bureaucracy,
 
The importance of seed in any agrciultural development
 
activities is high enough to jusat4fy extension of the current
 
Project in order to provide all Prcject inputs.
 
------------------------
lj' 
IV. IMMEDIATE ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN
 
1. Extend the TDD for up rc one year to cover not only

the MSU contract, which is scheduled to terminate March 21,

1981, but also the incculum productizn equipment yet to be
 
ordered. The current TDD is December 11, 1980. 
 Final paymen

for the inoculum equipment cannot be expected to be made
 
before early 1981. 
 Final payments for some seed processing

equipment may also extend beyond the TDD. 
 (Between the time
 
of the initial draft cf this rep:'ct and the USAID review,

USAID received an of±icial request to extend the Project for
 
one year.)
 
2. Extend the funding pzrad for the training grant to
 
cover Master's degree candidates wh= will begin training this
 
year and in August or Septamcer, 1980. It they do not begin

this year funds should be s.qtched to short-term training ­
both U.S. and Third Country.
 
3. Discussions and resclutions zf current problems,

especially marketing, between RIG and USAID officials above
 
the implementation level.
 
4. Continue increased USAID par .... to in the
 
Project.
 
5. Complete the IFB for the incculum production
 
equipment.
 
6. Work with the Seed Divie--Zn to establish a system

whereby informaton cn nmmhsra of farmers participating and
 
number of rai planted is ava.lable at the Bangkok level as
 
well as in the field.
 
7. Make a detezminataon as to how the Project should
 
be restructured or revised (as recommended by both AID/W

and AAG/EA) and complete the necessary documentation.
 
V. DECISIONS MADE DURING USAID REV:EW
 
1. USAID and DOAE shzuld jointly review the current
 
progress of the Project and consIder necessary revisions to
 
the Project design and impiementation plan, particularly

with regard to the most important re:rmmendations of the
1978 Project Evdluation. (In.s has been proposed to DOAE
 
and USAID has received .ndicatin cf intarest.)
 
1/ As of June 29, 1979 - the date of the initial draft.
 
( 
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Extend the TDD tc Apr-'i 11, 1981 to cover the MSU 2. 

The decision to extend tc the requested December 
11,
 
contract. 

1981 will depand on the cutccme of the Project review.
 
Extend the funding period for the training grant
3. 

to cover the M.S. candidates who ate scheduled to 
depart in
 
August or September, 1960 with the understanding 
that they
 
will depart at that time.
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F. Purpose: Two part evaluation: 1) primary purpose to review and assess 
all phases of tl,,e loan, e.g., imple.entation, achievement of purposes/goals 
and meeting USAID requirements; and, 2) an overall look at BAAC operations 
and internal administrative problems. Both parts are to address the extent 
to which both AID loan funds and BAAC policies reach low-income farmers. 
B. comment
 
During Novemner and December 
of 1976 a large joint
 
Thai-US evaluation team undertook 
to assess the progress of 
the loan, to identify causes of 
the many delays which had 
encountered and to provide 
observations and recommenda­
been 
tions aimed at improving planning 
and implementation of
 
careful study and observation
 
future development projects. 

by the present# much smaller, 
evaluation group confirms 
the
 
1976 findings and fully supports 
the conclusions and
 
recommendations which are contained 
in a January 1977 report
 
attached hereto as part of 
the evaluation.
 
It appears redundant to repeat 
statements of fact
 
as contained in the 1976 evaluation, 
for that report did
 
indeed pinpoint causes and effects 
for delays in loan
 
In essence, it
 
approval and subsequent implementation. 

seems clear that:
 
Flaws in initial planning 
and implementation
 
l." 

of the project by the US and RTG brought 
on problems of baht
 
generation, program coordination 
and communication.
 
Rigid procedures of both the 
US and RTG
 
2. 

engendered their own special 
problems.
 
Lack of understanding on the 
part of MOAC and
 
3. 

BAAC regarding loan requirements, 
difficulty on their part
 
in designing acceptable projects and 
lack of coordination
 
resulted in further confusion 
and delay.
 
4. The US and RTG planned and 
agreed to a loan 
that was poorly designed and 
initially, at least, poorly 
implemented.
 
settling landless people
assisting them in cattle raising, received 0400,000 ($19,700)
 
on small tracts of land and
from MOAC loan funds. 
The money was Used to clear 500 one­
rai blocks of land from forest, to cle
rai for the cooperative i t o. n addol
heaifor ter _clearan adtional 500cperativethe headquartgrs itself and build, 
 compound a fence aroundcocperative An inspection
land revealed that only 100 rai had been seeded
 
of the 500 ral of
to grass, with the remainder beginning

forst.There to grow back to
was no evidence of cattle,

standing idle and quite obviously
'ground cath le upm~ground to ahust. equipmentto a halt. the whole operationwaahad
charge The Land Resettlementof the project CO-OP OfficerexPlained infunds had thatbeen as Yetmade available no operatingrequest for 1979,was under consideration but that his budgetTeamhle
11 , while recagn.z in MOAC.Treo~izing h u * -' The Evalun that uc Evaluationtnevertheless 
point it 
this may be an isolated case,
and folloW Out as an example of poor planning
th ouh with. the result that funds f t loan
have not had the favorable impact intended. 
C.
£2luslons
 
It has been said by earlier RTG and us observers
is no 
that this loan should not have been implemented 

hi 
 ter
history, 
doubt thhttthe loan has had a rather troublesoand little doubt e
been Poorly Used, 
hate of t loan fUnds 
 haveit wouldhave backed away have been counterproductivefrom iplementatioon towat Signed. ceIn this he Loamaterial type of Undertaking Agreem progress it must be recognizedintha implemr
Projects may not discerniblebe ipeenting long-term developmentfor some Period of time. 
loa
oan fu nfUnds this case it is evident that the bulk of the 
was Used for product
of these funds did reach dow thto ve PUrposes e n haa meuoey low income farmers,
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It is not 	clear that the 
intent of the loan toexpand and improve MOAC capability to prepare and implementlong-term agricultural projects has been fully achieved.The Evaluation
1 Team believes, however, that the ability of
BAAC to design and implement development projects and carry
through with effective lending programs has been cc'nsidarably
enchanced. 
To that extent, the loan has successfully

achieved a 
major goal.
 
F. Recommendations
 
I. 	 Th&i 
any future loan intended for long-range
agricultural develcpment 
purposes not be authorized prior
to having in hand a full and comprehensive project plan with
supporting data, including disbursement schedules and a time
frame for 	project completion.
 
2. 
 That any future loan which contemplates
release of funds to more than one user have a clearly
established mechanism to insure adequate coordination and
cooperation between the users.
 
3. ,.That a loan whose funds are to be used by an
 institution (sdch as BAC) for relending purposes be designed
No that funds can be advanced on a scheduled basis thus
2inimizing complicated internal budget problemn for the user.
 
4. That 	any loa, 
 the implementation of which
, quires services of outside aptcialistsIlntain provisions 	 or consultants,to insure 	that such services are adequately
unded either from loan proceeds or other sources. 
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5. 
 That loans to support long-term development
pro~etts whose completion dates extend over several years
be planned in such a way that standard time strictures for
fund disbursement not force premature use of the loan
proceeds to avoid deobligation. 
Such loans might well be
designed so that an initial large committment could be
released in timed stages under separate approval as specific
phases of the pruject reached completion.
 
Evaluation Team
 
1. 
Miss Tatanee Srikijkarn, Office of Fiscal Policy,

Ministry of Finance
 
2. 
 Mr. Suphot Srisa-ard, Manager, Research and Evaluation
 
Division, BAAC
 
3. 
Mr. Uoychai Vattraphoudej, Assistant Project Officer,
 
USAID 
4. 
 Mr. Glenh G. Browne, Consultant, AID/W
 
.°V
 
G. Conclusions
 
The foregoing narrative indicates the far reaching

changes and improvements in BAAC during recent years and
 
outlines several areas 
requiring ocme additional attention.
 
Under present management it is reasonable to anticipate that
 
necessary corrections will be made and that further improve­
ment in Bank operations will take place more or less as a'
 
matter of course.
 
The Bank has the potential of tapping large new
fund resources domestically, as well as from external sources,
possibly including the United States. 
 Commitment of such
 
funds, particularly from external donors, will require well­developed fully-planned and scheduled projects, the preparation

of which is well within the Bank's capabilities.
 
In addition to loan funds, BAAC can continue to

utilize effectively the'services of outside specialists and

short-term consultants. 
Fields in which professional help
 
may well be needed include electronic data processing,

computer operations, training, research, development banking

and management. 
The record of present BAAC management in

making use of and implementing reccmmendations of outside
 
specialists is good.
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problems of the project as well as silk production, extension/training
 
and technical problems.
 
*.(BAAC, inferred from page 28; this money not yet disbursed; moreover,
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this project that a high overall deficit ensues, raising questions of
 
.sustainability. page 35.)
 
I 
SUMMARY
 
The Sericulture/Settlements Project Loan Agreement
 
between the RTG and USAID was signed September 8, 1976 for
 
$2.6 million to be equally divided between Public Welfare
 
Department (PWD) and Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural
 
Cooperatives (BAAC). PWD is the implementing agency for
 
the extension aspects of recruiting, training and counseling
 
silk producers. BAAC provides the credit through local
 
branch banks to project participants. Technical information,
 
training, hybrid silkworm eggs and cocoon marketing services
 
are provided by the Sericulture Division of the Department
 
of Agriculture.
 
Settlers in ten Northeastern Land Settlements are the
 
target audience. According to a 1977 btseline study, these
 
settlers had seven family members with a combined average
 
income of $9,245 ($462). The goal of the Project is to
 
increase the family income of participants by fifty percent
 
in five years. To do this 1,500 families are to produce
 
silk cocoons according to approved practices.
 
Project technology includes the planting of four rai
 
of mulberry, building a silkworm rearing house according to
 
specifications.- and rearing hybrid silkworms following
 
approved husbandry practices. By September 30, 1978, a
 
total of 588 families were either producing silk or in
 
the early stages of training or establishing mulberry plots.
 
Major technical problems are the production of mulberry
 
leaves by the farmers and the supply of quality hybrid
 
silkworm hatching eggs produced by the Sericulture Division.
 
Both areas are seen as critical constraints to silk cocoon
 
production. Mulberry cuLcual practices of using mulch,
 
compost, manure, chemical fertilizer and weeding are within
 
the means ef the villagers. Lack of water or flooding are
 
problems over which the farmer has less control. However,
 
location and soil type combined with good cultural practices
 
can ameliorate these conditions.
 
Production of hybrid silkworms is a temperate zone
 
technology where the parent stock produce eggs only two times
 
a year. To hatch silkworms for six or more cycles required
 
in this Project, involves storage and breaking the dormant
 
cycle as needed. The technology and facilities are available,
 
but require more testing and adjustment in procedures to
 
attain a hatchability rate of domestically produced eggs
 
carable to those imported from Japan.
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The silkworm rearing skills of the farmers appears tobe good with many members obtaining cocoonslightly less than in Japan. yields only
The old silk worm rearing
houses facilitate the rearing of worms relatively free of
pests and disease. 
doing The PWD extension workers appear to be
an effective job of assisting farmers with mulberry
production and worm rearing.
 
Farmers are receiving a good income from silk cocoon
production. 
The average farmer produced 106 kilograms of
fresh cocoons in 5 cycles between May and December 1978,
making a gross income of 05,485, with an estimated $475
net income. 
Cocoon price has recently increased by 038 per
kilogram for high quality cocoons and should substantially
increase the incomes of members and encourage additional
farmers to join.
 
The Project is behind schedule in disbursement of funds,
number of members anticipated and production targets. 
This
reflects more over-optimism at the planning stage than lack
of solid progxess. 
A good base has been developed and
combined with recent increases in silk prices, the Project
should gain momentum over the next three years and should be
able to meet planned targets by 1931.
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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
 
I. 
 The Project, while not achieving the targets
originally planned, is meeting the basic objectives of
increasing income of poor people in the 10 land settlements
areas. 
 The average income in the 10 settlements in 1977
was $10,592 and the medium income $10,650 with a low of
$6,315 and a high of 021,551 per family.
 
2. 
 Technical knowledge of mulberry production is
available but most farmers do not follow the recommended
practices of pruning, applying compost, manure, mulching and
chemical fertilizer. 
Those farmers who follow the recommended
practices are achieving good leaf production. We would like
to see more innovativeness in planting mulberry to achieve
higher production. An adequate food supply is tha key to
highez cocoon weight and better quality silk . A contest is
suggested to stimulate increased use of approved pract'Ces.
 
3. Technical knowledge of silkworm rearing appears to
be good, with most people following directions. Many report
large losses of worms during the rainy season. Mani producers
report yields of 20 kg. or more of cocoon per box and are
striving for 24 kg. yields achieved in Japan. 
 Producers
obtaining high yields appear to do so consistentlyindicating
they are following good practices. Coverselylow producers
are also consistently producing less than the average.
 
4. We are concerned about the cost of the silkworm
rearing houses, usually 015,000. Construction materials
varied, but all were very sturdy with cement block
foundations, wooden, block or brick walls and corrugated or
asbestos roofing. 
Some people built the house-themselves,
others nired a contractor. The villagers did not think of
them as being too expensive, but were proud of this new
status symbol. 
 We believe a less expensive house could be
built utilizing local material that would still provide the
sanitary and comfort conditions required by the silkworms.
We would encourage some innovativeness in this area. 
Perhaps
a contest in the schools of architecture would produce some
interesting design possibilities.
 
5. 
 Credit is being extended to farmers in all settle­ments as fast as members for the Sericulture Project can be
recruited and trained. 
By September 30, 1978 
a total of
06,934,780 credit was extended out of 013,315,000 approved
for 588 families in the 10 settlements, iith a total loan
usually being $20,000 
 to 925,000 for the rearing house,
equipment and starting 
mulberry plots.
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6. 
repayment rate, but it 
It is too early in the project to determinecocoons-are is expected themarketed to be good sincethrough the Korat Center. theis'deducted at the land settlement at the rate of The repaymenttotal value of the cocoon marketed. 40% of theAs long as the Korat
Center pays a good price this system will assure a high
repayment rate, but if farmers can earn more selling privately,
collection could become a problem.

7. 
 The BAAC provides guidelines but apparently givesthe local bank manager some discretion in collatoral or 
number of guarantors needed for loan approval.
and This is good
 we would encourage the bank to be innovative and not overly
 
Strict in applying collatoral or group guarantee.rules to'the
very poor who have demonstrated industriousness 

to produce silk. or willingness
 
8. 
 The extension workers appear to be well trained
 
and enthusiastic. 
The ratio of one extension worker to 20
 
families seems rather high and probably could not be maintained
 in a greatly expanded program. 
The project does provide a
training opportunity for these relatively inexperienced
officers; with more experience they could advise more farmers.
 We believe more women could be employed as extension workers
on this Project.
 
9. The supervisors
generally be doing are knowledgeable and seems to
an effective job of managing the project
within the settlements. 
Most women supervisors seemed
to be effective in their work.
 
10. 
 While this has been described as a women oriented
project it is by no means exclusively the domain of women.
 It is a family business with all members of the family
involved, particularly at busy times. 
 Women and teenage
girls were most often responsible for the gathering of leaves
and feeding worms, but men did these jobs as well.
11. Trainees are equally divided between men and women.
 
The reason most often given for men attending training is thatparticularly those with small children, could not be away
 
they cOuld get away for the month long training session.
from home for so Woment
long a period.
in the land settlements If training could be conducted
more women would probably be able to
attend.
 
12. Cooperatives have not been a significant component
 
of the project to date. 
 Since the promotion of cooperatives
would require a large investment of Personnel and financial
resources and would divert attention from the more central
objective of increasing Production and incomes, it is recom­mended that the cooperative element of the Project be
deemphasized for the time being.
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13. 
 This Project has the potential for replicability on
a broader scale. 
it has been shown that the technology can
be transferred successfully, 
Scattered incidences of spread­effect have been observed already in the vicinity surrounding
project sites. 
 RTG, however, must eoon undertake planning
for the replication phase in order to be prepared by the
termination date of this Project.
 
14. 
 The Project Coordinating Committee appears to have
been an effective mechanism for discussing and resolving
problems among the implementing agencies.
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F. Purpose: 
 Jvdge the extent to which the project has succeeded in
 
developing an independent and self-sustaining capability that will carry
 
on the work; paying particular attention to rural poverty(the proposed

three-year extension of the project would have as a primary aim giving
added emphasis in this area). In particular, examine how the project has 
addressed the needs of those on smaller farms,- in order to test the
hypotheses that improved analytic capabilities in fact benefit the poor; and,
finally, make -ecommendations on how best to meet the needs of the rural poor 
in the future.
 
H. Evaluation Team Composition: L'
 
Joint Thai-U.S. Team:
 
--Dr. Warin Wongharchao (Co-Chairman)-

Dean of Economics Faculty
 
Chulalongkorn University
 
Dr. George S. Tolley (Co-Chairman)
 
Professor of Economics
 
University of Chicago
 
Dr. Tongroj On-chan
 
Professor of Agricultural Economics
 
Kasetsart University
 
-Mr.Sombong Pattamavichaiporn
 
Technical Services Division
 
-Department of Technical and Economic Cooperation of the Royal Thai Government
 
VI. OVERALL ASSESSMENT OF IMPACTS AND SUMMARY EVALUATION
 
In the opinion of the review team, the project has succeeded
 
in its mission of establishing a high caliber operational capability 
for
 
to government policy problems in applying agricultural economics analysis 
an action setting.
 
Evidence of several kinds supporting this conclusion has been
 
cited in the preceding sections. The methodology of the models.
has been
 
found to be up to date and generally nound. The models have 
been used in
 
a variety of ways to aid policy making at the national and 
local levels,
 
and the uses show every sign of con :Tnung to expand. Many project analyses
 
Most of the activities of the
 have concerned rural poverty directly. 

rural poverty because of the emphasis on incomes in project have impacted 
and low income regions such as the Northeast. The capabilityagriculture 
which has been developed has been successfully institutionalized, 
with Thai
 
ui M .nd machine resources able to maintain the models and carry 
on the
 
policy work after doparture of the ISU team.
 
Because an infiunce on major policies affecting agriculture is
 
achieved by a project of this kind at a low cost, relatively speaking,
 
it is s cosz effective wiy of promoting agricultural and income 
distrib­
ution objectives, and thus is cost effective in favorably affecting the
 
lives of Thai vurai farmers. As an example, the analysis of 
Fourth Five
 
Year Plai% alternatives led to identification and choice of a strategy 
that
 
was more favorable to raising incomes in the Northeast than other 
strategies.
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If the strategy turns out to be only 
very partially effective, succeeding
 
in raising the incomes of .5 million farm 
families by $5 per year, the
 
resulting $2.5 million gain in yearly income 
in the Northeast would far
 
acceed the costs of the project which even in 
its development years has
 
foregoing illustration had costs beyond this range. The apparently not 
uses of the models of the to only one of myriadapplyingis conservative, 
and ruralwith developmentactivity concernedno 
The project is 
project. Possibly, other 
of this project.the cost-effectivenesspoverty matches 
concerned with development and of activitiesto other kindscomplementary 
rural poverty since it helps in the 
choice of policies and programs which
 
other activities.determineimportantly 
such, other products of the
 
Aside from the uses of the models 
as 

project are used including the data generated 
and the background analyses
 
the demand and cost of production 
studies.
 
prepared for the models such as 

Among the most important outputs of 
the project are the insights developed
 
knowledge about the agricultural economy 
which contribute to building up 
in answering requests
used almost unconsciouslyand which areof the country 
not drawing specifically on the models, 
in framing policy suggestions and 
in
 
on the country's
and informal discussions bearingto formalcontributing 
both formal andthe project outputs,all the uses offuture. Considering 
informal, the benefits of the project can be 
deduced to include benefits
 
resulting from avoidance of policy 
mistakes that occur when policies 
are
 
to priornot been subjected 
are untried and which have undertaken which 
The avoidance of mistaken policies, 
which without
 
quantitative assessment. 

the project would have been undertaken, but 
which are not considered
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seriously once a stock of knowledge about agriculture is built up, raises 
the cost-effectiveness of the project above that considered above which
 
concerned only formal analysis of specific visible alternatives. 
. Compared to other pos-ible policy planning approaches, Agricultural 
Sector Analysis has several unique characteristics. First, being compre­
hensive, it forces a total and consistent view of agriculture, helping to
 
maximize the likelihood that all important effects will be included and that 
estimates will be accurate. Second, Agricultural Sector Analysis gives
 
quantitative answers helping to sort out the important from the unimportant
 
effects of policy alternatives and helping to select policies contributing
 
more rather than less to goals. Third, Agricultural Sector -Analysis as 
developed in the project is an operational policy tool. The results are used
 
directly for policy and not primarily for those in the academic community
 
or others who might or might not take the extra step of making the results
 
policy relevant.
 
Side effects of the present project may be noted. The project
 
has trained people, adding to the intellectual assets of Thailand. Ithas
 
contributed to the Vpgrading of an arm of government through its direct and
 
indirect effects on DAE. Finally, the project has added a new component 
to the agricultural economics profession In Thailand. The by-product of 
interactions of Agricultural Sector Analysis personnel with other agricul­
tural economists enhances the agricultural economics profession in the 
nation and contributes to the ultimate wider development of research knowl­
edge about the agricultural economy of the country. 
VII. RECOMMENDATIONS
 
The following are the recommendations of the evaluation team,
 
summarizing and elaborating on recommendations contained in earlier sections
 
of the report:
 
1. 	 Additiona] assistance will be needed to complete the development
 
of models now nearly completed. This could be done by temporary
 
consulting help. If the full development of rural development
 
and poverty capability is to take place, a full-fledged continua­
tion of the project would be necessary with a resident team.
 
2. 	 The input-output technique for analysis of local atd regional 
effects is a tool that is very co-natible with linear programming. 
The DAE can and is preparing to obtain data to calculate input­
output coefficients for nonfarm activities which are closely 
farm related, such as farm innuts and agricultural processing. 
Information on other activities is available from elsewhere in
 
government. On the other hand, the macro modelling suffers from
 
data problens and partially overlans macro modelling being done
 
elsewhere in Thailand. The problems of linking it usefully with
 
the linear programming models are great. A strategy that emerges,
 
then, is to concentrate the analysis of nonfarm activities in
 
the input-output modelling and dem-emphasize the macro modelling.
 
The main variables needed from the macro modelling is income.
 
The feed backs at the national level from acricultural events
 
is a topic to be explored in the future but may well legitimately
 
be de-emphasized in the near term effort.
 
3. (Wforts to relate the modelling to long run factors determining
econ-oii ve o--men anc pe ~[aI mes of sec'enfl £ ]e 
farm 	and nonfarm economy should be initiated.Cle reasoT-r r doing 
some 	work along these lines is to provide a basis for keeping the
 
sector analysis consistent with the long run determinants of
 
developments in the Thai economy. Particular attention might be
 
given to migration and to the course of the general level of wage
 
rates in various sectors of the economy, which change markedly if
 
there is successful development and has irplicatiors for the terms 
on which labor supplies itself to agricul'ure and for the choice 
of farm technologies. (Fully extending the models to consider 
credit and other factor is also to be recommended. 
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4. The elevation of status of DAE which is in prospect will promotetwo way communication, as DAE will have an increased responsi­bilit, for all policies related to agriculture. The two-way
communication will be enhanced if the top echelons of the MOAC
take 	steps to formally ensure that the agencies within the Ministrymake 	 their views and needs known to DAE and that 	DAE makes knownits capabilities and policy results. 
5. 	 Two-way communication will be further enhanced if there is greater
communication among agencies both within MOAC and outside MOAC atthe working level. Tis is taking place in many ways. 
 Itisrecommended that DAE on its part undertake to initiate as muchcontact and cooperation, particularly among research technicians, 
as possible. 
6. 
 Steps that could be taken to enhance two-way communication with
the academic community would be to seek cooperation in developing
needed coefficients and analyses used as 
inputs or extensions of
the models. To a significant extent 
 this 	could be accomplished
by arranging meetings and conLinuing liaison in which there was
give and take about the models and in which the needs for behavioral
analyses to give inputs into the model were explored. Beyond this,
leaves of absence of various academic personnel to work in DAE for
a period might be considered, as well possibly as 
subcontracting
particular assignments to universities. The development of a
capabillty for fully evaluazing national farm credit policies is
but one example of a possible focus of such cooveration.
 
7. 	 Consideration might be given to fostering more t'o-waycommunication
between DAE, particularly as regards its rural development results
as they emerge, and those at the provincial level charged with
planning, as it is reorted that there is 
a relative inexperience
in carrying out the program and projectchoice procedure thatgo

with the increased emphasis on planning at theprovincial level.
 
8. 
 Elimination of overlap and fostering of greater cooperation between
the data collection activities of DAE and the National Statistical
Office appears to beproceedig. 
A data improvement effort that
might be more fully explored is for DAE to contribute to increasing
the quality of information obtained from the provincial level
agricultural offices who, it is reported 
 sometimes could be more
systematic in their reports on acreage yield, production, prices
and other variables. 
Partly there may be a need to communicate

withtheprovincial offices to let them know how important this
reporting is. Partly there may also be a need to offer training
on hot 
to obtain the information. 
DAE would be in an excellent
position to offer this training in view of expertise on data
 
collection.
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9. 
-It is to be hoped that the enormous strides in the development
- l n intWlfutur'. The tipradinc!oshould enable morehligh level positions to be 
the DAE 
available and thusbel_ o retain the_personnel who have been trained nd who maynow find attracrive opportunities outside DA- availale to them.
While theyouJdstill undoubtedly contribute to iaLland'sdv ment the Particular needs for the analytic capp .bi
 
"
 offered 6y DAE makes it desirable for them to stay there if possible.It ill in addition be important to continue to train poleadvanced levels to ensure an ongoing proces tohereby those now 
newly trained mature and move to positions of higher responsibli
to be eventually partially replaced by uunger technicians in thefuture who hopefully will be professionally as well qualified.
Lere .mightwell also be a role for re-tread prorams to ensure
that the staff remains professionally current.
 
10. 
 One of the most effective ways for helping the rural oo in
Thailand might well be for DAE to be charged with responsibility
not only for evaluating particular rural programs aimed at the rural
poor, but also to undertake an in-dethanalysisofo 
 alter
natives aimed at developing effective rural income srate{g 
 h e,
on quantitative assessments of theirimoacts. 
DAE has almost
certainly the only extant capability for undertaking this task.DAE wouldbe charged with working with the responsible aencies,1ncluding most preferably a comission charged with making legis­lative and admnistrative proposals, to develop the overall strategy
and thentotranslate the strategyinto an operational set of
programswhichwould provide the guidelines for allocation and
adminstration-
 programs concerned with the rural poor.
ancillary effort would be to analyze theeffects on 
An
 
the rural poor
of poli 
-,suchas rice price picy,
which are not aimed at the
poor as such bu 
which may have an important influence on them.
Inthis way, thL interest inhelping the rural poor could be given
aiweght in alT ;oiocy deliberations, notjust those concerned
d IFietl-
-Lne rural poor--enabling a concerted and consistent

attack on rural poverty problems.
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Summary#13 

The n Sm proved-foodpro systems has led to an losses
ofd-preduield 

TeMed4_for_ Improveds 

ncreased
 
emphasis on crop protecloo and a greater 
awareness of the yield
 
in developing countries 
resulting from animal damage.
 
At the time the AID/DWRC agreement 
was initiated, little was known 
about
 
vertebrate pest baology/control 
as it relates to food production 
systems
 
As a result of AID funded 
projects, the
 
con­
in the developing countries. 

DWRC has expanded the 
body of scientific literature 
relating to the 

trol of animal damage and 
explored new methodologies 
for assessing that
 
Research models have been 
developed and LDC scientists 
have
 
damage. to research local agricultural 
problems.
 
opportunities
beern provid 

in the attainment of
 
DWRC has been able to make 
substantial progress 

predetermined goals for 
major projects in the Philippines, 
Sudan, Bangla-

The vampire bat control 
project has been brought to a
 
desh, and Haiti. As a result of this program's 
component projects
 
successful conclusion. 

field and laboratory techniques 
have been developed which 
will
 
projects.
numerous 

enjoy wide application in other 
pest biology/control 

#14 - Evaluation Methodolog' 
The project was evaluated at 
this time with the objective 
of performing
 
a comprehensive analysis 
of the project's planning, organization, 
oper­
ation, budgeting, and research 
components.
 
The project was evaluated by 
a team of four recognized 
livestock scientists
 
who reviewed in detail 
issues relating to project implementation 
with
 
The evaluation team was composed 
of: 
-.e-bers.
DvR3 say 
William D. Fitzwater, Director, 
Biologic Consultants, Chairman
 
Dr. Robert E. Gray, Special 
Assistant to the Deputy 
Director of
 
of International Cooperation 
and
 
Technical Assistance, Office 
Development, USDA.
 
King L. Lovinger, Director 
of the Information Division 
of Animal
 
and Plant Health Inspection 
Service, USDA.
 
Dr. John W. Walker, AID, 
DSB/AGR/L, Project Manager.
 
The following DWRC staff 
members participated in 
the evaluation sessions:
 
Michael Fall
 
Richard Curnow John De Grazio
Clyde Jones 

G. Clay Mitchell 

Richard L. Bruggers Glenn A. Hood
 
R. Daniel Thompson & Staff 

Donal S. Balser Charles P. Stone
 William Dusenberry

Howard P. Tietjen 
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#5 - Exterfnal Factors 
a greater undertanding of the magnitude 
of food and fiber 
The need for 

Ilting from vertebrate pests and the need 
to design and inole­
losses re 

losses has not changed. During
ment progra s to control those 
the life of this project an increased awareness of food losses during both
 
che part of AID,
the production and distribution processes has developed on as in the
in several countries,
Iun 

s and d n
theprodo 
 h
councret
a n recipint
u 

,pnci~pient,Ifreoertertiest control 
systems have been Incorp­
case~~~~~~~~~ oftep 
.... 
Wi-th­n farmer rural developmentcriticalstrategies-of knowledge
caofthe
_rL-
oo  
"ec on
into _ednational small he part of DWRC
-

o
i 

e xprtae 

additional experience oncth ede
A crical mass 

an increased expertise
program will develop 

and expertise has been generatea which 
will prove valuable in the develop­
future control projects­ment of 

#16 -Inputs 
not encountered serious problems 
with. respect to the delivery 
of
 
During 1978 DWRC scientists and consultants spent 
435
DWRC has
project nputs. 

in 24 countries working on evaluations, cooperative 
studies
 
person days 

scientists, liasion/coordination with international
 with host-country 

and trailsngs Support is continually requested
 reseach orgliZationst 

by AID/W, USAIDs, Regional 
Bureaus, Regional Offices, 
and cooperating
 
countries.
 
- OutDuts
i 
the demonstratiog
 
Some of the programis more recent 
outputs would include; 

tnat Rhod ne B is a hghly effective marker when 
used in a grease formuq
 
lation, the determination 
that DRC 4575 has the 
potential for use as 
an
 
automated computer system 
which
 
determines the daily 
feeding patterns of rats, 
and the demonstration 
that
 
acute rodenticide, the 
development of an 

as a bait mark and to
 
and rodents.

_rds
microtaggant plastic particles 
can be employed 

-
.,-
zcp-:, 
In the Philippines, the 
national government has 
adopted a series of
 
recommendations which have resulted 
in the implementation of an effective
 
method of rice field rodent control through 
sustainedhaiting with antl-

In a similar action, Philippmne rodent
 
coagulants by small farmers. 

control programs were reorganized 
to incorporate improved methods 
developed
 
National Crop Protection 
Center's 
has been incorporated 
into the Philippineby project 
personnel. Vertebrate 
pest control research 
and training 
More than twenty Pnilippine 
graduate students have 
completed 
Program. 
thesis work in association 
with the project.
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In the Sudan, the project determined that the widely practiced popu­
lation reduction bird control programs were ineffective ana uneconomical.
 
an
 
Indications resulting from project sponsored field trials are that 

effective protection of small grain crops from bird camage can be
 
achieved with relatively low levels of methiocarb repellent head sprays.
 
In Bangladesh the Agricultural Research Institute has formed a Verteorate
 
Pest Division, which has selected counterpart personnel and established
 
cooperative ties with other institutions. A new laooratory and office
 
/facility has been put into operation. The project has sponsored work­
shops and training sessions for personnel from the Agricultural Research
 
During 1979 a nazionwide survey
Institute and other government agencies. 

of wheat rodent damage was completed. The survey placed wheat yield losses
 
at 12 percent or an estimated $15 million at current domesti.c prices.
 
The program's Haitian project gathered information relevant to vertebrate
 
pests and their impact on that nation's agricultural sector. A feasibi­
lity study was performed regarding the possibilities of topically treating
 
corn plants with chemical control agents as deterrents to cotton rats
 
(Sigmodon hispicus).
 
#18 - Purpose
 
The project purpose is to increase small farmer incomes and the supply of
 
food in developing countries by reducing that damage to field crops
 
caused by rats and noxious birds., Project purpose is met in part by;
 
in-country programs, TDY activities by DWRC at the request of AID/W,
 
USAIDs, and cooperating countries, and the continous research activities
 
A greater ut3lization of /of DWRC relevant to rats and noxious birds. 

economic impact analysis in future evaluations will provide greater
 
insights into project's attainment of its stated purpose; the increase
 
incomes and food supplies through vertebrate pest
of both small farmer 

control.
 
#19 - Goal
 
The project goal is to develop safe, economical, and effective vertebrate
 
pest control methods that are compatible with social and economic conditions
 
All methods developed or in development
Sexisting in developing countries. 

consistent with scientific principles. Special attention is devoted
 are 

to those demands that are unique to small farm systems. Progress indications
 
from countries like the Philipoines and Nicaragua, where certain types
 
eliminated, demonstrate
of Vertebrate pest damage have been reduced or 

that project activities have been and continue to be consistent with
 
stated goals.
 
/
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#2 - Benefic:aries
 
The Vertebrate Pest Control Project has been desizned and implemented in 
such a manner as to generate a positive jenef.t strear' Accruing directly 
to the cooperating countries' small farmers. Additional bencfits accrue 
to urban consumers when food prices tend to stabilize as a result of the
 
increased supplies generated by the reouction of vertebrate pest related
 
losses.
 
While vertebrate pests are not the only sources of crop losses that small
 
it has been estimated
farmers incur, their damage is extensive and costly. 

lost each year to rats,by Bengali whoat farmers. Verte­that $25 million is 

brate pests consume an estimated $100 million of the grain crop annually
 
an impact in reducing
in affected African countries. The project has had 

these losses. Rat damage on 500,000 hectares of small holder rice in
 
one percent, generating a
 the Philippines has been reduced from five to 
 In

savings of approximately $50 million every year for those producers. 

the Philippines and Colombia, the project produced control systems that
 
have been effective in the reduction of rat damage to coconuts.
 
The project has had and is expected to have substantial impacts upon
 
income distribution. Farmers who invest their limited land, labor, and
 
other resources in recommended technological farming packages can expect
 
to receive an increased return from their efforts rather than losing a
 
portion of their production every harvest to pests.
 
#21 - UnDlanned Effects 
Due to time and logistic constraints, the Revie. tommittee did not
 
address this issue.
 
#22 - Lessons Learned
 
It was the opinion of the reviewers that the Vertebrate Pest Control
 
Project could serve as a model for the development of projects of a
 
Someof thefactors which have contributed to the
similar nature. 

success of the project are: I an integrated approach which incudes-­
researc-',training, and interaction with local institutions to develop
 
and implement programs to utilize suitable pest control methods in
 
problem situations; a development approach based upon local field trials
 
in each situation to provide not only the necessary scientific proof of
 
technology but also as a major step in the process of developing effective
 
implementation programs which can be sustained by local institutions; and
 
the complementarity of U.S. comestic and international programs.
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#23 - Remarks
 
The Review Team recommended that the 
Vertebrate Pest Control Project be
 
nal three years beyond the present termination
 additiol
continued for an 

date of September 30, 1980.
 
The Review Team also recommended that 
DWRC researchers working in host
 
countries should be gradually phased 
out of long-term projects as host
 
With respect to the dis­
country counterparts become fully 
trained. 

semination of information, the team 
had two recommenuations; publications
 
should be prepared with the expressed 
purpose of familiarizlng regional
 
bureau, USAID, and LDCs with the 
functions and services of the DWRC
 
and that greater attention should'
be devoted to disseminatilng DWRC
 
incorporating
 
generated information to individual 
farmers as well as 

animal damage control techniques and 
tools developed through research
 
It was recommended that future evaluations
 into LDC farming systems. 

a close look at field projects by experienced, 
knowledge­
should include 

a means of determining host country 
acceptance of the
 
able reviewers as 
 FinallyLthe team recummended
 
validity and usefullness of DWRC research. should be made throughout the life
 
use of economic analypis
thagreater part~lpate Inresearcproject justi­
- Economic data are important 1or eeearch
of projec(;ts
of all 

are needed to motivate farmers to participate 
in research
 
ftication; are a vitally important factor
 
projects and to utilize solutions found; 

in prioritizing alternative solutions, 
and are useful in determining
 
whether or not potentially useful 
lines of research should be followed.
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hvaluation Fitic: Evaluation Report-- IlRk! Small arm Equipment Extensinn 
Project 
:. Purdose. [he team w~as instructed to evaluate uhther TID should
 
continue fndi nq IRRI 's industrial extension proran. All major
 
aspects h:ere inv'estigated includtn 'nachinery dest ,n and extension,

overall cost effectiveness, management, and social effects. Under
 
social effects, particular attention was paid to labor displacement, one
 
of the most controversial features of the program. 
Ii. Evaluation Team Composition: 
lain Team: 
Gerrit Argento, PhD Econonist and Feam Leader, AID, Asia Bureau, 
Washington, D.C. 
Marvin Parker, Agricultural Engineer, USAID, Cairo, Egvpt
Mlervin Yetley, PhD Rural Sociologist, Tlexas A & N, College Station, 
Texas (consultant)
 
Thailand ream 
ClifF Barton, PhD Anthronolo;lint, AIDl, )evelopment Spport Bureau,W\ashington, DI.C. 
Vansantha Narendran, PhD Anthropololist, (consultant)
Dow lanqKolsmat, PhD Economics Professor, rhammasat Un iersity (consultant)
Chesada Loohawenchit, PhD lconomi cs Professor, Thaimwasat llniverni tv, consultal 
Rapeepun Ta ssard, Phi) ,ricultural Lcononics Professor, Ch3anqmn i Universitv 
consultant. 
Te c ZI f 
CHAPTER I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
 
1. Scope of lork and Itinerary
 
In June 1975, AID and IRRI began the Industrial Extension of Small Scale
Agriculu-ra 
--
Euj.ipent P.roject (498-0265). Upon termination in April
l9,--l4l2,o0o 
 ,11have been obligated for this project.
 
Theteam was instructed to evaluate whether AID should continue fundingIRRI's industrial extension program.including machinery design All major aspects were .inves-tigatedand extension ,'-aIT-c6 t-ef-fectivenes,management, and social effects. 
 Under social effects, particula atten­tion was paid to labor displacement, one of the most controversial features 
- of the program.
 
Between November 2, 1979 and necember 19, 1979, the team visited the Phil­ippines (Manila, Central Luzon, and Ilo Ilo), Thailand (Bangkok, central
plains and Chaingmai provice), Pakistan (Islamabad and Punjab province),
India (Delhi, Punjab and Harayana provinces) and Indonesia (Jakarta, West
Java and West Sumatra provinces). In this evaluation we were able to
apportion our time roughly equally between three groups:
 
1) IRRI - host government 
- USAID officials,
 
2) fabricators,
 
3) farmers.
 
The team was composed of the following: 
,lain T-a.1 
Gerrit Argento, PhD Economist and Team Leader, A'ID, Asia Bureau,
Washington, D. C.
Marvin Parker, Agricultural Engineer, USAID Cairo, EgyptMervin Yetley, PhD Rural Sociologist, Texas A & M, College Station,Texas (consultant) 
Thailand Team
 
Cliff Barton, PhD Anthropologist, AID, Development Support Bureau,

Washington, D. C.
Vanantha Narendran, PhD Anthropologist (consultant)
Dow Mongkolsmai, PhD Economics Professor, Thammasat University(consul tant)Chesada Loohavwenchit, PhD Economics Professor, Thammasat University(consultant)Rapeepun Taissard, PhD Agricultural Economics Professor, Chaingmai
University (consultant)
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These people were divided into two groups. A main team of Argento, Parker,
 
evaluation

and Yetley was to visit all countries and conduct the overall 
fabricators inwhile the remaining members were to interview farmers and 
Due to their importance,
Thailand and study social effects in that country. 

social effects were singled out for special study and Thailand was chosen
 
for this study because among the three outreach countries it has the longest
 
experience with small scale mechanization.
 
conducted according to plan and its
With two exceptions, the evaluation was 

purposes we-reacieved. The agricultural engineer, Marvin Parker, was
 
obliged to join the team in Thailand after it had completed its visit to
 
This late arrival was compounded by an early departure.
the Philippines. 

Mr. Parker was evacuated the day after the burning of our Embassy in Islam­
abad. The consequent absence of an agricultural engineer's observations
 
in Pakistan, India, Indonesia, and the Philippirn s was a handicap which
 
fortunately has been mitigated by Mr. Parker's long experience with mechan-

Mr. Argento was denied both the opportunity of seeing
ization in Asia. 

the program in Pakistan and the risk of exposure to terrorists at the
 
behind in Thailand to observe a farm dog that
Embassy by having to stay 
bit his leg. Most of the substance of the report was written during the
 
mission before the team broke up and the major recommendations were pre­
sented to IRRI before the team returned to the United States.
 
for the openness, good will,
We would like to record here and thaok IRRI 

and detail with which it presented its mechanization program. Many hard
 
questions were answered thoughtfully, logistical arrangements went smoothly
 
which was very helpful given the busy schedule and the need for time to 
write, and IRRI seemed to welcome an outside appraisal of its program.
 
2. Recoimendations 
The various IRRI components mentioned in these recommendations are as
 
core
follows: First, there is the'_En.gineering Department funded from the 

on
budget and begun with AID assistance in 1965. Organizationally, it is 

a par with the research departments in economics, entomology, or cropping
 
systems. Next, there is the'industrial extension office established with
 
AID funding in 1975 to extendthe-knowledge produced in the engineering
 
terms of permanence and relation to IRRI's primary activities,
department. In 

it has the status of many other project financed activities at Los Banos.
 
Next there are the 'outreach offices in Pakistan, Thailand, and Indonesia
 
Next there are" subcontracts supported
which do most of thie extension work. 

core budget in India, Burma, and other countries wi-h universities
by the 

and government agencies engaged in the design and extension of farm machinery. aFinally, there is the IRRI country team composed of all IRRI people in 
country financed under different projects and contracts and coordinated by
 
a country team leader.
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IRRI at Los Banos
 
a. The Industrial Extension program should be continued under a
five year grant commitment with a review at the end of the third year which
if favorable should extend the commitment for two years; i.e., through year
seven. This is 
a long term technical assistance project which requires
security of purpose, funding, and employment conditions. If AID is unable
or unwilling to make such a commitment, we recommend termination of AID's
involvement when current contracts expire.
 
b. The Engineering Department should add a core budget funded
engineer to design machinery for dry land rice rotations. This addition
will match the core program to the expanded outreach program recommended 
below.
 
c. 
IRRI's core staff, especially the social 
scientists, and the
country teams should participate in preparing more explicit strategiesfor the outreach programs. A country strategy should includelocation within the targetcountry, farm operation, machine type, institutionaland personnel development, short and long term objectives, and the social
and economic consequences to be monitored. 
 IRRI's multidisciplinary
strength should contribute much more to the design and monitoring of thecountry programs. Focusing 4ts various viewpoints on its industrial ex­tension activities should be 
a routine IRRI function but AID, if necessary,
should add a sn.ll amount, say $7,000 per year, to 
the new project so the
extension office can contract for studies within IRRI 
 and the outreach

countries.
 
d. As a component of institutional and personnel development, the
IRRI outreach office and its counterpart should designate candidates forMS engineering training at an Asian center with dissertation research at
IRRI. 
 The country government should pay salary and academic costs and
IRRI, with AID funds, should pay per diem and materialsdisser-ation period. 
.%so to foster costs during the a practical results oriented view­point, IRRI should explore industrial secondment in Asiacounterparts. for its outreachIf suitable arrangements can be made, AID should sharecosts, through IRRI, with the outreach government. 
e. In countries like India and Thailand with well establishedmanufdcturers needing design ideas rather than help in blueprint reading,
production, or marketing, the outreach programmodest fees should consider chargingfor services which approximate those of a consulting engineer­ing firm. This will discipline both patron and client, add to the private
sector style of the program, and check an unavoidable bias in favor of thelarger manufacturer. 
NQ)
 
-4­
f. The handling of IRRI's contract should be moved from AID/W to
 
reduce the payment
the AID contracting officer in Manila. This will 
period from three months to two weeks and greatly facilitate other con­
tract business.
 
g. Services provided by the Georgia Institute of Technology were 
not cost effective and a subcontract for its participation should not 
be included in a continued project, Social and marketing studies plus 
are an
assistance to fabricators on shop layout and business practices 
integral part of IRRI's extension responsibility. 
Philippines
 
h. AID should support an outreach program in the Philippines, 
separate from IRRI and -sfmilar to the other country programs, if the GOP 
so desires. Although IRRI's presence in the Philippines has been longer 
and more intense than in the outreach countries, there has been virtually 
no institutional development for research, design, testing or extension. 
Thailand 
i. The Thai program should continue but at its current relatively 
low profile. It should concentrate on the pass-through of ideas from 
Los Banos to fabricators, feedback to Los Banos, the development of 
design and testing capability and the identification of candidates for 
training. In these activities it should broaden its emphasis to include
 
for dry land rice rotations in the North and Northeast.machinery 
Pakistan
 
j. This program got off to an uncertain start due to poor planning
 
and the absence of a strategy either understood by IRRI or accepted by
 
the GOP. However, due zo the energy and resourcefulness of the IRRI
 
representative, Amir Khan, important achievements have been made in machinery
 
adaptation and institution building. With much adaptation work completed,
 
several trainees due to return, and operating procedures and policies to
 
needs continued IRRI support. AID is prohibited
be established, Pakistan 
by statute from continuing funding for this program. We recommend that 
other donors be invited to continue the program under an explicit strategy
 
for a period of at least three years. If financially and legally feasible
 
and desired by IRRI, AID should agree to a no cost extension to avoid dis­
mantling the operation until another donor can be found.
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Indonesia
 
k. The program in Indonesia has led a precarious financial
 
existence catching at opportunities, with weakness in strategy and
 
coordination. The achievement of starting a program is due more to
 
the energy and resourcefulness of the IRRI representative, V. R. Reddy,
 
than to overall planning, management, or support. The program should 
be continued, rationalized, and brought under a unified AID/W project.
 
Two of the IRRI paid local engineers should be assigned to target areas
 
off Java.
 
India
 
e. IRRI and the GOI have discussed an outreach program in South
 
India. AID should be receptive to adding India to the project if the two
 
parties can formulate a five year action plan adequately addressing the 
issues raised in this report.
 
3. Major Findings
 
a. 	The outreach programs have suffered from a weakness in overall
 
This has resulted in vague country agreements,
planning and management. 

an opportunistic, untargetedthe lack of intermediate performance standards, 
approach and the underutilization of IRRI's fund of multidisciplinary
 
expertise.
 
either by IRRI/AIDIn the Philippines, little effort has been made, 
or 
\-
the GOP, to shift IRRI's functions in research, design, testing, and
 
extension to the GOP.
 
behavior has been a major causeAID's short term and erratic funding 
of IRR's difficulty in planning, managing, and coordinating long term tech­
nica-l assistance. To some extent IRRI has had no choice but to leave pro­
gram formulation to its lowest level field operatives. While a degree of 
decentralization to the field level and an opportunistic approach have 
advantages when starting outreach efforts in very diverse situations, the
 
program would have benefited from wider and more consistent managerial
 
and strategic perspectives. Now that this excessive flexibility has 
generated some lively country activities, it is time to incorporate these
 
and a morewider perspectives, consolidate what has taken place plan 
deliberate longer term effort. 
b. 'No problems of labor displacement have been observed in areas
 
hurriedly visited by the team where mechanization by IRRI or non-IRRI
 
machinery has occurred; Ilo Ilo and Laguna in the Philippines, the central
 
the Punjab in Pakistan andplains and Chaingmai province in Thailand and 
India. From these 	areas, it appears that mechanization is induced primar­
ily by improvements in water control and cropping intensity and secondarily
 
by increased off-farm employment opportunities.
 
\;
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c. IRRI has developed machinery for the small farmer and fabricator 
superior in many ways to existing alternatives and is likely to continue 
to do so if supported. It is also likely to be able to continue to re­
cruit very effective individuals for its extension program. 
d. A major justification for a farm machinery industrial extension 
program is the need to develop machines and a national capability able 
to resist expensive unsuitable imports of their domestic copies sponsored
by public authorities. IRRI appears to be the only agency with the ex-
­
perience and capability to assist such programs in developing Asia. 
e. Although there are many ways in which machines can increase
 
yields, quality, po;t harvest retention, cropping intensity and cultivated 
area, our brief visits to five countries did not reveal a strong impact
of mechanization on output except for pumps in the Punja- an -Teenral 
plainso-f-hailand.-in Pakistan, machines may have prevented a decline 
in production by replacing laborers moved to the Middle East. Our farm 
surveys in Thailand indicate that farm machinery ie" farm income by
allowlng more time for off-farm employment. Also, machinery made farm 
"o-k-i ess--arcfub-u-s fr many of the Thai -re-spondents and may have inhibited 
the migration of the younger generation to the cities. 
4. Plan of the Report 
The remainder of this report proceeds from the general to the specific.
We felt it necessary to include in Chapter II an outline of the strongly
held opinions on small farm mechanization. The dearth of hard data in 
this field has not been an impediment to conviction and it is useful for 
the reader to understand the controversy and uncertainty under which the 
Levaluation was carriea out. Chapters III and IV attempt to set out the broad guidelines for IRRI and AID support to mechanization. All too fre­
quently analysis and comment in this field center on the pros and cons of 
cases or machines with a neglect of what is generally important and un­
important. The final half of the report, Chapters V and VI, presents
the country evaluations. It is hoped the general first half and specific
latter half are mutually reinforcing. 
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of the project.
 
VIII.. CONCLUSION
 
The MHDI project is now fully operational.
 
Every effort is being made to assemble the information 
needed to modify and to strengthen the delivery system
 
for replication throughout the nation. 
Since many of
 
the questions surrounding the demonstration projects
 
are ultimately empirical, a cert-ain amount of experimen­
tation is inevitable. The strategy of the first round
 
evaluation, theny should stress flexibility, and should
 
not prejudge the results. Therefore, the paper which 
we present here is not the final version of the external 
evaluation results, but simply an intermediate evalua­
tion for discussion purposes only. 
The foregoing
 
discussion outlined a procedure which will enable the
 
NHS/KDI staff to systematically evaluate the demonstra­
tion project, leading ultimately to improved rural health
 
care delivery. This is not an easy task: much of the 
hard data is not currently available, and it will take
 
time to practically apply the theoretical framework. 
The objective warrants our earnest efforts. 
We contributing
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to 	a national health policy, a 
policy that can be only
 
as good as the data which it is based.
 
The important information obtained through the
 
first round evaluation is:
 
1. 	the average monthly number of service contacts

cagagorized by the health facility and by the

service function,
 
2. 	the average service time spent per 1,000 target
population catagorized by service function, by
health personnel, and by health facility,
 
3. 	the variation pattern of time spent to perform

one service catagorized by service, by health
personnel and by health f.cility,
 
4. 	the proportion of time spent on various types of
service functions (direct, indirect and unpro­
ductive),
 
5. 
the annual number of referred cases per 100

service cantracts catagorized by health facility,
 
6. 
the 	total operating cost in a given fiscal year

catagorized by service function, and by health
 
facility,
 
7. 	the average cost to the Korean government per
service contact catagorized by service and by
health facility,
 
8. 
the health expenditure of the Korean governmentper capita in each of the areas per year brokendownby service function,
 
9. 
the average cost borne by patients seeking services
 
at the demortration level.
 
ISO0
 
a 
The following are the sunmarized results and 
observations of the performancei cost, and cost 
-effectiveness studies.
 
a) 	Sufficient evidence exists to suggest that the
 
to total personnelratio of direct service time 
time is rather small at the health center level, 
but 	the ratio improves as the size of the facility
 
decreases.
 
It can be seen that the PHUs are delivering
b) 

curative ser',ices reasonably well, treating an
 
average 15-20 patients per day. This seems to
 
be an acceptable utilization rate for a popula­
tion of this siie. The average per capita annual
 
contact rate between 0.6 and 1.5 is also acceptable,
 
bearing in mind other sources of medical care such
 
as herbalists, drug vendors and private parcti­
tioners are available. Also, it must be noted that
 
this is the result of the beginning stage of
 
implementation.
 
c) Sufficient evidence also exists to suggest that
 
the working pattern of various functions is quite
 According
different among demonstration areas. 

to the results of field observations, the health
 
facility activity profiles of the different areas
 
are 	as follows: the ratio of direct service to
 
the 	total health facility service ranges from
 
about one-fifth in the health center level to
 
almost two-thirds in the substructures.
 
d) 	Even though it is not possible to compute the
 
ratio of service time performed in the field to
 
the service time performed in the office with
 
available data, personnel in the PHU spent a large
 
portion of time working in the field, i. e.,
 
community health practitioners and community health
 
aides consistently have larger average travel time
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compared to their co-workers in the health center
level.
 
e) In the substructures, there is a strong contrast
between the 32.5%of total annual expendituresused to provide curative services andto provide preventive health a mere 6.4% care. The majo"portion (53. 1%) of the total expenditures in thehealth centers was used to provide other health
related activities and administration, and only 15.9%was used up in curative services.
concluded It can bethat the substructures paid much smallerattention to the preventive services than to other

activities.
 
f) The largest rortion of expenditures by both the
health centers and the substructures (60% to 65%)is spent cn salary. 
g) It is 
seen that the average expenditure per
service contact for che health centers is 3.47
thousand won, but a much lower, 1.14 thousandwon for the substructures,
 
h) The annual average 4,090 won per capita cost ofthe health centers was observed to be much higherthan the community health centers',average per capita cost, 2,220 won or the primary healthunits 1,580 won Der capita cost. 2-6
 
i) Ther6 is evidence that the degree of fiiancial
self-sufficiency in"the substructures is higher
than that of the health centers, 

.. e., 25.4%
for PHU, 18.3% for CHC, and 17
.69for health
 
centers,
 
6/ Won (W) is the unit of currency of the Republicof Korea (1978) US $ 1.00 = W485.
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J) It is seen that the total efficiency ratio of the
 
substructures is higher than that of health centers
 
i. e., 1,6953 for the substructures and 1,0234 for
 
health centers.
 
k) The combination of both performance and cost analy­
sis indicates that the substructures are more
 
than the
efficient, or had lower cost per capital 

health centers. Even if these conclusions are
 
tentative, by virtue of the fact that only one
 
year's data was utilized in this first round study,
 
it indicateo that the efficiency of different types
 
of facilities (scales) may vary from one case to
 
another. Finally, it was found that both the
 
substructures and the health centers experienced
 
economies of scale in health delivery administration.
 
To date, KHDI's progress in mobilizing community
 
resources and developing community health practitioners
 
for primary health care is very encouraging. However,
 
there are three major tasks remaining: to inculcate
 
in the general population the concepts of primary health
 
care, to gain the support of national leaders for the
 
organizational changes needed to bolster the primary
 
health care effort, and to develop and to utilize the
 
appropriate technology for primary health care.
 
If these tasks are accomplished, rural people will be
 
helped to help themselves. "If rural peopl are helped
 
to help themselves..., a genuine development will be
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insured."
 
An Effective national 
Policy on primary, health 
care for the underprivileged will involve a virtual
 
revolution in the health service system. Fundamental 
changes in rural Korean health care will require
 
similarly far-reaching changes in the organizational
 
structure and the management practices 
of the health 
services. 
The entire health service must mobilized to
 
strengthen and to assist the primary health workers,
 
providing them with training, supervision, referral 
facilities, and logistic support including a simplified
 
national health technology appropriate to their needs.
 
Assessing the feasibility of project replication
 
will be based, in part, on analysis of coverage, per­
formance, cost and other data gathered from all phases 
of the IMDI experience. The feasibility of replication 
will be determined by both financial and administrative 
factbrs based on both subjective and objective judgements. 
Part of the KHI project external evaluation process is 
to gather both qualitative and quantitative data which
 
can contribute to this decision-making process.
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The evaluation will demonstrate the effectiveness* 
andwill show the cost of modifying the health care systemin other areas. Project evaluation results concerning

salaries, system performance costs, and health behavior
and health status impact have a direct bearing onfurther refinement of the ministry decisions.Much of the RHDI project experience will be incorporatedinto the ministry Planning process to develope the min­istry's expanded primary health 
care system. 
 Thiscooperation together with the quantitative and qualitative
results of the project, should have a significant influence
 
on rural health care implementation.
 
From the beginning of project planning, we haveemphasized the deyelopment of a low cost delivery
system, since cost was assumed to be a major factor,influencing 
both the provision and the acceptance

services. ofIt is assumed that improved cost effectivenessmust be clearly demonstrated 
to convince government of the
efficiency of comprehensive health delivery system.
As a result, cost factors will be strongly emphasized,
both in the project cost analysis study and in the other 
components 
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However, 
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- 156_
 
methods, and reduce the follow-up sample size.
 
Final data collection will begin in fiscal year 1980
 
and will be completed in the first half of that fiscal
 
year. Coding and editing of the data by area will begin
 
as the first sets of data become available, and will
 
continue concurrently as data is collected in subsequent
 
areas. Three to four months will be required to complete
 
the data processing and the tabulations. This step is
 
similar to that of the initial analysis but in an
 
abbreviated form. Basic tabulations will available
 
through the second quarter of fiscal year 1980, and
 
should be completed for all studies by the third quarter
 
of that year. Approximately one year would then remain
 
for integrative analysis, interpretation, report writing
 
and other documentation.
 
Activities related to the preparation of the
 
analysis will be conducted concurrently with data, collec­
tion, and will be completed in fiscal year 1980 when
 
all data sets should be available for analysis.
 
The interpretation of the results and the preparation
 
of the final evaluation reports and other project
 
_ 157­
documentation will be completed during fiscal year 1980 
to transfer the knowledge gained in the XHDI project 
experience.
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F. Purpose: 
 "Interim check-up" on the project's operational well-being
(page 6) and overall program direction, including: Assessing continuing
validity of project purpose and an emphasis on type of service, coverage,
priority target population, community participation, and institutional
 
development of KHDI.
 
H. Evaluation Team Composition:
 
Carl E. Taylor, M.D.
 
Professor of International Health
Johns Hopkins School of Hygiene and Preventive Medicine
 
Emmanuel Voulgaropoulos, M.D.
Associate Dean and Professor, School of Public Health, University of Hawaii
 
Helen M. Wallace, M.D.

Professor of MCH.and Family Health School of Public Health
Department of Social and Administrative Health Sciences
University of California, Berkeley
 
Lee Howard, M.D.
Director, Office of Health Development Support Bureau
Agency for International Develupment
 
Susi Kessler, M.D.
 
Director, International Health
 
American Public Health Association
 
I. SUMMARY OF PRINCIPAL RECOMMENDATIONS 
"It is inherent in success
that it demands greater effort." 
Whitman
 
The Review Team considers that, in general, KHDI has made
excellent progress in organizing its staff to develop and implement
three different models of project activities in widely different,
geographically separated areas of Korea.
 
The Team commends KHDI for its decision to implement these
demonstration models through (and in close coordination with) the
local "Gun" authorities, rather 
than as separate "pilot" projectsadministered and operated directly by KHDI. 
While the demonstration
effect might possibly have been accelerated by a "pilot" project, the
long term prospects for replicability should be enhanced by KHDI's
approach in integrating the demonstration model with the existing
government structure. 
Progress in the two areas that we visited(Hongchon and Gunee) is greater than we would have expected under
these circumstances, based on our experiences in other health programs
and projects in developing countries.
 
As in any complex social service development program of this nature
dnd magnitude, there are some areas which still need concentrated
attention and/or strengthening. 
These areas were not unknown to the
Korean Government, KHDI or its advisors before our visit; however,
through intensive discussion with the review team by all participants
the spotlight has now been thrown upon them. 
The Team therefore
submits the following broad recommendations which have emerged from
this catalytic process, as a constructive contribution to Korea's
future efforts in developing primary health care delivery systems for
its rural areas.
 
OVERALL PROGRAM DIRECTION
 
1. Project Purpose
 
Although the project purpose will remain consistent with the
original loan agreement, namely to plan, conduct, and evaluate low-cost
integrated health delivery projects directed towards low income families
and to demonstrate successfully a multi-gun, low-cost integratedhealth delivery system that is replicable, assessment of the achieve­ment of these goals should be based on an analysis of the effect of 
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selected project components (such as the role of specific category.­
of health workers) rather than a comparison of the comparative

efficiency of each of the demonstration projects.
 
2. Service 
Primary attention in the project should be redirected from
 
curative medical care to individuals, and focussed upon providing

preventive health services to the community.' Specific Maternal &
 
Child Health (MCH) activities should be undertaken for individuals in
 
rural areas by traired Community Health Aides. 
3. Coverage
 
The key indi.-ator proposed for evaluating impact from these 
projects is percent of population reached by specific services or 
coverage. Present service, and data are focussed primarily on curative 
activities. This should be totally reversed with primary attention
 
to getting complete preventive coverage, especially with maternal
 
services and child -rp through a deliberat' extension service to
 
homes.
 
4. Priority Target Population
 
Concentrated attention should be given to the poor, and their
 
major health problems; particularly those problems which could be
 
alleviated by appropriate preventive measures. In this regard, we
 
recommend a major focus on preventive measures for women of child­
bearing age, mothers, infants and children.
 
5. Community Participation 
Increase community participation through the Saemaul Undong.
This represents one of the greatest potential strengths of these 
projects. 
INSTITUTIONAL DEVEWP =T (KHDI) 
6. Internal Organization 
The internal organizatitn of KIHDI should be retained essentially
in its present form for the purposes of loan project implc-entation. 
7. National Health Planning & Evaluation 
Beyond the current scope of work, KHDI offers an important 
potential for national health planning in Korea. In view of the 
-3­
rapidly changing economic conditions and the need to propose viable
health systems which can reach the population majority, efficiency
requires that the Republic of Koi'ea establish a health planning and 
­
evaluation unit with the capability to recommend appropriate technical
and economic solutions within 
the context of national development. 
 Forthis purpose, KFDI should receive careful consideration as the nucleus
of a national health planning organization which permits assessment of
health options in relation to all socio-economic development trends.
 
8. National Linkages
 
KHDI should continue to expand and strengthen its linkages with
the Economic Planning Board, the Korean Development Institute, theMinistry of Home Affairs, Provincaal Governments, National public and
private institute5s, and professional associations in order to under­stand and assess the full range of alternatives to improve national
health levels.
 
9. International Linkaes
 
One of the most constructive future roles of KlaI will be to
serve as an international center for health planning,
training. research and
Possibilities should be explored for international support*
for expanding KHDI's capability 
to fill this important regional role.
 
.....
 oo.........o 
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Further detailed recommendations
de relopment loan project on specific aspects of theare contained in Section IV of the body of thereport. 
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ANNEX II 
I. Assessment Team Members and Program Contacts
 
A. 	 Exterior Consultants
 
Senior Malaria Advisor
1. 	 Prof. David Clyde 

WHO/SERO
 
Na Delhi, India
 
Senior Malariologist
Prof. 	W.H.R. Lumsden
2. 

Representative of the United Kingdom
 
inter Regional Coordilnator/Malaria
3. 	 Dr, David 11uir 

WHO /HQ. 
Genev , Switzerland
 
Deputy Director
Dr. 	K.G. Samnotra
4. 	
National Malaria Eradication Program
 
New Delhi, Irdia
 
Entomologist
5. 	 Dr. K. Slooff 

Representative of the Netherlands
 
Malariologist
6. 	 Prof. H.J. VanderKaay 

Representative of the Netherlands
 
B. 	 WHO Staff
 
Country Coordinator
1. 	Mr. K.H. Notaney 

Malariologist
2. 	 Dr. E.C. Haas 

Entomologist
3. 	Mr. G.P. Joshi 

Sanitarian
4. Mr. S. Tarkajosopuro 

Anti Malaria Campaign Headquarters Staff
C. 

"
 Superintendent, AMC/HQ
1. 	Dr. Abeyesundere 
Deputy Superintendent, AC1HQ2. 	 Dr. Subramaniam 

Medical Officer, AIMC/IQ
3. 	Dr. T.S. Ruberu 
Medical Officer, AMC/HQ
4. 	 Dr. P.P.R. Dias 

AMC/HQ
5. 	 Dr. M.U.L.P. Samaresinghe M.O. Training & H.E., 

Dr. P.J. Herath. Ento-olOgist, AMCIIQ
6. 
7. Mr. M.B. Wickramasinghe 	 Entomologist, AMC/HQ
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D. Anti Malaria Campaign FielA Staff
 
1. Dr. S. Sri Rajasekaram 

2. Dr. K. Kamayasabai 

3. Dr. R.A.D.W. Berard 

4. Mr. Pathameswarn 

II. Government of Sri Lanka Officials
 
A. Ministry Contacts
 
1. Mr. Gamini Jayasuriya 

2. Mr. B.C. Perera 
3. Dr. H.A. Jesudasan 

4. Dr. P.U. de La Motte 

5. Mr. S.W.A. de Silva 

6. Mr. M.D.P. Wi'jegunasekera 

7. Mr Jerry Hughs 

B. Other
 
1. Dr. Shanmugallingum 

2. Dr. M.J. Nonis 

3. Dr. H.R.S. Wijemanne 

Regional Medical Officer
 
Jaffna Region
 
AIC/Ja ffra
 
Regional Medical Officer
 
Vavuniya Region
 
AMC/Vavuniya
 
Regional Medical Officer
 
Anuradhapura Region
 
AMC/Anuradhapura
 
Public Health Inspector
 
Officer in Charge
 
Trincomalee Region
 
AMC/Triticoma lee 
Minister of Health
 
Health Secretary
 
Ministry of Health
 
Director Health Services
 
Epidemiologist
 
Epidemiology Unit
 
Ministry of Health
 
Director of Budget
 
Ministry of Finance
 
Deputy Director of Planning and
 
Implementation
 
Ministry of Planning and'.mplementation
 
Transportation Consultant
 
District Medical Officer
 
Cha vakach cheri 
Jaffna Region
 
Medical Officer
 
General Hospital, Anuradhapura
 
M.D., General Hospital
 
Anuradhapura
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D. United States Mission 
1. Hon. Donald R. Toussaint 
2. Ms. S.J. Littlefield 
3. Mr. Larry Cowper 
U.S. Ambassador to Sri Lanka 
Director, USAID/Sri Lanka 
Regional Malaria Advisor 
USAIDISrK Lanka 
4. Mr. Ed Smith 
Chief Malaria Advisor 
USAIDWashington 
C 
1. Introduction 
1.1 tnti-.°alaria Camai m-
The Anti-4alaria Carzain is a spncia1!-ed Ca-ai 
which functions under the -erut7 lirector of Fhil-lic e~alt",
Services and Director of Health Services. The Central 
Crg~uization consists of a 3uperinzterAnt, e-'ut puprin cndent
and four Nedical Officers in-charge of Trainnc., epidemiolog.r,
logistics and laboratories, spraying and transport. Thereare two (2) Entomologists in-charge of the -ntomological 
Activities. There is an s tablishmnent, Finance and lssessr en
Branch at the central level tog'ether with a Central laboratcorrz
and a Motor Repair and 'Torkshop. The !eadcnarters is sit-d 
at Yarahenita. A seperate Cross-checking Laboratory and 
Training Centre function at Deanfs Road, I'aradana. At the 
Intermediate Level there are 16 Pegional Offices at Jaffa,
Vavuni-a, Anuradhapura, Puttala-i, 'aho, lozrinefala, Ya tal-,
Aandy, Padulla, Honeragala, 
-'marai, Eatticaloa, t'ingurakgoqa, 
Trincomalee, xbilipitiya and Yatara. These are usually
manned by Regional edical Officers, Senior Sanitarian 
and their staff. There are 17 sub ?.egicnal ,fficis ranneiby Sanitarians under the regicnal offices and at the periphery
tlere 42 Public ealth Inspectors t Vigilance Uni's -ihici 
Supervise the spraying activities surveillarce and treatment 
activities carried out. Altogether there are 4,CCcover 

employees attached to the Camraien.
 
1.2 Background of theT.evie-: 
The Intensive alaria Con trol Prograrze ccrm.enced 
. t - 1077. This prograrme -as 1ased on the 
Plan of Cperaticns sined by the Govrnrment of qri lanka
and "70 on Sth Yay, 1977. The particiratLng b-ilateral 
Agencies are S AI,-. United Kingdom and the retherlands. 
According tc this Plan of Cerations and the loan agre-.ent
signed bet-een US ,A11 and the Gover-nment of -ri Tanka, theAC:C prograv=.e has to be evaluated annually 'n
 
Assessment Team.
 
This is the 2nd evalration. it is iLortant as itis at the end of the seccnd year of inzer sive enraving rith crialathicn. " decisicn is required as to ; .. 1e or not certain 
areas should be reroved fror continuous malathicn spraIng and 
put on an seasonal 'asis of spra-ring. 
it will also be inmortant to determine the decree of 
intensification of surveillance that should out.be carried 
ccrtt... 2 
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1.3 Particirants in the Second Annual Revie' Team : 
1. 	 Dr tnrtan De La Fotte - Chief Tpidemolooist, 
!_inist-ry of Health 
(Chairman). 
2. Dr David 7. C2'.de - Regional 'Llal.,riaAdviser 7'C S-ARO 
3. 	 Dr Gerald Prooks - US AD :alariaConsultant. 
4. !r tarry Cowner 
- Regional alariaAdviser - ASVL, 
tys AID. 
5. 	 Dr R. Slooff 
- M.alaria Consultant,
Government of the 
Netherlands. 
6. 	 Dr Rugo T. Van der Kaay - Yalaria Consultant, 
'overnment of the
 
V'etherlands. 
7. Professor Lumsden Kalaria.. - Consultant, 
Pritish hrigh CornIssion. 
8. :r Arthur Silva 
- Director Fudget,MLinistry of Finance. 
9. Y:r K.G. Sarnotra 
- "t4 Consultant,
1 eputy Tlirector(7ntonolo­
! ZI, India. 
10. 	 I D.P.'. jegunasekera 
- Deputy Director, 
Plan Irmlementation. 
11. Dr David ''uir -	 Entomolo-_ist, 
"7C Headquarters, 7eneva. (Tantorteur). 
1.4 Terms of Reference of the evaluaticn team , I he 
1. To r-evievr the progress of the 9I:C since 1Q78,
situation analysis and the acticns taken on 
the recor-_rcndation made for t'e 1"C prograrnc 
at that time. I 
2. 	 To review the present status of the malaria 
situation in the country and its relationshi. 
to the olanned activities undor approved 
Plan of Operations. 
3 Page 
1.4 Terms 	 of 'eference (ccntd.I 
3. To provide an epidemiological revieir of the 
malaria programme with a view to determine
those areas in the next year which -
1. 	require continued intensive 
anti-malaria activities ; 
2. 	 can proceed with a min-i-um of 
malaria programe inputs and 
3. 	 those areas which can be observed 
through an integrated health 
service programme. 
4. To review the nature and extent of administrative,
operational and technical problems a__ecting
the programme, with special reference to 
decreasing spray coverage in certain areas and 
to make recommendations to overcome these 
problems. 
5. Reviev and assess the present research projects
being carz -Led out in the AI(C proatue as well 
as identifying additional projects which could 
be implemented in the programe in the coming 
year. 
6. Review the existing programe of' village
self-helr in the malaria control field with a
" to recormeding activities to increase
commuity particiration in the .A:C programme. 
7. 	 Assess the efficacy of the training of malaria 
and public health personnel in the various 
categories and to make recormendations for 
future training directicns.
 
1.5 1'ehodolo- of reviei : 
First 2 days : 6 & 7th February - 4t A'C briefing 
and protocol 
Yr Arthur Silva Director Fudret 
1:r D.P.-ijeguna-	 o 
sekera 	
- 1'inistry of Plan 
I plemen taticn 
were also present.
 
7.2.19O - The TeaT' met the Secr"ar-, ii nisbry of
ealth, 1hirector of Health Cervicps and th 
neputy ir-ctor, Pul-lic uealth "erizice!
and "rif thc, crn their -Icsn arA 
-'r' of reference of 'o t'ar. 
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1.5 	 ethodoloi- of revimw (contd.) 
7.2.19e0 
- Frelirinary disclsicns continued at 
the '-CFeadoarters. 
Four teamrs rers forried to carry cut field ins?,ect-on 
througaout the Island, toand this too: 	place 8.2.ec 
18.2 .O. 
The teams consisted of :
 
Team 17o. 1 

.rea visited
 
1. Dr David 	F. Clyde 
2. Dr R.. Slooff 
3. Yr S. Tar-kajosopuro 	 South "astern Regions. 
4. Dr T.S. Ruer
 
Team ITo. 2
 
1. Dr H.J. Van der Kaay
 
2. riLarry 	Couoer
 
3. Dr s.C. Haas 
 Easterni Regions.
 
"ickrarasinghe
 
Team ro. 3
 
4. Nr 	 -.. 
1. Prof. "r.N.R. Lursden 
2. Dr David Yuir
 
2 2 5"ct Central ?egions.
 
4. Dr !:.U.L.P. Samarasinehe 
5. Dr (Tiss) 	F.P.J. Herath 
Team .
 
1. Dr Gerald 
-rooks 
2. 1r "K.G. 9a rotra 
3. I'r G.P. Joshi 	 :orthern 2e2ons. 
4. Dr F.3.R. 	Dias 
contd... 5 
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The detailed itineraries are wven in -kr-n 8. 7rorm 19.2 .lP-0O 
to 27.2.!9tO - The Ardnistrati-n and Crparnizaticnal set u-6 
of the V:C ,-as rev-i red ,tich included a survev of the CGntral 
storage of insecticides and other su~zlies and euiprent.
Insrection of laboratories, central ar.d cross checking, -.er? 
also carried out, The prograrre o' -ror'- of the Traning 
Centre was revi±,ed in February 1979 -y a joint Team. 1 
cormrehensive report on the "&'.C activities was nreazee and 
the Draft !Zeport, eCO~rnendaticns and Cbservat'cns rere pr-sentea 
to the FTntble Yinister of Health on February 28, 1980. 
2. Review of the actions taken on the recoc.pendations of the 
First Annual Revie% Team - r ovewrber 1978 
The reader is referred to the report of the FirstAnnual Revie. Team, November 1978, Section VII, Page 43 - 50, 
for the full text of the reconmendations put for.ard at that 
time.
 
The folio-wing is a sumary of the pr-sent Teamts

findings in relation to action taken to irplement the
 
above recor-mendations : 
2.1 -oloro 
1. Supervision t7 Regional redica Officers 
RX.Os are ncw responsible for adrnrnistrative supwcrt

of the entoolog teams, technical supervision re.Taining .Frth 
AI.cC/iQ. The R.fl.Os have the cpportunit7 of usir7 te tbas 
for special2 investigations. Vany do not bare the ecerience 
recuir~d fcz s',mervisicn. 
2. (a) and (b) Suitable red.oyi-ent of teams
 
This has been recently carried cut, and the teams 
are undergoing a period o' adjustment.
 
3. Traips 
These are being re-designed and suplied in
 
adequate numbers.
 
4. Susceptibility! testing 
This is being done, with si,-le scre-ning tozts 
where the vector is scarce, and meas ero.t ot' actual susceptibi1ity 
level where numbers pernit. 
5. lYalathion resistant bed-buas 
Areas affected by t.'is have not be.n fa'lT rerrarcat,d. 
It has not be n demonstrated hc;ever that srraying rfusals 
are primarily due to this factor. 
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10. Conclusions and Recommendationz, 
CONCZUS IONS 
The Team concluded that in all but on* rural
 
area, and some small urban areas of intenaified 
spraying operations, there should not be any 
reduction in the coverage and frequancy during
 
1980 and probably also 1981o 
Important factors contributina to thin recommend­
ation rel4te to the cctuses of oontinuing transminsion ­
large gzp3 in the surveillance netq the moderxtA. to 
law spraying coverage actually achieved in oome areau, 
and the doubtful operatioal quality of the opay baing 
applied. The continuing sdnsitivity of the vyeto: to 
malathion is, of courset a paramount consideration in 
Tontinuing ita uage.
Reduction of upray rounds from four to tio, the 
latter related t peaks, ito aeaonal1rsminzion 
recommended for Mannar Island whore rofu2ala aro 
particularly common on account of bed bug resiatance. 
Thee can be no transfer of any tra.aisaiom area 
to the control of the General Health Sorvicog vhile
 
the prinary goal of the proraimma 12 Pa.etlc1-ra, 
eradiction. 
It was also concluded that the 3urvoillanca 
mechaniom is inadequate and needs strengthening 
particularly with reference to P.C.D. 
-hs need for continued development of Commuity 
Participation and Community support iz particularly 
streaied. This should be encouraged to the utmozt, 
and full support given to the Range P.l. 
Another major recommendation is the formation 
of an Epidemiological Rasource Unit for the programme. 
The Team was inpressed by the progros rde by 
the A.!,C. under difficult circumstances, and by the 
willingness shown to develop and utilizo ne-i approache ­
to control measures. 
To aummariae, continued technioal edzytbility,
oommunity participation at the rilllno le7el aad 
political will at the top woro idontifiod ao the 
outat ading support inaredlonti which wculd ba 
oacent;Il for nuocer.3 
(Ontd...)
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ASIA/DP/E: 8/80-
discussed 
- a savings of $20,000. Time and attention should not
be taken from the analysis, interpretation of data and writing

of reports during the middle of the two year period.
 
If the above suggestions were adopted there would be a total

savings of about $90,000 ($82,000 plus 10%). The team does not
believe that these suggestions are necessarily the only places
in which savings could be made, and recommends that the project

staff consider carefully the possibility of other modifications.
 
On the other hand, the team members agree that the project

staff could benefit from the addition of a person skilled in
date processing, data analysis and evaluation techniques. It
is recommended that serious consideration be given to locating

a well-qualified Thai who could be hired half-time for the
project. It is further suggested that attempts be made to

convince the directors of tha Ministry's Rural Primary Health

Care Expansion Project to employ this person, also on a half
time basis - to assist in planning and implementing the evaluation

of this project. It is recocfnized that given the sensitive

relationship that exists between these two projects this may

not be acceptable to either or both parties. 
Nevertheless, we

strongly believe it would serve a most useful liaison function
if the agreement of the directors of both projects could be
 
secured to establish this position.
 
Although not charged with considering possible management

mechanisms for the continuition of the project, the team would
like to suggest that it should be managed by a contracted
 
agency, which would be less costly and hopefully more efficient
than past management arrangements or direct management by the
 
Mission.
 
Summary and Recommendations
 
A research project in health care is usually designed to answer
questions concerning effectiveness. A demonstration project is
primarily concerned with questions of efficiency. Studies of

efficiency are composed of two parts, the first dealing with

the difficulties of setting a project into motion, and the

second with its continuing operation. The Lampang Project

should be considered a demonstration with added research
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orientation. 
Much information has already been accumulated
and presented on how to put such a health care system into
operation 
-
selection of personnel, training, record keeping
and logistics. That considerable attention has already been
paid to the Lampang experience is evidenced by the adaptation
of elements of this health care system to other provinces in
Thailand.
 
Among the most important 
lessons yet to be learned from the
Lampang Project are those concerning how to keMsuch
system running. a
Continued organized observation of this
health care delivery system should idertify problems both in
personnel and logistics that arise during the first few years
of operation. It should point to ways in which they may be
corrected or avoided in other projects. 
 It should also
identify elements in the program which work particularly well.
To curtail this continued evaluation would lose half the
value of the project. 
In addition, without continued observation
the modest research elements in the design would come to naught.
Little can now be said concerning the effectiveness of this
health care training approach and delivery system. 
Only
through collection of additional data and comparison with
control districts will any notions emerge as to the'impact
the system has had 
on the health and attitudes of the rural
people during its first few years.

In the opinion of the review team, it would be unwise to refuse
further financial support and not attempt to reap the important
benefits which can yet be obtained from the project. 
The
team, therefore, makes the following recommendations:
 
1. 
The proposed two-year evaluation should be
supported by AID at a financial level corresponding roughly to
the intermediate budget submitted by Lampang. 
The evaluation
approach is sound and the activities should be completed within
two years.
 
2. 
The two full-time foreign technical advisors
should be retained, but only one international consultant for
two visits annually.
 
3. 
The surveys and studies suggested should be
conducted as planned, except for the Vital Events Monitoring.
This should be dropped unless greatly modified.
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4. The Project has been managed throughthe American a contract withPublic Health Associationwith the University of Hawaii (APHA) and a subcontract(U). APHA's involvement in the
Lampang Project is a legacy of its original task of management
and coordination of all five DEIDS projects.institutions in the Lampang project The role of bothis now obsolete and alter­native management mechanisms should be considered. 
5.-
 The Rural Primary Health Care Expansion project has
drawn on the Lampang experience but has introduced some major
modifications. 
Cooperative studies of these two Thai projectscould highlight the relative benefits and identify effective
components of each. 
 To facilitate such studies and to assist
Lampang in its evaluation, particularly the data analysis, a
liaison position between the two projects should be considered.
Ideally each project would Linance half of the salary for the
person selected for this position.
 
6. The Lampang project has been visited by many persons
interested in primary health care.
devoted considerable time as hosts. The senior staff members have
During the evaluation they
should be free to focus their attention on date analysis,
receiving few visitors.
 
7. During the two-year evaluation period the senior
staff should curtail outside activities to concentrate on data
collection, analysis, interpretation and documentation.
 
8. The team was provided with copies of all papers
prepared and/or presented at conferences since the project's
inception. 
Future written materials should concentrate on
documentation and analysis of the Lampang experience and be
organized to minimize overlap and duplication.
completed work Much of theis descriptively repetitive and contains littledata analysis; as the data become available during the naxttwo years, they should provide the focus of the documentation.The team also recommends preparation of a single documentsummarizes the Lampang approach that its strengths and weakness to primary health care, analyzesand evaluates its Potential
replicability. 
- 21 -

Finally the team would like to urge AID to makedecision concerning the future of the project. 	an expeditiousAll memb-rs othe project staff deserve this as they have been kept dangling
much too long. In addition, if AID wishes the project to
continue the staff should be informed before they feel compelled
to accept other opportunities. If key taff members shouldleave, the evaluation program may have to be discontinued. 
\vlv
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TIC 	 PROPfECT 
TLio Luwa are -.nd Transrnir:-Lion IDevo-hrrien' Project (LTD-1) :
 
nit) bi'-crtoral r~- development projoct1 iocat' ill I::a~kni I'wru . ­
the prO'TaA.JQ of Sot-L Sultawesi. Th01e Project is 2.- ef L'or to cocrC~.inE- . 
th'- Pla--'- .lpleor~ntation of rur.,Q -,.evaloprnont projots cf' vL~r-oi;: 
riiw' 4-- c--,t a~~ oimloplernt packoaEu tUtwl itiprove tho livinE; 
st-ndari.: ; r-,ral poor. The basic idea of the project -Ls that E. 
dovclcp i n' ac-.g whiol, atttnmts to i-provo : various f':Cbr-- LL-,t 
affect 11' .c i-; of tho Thl:oi~afuarier s, o~i as improved ixrigLatlcn 
and. rowTh, moclcrn f'ari c- chnoloT,-. Ewi-lbLll-y Of ar;ricul'uural ii.p.utr., 
rind accco;z -to iicxrcts for farm production w,ill have a _rvo:tor i.ip'ct 
th"i farmero iU'L tn total econordc devolonmrdot of 'uhe1 al-ca bhia ifthz 
projects wore i-,tnernontod. incliVdlUlly Over varioCUS tir.o porlds3 
Thea LADP dlirectly involvcs four UoorirtPini-tries and. fiLV, 
d.~corit~ jncg.lor acies whuihIavo cao,-to-d fivc iotbproo'3cts 
plustkaj~ ~-~thc-Aq-urt,-rv. wine' haI[V, th) 0o11oi'511 ezaabio 
Id.pM32-,4i, of7 Ilanpow..,r and Tr;',ri~,i Yolluon 
A. 	 iDir,-uVr:Lo a~c of ~~~irtc­
-to10 Q~RY~S O,,opeab a ier1tosin Palopo i Lh of-­
licos in, ijuiirj Pandin- and Jaka~rta, which coordinvt' -,h-, 
.2: -G ; rc.Ozo.t --d eozhzit tr: iian., acltvib1cu 
2. 	 ~'JS~dGEUTIOTT SUBPFiAJEC' - -'- sot tlo seven laundidrcd. traii-­
ia-- A f -riilios in- thec Pr.u,j,;ct Luwu Lrricp."ion oroao0 
I!* of :k.',lac Works 
A. 	 113 roctorzeG.rlo JI,:'x (Bina llar ;a 
ftOii. E' POVEIZ'!T SUTFIZOJECT - to imq~rovo 177 !alo;.oo ci 
tr-'unk rCoad. IOtWDen Pa~l I), -1-Al IR7alili. 
B3 	 Dirct or-obeuncr-d] ef Uatcr flosourcc -, flo-,olcpi ic.It. 
IIL~lG~ : r-~j~j-1 -to rolh-bihlltz-to ond impfcvo t "jBc. 
Loco'i K-lc'ona ;tion uzystcius d-x:L- u :La.-­iirri, , to ohic. I 
r L* - o 3C',9)LO hoc. r - of land. 
*iCI[,Ti'-, .7j7 i07" T - Lo ~~~i1 foir 11rl ,.C 
Bea.Avzllablea Docquazi
 
r~ir- (ro ) in the Luiu. a:.-ca u±nd p'rovido e'xtaiision ccp'vior.-i
 
-. . c: f~'ror rcgardinio food cops, livostook, fi:"1.,3OriUi,:i 00 :. LOi
 
vs. ort;~PrOdi,--ctibn.
 
IV$ I.iisiitry of Tradio and Coepor-x1ivos
 
A. 	 Diroietor$te General of Cooporativos 
COOFEPL';TI1.ES SUbDPROJL2CT establish four Farm Coopor:.iv.,.; -to 
COntors 'FCC) in Luwti to bea SUJ :0p-od b ocalJ f..i-rm cooPO2pevi-o3
 
A Thei FCC, rvd farm input.F; to Luwu farniors arid purclirLSo tho.',
 
L..m:i ,urpluscs.* The Capital Aosistarloo Paproiialypa,~
 
K P.2Cs be 
T01o10%or, t;e1-rWore Eseparxouod into indlividuial ebojocprier 
to t4!,,, oiid of the Loan A,6Tr~cemnt. 
Or-w..yteIiiistry of HealJth had ale&0 boon piaxrmod. to- patr­
~~~~the and FOCs to enie&.no r.1Sorvice Conter&'. 
tiop~to ao 'p'.'jobto oroejbo0. ]i Ot~rubprojc-ct wrhich Ce~crf+n *1l - ' 
f isi a, T2L1-; r 1 rjci howevor ha.,z oincc o~' oanclo yet 
Rick 	Lof inidojn~o cffil,.riacsis in the atixo. 
Fi~jtro 1 il-.ba~ sco-,vjialytd pro jobt arimd its eempoll,;rGu. * 
As Chown, tr.7,iumiL11.its providec the labor to w: 'rkhoI'il a~zA
Iopoened i'P-o jact Luwu 
 . The transamira~ts zmni tho local £rmr'c, 'V 
proijOC. wco, Cro i c>t bniia'csof the ProeCt ~Tu;J. - '~ ro]hal.ilitatiot'~a- cM,1s1 Of~twlo Ir-itoi 
sysitoms, und modern farm. tochnoloj y ±L4 providcl to the ron i 
other farmraer by' thei -. onbs of tho Rur'al. Extonsion Cowes n h ar'DU 
Faii: Coopo.,r:,,tivos Cantors aro 1ioi:i±: ostab.lisho diJiicA will help to oupl,­
fai-Lror w,,ith noco-ory a,7rioultutral inpus and to provide a T.-arlcot for 
tho fari-,yr.,- by urchiasi.n, the-ir outputs znd praevidiriC primiary procOstsirv 
boforoc~ .1n tl. om ott of the aroa. All eion of the project- aro 
.A,; ~ 'o~ soiLi;t.10 :Idn road pasino, throu,-1,, 'hc proj.oct wh'ichi is bu.1.rivii.'
 
~*J. iiu'o ac.coss t~o mrktsfor the fr~r.-Ir3 of Luwu. 1,1l activi­
ciPro jct Y.w a~r-ir or~~F 11y loautcid
ordiimtod theO~t wlc' is 
P-ioipo, thc .rpit~idl of the LuwuIabvto 
i., of pritm.ary impor-'O"I.cu" it 1 i~~th" 'OIP:fic.ti 
.1 .tc~ prv. '.~&e:j;to mrkes, wic .;ro vitr±Id tc-, * I~rojoct 'r1 zucoer0f::;
 
2Y, '.,c) 

this GU~y'' i.~itovBbr~~ coft 
pWlcnod buvx., .j lBalocated, tUo tho hoadqUal'rb.rI 
6p oototho REC rh: hondFO.S. 
o 
End 
27/ a tiu 
trxlgrtu f 
1PR0JECU LO'0i" 
. As'shin in Fi 2,Kabupaton tho northrl t of th"I 
Bay of BonoI .ca in th northeast part 
of the proVinc f h 
SvJ.awoi Th. Klab;.paton has an area of 
25,149 Im2 and a currcnt popU.­
. : B , awosilocat... . 
i n• 
T1 1 c rtrd of Project Luwu iocto in 
Palopo, and Most pro joct activitis are nprOald throuhout th-b..Nalili How­omeo, 177 X1111from PaLl01" 
The road. iproVCf'- It pro jecto tends 
-to . 
'areas 
e" 
I 
K.7.The 
R 
ever, 11 st P.rcioc-btt .%iti OS aro 
Situated in theo BoneO Bono a-nd KaJlaonIa 
whor the irri.-tion improvoraonts are locv.l 
In Bon o ,c" 3200 
! clrL~oO w ill bo irriro.ed, and one aPG ,nd ono FOC are 
cach locttod in 
thi"s aea. oca,,atan Bono Bone oontains 3239 trnsmi&Mant 
f...:.ilic: ill: 
have boon settle sirnce 1970 under the 
MilistrY o .fTransmi ,r '. 
roSuLar ti.-fl3nigratJon program. 
Kala-na i, th site of one REC and no future 
FCC, ai. 7560 O 
will bo irriatod by, tho Kalacla River 
riEhtban systom. Sevr hvndrcd 
transmi,$arlnt fciilios have boon settled in this 
area by Pro)jct Lu..m2 
along with 3100 f~diswho have boen 
settled byteA~~rtao 
-
-miatioflprogram. ' 
road impr6vement sub-projoct passe touh b oth n Bon 
. 
'a.laol., as wcll as throu&Sh Datusitanluk 
where 0n RE C'is now locatod an.. 
no FOCwill b--bnilt~i the futu ro S 
lopo an REC hLs boon 
.'lilt ".n adas Sappa, and an FCC will be built in Bolopa, 
7-t frmt1e Kabupatn LuuL. Transmigratio
0 Office imlioat that 
., 
b.:,'':o oon settlec! in Lu.ru since 1970, repreosonting 
aPProxi­
3C~ ~G inthe o 
:,"C.: +trnir.,flts ii-i the c,,uatans 
of asambal on 
:.-,.ktu, .... i.1-tj1f:-. all of whom stLand to benefit 
from Project Luwa. 
F... .- "- '. 'UTTC ',L COO )I,'1712fI­
,:.u' 
'"n'rojoctT* in any country which includos the 
participation of four 
......... :.ministri'o is bound to be a difficult 
affair to maa~c, and 
.- is no oxcoption The various :mia strs'i 
s of the O1 havo. 
"'.Ac 
s 
n o O O ~ ~ 
n " 
" ' 
' 
" 
...
" ..... ..' 
': 
k"I* 
R 3F: 0,1 
one of the criginl ac-An evaluation proGram for Project Luu.i wars 
of the overall scope of the project, wich tivities planned to be a part 
Paper (CAP). The CAP defines the is outlined in the Capital Assistanca 
* purpose of the evaluation as having four aspects . 
I) To monitor progress towards the attainment of project goals, 
-12) To assess the scocio--conowic impact of the project, 
inhibit 
denify problem zaras und constraints which3) To .. 
pro .yess! and 
decision maki'ag
*4) To feed relevent information back into the 
//. process of continued plan£ng. organization, and implemen­
development of similar proj­tation in Lu, and into the 
..i a n e s - -
...idprga-eval+uatnn oter -t-e in Indonesiao~
ize the 
.... ctsots in other locations 
The CAP stresses that he vltion e 
inputs rather thai the monitoringimpact of projectassessment of' th 
:of the execution of inputs, and will include a broad-baso social sector 
m are in theof the -v-ilua.ion progra out'hind analysis. Thauee phases 
to 
to assemble information alr.,dy available, and CAP. The first is 
phase is to conduct aTho scoond
rofine the evaluatioh mothcdoloT.Y, 
basolino study of agrioultwa 
l production and technology, marketing, 
andi or&g iu.ia-uiofl for' development. TheDrcdit, level of wcll.1being, 
and reporting.
phase includes data collection, calysis,third 
in Yandan(" was contracted by ProjectKasanuddin University UjLun16 
anm •Vri ch would be undertaken throughLuw. to coniuct the evaluatio. p;,o 
anual studies, UIUAS he so far 'omplcted two annual studies .a series of 
s" 'A ;nmrleos inthe project area. using data gathered throgh 

Llxn a:Al U'AID that an additional study was It was felt by Proju't 
thl LIUitV.S work, particularly to provide .aso line necessary to complemet; appcared to be-lacking in the UI.H.S data nd benohz fiures o
11lc
consultant.wasstudy. Throf ore ChqQclhi and Company asked to prov&d.o 
undor its technical with'Project Li,1.assistanc, assistance contract 
M,. Robert Manly was 
to undertake an .3valuati.on study of tho project. 
as a short term evaluation consult+ant to the project aid contracted )Coohrano, a long term consultant conducted -.his .valu;tion with itr. Steve 
.,'.. 
on the Chocchi/Di'IJ l advisory 
.. .-
.J -, 
t-am in 
. ...... .. 
Luwa. 
*.. ...... .. .... , . 
. .. 
S.,. 
. .. 
... 
. . . .. ' " .. 
. ' '':. ij"I. ...".~>~ , 
PuriI, ) )lauUnt; stooge Of tis ov,1u=tion staldy th,e sccpe of 
tle 1orik w.:r A, cl.x:rl,; defined by .,ny sinilu iucrinent. It yas there­
fCrC neCocLIr. to refo'r Lo the CAP and .o lottLr correspondence botecon 
Frojucb L.,TuT USAID2 aad Checcii ,,il Company, in order to dofi.ic the scopo 
cf this stuly. UfM,1S rervn,3 the primary anhjly responsible for the total 
cvrluatioa proLr-,n. The scope of his evaluation study includes the 
follouing : 
1. 	 B3SELIITE D..TA AJ)D BENCI-T RI(S 
Ono cf' th.o priimarj objectives of "hlis study is to gather baseline 
data a.nd determine benc]marks which can be used to assess the imnact 
of t:he -reject. 
2, 	 1] 2U2ES OF GOAL LCiTIEV MIT 
This study idantifios appropriate measures of ,otl achLovonont wholi 
indicato the progross of the project and iioasure the atbiiriort cf 
its anals. 
3. 	 PROJECT IIPACT 
Thi, study ab-tem.pts to i-easiro the impacts of Projoct L:t..ru tc 
dotor-iine if the projeoc goals arc beinr, achieved, and to dot;r-­
13nc ifI ir. fct , Project Lu7u rith its iulti-seotoral approawh 
is repossible for the attainven' of the project Goals. 
4. 	 PR!CJ2C1 C--0IIZATIOIJ Iil IMAPUETTL ION 
An atte-,rr- is :iade to study the current organization of Project 
Lu,,u and t , recoImrond irnprovcmeints to the existing orSanizatical 
,whic1-can mprove -':- implcr.entation of the project. 
5 % EVIOSI0 O1 LOGICAL FRI?:1,4ORPK MLTRIX 
A review ofFthe Logical Framework 1,r)Aix in the CAP is a part 
of this ovaluation effort, to try to make the matrix a more 
useful tool f"r p~oj-,ct evaluation -.id monitoring by Project 
Lutrarn'aie.'ept end U17SID. The revised 'LogFrame" is not in­
cludC. in this report, but hos been forwarded to the Project Luat 
Iianmer an4c the USf.TD Project Officer under separate cover. 
6. 	 ANUTUJAL EVYLLUATION 2'D REFORTITG T JOrK 
The final objectave of this evalaatian study is to set up a frms.­
work for evuAuation which can be repeated oi' an annual basis by 
\1c
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Pr . Li. u L 1 '1i13c1 Will rcsul,, la on 'nnurl reporb of the 
Pl'crcsJ Of V11 r-' ccot i.d iLtl)ct L e Dzrr Inot Luu area. thlis 
re -lrd. it should be notcd thab uhis Lt' not a final Cvaluaioni but 
, only tho firslu of a series of anual evalation reports. 
All threc phr-scs of eraluati).. r'n5iunecd in th-c CAP wore includ.cd
 
in this study, 01h) evaluation m-,thodoloLr ias rmfilled, 0 baselino 
s t.dy
110s co;1ducte( 1 -in' progross data was atthred and analyzed rcultin6; in 
this rolor., 
'iusevaluaulion stud, was conducted 'over tho course of four maoths< 
frrm laL, Atp-o-
-, .aly Docemnber 1979. All research and analycis ,Ts,/
 
ccnd tcteD . ?1-h ,o i r -'o.c-vh ad ouar.a-: . 11 o c r p 
o Udt-.­
Pao.nck:,-t-,,-e 1,t- not a-,ailablo in Palope. It is holed that this
 
2rDnm-l evalu.n 
 rtol-,rt
my 1e started soon after April of eacit rcar
 
whun an-vl e;ovoriu nt statistics becom4e avlilabjo a'Vhe e
U r1igan0 of,
LaCh "c;r ' i'l/cal year 
 As t-,c process bccomes refin-.ed, tho C.11nual
 
StUdy, S, C-ltIr/I1e l1-
,) accorrpmli-hcd in ono to two months. 
:Z'].s *cp~rt " izrs -,uith a 2,enor.l dc,,cripttoni of Proje Lva, n­
,nan-,.i-" )i 3 D rcrcctys or>nization, Tt then foico:is t'o basic
 
ouiline of t' oTz Fr.vnowor- Matrix. V,') projocb ;oal is vs+
 
analyzod, ,uia-
 ,tsl ne datq and boiic'2-tarks in comparison vlkh ,rO£Tj:.

data for t]'o Uaoar', sinco Project Lu.rn 
1c .an, 1o ns.i~miot the atmainmen 
of the project s o
 
The Eoogrp'iic i[.olation 
of Luxzu provided z trcmondous oprortuitj
 
to study the impact of Lho projacts, It is alirnst; 
 ocplatoly s-trround-l
 
by nountains and ;7-t-'1
sea acoeso only by tizo i.jor roads to Falopo, or 
by sea thruujh Palop: or Nalili Uib:,i no ot'er major development 
proGram ccurn, in and fouzLuwu outside im*]uenocs ffcctin, the area, 
it rzcvided a convonio--r "Lborotory"l for the study of the impacts of 
this mut_2--sccter- dcv,':lorncnt projLct,
 
Th- e 0 .ictio
oI, 
.s foloced by -i. annlysio of the p-oject r 
iapuk.s uII LE,2-l ~'.rn , Thu £-\a--l sOction of tho rero'rt doscril cov 
t]e nLX'cx:oJle tse.o , t us ev-.luzticn stuly° , -m.ries of 1L.c dta 
gathur..dl fo_, al'.--) nalysis ire arne:-eo ati. bec: of Uie rerorb. 
*-6.
 
Ml*l1, &O'oz' drin; tiiz valiution cffort rr'e on file at tilo 
FrojoeA f11a q-arb ro III Palopo aid arc open to ain~onua w1ihin,,j I i'ora 
ILI !uz of thue f jtLros.lr-r:si: 

It is !,-I~ roro2.,t will bc. valuablo
iisz to tho CGovor-l.13nt 
Of i-b * f in1 Ulldcrstarrlin- tho boenefito of Project Lit~r 
t~Sir11 ,- ;Il.-wicnybenco ntered in implementinc a 
m bli -,0-.tor, v;''e~ projoct. 
ISl. S U 11 1I A R Y 
T'ho Li. %:'u. ,,d Tra.n':migrtio1 Dc~ei<,nt Projeob is a oomr.le% 
,2.ulti-s.(Ctol rur".l (!JVolopmunlt project whoch coordinaLes the activi-­
ties of four G I u1iistrics and fivc dliroctorat: goncral or agencies 
to create ,lve'up eaoketS Lufu Wimch would vo groatora -at in 	 hw. a 
iwpact on Uho rural poor bhan if tho ooti-itios wero all implc!nentcd 
separately over various tiwe periods. 
Data iaO idca tLAL Frojec Luum is woll on its way to attain-n, 
its ,;oal of incro sing the well boiag of the small frnor in Luvru. 
Almost all rmuasurs of Coal achievront show quite positive trcnds, 
currently iOc'i; at Jret2A' rates th,.an _ .] . , 
inds-tin 1-" th,- project has ]lad a sioiificant pocitivo impact on 
the 	Lvvn ar2a. ',c iicrcazimn; Srout ratcs of the mcsures of ,joal 
achicvcnit ... :,11, .,ojoct areas comparod with the rather stoady f~r vth. 
rates in E) f w project acLivities indic-to Th,A Project Lmu 
hoc 	 boon -. ajor ot-,e of the incrosed OOOlIOric devoloplionl seon -.n 
Tj .0'...-] L r' "'-j,'n1rowt~h rases indicoto b!ha[- The m~ulti-Sactor,] 
aPlohoi of -":, r, j %'as provided bcrjncl'its to -I wide ran6 of thc 
Luwu popu] .,o 1. thoso widosproad bncfits appear to have , 
a grca , l , ;,.ous invostmont !u~h has furthered Luwiu t : c¢,­
nomic cvel, D,.t. Hajor measures of ;oal aecazovmont for Kabupaton L,,' 
show a. rolrth bencinark 2.:- ,vraorates since the year of ' f7S/, 
food pruduc '%(-± 1O,6 c,, for food oxports, 12.52' for food co"c'imption 1 e00 
capit, au, 12.6. fcr n.At incoric per food farm person. 
AltA.ouI, the a'mrwact of the pro-1ct alroady appears to be svbstcni.l, 
records of p-c jc npu s show only 34P of total estimated Project Doc t 
disbursed o- of iNarch 317 1979. By source of funds7 34o of C01 pro,,cc 
costs (DIP Ib1r Ai) %.nd27' of foroZn exchl&'o costs had bO-on disburF;o(, 
but only 1, o2 z-,rs-blo rupivh costs prefi.anced by 0O1 (DIP Sti.­
rc~ic' At) 1:cre rocorded disbursod. Bocausc of contracting and dosign 
probl!; .r, Iv-,t, j,.ct i.taplrmcntation is beingj sprcad over six years instcld 
Of Ti, .. '... .Lrad four ,0,-rs, but if thc current rate of 
di:zb'u',oc,., ccntincs,-L: Lime fr'.no of the project may rell ,,xLcni to 
o1ht O iuar'( imnproverornt which for 3Q.: ofhe -(I _u7proj(zcF 	 accounts 
1%. of lbi., 011J 3i'Lcd ±hr~;'uc -L~ctto 'r01layj 11 cui'trccb 
;'obilizaL on andrdoi~npobos 
Acccrtlils"; '. , -'I.j. ct recor-Is? the prc~yro. s of ,.cojoct c.iultr is 
~rcc..Jn~well., 11j b1i c"he oxcopblon of U1h3 FCc 'andl rond irrprovi~icnt ac ­
iviti., y-ic" buth suffered fromi undor plc.niin and undeor bilje;t. 
3ic-. TY'c FC- 's. facilitics hazve hodl Lo be oxPa,1i1r. rm-'rc than tcn tir'jes 
i2o10lA n ai:c1 t-c road rehtb- l2tat~on plan ias hod] to be con'­
plol~ .;t, s-bpiojoots be in TMeOIL ~ Eohb-h SILUu1.d. complote 1983. 

~ransii~1 v",h'rojoCti1 j.,o1 cOrjp]rte, ond other subprojects are
 
pro-r;s-,in cl-rz t)schodulo.
 
c'.; -'~p~''as o_ C.'(!.fic C_3-i 
cp..rA~tiflSj ad ciTt.'f (TOTI) pro,-rams for the oubprojectfs do­
v.' ,&t ~C~iLt-Lt.s? oapicaro to havo a Cood probability of atta:.nment 
.Lo. '11" I.CG :111d 1"11C aybivitios. The ro~odiu. jdrrif~ibion subpr:oi-clusf 
wi'vh t'z'ir C'! costs, reore' c:llconstrucLtLi iill fairly 'Ui;h 
POIK b 4 ,t, i3 -ormoiit, it appears tli, thec irri,-:tion Subprojoct 
wil' 1.\xv nul'. 77,j of its esimat.cd POI LUd,)ct needoz, and th10 road 
rchpi'oj ct :.L.l7 n aboui 25c' C its '7OT1 budCoht needs avail5"lo. 
Pro jc-, Lird Ui huLd a subst~tia1 jp,_sit2vo impact on *i6ie Ltvu 
airea despito tn.o .1air.,cn1,nt difficui~ui is it cri vbez for a govornnwcln 
uhich ios or .d ,i rnlon- stronfg soctoial lin&.' ILjor m'anaeorront diffi­
cuioies havo beena created by havin2 ono miistry coordinate the aotivi.­
ties of otheor traclitao,,_.lly I"oqu~al"' -:ill zbr2.Cf, IWith its ~roJ3ct he U".­
qtiartors ini Luzu where coimunacations d.ifficul Les with Ujung P, Ii(an11 
anc'. Jakartba arc inheirent. 
A.,. effoctive project coordination systera has evolwd howevor for 
the rr~pc ~ 'zu~h arzoiiz GOI Jcoos ar.1. US,'.ID letr of 1rere~ 
tation hec P:*:'vvt Matiods of projectjDat T~mgrwith soveral 
coor .- c~nAi ct; 1-- cii'r~i process which rocftaro si ~ 
prn-.,ots to i: ,:±.oe -"'ojoct r%,inager up to date o.1 'he pror6reso of StJb-
Ir.. j, t idx ± 1t, ut r,, _,d through pro joct coordinTion Tect. ­
",_U.LIf2.'AS The- ziccess of the pro jock pro-vides ' 
'or oxi ±h:~. G0 s niulti-scborj duvclopmont efforts i-itr 
i'.Ui*'*~ .' '~ ~j ~ LO 1.~PC L ri c; i.a~.r2 co~ *o-. o..'I.. 
- 10 	 .-
IV. rfiCO[EimlATINioj3 
* 	 '.lo0 irapert'-1co of completir; .ll su1.prc,jecb activti : oa-not 1,C
 
ovorO ;r',s3cr11 avon if cost overruns -orc incurred. The cv-iu).tion
 
±1x-; tod t'. 	 -O;zc ,"'"-"t"Unof its are al roady 2ciL-a 'ccrue through 
•--. pr(,(Iucion, increased incomos, increased exports, iind in­
crcc.zd :1-i'. to i.ro tr.v.cnt in Luium In carrying' the projecL t*11s 
far, the oLctions of thC people in/&ares have risen, encour_,-anc.; 
i~i -ic-Ln ;.-d inerc tZced development activities Gains already 
mdlao must nc' L'. ],-t and the continuai positive growth trends must 
ocnttnuo c bo .,..coaraged. The completion of all subprojects vrill 
arealize 
allow both priwato sector and the government to/returns on thoir 
invostr.--ts T .d :_ll oncourao4, more spontaneeus private invst~ment 
in! te &2r. 
2. 	 ~AriculLural ec:on±sification .as boon a raajor factor ii aroating 
pro j'Y,;L benefits to daLe. Stress must ±ow be laid on the proper 
mana c. cnt of aricultural intonsification prograns .- irrigation 
opertics ,Licutaultr.l extension services, ar the pr_.vision of 
propor arrioul'u2Al iinputs. Continued increases in the Croirwh of 
aroultural prociuction will rely mo and merc on intensification 
activitisco as l.:i clearing comes close to completion. 
3. 	 T1',e ,la-- ' - ai flow of fwur.s, pnrt-icularly in regard to roi-ibursc­
rmcnts an::d :'j cial reporting; Las been dii'colt duo to the comploxi­
ty uf . .t0 aad it is recomnended t2-hb a Coordinabing Poject 
Treaisurer I, ap c'iinLed within the Directorote General of Bud,'%-t of 
the 1~~lst:,r f Fii.ancc to handle all PrOect Luwu fi:-onncial docu­
ments. This !c-con w-uld be re3punsible for processi:; all theo sut'­
project treasurcrs' monthly reports of exponditures account.bility 
and rQcuotss for r.2-nburomont an(I would forward them promptly to 
USAID, birci.'Etic Directorate General of Interrmtional Mkioary 
lffairs, ,iL +ohe Projeoc Luwu ilai-.uger. 
4. 	 , To src,.2 -t' - ursomont trocess of the projecb, it is roconmended( 
-'ic.t , i - b. office prepare a Meetini" to be atiended by all 
proe, c i, L.o as. ., of the Luwu Subprojects as wall as other ropre-­
sonttiivo. L.,. dir ,ctorates '3nexrl invclvd 1 in order to explai-n 
the procedure, t-.]3, d in Mizcry of Fin'.no Decree iTo. 395/79 
LA4~ 
-,, I oV'00o r CM -b b - 4 'iJ u l h 
-. 
c rop nib lt ni ro ,fc 
v*it-- t' ofqu. 
d:, pwraTor rofw t., to ,o Proljibc11I-auo r cam.i:riic rig in. voi.t ablo­
c puot r Prvio o 1 rojri'o outu eot,-oiuaro dt t o th rojc 
flAy4rs .1f oubinit cura oicluing DIP 
-imc'~4_- ..01.olt3 to t;..o6 dzojoionzr .oprig..... fc~lo 
-,1141, 1o ofunctiipon*'hod ,mordcvo itohntof pliuno 
lua:1z04 r u,-)1tr ofth projot 0progZfuturmcnioi 'of0~i.iuo L-C 
1; 70''1 1.6. 3upoo s iii the CA P ro jorts nUo -.ihnpu rad0A should beold 
th 01or11 isf j;10 cmocffintE bni o umon(i Husr'6 Dw~IP u 
''*a~L! I ),v.:rjC~t £"'uotinmonily ro1 propestuditrning cf fi , 
futv.aioiF1. f Tlwchopooo s n utuiros ln ofupotu ro. .­ 4-44'd 
~~~I0.C.SlohtUl~oo inocch CAd fundingsources C'i1oilitions pro=ulc.o dn' 
'4'4'4,d r.EorCo ( theIr2AIDA VCs-osbmttorogrivto 
ti o P , 0ud0TheP1 
toom~i uii/,-ojcis projta 
proctmnomtsul]iw'Crae ndabro'.d,: 'cr 
soiineitappoarovlzthoA the nr~o­
tN ' . 
onnno ilwolviN; 61l-illo] .i-
Tha lifo Ozync' 'c 
~gJ.rocjiro 0. ,;roat dwej. Of rz-niaw 
tolr'-.c1C -T2Accr:3 tailaCu'i Iil tann:100 IlLd~. 

of 'Uo nowt r. -13 o,0q'oi c L- la~s rOou-rf 'CIP, ;i'Yol.
to ba tnU1 
~2.;tf~ r aboier; f 1Va uan0It3. P a-1di rShould cz,,rb L~Iiir.ta!"rr~r u 
to crix a,r proprivto -,CII prCLS.-n wI1 Lbjo nGcCSS"rv bc wSO 
L'L .r c.p'n'sod i c,')ra-aj) a-,t~ rozd sc,' 1 lllc imrc 
0ha ,cor9. 	 11, : G rCCOTfl1OA'loR) a mlti-73octorCl cdavolopmCAnY' frojoct3 
~i~ii'x(' loum bo i:,lcmeate1 i:. oILor areas of Indoxnosia, ihn 
-2.CxiOr to ':03 ifC ',:- SUCCOSful im~pao,, cf F5i'c, mcct -,~o 
ofhi. iation szhoui -L' %b 1,ite:~T;ktod LII'2O. Y-13~ Ofr Iat 
muli..zct raJ lv01 4 app Iboon sniccaofu1 ill Lulwu6oloicri .a 
li.J'o fina-,l toCsk will Como wTica t,,c sinic o~praacl iz- atteI'Aptuad i i 
difforc:-, a.'cao withI difforil.,; cdito sStran'j ovahwvlotio oru­
pofl(.iuc '-Xouldci asle a part of aLl ncw -,rojecits to cl;cuio tlivat 
t2h:r iri-os rc wall uatlorutood. 
10. 	 The PrTh.ci Lumi Evalua'uno,-i ParoLrc'm ,,ci,.ld 'Do contaua(1 on2 %-, miinu-l 
basis up to *a oroject'o coir)lciGwa Luo Lhcwt LXq cuot-H raluos of t-"o 
,.iurx 	 i 3,i~l ac~dovoal.on may -'-, rmoitored over a lomjcr tir. 
-taba fuller udrt12I of heprojact as oalpctoc.peariod?~ so 

may ')ba oiJ
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F. Purpose: "The primary purposes of the evaluation were to (1) determine whether
the broader project design is valid or requires modification and (2) analyze and
document accomplishments and problem areas and recommend courses of action and
realistic time frames. 
The evaluation was based upon a review of background doctments,
reports and communications, observatiFos at the project construction site and
personal interviews with relevantpersonnel."1
 
H. Evaluation Team:
 
Raymond A. Bailey, PhD, is a senior member of the Public Administration Service (PAS)
Washington headquarters staff and has broad experience, in Asian rural development

program implementation.
 
Frank Stipak is a registered professional engineer #8343, State of California, and
is a PAS Senior Consulcant with extensive US. Bureau of Reclamation and international
experience in irrigation engineering and water resource development and management.
 
Bicol River Basin Development Program (BRBDP): 
Patermucio Calleja and Fernando
Alcisto, Jr., Project Coordinators. 
Francisco Balitaan, evaluation specialist..
 
JR 
Construction progress for Phase I has been seriously impeded by duplicative
administrative procedures in reviewing and signing construction contracts 
and by delays in funding, i.e., in allotments and the issuance of cash 
disbursement ceilings (CDC). If the flow of funds is constructionadequate,
of all phases can be finished by the schedtiled completion date (' September 30,
1931). Design and construction procedures now being followed will provide
facilities adequate to permit long-range irrigation and drainage of the 
service area.. . .. .. 
The organizational structure and staff composition of the Project Mmnagement
O'fice (Fin) are adequate to meet current project needs, and, with support
by an active policy level Ccmposite Mn eage:ment Group (CaW), excellent line 
agency cooperation has been achieved. The full ecoplement of interagency
personnel assigned to the project is successiully implementing all insti­
tutional project co--ponents. It can be accelerated as construction pro­
gresses. As construction and institutional activities are accelerated 
in 1980, additional supervisory and ertension staff may be reqaired. 
.I. EVAIA.TIOU MIDDOLOGY 
This evaluation was conducted by a joint GOP-U.S. interagency team, 
consisting of representatives of BRFDPO and USAID contractors. The
 
Ydistry of Agrarian Reform (KAR) end the PWf provided associate members,
Raymond A. Bailey and 2rank Stipak were e-ployed by USAID under short­
term contract with Public Ad&-ni 'ration Service to serve as outside 
mebers of the joint team and have been primarily responsible for writing
the Exalution Report and drafting this Pr6jeRt Evaluation Sum (PES).
In this effort, they have brSen ably assisted by other members of the team,
in particular by Patermucio Calleja and Fernando Al!sisto, Jr., BP3DF0 
Project Coordinators, and Francisco Balitaan, contract MMDO evaluation . 
specialist. No representative was assigned by YDA. 
The pr.lnavy purposes of the evaluation were to (1) determine whether thebroader project design is valid or requires modification and (2) analyze
and document accnmplislmnents and problem areas and recommend courses of 
action with realistic time-frames. The ev-aluation -;as based upon a 
review of ba-kground documents, reports and other written commnmications,
obsermtions at the project corztruction site and personal interviews 
with relevant personnel. 
15. APFACTORS 
A subseauent Presidential Directive requiring prior approval by the Presl­
dential Review Coimittee for contracts in excess of 2,0O,OO imposed
unanticipated delays in contracting for construction of facilities. 
One lo&r-ame assmnption for achieving project purpose, ie.., "The Bicol 
Secondary and Feeder Roads Project will provide improved all-veather main 
road access into the entire project area by the end of CY 1979, "will 
.probably not be met before the end of CY 1980. It is recomended that 
priority in the Bicol Roads ProJect be given to early ccmletin of the 
-3­
£ xt Domingo-San REsmon feeder roads, servicing the first phbaes of 
the Bula IAD 11 Project of which a 200-meter section is inoassable 
during the rainy season. 
26. nxjrs
 
Scheduled construction activities were not underway because of delays
in sign-ig conltracts. Delayed release of funds, materials and fuel have 
caused some wor: stoppages. Procedures and priorities are needed to 
insure availability and time-ly delivery.---_ 
17. OUTFTS 
Progress toward attainment of logfrme output targets is qppro.Cimate3y 
one year behind schedule, due in some part to delays in fund releases (Assumption C-4-a-6), but primarily due to long delays (as much as 
12 months) in the evaluation and awrd of construction contracts. 
Contract AE design work, training programs, land consolidation, insti­
tutional develo.rnent, and force account construction are all progressing 
as rapidly as ph-ysical construction constraints -ill permit. Out-puts 
accomplished to date do not require modification. 
18. PUPOSE 
Detailed discussion and quantification of progress toward attaiment 
of End of Project Status is not pertinent at this time in that none of 
the project area has yet came under the new irrigation system. However, 
progress in organizational devopment and training, and in tenurial 
developm~ent in the Phase I Barangays of San Ramon and San Agustin indicate 
that the set of EDPS conditions is a valid and realistic description of
what will exist when the project is comleted. A caveat, however: the 
time-frame is valid o if no further delays occur in contracting and 
completion of physical construction. 
, Goal: "To improve the socio-economic situation and the quality of life 
of the rural poor residing in the project area." aqluation is not 
Pertinent at this early stage of project iMlemetation. 
20. BMLmICARMS 
/ At this time, serious discussion of impacts is not pertinent. It mightbe noted that some short term inconveniences have been caused by some 
construction activities. Generally, beneficiary participation bas been 
- active to date in household relocation, institutional develoi t, and 
traing antivities. 
21. IzpuaDI EE=T 
One u42plamned but desirable effect was reported by private sector members 
at the regional wrap-up meeting of the project Ccxiosite Management rop.
-at is a grawing avmreness elsehvere in the region of the project area 
activities, and interest in the possibility of access to similar oppor­
tunities. Particular reference wvas made to interest in 'honesite devel­
oinent on the project model. 
DSSONS3 LFIMA
 
The primsary lesson learned to date 
is that decenrralization of central9ovenrnental agency authority to the regional and local levels is =oteasily accoplished. However, as in other Bicol lAD projects, theincreased effort required to seci-re drentralzaotin will pay off in -
terms of broader participation by different line agencies, lcal govern­
ment and local instituions.
 
23. SPECIAL COHNM S 
Additionml details are included in the evaluation team report datedJ'tme 23, 1979 (10 pages, 2 tables).
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F. Purpose: "The primary purposes of the evaluation were to (1) determinewhether the broader project design is valid or requires modification and
(2) analyze and document accomplishments and problem areas and recommend
courses of action and realistic time frames. 
The evaluatioy, was based upon
a review of background documents, reports and communications, observations at
the project construction site and personal interviews with relevant personnel."-

H. Evaluation Team:
 
BRBDP:
 
Francisco Balitaan
 
Fernando Alcisto, Jr.
 
Francisco Vargas, Jr., engineer
 
Publi,. Administration Service: 
(main authors)
 
Frank Stipak, Registered Professional Engineer #8343, California, is a
PAS Senior Consultant with extensive U.S. Bureau of Reclamation and
international experience in irrigation engineering and water resource development

and management.
 
Raymond A. Bailey, is a senior member of the Public Administration Service
Washington headquarters staff and has broad experience in Asian rural
 development program implementation.
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13. SUMRY 
There have been f-ther delays in construction of the pbysical facilities 
since the last evaluation (May 1978) due to heavy rains, including typhoons, 
as well as lack of adequ- c equipment and occasional shortages of cement 
and fuel. The physical facilities, with changes as jointly recommended 
herein, are adequate to provide long-term irrigation, drainage end tidal 
flood protection to the service area. Under a revised construction schedule 
which appears attainable, facilities should be completed and operational by
June 30, 1980. If further delays in completion become evident by February -­
1980, extension of the terminal dates of request for reimbursement should be 
requested by the GOP and USAID. 
In implementation of the organizational/institutional/training components,
previous differences between the National Irrigation Administration (IaA)
and the Bicol River Basin Develomment Program Office (BRBDIO) have been 
resolved, and an effective project cooixination/manag ent structure is 
now in place. Some difficulties renain in defini ng specialist and extension 
personnel needs and in attaining full interagency participation in staffing,
but these are apparently moving toward resolution. Structural organization
of farmers groups has been butlargely completed, substantial work is still 
requiec to adequately prepare farmers syste operation and managemnt res­
ponsibilities. 
The NIA is placing higher priority on support and develoment of theinstitutional comronemt and is now, at the start of the final year before 
scheduled water delivery, finalizing the detailed i=lementation plan for 
completion of this component. The plan includes definition and scheduling
of required interagency staff, the finalization of a water mana ement p1laM, 
a wmter rate schedule, end a phased five-year schedule for *stem turmover 
to farmers. 
It was the consensus of participants in this evaluation that it adequatey
reviewed the project's status and progress since the last evaluation. It 
reco---ed the existence of unilied project policy and direction and 
facilitated timely, substantive project decisions. 
14. EVAU _TION MMEMDOrOGY 
T.ais evaluation -as conducted by a joint GOP-U.S. interagency team,
consisting of representatives of the 3DPO and USAIl (by contract).
Psymond A. Bailey and Frank Sti ak were employed by USAID under contract 
with Public Administration Service to serve as outside members of the Joint 
team and have been primarily responsible for writing the EValuation Report
and Project Ea1=luation Slzmary. In this effort, they have been ab3v assisted 
by other mbers of the team, in particular by Fe:--ando Alsisto, Jr.,
Francisco Vargas, and ?-Etancisco Balitsan (contract) of the BREDPO. The VIAOffice of Special Projects (OSP) Yanila and the Project Yznagement Office atLib- ran provided associate t--am members. No representative was assigned by
IEA. 
The pri xay 3=-poses of the evaluation were to (1) deternmine Mhether the 
broader proJect design is valid or requires modification and (2) nalyze and 
7-­
"Increased rice productivity per hectare."Subgoal: 
achievement cannot begin to be1%rogress toard goal and subgoal 
objectively measred until the project has been 
in operation for at least 
the first
 
year. Assuming construction is ccopleted 
in June 1980, 
(or June 1982).
should beone for Jime 198)scheduled field impact eva2itilon ' pilot impact evaluation effort under project is also included as aThis 
and Social Impact Analysis/Women in 
Devel­
the USA.-supported Fonomic 
unde---Aopment (:...A/W3JJ) p-roject 
20. BEDICIALPES 
than orie.nalPreliminary data indicate that the 
number of households will prove 
to be 
size of anholding larger,and the averageslightly lower, practice in which elderly cue to the camon 
estimated. This is possibly worked by the families of their sons of the landto alJparents hold title to be the single, large landholding 
of 
This then appearsand d&waghtezrs. 
The true number of beneficiary families 
should be clarified 
one household. 

when complete beneficiary data become available.
 
F-TS21. K.= 
SBeyond the unplaned effects discussed 
in previous evaluations, certain
 
an April 9 suimarywere noted ineffectsas positive) Fiveadverse (as well in the project area. selected farmers 
report-/ from interviews with side effects including local 
farmers indicated adverse desia/construwtion system) irrigation
loss of existing (Handong interference with drainage, This evaluationcanal construction.to road and water, and loss of land small relative to 
of such side effects is the incidenceteam observes that of short-te 
of the area. They are mainly to be the total population of repeated construction delays. but appear persistert because nature, 
once the system is completed and tested. correctionMost axe scheduled for 
-22o. LESSONS LFAM 
regarding the dificulty of devel­evaluationsreported in previous and managementLessons structures 
installing regional level organizationaloping and 
for awtaining full interagency coordination 
and prticipation have 
systems pays in terms of broadereffort, howver,The increasedbeen reconfirmed. and locallocal governmetline agencies,participation by different 
institutions. 
excavation sections of 
experienced iu excavating the deep The difficulties the need for adequate pre-constructionamply demonstratedthe main canal have and vertical controlhorizontalas topoeraphy,laning and field data such 
and sub-surface explorations.
 
23. S-r=-AL CO.1-1RS KID S--tO 
a two-part joint GOP-U.S. cvalation are included inAdditional details 1979.team report dated June 22, 
(13 pages and 4 figres) 
I. luation of PhYical Facilities 
(12 ?ages)Managet and Operatizg SystemsII. Organization, 
e . rLaag, AS/TfEfl (A'/W), April 1979. c Z_C. iEcxey 
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Bicol River Basin Development Program
 
GOP/BRBDP-USAID 
August 1979 
lu1ila, Philippines 
FACESHEET 
I. BASIC PROJECT IDENTIFICATION DATA
A. Country 15. Project Title 
Jklippines n Bipol Integrated RuralIDeve opment Proiect 

Life of Project Funding 
1.AID: (Loan or Grant) per 

-Other Donor 

lor Country Counterpart Fund& 155.6 mi llion 
_ 

TOTAL .
 
G. Project Dezign 
1. In-House (Name, Position) 
not stated 

2. Contractor (Name, Firm, Contract No.) 
not stated 

I. Previous Evaluations (include Title, Typo and Date) 
1975, 1977 evaluations
 
U1.
BASIC EVALUATION DATA 
A. Evaluation Title B.Evaluation Date 
Bicol Biennial Evaluation: August 1979
Bigol-Rivet Basin Developm 

_tPogram,
veo t Prorm(SEE 

E.Evaluation Cost 
1. Direct Hire.IntatdB 
a. travel 6,420 
per diem 
_ 4260 
K .ontract 31,710 
3. Other 1 610 
per coT - eAfct.0 
H. Evaluation Team Composition 
1. Direct Hire 
a. Nm 
- 2. Coa: 
b. Present Position 
a.Name of Organization (Ifany* 
(SEE attached sheet)
 
, C.Name(s) of Persons 
1. Other RePonuibii AID and Hoot Cowy 
"J.Pe-sonnel (Name, PositlonjTeodoro Encarnacion,-
-Deputy Minister, MPIV;
Eduarto Corpuz, AsSistant Director, NEDA;

Francisco Balitaan, BRBDPO Evaluation 

-necialist.
 
FOR SPECIAL-VALUATION
 
C.Prnject Number D. Active Life of Projet: 
492-0303 1. Project Agreement Signed FY not stated
2. Approved Project Corrmpletion Date (PACO) FY_ 
F. Responsible Mission Officials 
1.Mission Director 
2. Project Off.cws (Name, Position) Camnilo Balisnomo, program3.Other director
 
H. Implemet'iton 
1. Host Country Agency(ie) 
National Council on Integrated Area
 
Development (NACIAD)

2. Contractor (N.mq, Firm, Contract No.) 
not stated
 
C.Type of Evaluation 
Biennial 

F. Purpose(s) of Evaluation 
(SEE attached sheet)
 
c. Ares of Expertise 
b. Contract No. 
d. Area(s) of Expertise 
EvaluationCoriar 
fignatur 
TYpfd 
. D. Project Period Covered by Evaliation 
"Now in its sixth year.""Now i t ithya.
ATTACHMENT F 
1974-1977)
 
G. Initiated By 
not stated
 
Date 
- ASIA/DP/E. 6/80 
Bicol Biennial Evaluation: Bicol River Basin Development Program page two
 
F. Purpose: "This evaluation differed from 
its predecessors by concentr.
 
on the broader Bicol River Basin Development Program now in its sixth year,
as well ajs the supporting USAID grant technical assistance project." 
 Consonant
with the project's evolution . it covers program direction; agribusiness

promotion; management, research and training; and organization, adminis­
tration and staffing.
 
H. Evaluation Team Composition: 
 Contract Consultants
 
U.S. Members:-.
 
Dr. Thomas T. Weaver, agricultural development, Univ. of Rhode Island
Dr. Gerald C. Wheelock,rrural sociologist, Alabama A & M University
Dr. James A. Roumasset, economist, University of Hawaii
 
G.O.P. members:
 
Dr. Gelia T. Castillo (UPLB), rural sociologist

Mr. Joaquin P. Cortez III, Planning Consultant, MI.S. 
in urban and regional
 
planning.
 
Mr. Rolando Tungpalan, NEDA, A.B., economics
 
Mr. Danilo Alcantara, NCIAD, A.B. mass communications
 
I SUlARY FINDINGS AND RECOUDATICKS 
The Bicol River Basin Development Program (BRBDP) was last evaluated by a
joint GOP/U.S. team in 1977. It was also evaluated in 1975. The following

report presents the findings of a follow-on 1979 evaluation by a joint GOP/

U.S. spoisored team conducted over a period of six weeks. 
The evaluation
 
team members reviewed project documents, visited the three-province Bicol
 
Program area including individual project sites, and drove down many of the 
new project roads. Trips were made as far as the Irosin Valley in Sorsogon
in search of information and confirmation of concepts. The team interviewed
 
numerous participants and officials ir both Manila and the Bicol. This eva­
luation differed from its predecessors by concentrating on the broader Bicol
 
River Basin Development Program now 
 in its sixth year as well as the support­
ing USAID grant technical assistance project.
 
Summary Findings 
The team assessment of the joint Bicol Integrated Rural Development Project
(Bicol IRD), indicated that it has been successful in providing selected U.S.
 
and Filipino technical consultants, participant training to the U.S. and 
 otherAsian countries, and a moderate level of essential commodities (see Attachment
F). The emphasis is now shifting from project planning/packaging to technical
 
assistance in support of the implementation of the five on-going Bicol loan
 
projects assisted by AID, agribusiness and rural industry promotion and proj­
ect monitoring and evaluation activities. Activities are also proposed to
facilitate spread effects from the Bicol Program to other IAD efforts in the
 
Philippines.
 
As detailed in the main body of the report and its attachments, after originally
attempting a comprehensive approach to regional development, the operations of

the Bicol Program now focus on a package approach to development. In this 
approach, critical development bottlenecks in an area are identified, takinginto account the expressed needs of the local population together with some 
knowledge of the available resources in the area. The identified bottlenecks 
are used to pinpoint a complementary set of component projects. The teamfound that this practice of packaging integrated component projects is funda­
mentally sound. It has been successful in attracting funding by external 
sources (see Attachment E). It can be further strengthened Ui a number of 
ways, and the team developed a number of recomendations which are presented 
in this report. 
The evaluation team found that decentralization of appropriate planning,
coordination and policy-making activity to the regional and sub-regional
levels has been effective. When decentralization of the appropriate functions
has been employed, local government and popular participation in the planning 
process is encouraged, Bicol Program Office staff are more productive, and
the problem-solving capability of the Bicol Program is enhanced. The reverse 
is true under a more centralized process. 
At the present stage of evolution of the Bicol Program, It would be premature
to recommend transfer of the entire concept to other regions or sub-regions.Nevertheless, the potential for replicating the package planning and action 
strategies is immediate. However to achieve that potential, it seems neces­
sary to fully operationalize the concept of decentralized planning and Imple­
mentation. 
In sum, the overall picture of the Bicol Program test case in Integrated Area
 
Development is mixed. The evaluation two years ago saw reason for consider­
able optimism primarily on the basis of the Bicol River Basin 
Development

Program Office (BRBDPO) having effectively planned and coordinated a variety

of component projects. 
The promise of two years ago has not yet been achieved.
 
In the interim, changes in personnel and operational approach have tended to
 
mute the full BRBDPO coordinating and planning capacity. New projects re­
cently funded will place prcssure on training less experienced BRBDPO staff,
and 	 the momentum from yeoman efforts in earlier years may bring yet more 
projects to the Basin. The brief inspection of individual projects already
underway suggests second generation problems ahead that will need priority
attention. The very success in designing and funding projects seems to
diver' attention away from other key development problems which need to be
 
solved if the benefits, particularly from irrigation projects, are to be
 
achieved. 
The 	 evaluation team wishes the staff of the BRBDPO every possible success.
 
They are engaged in a very crucial 
program. The nation is looking to it forguidance. It should not be allowed to be crushed on the rocks by its own
 
momentum.
 
Recommendations
 
The main body of the report and its attachments develop a number of 
recommendations. These are presented here in summary form under the headings

of (A) program direction, (B) agribusiness promotion, (C) management,

research and training, and (D) organization, administration and staffing. 
A. 	 Program Direction 
The 'focus on infrastructure development was an appropriate choice for the 
first generation of projects in the case of Bicol River Basin. In the first 
stage, the key was to get the integrated rural development apparatus moving
and to achieve some ini.tial successes and impacts. This is still true for 
project areas outside the physical river basin. The evaluation team feels 
that for the second generation of projects the focus should be somewhat 
different and perhaps alightly more narrow. In particular, the area of 
resource management, broadly understood, would appear to be a strong poten­
tirl comparative advantage for the Bicol Program. Management of river basin 
resources includes hydroecology planning, agro-forestation, and water manage­
ment. The resource management concept should also be extended to include 
coastal zone resource management and to the design and implementation of 
cropping systems for smallholders in the non-irrigated areas (e.g., the devel­
opment and extension of a simple cover crop for coconut areas). Specifically, 
the team makes the following recommendations: 
1. 	 New component projects should be designed and existing plans reviewed 
in accordance with the principle of providing projects with the least 
disturbance to the physical-social-economic environment in place. In 
construction, this means investigating projects with lower capital­
intensity. In institutional design, this means building on 
the strength
of existing organizations and contractual arrangements rather than ro­
placing them with fashionable, but unproven, systems imported from 
Manila or other countries.
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2. 	 Second generation projects in the Bicol Program area should include: 
a. 	 agro- forestation 
b. 	 coastal zone management 
c. 
perennial cropping systems for smallholders
 
d. 	 abnual mixed cropping systems 
Pilot efforts should be continued or initiated now in these areas to provide
information and direction for future planning. 
B. 	Agribusiness Promotion
 
In addition to BRBDPO resourpes, the Bicol IRD grant project provides re­
sources for BRBDPO, NEDA Regional Office, and concerned line agencies to 
develop a collective regional agribusiness and rural-based industry strategy
and action program to further stimullte a significant increase in private

sector investment. P-egarding the on-going agribusiness and rural industry

promotion effort, the evaluation team jakes the following r-commendations:
 
1. 	Preliminary Bicol Program investment promotion activities have been
 
largely concentrated on the preparation and promotion of pre-feasibility
studies on agribusiness and/or agro-industrial projects. Considtring 
that a rational investor will somehow have to undertake an investi­
gation of the project using his own set of assumptions and policies, 
we believe that this activity is largely unnecessary. Instead, general 
area profiles depicting the available and abundant resources and business 
opportunites in the region may be prepared and widely disseminated. The 
preparation of brochures as general investment guides for interested 
investors now underway may prove to be more useful. 
2. 	 In the area of agribusiness promotion, the efforts of the BRBDPO can 
only complement the efforts of the private sector. With this in mind, 
the 	agribusiness program should focus on areas where private invest­
ment may be inhibited because of difficulties in obtaining the neces­
sary information, designing and enforcing contracts, coordinatingor 
Investment efforts across enterprises and investors.
 
3. 	 Recently, the agribusiness staff of the BRBDPO was chosen to serve as 
the technical secretariat to the Regional Council of Small and 	Medium 
Industries (RCSI). We believe that with the full support of the
 
BRBDPO, the RCSMI could effectively function as a strong coordinating
body for private investment promotion and acceleration in the region. 
C. 	 Management, Research and Training 
Some of the project designs appeared to be affected by engineering and plannerbias. In particular, the Libmanan-Cabusao and Bula projects may have been 
unnecessarily sophisticated. in the future, it may be advisable to more 
thoroughly investigate cost-saving alternatives which deliver most of the
 
benefits of the original design. Similarly, one should not overload projects
vith excess institutional baggage. Rather, one should build on the strengths
of existing voluntary organizations and contractual arrangements. 
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The 	methods of data collection, project selection and monitoring should be 
streamlined so as to conform with the package approach. A comprehensive
 
survey of the current economic situation is unnecessary, and studies which
 
fully isolate the impacts of projects are impossible. Instead, more intensive
 
data collection efforts are needed in the critical areas where Bicol Program
 
intends to concentrate its efforts. 
Thus, for example, if irrigation is tobe the focus, improved topological maps, hydrological information, and weather 
statistics should be made available. Similarly, the goals of project eva­
luation should be more modest. It is important to monitor the more narrow 
objectives of the projects in terms of the actual operations and in terms ofdirectly related economic activity (e.g., cropping patterns, inputs and
 
yields).
 
Another potential comparative advantage of the Bicol Program lies in research 
and extension. In this context, applied research is needed not only to devel­
op appropriate production techniques, but to develop appropriate systems of 
resourie management and appropriate modification of existing institutional
 
structures. 
Extension is likewise understood to include the implementation of
 
similar management systems and institutional adjustments. An independent
center of research and extension activities should be built-up around the con­
sortium of agencies concerned with agricultural research and the complex of 
research facilities, under the auspices of PCARR, at CSAC and BPI experiment
station-I_/ The proposed research group would be of additional utility at the 
planning and feasibility stages of project packaging. The following specific

recommendations are developed in the text 
of the report: 
I. 	 Field trials should be continued in all IAD project areas by the line 
agencies concerned under the general coordination of the Bicol Agriculture
and Resources Research Consortium and BRBDPO. Such trials should be used 
to establish the appropriate farm practices which ought to be adopted byfarmers given current technology. Further, this effort should be coor­
dinated with evaluation activities, e.g., BAEcon data generation and 
BRBDPO Farm Records Project for feedback to, and action decisions by, the 
Composite Management Groups (CMv's) and the Project Management Offices (PMO's) of the respective IAD (component) projects. Much of the machineryfor this applied research is already in place. What is needed is the 
capacity to analyze this data with updated economic methods (incorporat­
ing stochastic weather variables and individualized shadow prices of labor 
and credit). 
2. 	 Immediate analysis should be carried out by the appropriate agencies to 
consolidate all available rice yield data from the region so as to estab­
lish reliable szatistics on: 
a. 	 irrigated dry and wet season yields
b. 	 rainfed dry and wet season yields 
These data should be analyzed w.th respect to: 
a. 	 variability within agro-climatic areas in the Bicol 
b. 	 variability between years within agro-climatic areas 
IL 	Philippine Council for Agricultural Itesources and Research (PCAR);
Camarines Sur Agricultural College (CSAC); and Bureau of Plant Industry(BPI). All are located in the vicinity of BRBI.PO 
c. 	 the potential of output growth based on increased inputs of
irrigation, fertilizer. 
-nsecticides, and other indigenous,
but 	potentially productive cultural practices. 
 In addition
 
to existing line agency and BRBDPO staff, highly experienced,

senior Filipino consultants should be considered for funding

under tne Bicol IRD Project.
 
3. 	 An expert hydrologist should be employed to do follow-up investigation

on the soundness of assumptions incorporated in the basic project
design, particularly for the lower basin. 
Adjustments could then be
made to the benefit of the farmers who will benefit from the projects

and 	who are being asked to pay for the projects through irrigation
fees. 
 The evaluation team understands that hydrologic data collection

and analysis as well as the puolishing of the results for the complete
Bicol River Basin are scheduled to be upgraded. This is essential.
The 	National Water Resources Council (NWRC) can play an active role.
 
4. 	U.S. and Filipino water management consultants with proven expertise
in rice irrigation and in supplemental irrigation systems should be

employed by early 1980. 
 Such consultants would work with technicians
of participating line agencies particularly NIA and 	the Bicol Agricultureand 	Resources Research Consortium to advise on and monitor the processof the irrigation systems. This would include establishing appropriate
soil and water use management needed to gauge the efficiency of the
 
systems.
 
5. 	 Workshops should be held for project managers and staff and BicolProgram staff on irrigation rotational systems already in place

elsewhere in the country, so that experience gained in these systems
can 	be available to the Bicol. 
Proposed operational training (AID­
supported) in another Asian country for the senior staff who willoperate the major systems and local line agency staff would also be

valuable. 
6. 	 Considering all the'complexities, controversies and issues associated
with rotational irrigation, the viability of irrigation associations,

compact farms and Samahang Nayons, the design for institutional devel­opment deserves a serious second look before system-wide efforts to
implement it get underway. The pres-nt design might have to be treated
 
'ith less sanguinity that is now presently held.
 
7. 	 Present national policy on irrigation repayment calls for repayment

cover capital expenses and operation and maintenance costs. A funda-
to
 
mental ambiguity in the policy exists, however, according to whichfarmers who are unable to pay will not be forced to. This introduces a
great deal of discretion into the collection procedure. 
This ambiguity

should leave room for the Bicol projects to experiment with a system
under which farmers pay proportionately to potential benefits that could
be received from irrigation. Potential benefits 
would be assessed inde­pendently for various classes of farmers according to topography, accessto and reliability of the water, and economic characteristics of the
 
farm family.
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8. There should be a close examination of the land consolidation in
 
the Bula IAD Project with a view to assessing the merits and
 
demerits and the rationale of the entire approach. If land con­
solidation appears to place unnecessary burdens on many farmers,
 
then the system should be redesigned rather than continue a ccmmit­
ment.to a "pilot project."
 
9. BRBDPO participation in the Bicol Agriculture and Resources Research
 
Consortium (BARRC) should be considered a priority activity as part

of research coordination and a monitoriag requirement for BRBDPO
 
operations. Similarly, the BRBDPO should become intimately involved

with the Soil and Water Management Research and Training Center.
 
This should serve as a means of directing research efforts into
 
problems encountered in project areas and in supplying a source of
 
research results to BRBDPO planning staff and BRBDPO project coor­
dinators. 
The BRBDPO should strongly support the involvement of
 
UPL5, IRRI, PCARR, BAEcon, NIA, FSDC, M1DCD and others in the Basin
 
research program, through the Soil and Water Management and Research
 
and 	Training Center. 
D. 	 Organization, Administration and Staffing 
Based on extensive interviews, current operations of the BRBIPO appear to be

unsettled and currently lack sufficient decentralization. In order t6 de­
centralize the planning and implementation of projects, the BRBCC should be
 
re-established as the primary policy-making body. 
Increased funding and

contracting authority for projects should be decentralized at the regional
level (to project directors). The latter can be accomplished by giving theline agencies more autonomy and by relying more heavily on provincial and
municipal offices as implementing bodies. Linkage to the ministerial levels
 
to solve operational problems should be strengthened.
 
The evaluation team also feels that rebuilding the planning staff of the
BRBDPO should be a priority activity. This restaffing should be carried
 
out with a view to assetnbling the particular expertise required for the
 identified comparative advantage of the Bicol Program. 
Specific recommenda­
tions in the report include the following:
 
I. 	A permanent program director should carefully be selected and appointed

following the guidelines of Presidential Decree 926.
 
2. 	Appropriate authority ahould be redelegated to deputy directors and
 
decentralized within the Program Office itself, so that Bicol Program

activities can be raised to the increased level of activity required

by the increasing demands of accelerated project development, coor­
dinated implementation, and monitoring/evaiuaticn.
 
3. 	 The role of the BRBCC as a coordinating and policy-making body should 
be fully restored. As the functions of the BRBCC are restricted, there 
is in turn less reason for the existence of a BRBDPO. 
4. 	Restaffing should be carried out with a view to assembling the particular
expertise that will be required for planning projects such as agro­
forestation and mixed fishing/farming (as discussed above) which are
 
within the identified comparative advantage of Bicol Program.
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5. 	 Full staffing of the planning section of the BRBDPO must proceed

on a priority basis. 
A high level of capability is essential for
planning second generation projects and for tehnically supervising

and assessing the increased level of contractor dcc-uments and per­
formance.
 
6. The BRBDPO should sponsor and coordinate seminar/workshops for BRBDPOprofessional staff and for the personnel of cooperating agencies to

update them on latest research findings and other developments relevant
 
to their planning, coordination, monitoring and evaluating functions.

Such interagency meetings would provide a mechanism for discussion
 
of project ideas and plans.
 
7. The BRBDPO should give all staff members the opportunity to visit and
possibly work at project sites to gain first hand familiarity with
 
operations.
 
8. 	A special depository for important Bicol Program documents be created
 
to complement existing library facilities. Particular attention should
be given to such things as maps and plans. Current maps should be made

available to all participating agencies on a cost basis. 
A special index
 
of all materials should be produced by the BRBDPO for public access.
 
9. The BRBDPO and national line agencies (with USAID assistance for other

Asian countries and U.S. when appropriate) should invest in the training

and 	general upgrading of line agency technical staff capabilities in

agriculture and water resources development and related areas, because,
in the ultimate analysis, project implementation anf farmer support are
 
their responsibility.
 
10. 
Although active and quite effective to date, BRBDPO publicity efforts

should be carefully designed and monitored to insure accuracy. 
Mis­
understanding and unduly elevated expectations only add confusion and
frustration. 
An updated, accurate, rhetoric-free framework plan captur­ing 	the essence of the Bicol Program would be an appropriate public
information document.
 
11. 	 A professional technical level document should be prepared and published

on the Bicol Program and the component projects for distribution to
 
Philippine institutions and professionals as well as international pro­
fessionals involved in integrated area development.
 
12. 	 LI collaboration with NACIAD and NEDA technical staff, the 	BRBDP monitor­ing 	and coordination system for implementing projects should consider
 installing em an as-needed basis, a formal "special action report"

eystem a backup documentation for the informal action reporting sys­tem, through both the lead-line agency MIS and through the Bicol Program

vertical MIS. Additionally, the BRBDPO should consider implementing

monthly sunmary progress reporting to the PAC, BRBCC, NACIAD and funding
agencies. The exception reports should summrize the "Special ActionReports." 
The more detailed project status reports currently produced

would be submitted quarterly or semi-annually.
 
13. 	It is suggested that a Management cmmittee be established under NACIAD,

cCposed of the deputy or assistant ministers or assistant secretaries
 
of member agencies and the directors of all on-going major Integrated
Area Development (IAD) programs/projects. It would likely be chaired 
by the chief operating officer of tne council. 
II EARLIER DEVELOPMET EFFORTS IN THE BICOL REGION 
Prior to the 1973 formation of the national ministerial level Bicol River
 
Basin Council (BRBC) and the Bicol River Basin Development Program (BRBDP),

there were some significant development efforts in the Bicol Region.
 
In 1959, confronted with the problem of credit collection, Jose C. Morano,
then Regional Accountant of the Agricultural Credit Administration, devel­
oped a concept of compact farms and tried to concretize those in Borong­
borongai, Minalabac (Camarines Sur). The project, because of some diffi­
culties, did not materialize. However, much later, Morano, who had now re­
inforced the compact farm concept with inspiration from the Israeli moshav­
type of farm cooperative, reintroduced his ideas in an irrigated area in 
Inginan, Minalabac. This compact farm gave stress to production-marketing 
linkages.
 
That same year (1959), the Nueva Caceres Archdiocesan Secretariat for Social 
Action (ASSA) headed by Msgr. Jose T. Sanchez held a Congress at the Ateneo 
de Naga, to generate self-reliance among the parochial populations by lessen­
ing the farmer's stifling overdependence on the government for social uplift­
ment. The Secretariat with the technical help of local bankers and business-' 
men evolved the concept of joint liability for production credit in compact
 
farm units. 
In July 1965, the Bicol Planning and Development Board (BPDB) was created by
the President of the Republic under Executive Order 159. This was sub­
sequently followed by Republic Act No. 4690 (C.1966) establishing the Bicol
 
Development Company (BIDECO) which aimed to "promote the balanced and acce­
terated growth of the Bicol Region within the context of national plans and 
policies for social and .economic development through the leadership, guidance
and support of the government." The BIDECO appears to have almost petered 
out of existence without any sign of accomplishment, while the BPDB among
other things, was able to conduct a survey of the resources of the Bicol 
Region as a foundation for the preparation of a regional development plan.
Many of the plans and some of the personnel of the BPDB were absorbed by the 
BRBDPO and by the regional office of NEDA. 
In early 1970, the Archdiocesan Secretariat for Social Action collaborated with
Morano in developing compact farms in Inginan partly following the concept
which involves grouping adjacent neighbors together and making them jointly
liable for their production loans. About ten groups were initially formed. 
In October 1970, Typhoon Sining swept over the Bicol Region causing mausive 
destruction to both life and I roperty. Modest developments in ccnpact farm­
ing in Inginan were overturned. 
In light of this calamity, concerned citizens in Camarines Sur, banded 
together under the leadership of the Archbishop, carried out rehabilitation 
work by means of the Food for Work Program with the Catholic Relief Services. 
Compact farms were also formed in Buhi, Naga, Bula, Pili, and Goa in 
Camarines Sur Province with the rural banking institutions giving massive 
capital support, an event unprecedented in the country's banking history. 
Meanwhile, Bicol leaders set a series of conferences in Naga with represen­tatives from the National Economic Council (now the National Economic and
Development Authority), the Engineering Coips of the Armed Forces of the

Philippines, and the United States Agency for International Development to

solicit support for compact farm projects. Subsequently, in a meeting con­ducted i Manila, Secretary of Agriculture Arturo R. Tanco, Jr. and then

Public Works Secretary David M. Consunji gave assurances of government sup­
port. An Interagency Bicol River Basin Team headed by Dr. Ramon Nasol,
Dean of the Center for Regional Studis at University of the Philippines in
Los Banos, was formed to study the problems of Bicol and submit appropriate

recommendations. 
USAID assistance was led by Douglas Tinsler with the sup­port of Frank Sheppard, USAID/Ag and Director Thomas Niblock. 
By September

1972 the study, Report on the Province of Camarines Sur and Lower Bicol River
Basin, popularly known as the "Green Book," was submitted. This study wasfurther refined by the GOP and presented by Secretary Tanco before the Con­
sultative Group in Paris in October 1972. 
USAID signified interest in
funding Bicol grant technical support and capital loan projects adopting

the Integrated Area Development (lAD) approach tc 
rural development.
 
An expanded study was drawn up in February 1973 by fifty technical personnel

representing fifteen national and Bicol Region agencies and a private con­
sulting firm. This study was supported by USAID. The output, Bicol River
Basin Develoment Pigra, Framework Plan, was to be popularly known as the

"Blue Book."
 
III THE HRBDP DEVELOPME MODEL - ITS ORGANIZATIONAL EVOLUTION AND LESSONS
 
Given the nature of the organization of the various offices of government,

the following constraints and problems to effective development administra­
tion had been identified by 1973:
 
I. 	the difficulty encountered by line agencies in planning and implement­
ing projects aimed to spur development which is multi-dimensional in
 
concept within a defined action area and area of influence;
 
2. 	the difficulty encountered by a line agency involved in a project where
 
the synchronized inputs from other line agencies are necessary for the
 
completion of the total project package; and
 
3. 	 the lack of local perceptions and area specific data (e.g., agro­
climatic, hydrological, etc.) used for problem definition and iden­tification tnat could eventually influence project development.
 
In response to these contraints and problems, the primarily national level
Bicol River Basin Council (BRBC) was created under Executive Order 412. Its
main role was to provide coordinated leadership and rational direction tothe developmental undertakings within the Bicol RIvLr Basin by supporting
plans and feasibility studies for domestic and foreign financing. 
The 	Bicol
River Basin Council (BRBC) constituted a Board of Directors with eight (8)

members. 
The Secretary of Public Works, Transportation and Comnunication
 (David M. Consunji) was Chairman with the following members: 
 Director
GenerLl, NEDA; Secretary, DOA; Secretary, DICD; Secretary, DAR; Secretary,

MgR; 
-overnor, Camarines Sur; and Executive Director, BRBC-Program Office.
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A Program Office was constituted with an Executive Director, a Deputy

Director-Physical Infrastructure Department (PID), a Deputy Director-Plans
 
and Program Department (PPD), Deputy Director-Social Infrastructure Department(SID), and a Deputy Director-Administrative and Finance Department (AFD). 
The BRBC'was not able to effectively overcome the constraints because of(1) a heavily centralized planning and decision-making process, (2) lack n7
 
technical personnel, and (3) budgetary constraints.
 
1. Centralized Planning and Decision-making Proceis 
Despite the formation of a field office (Program Office), the power and
"authority to negotiate and pay technical contracts, hire and organize
staff, and make fund releases were vested in (1) the Program Chairman,(2) the technical staff in the Office of the BRBC Chairman, and (3) the

the Operations Coordinator. As a result of the more centralized nature 
of management and planning (albeit effective up to a point) and due to 
the lack of an approved fumctional delineation between the office of the
chairman and the Program Office for the operation of the program, muchfriction ensued between the decentralized Program Office and the Office
 
of the BRBC Chairman. 
2. Lack of Technical Personnel 
The Bicol Program Office had to draw key personnel from the regional
offices of the Department (now Ministry) of Agrairan Reform, the National
Irrigation Administration and the University of Nueva Caceres. There 
were people recruited from the respective service-connected agencies.
The three deputies, SID, PID, and AFD, were concitrrently Regional
Directors for DAR and NIA and the Chief Accountant of NEDA. The unsatis­factory personnel situation had been partly caused by the centralized 
structure whereby decisions on recruitment was a Manila Office preroga­
tive. On the other hand, many competent, short-term people were assigned
to assist the Bicol Program in the early years. Many continued with the 
program which constituted a competent core group.
 
3. Budgetary Constraints 
Difficulties in budget releases were rampant. 
NEDA releases and line 
agency commitments were coursed through NEDA. Delays in the release ofBRBC's budget affected operations and caused major delays of many acti­
vities. Budget releases for planning and design activities were the 
major constraint being experienced by the BRBC organization. 
Despite the constraints, the BRBC continued the task of institution building.The notable contribution of BRBC was the formation of a Management Council,
composed of the regional directors of concerned line agencies operating in
the area, and the Private Advisory Council, 'representing the private sector. 
Moreover, moves towards the coordination of sectoral activities were started. 
Much of the BRBC's activities focused on the generation of field data to be
used for planning and project development. The Social Survey and ResearchUnit headed by the late Frank Lynch, S.J. (IPC-Ateneo de Manila) was cm­
tracted with GOP and USAID fands to generate planning data for the ProgramOffice. Two major feasibility studies (Bicol Roads and the Libmanan-Cabusao 
Projects) were also complet-d. 
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The aforementioned problems were recognized by the Government, and on
April 26, 1976, Presidential Decree 926 abolished the BRBC and created the
Bicol River Basin Development Program (BRBDP). This decree 
 spelled out
specific guidelines which enhanced a move towards real decentralization.
 
First, a line budget was established with the Budget Commission solely for

BRBDP- operations. 
Second, the IAD approach to rural development was adopted.Third, a clear policy was spelled out for management and planning of the
Basin area: it was to be comprehensive, decentralized and framed within 
regional and national plans.
 
The decree likewise created the Bicol River Basin Development Program Office(BRBDPO to be under the supervision of the Cabinet Coordinating Committee-
Integrated Rural Development Projects (CCC-IRDP) through a Cabinet 
Coordinator(Department, now Ministry of Public Works). It also specified that the BRBDPO 
was to be located in Camarines Sur Province. A Manila liaison office underthe program office was also created for the purpose of soliciting support and
facilitating coordination with the various national line agencies located in
 
Manila. 
At the program area level, the decree also created the Bicol River BasinCoordinating Committee (BRBCC) to serve as the policy-making and coordinat­ing body. The BRBCC is chaired by the Program Director of BRBDPO with the
NEDA Regional Executive Director as Vice-Chairman. Members of the council
include the Governors of Albay, Camarines 
 Sur and Sorsogon (the latter added
under PD 1553, issued June 11, 1978) and the Regional Directors (or their dulyappointed representatives) of the various line agencies operating in the pro­gram area. According to several 
officials interviewed, the BRBCC, until
recently, was highly active and interactive in coordinating the various acti­
vities of different line agencies in project areas where line agencies are
required to implement their respective project components. 
The organizational structure of the BRBDPO includes planning and monitoring

and coordinating departments. A mechanism for citizen participation in proj­
ect identification, development, review and policy was developed through theArea Development Teams (AD's) and Area Devel'pment Councils (ADC's) at theproject level and the BRBCC and Private Advisory Council (PAC) at the program 
area level.
 
These elements of the Bicol program structure seem to have been working well.Difficulties encountered at the project level were being resolved. The BRBCC
members felt they were actively involved in the development process. There 
was considerable momentum within the Bicol Program Office. The staff and itsleadership had been given the responsibility for directing the developmentprocess in the Bicol area and they were responding with enthusiasm and com­mitment. Output accomplishments in data generation, feasibility studies andthe first four capital projects were a reflection of this atmosphere. 
The causes for what seemed to have been a viable lAD organization were the(1) decentralized structure for decision-making, coordination and problem­
solving, (2) purposeful and competent leadership environment that then 
existed in the BRBDP0, (3) support the Program Office enjoyed from the Cabinet
Coordinator with minimal, advance approval fro 
above in terms of managementdecisions, (4)popular support that (1)end (2; 
were able tr generate, and(5) foreign and local funding for the feasible grojects that were designed. 
.­ 11 
More recently, the BRBDP organization has again been undergoing changes.
 
The 	creation of the Office of the Cabinet Coordinator and the reshuffling

of the Program Office has had the perhaps unintended effect of what appears
 
to be a move toward recentralization. Decision-making authority now seems
 
to emanate more from Manila according to the perception of many persons in­
volved in the Bicol. 'Themission of the BRBCC has been reportedly changed
 
from that of coordination and policy-making to that of an advisory body.

It is likely that the proposed realignment will affect the capability nf
 
the 	BRBDPO to operate in a decentralized manner.
 
It is the assessnmnt of the evaluation team that the Program Office has
 
reached a critical low in terms of senior technical staff capability although

there are knowledgeable younger staff that can be developed. It has become
 
apparent to the team that the Program Director plays a highly critical role
 
in coordinating, integrating and ooliciting the cooperation of various line 
agencies and local groups. He must have a good mLragerial grasp to build
 
around him a group of competent deputies and section leaders who function
 
with delegated authority.
 
The 	operationalipation of an IAD organizatlon is a complex task requiring
 
technically competert group of leaders who must exercise sound political
judgement iW deeling with the ditctive of Philippine government bureau­
cracy at the national, regional and lo&al levels. Organizing for IAD operation
 
likewise r~quires a good technical and legal grasp of the LAD concept and
 
the correbponding abilities to interpret and apply the IAD concept given the
 
parameters of socio-cultural, economic and political realities existing in
 
the area, as well as the techno-political relationships operating among
 
and within government agencies.
 
Ultimately, the effectiveness of the Bicol Program Office will have to be
 
judged on how and to what extent the program has an impact on the lives of
 
the intended beneficiaries, not on the number of funded projects. The cost
 
and number are only relative input and output indicators of the investment
 
process. The Program Office was set up as a means, not as an end in itself.
 
Based = these consideration6, the evaluation team recommends:
 
1. 	That a 2ermanent program director be carefully selected and appointed
 
following the guidelines of Presidential Decree 926.
 
2. 	That approprieAte anthority be redelegated to deputy directors and 
decentralized within the Program Office itself, so that Program 
Office activi'ie can be raised to the increased level of activity 
required by the Licreasing demands of accelerated proect- development,
coordinated implem-ent~ation and monitorinE/evaluation..
 
Decentralization of Authority in the Bicol AD Area
 
The 	pivotal question on decentralization focuses an the exercise of central
 
authority in Manila and field authority in the Bicol. Operationally, this
 
rer~uires a determination on what functions are most effectively carried out
 
in the Bicol and Manila offices. "Effective" here refers to accomplishing
 
moot expeditiously those tasks necessary to achieve the overall development 
doals of the Bicol River Basin Development Program. 
- .22­
.0 
One of the policies formulated for the BRBDP under Presidential Decree 926
 was the use of the BRBCC (see page 12) as a mechanism for regional line
 
agency involvement and popular participation (through the provincial gover­nors) in the projects and programs of the Bicol Program. Monthly meetings

of the RBCC served several purposes: (1) BRBCC members could be kept
informed of programs and projects; (2) the BRBCC could receive reports of
difficulties in project implementation and search for regional solutions

-which may in fact require cooperation between BRBCC members; (3) 
 the BRBCC
could act to assist in forming BRBDP policy; and (4) the BRBCC members could
 
comment on project proposals and plans and comment on the roles assigned to
 
them before the projects were submitted to higher authority.
 
This last activity, which gave the BRBCC a role in the planning process,
seemed to be a very important one. It served to develop a sense of project

commitment by the line agency directors, and it gave the provincial governors
opportunity to speak 
for the people they were representing. This activitydiagrammed belw shows the progress of the project proposal outlined by 
; ---Agecy Prsonl
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C.) BRBDP Consultants (Policy) Approval
and Contractors 
J 
solid arrows. 
Recently, there has been a modification in the process.
Project proposals are not necessarily passed through the BRBCC but ratherBRBCC members are informed after the fact that the project has been sent
ahead. This is indicated by the broken line in the diagram. 
It is quite predictable that limiting the role of the BRBCC in the planningprocess would mean a loss of ag-ency commitment, cooperation and integration
and a reduction in representative participation.
 
We therefore reccmmend that the role of the RBCC as a coordinating and
policy-making body be fully restored. As the functions of the BRBCC arerestricted,there is in turn less reason for the existence ofa BRBDPO. 
Another manifestation of recentralization of decision-making authority has
been the recently restricted authority of the program director in matters

concerning personnel appointment and in dealing with line agencies abovethe regional level as part of a problem-solving and BRBDP-project­promoting role. These are important in assessing the overall effectiveness 
of the BRBDP concept.
 
- 13-
SL 
41 -e ­ .', -,ff
 
44 
',' 
MAYqg f978
 
/
 
47-
 IFACESHEET FOR SPECIALEVALUATION 
I. BASIC PROJECT IDENTI FICATION DATA 
A. Country B.Project Title C.Project Number D. Active Life of Project:
dni Sederhana (simple) Irrigationdonesi 1. Project Agreement Signed FY ,and Land Development 97-02522. Approved Project Conlrletion Date (PACD) Fy
k.Life of Project Funding F.Responsible Mission Officials1. AID (Loanor Grant) ?zo0.n f00.fl 1. Mission Directe,thor Donor 2. Project Officers (Name, Position) 
.)st Country Counterpart Funds ** 3. Other 
TOTAiL $ 
*later increased to 23.7 million
 
*initi1ni
l 1flfl% finarn4ng (74/75)

G. Project Design H. Implementation
1. In-House (Name, Po-Ition) 1.Host Country Agency(ies)
Directorate General of Water
not stated Resources Development
Directorate General of Food Crops
 
2.Contractor (Name,Firm,Coniract No.) 
 2.Contractor (Nasme,Firm, Contract No.) 
not stated 
 not stated
 
I. Previous Evaluations (include Title, Type and Date)Evaluation Planning Documents: Sorenson/Thompson: 
 "An Approach to Evaluation for the Sederhana
Irrigation and Land Development Program." October 30, 1976
 
Theody: "Evaluation of the Sederhana Irrigation and Land Development Project: Objectives andScope of Work." June 28, 1977
 
II. BASIC EVALUATION DATA 
A. Evaluation Title f B.Evaluation Date C.Type of Evaluation 
. D.Project Period Covered by EvaluationSederhana Evaluation: IRq 
 Basically first of 3 years
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 review of ongoing 1974-1977
Rice is Growing 
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TOTAL 
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I. Other Responsible AID and Host Country N J. Evaluation Coordinator
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Director, William Larson, Chief, Rural 
 SignatureDevelopment Div., Dr. P. Tambunan, Senior 
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Economist, Directorate of Programming, D.G. Typed Name 
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Sederhana Evaluation: IRS The Water is Flowing, the Rice is Growing page two
 
F. Purpose: 
 Assess project success in meeting stated goals: increase rice

production; improvC well being of poor rural families; and enhance institutional

capability of GOI implementing agencies. Evaluation is 
to be used as major

reference for Project Paper for proposed Sederhana IT. Note: study of 517

subprojects from 1st 3 years (8n% in outer islands, 5S% 
 with rudimentary

prior irrigation systen)provides- main data base.*
 
H. Evaluation Team Composition:
 
Clive Gray, Fellow, Economist, Harvard University Institute for International

Development, former director, HIID advisory group, Government of Indonesia
 
(team leader)
 
Henry Gembala, consultant, Experience, Inc., formerly irrigation engineer,

Soil Conservation Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture.
 
John Duewel, Ph.D. candidate in rural sociology, Cornell University,

former participating consultant (inIndonesia Agricultural Development Council
 
SECTION I - EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The Sederhana Irrigation and Reclamation Program (IRS) was launched in
 
Indonesia in FY 74/75 with 100% local financing. In June 1975, AID 
approved a $20 million loan for the program which was later increased to 
$23.7 million. (By late 1977, IRS had expanded irrigated rice hectarage by 
18,000 hectares and gross crop rice hectarage by 26,000 hectares in 
irrigation systems scattered throughout Indonesia. In the 1976/77 crop yeai 
a subset of 132 "mature" subprojects accouaited for an annual production in­
crease of 20-30,000 tons of milled rice. A study of 517 subprojects, 90% 
of those undertaken in the program's first three years, pointed to an 
anticipated expansion of 75,000 hectares of rice paddies, 153,000 gross
 
crop hectare$ and about 400,000 tons of milled rice upon completion of
 
Sederhana I.' The 132 mature subproject3 are already yielding a net return
 
to labor about equal to the social opportunity cost of labor (62-90 cents
 
per day) after allowing for a 15% opportunity cost of capital invested in
 
IRS infrastructure. This can be expected to increase as more land comes
 
into production in the area3 concerned. The return to labor at maturity
 
for the 517 subprojects is even more favorable ($1.10 per day), assuming
 
an average social cost of about $1,000 per hectare for clearing and paddy
 
formation on 70,000 hectares required to achieve the full revised hectarage
 
target.
 
Pari passu with its contributions to increasing Indonesia's rice output,
 
which is one of AID's three main purposes for Sederhana I, the program has 
clearly also served a second purpose of enhancing income for seveval 
hundred thousa7nd farm-fiilies, nearly,all-of em-h-iUtiviting less than a 
full hectare Of' paddy. Progress toward AID's third purpose, strengthening 
the institutions responsible for implementing IRS, while readily observablt, 
appear nevertheless to have been slower than projected. This cai e
 
attributed to the inherent difficulty of administering a program spread 
over hundreds of sites, about 80% of them in the Outer Islands, where the 
establishment of functioniag irrigation systems and the absence of site 
feasibility studies put a premium on individual judgment of irrigation 
officials. A major benefit is the experience gained by these officials in 
the course of the program. Not surprisingly, recruitment and assignment 
of staff and administrative follow-ups by the provincial irrigation 
services has been closer to target than in the case of the agricultural 
services. The contribution of the agricultural services has been primarily 
the development of tertiary networks water-ucer associations, and extension/ 
training programs (focussing on improved water management, operation and 
maintenance, but including agricultural cultivation activities.) 
The evaluation report advances the following principle recommendations:
 
I. Improvement of Current Procedures, Project Implementation and Follow UT 
A. Subprojects Design Feedback. The functionality of many subprojects'
 
design can be improved by requiring contractors to return to the field
 
-2­
to evaluate preliminary design concepts and layouts in consultation with!
local engineers. The associated costs of such feedback would bring a
high return,
 
B. Operation and Maintenance. 
Lack of significant movement towards
instituting a formal system of O&M for IRS subprojects is not an un­mitigated portent of disaster for the system. 
In the long run, projects
on IRS' scale are more likely to succeed if the beneficiaries find them­selves obliged to handle O&M of components which are technically within
their capabilities. 
However, the team recommends instituting, on a
trial basis, an O&M budget allocation, of which the 1978/79 budget
"improvement" allocation for half the first three years' subprojects
may be regarded as a 
precursor, to service major structures in lieu of
handling this as new project activity, with its attendant delays.
 
C. Monitoring. 
 It is desirable to cuntinue both the comprehensive
monitoring the IRS subprojects by irrigation and agricultural officials,
and the collection of more reliable data on a scientifically selected
sample of locations along lines pursued hitherto by the Survey Agro-
Economi (SAE). 
II. Future IRS Investment Policy
 
A. SubproJect Selection Procedures. 
There is general agreement on the
need to intensify consultations by irrigation officials with local
farmers and authorities, as well as with other technical agencies (who
already enter at a later stage by having centrally organized Appraisal
Teams). The BAPPEDA (Provincial Development Planning Boards) should be
involved in the process of clearing subproject proposals before they are
considered at the national level.
 
B. Project Selection Criteria. 
Planning diligently is a useful vay to
achieve program objectives. Social benefit-cost analysis isan
accepted technique of project evaluation that might be applied
systematically in the IRS selection process, to some degree offsetting
higher nominal returns perceived by establishing subprojects in
previously existing village irrigation schemes.
 
C. Supplemental Investment in IS Subproects. 
Incremental benefit/"
cost analysis should be applied in evaluating proposed investments in
tertiary network, land clearing and paddy formation. Each extension
of development brings benefits, but should not be viewed as invariably
required to make initial investments in major works economic. 
Optimal
targats for government activity in these areas cannot be determined
without further investigation and experimentation, designed to learn,
among other things, ho' much investment the farmers will realize them­selvEs, once water isavailable to them.
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III. Staff Development
 
The team received concrete proposals from several provincial irrigation

officials as to the further duration and content of training required to
 
remedy shortcomings in the training required for different categories of

staff members. In the time available, the team was unable to map out and
 
cost alternative progra.s for training development but it believes a high

return is obtainable here. 
This should be the first priority for expanded

technical assistance.
 
IV. Future AID Assistance to IRS
 
A. Technical Assistance
 
(i) Training. Technical assistance extended so far has been
deficient in its 
concern with fast training. A full time advisor on
 
prograrming and curricular development of technical training is needed.
 
The curricula of the respective training programs should be reinforced
 
with materials drawn from IRS case studies.
 
(ii) Engineering. The team supports the proposal to station

additional engineering advisors ii major provinc~al offices. 
The ad­
visors could make strategic contributions, not only to execution of IRS,
but also to the sedang/kecil (medium, small-scale irrigation programs)

and other programs consistent with the Congressional Mandate. Serious
 
study of the Indonesian language should be made part of the advisors'
 
preparations. 
The team feels that AID dependence on the consultants'
 
certification of subproject completion places them in a complicated
dual role and the possibility of using an alternative mechanism is
 
recommended.
 
(iMi) Agriculture. 
The team felt the SINOTECH contribution had
probably given a favorable return on expenditure up to the present. 
The

Directorate General of Food Crops has indicated his desire that the
 
SINOTECH input continue at approximately the same level.
 
(iv) Social Science. There would be a constructive role for three

social science advisors, including the educator already referred to; an

advisor on the institutional aspects of water management, and an
 
economist to assist in subproject selection procedures and monitoring
 
the program.
 
B. AID Reimbursement Procedures. Reimbursement procedures under Seder­
hana.I have been subject to lengthy delays without any apparent com­
pensatiLg social benefit via increased efficiency of program implementa­
tion." The problem arises from trying to match AID's minimum engineering

standards with a program necessarily involving widespread field opera­
tions. 
Since the question is essentially one of attributing AID

assistance rather than determining which subprojects actually get carried
 
out, the team suggests that future capital assistance be met with a
 
subset of projects, chosen on the basis of convenience for AID's in­
spection ad approval and reimbursed at a higher rate than in Sederhana.
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S CTION III - CONCLUSION MID RECOMENDATIONS 
1. Conclusion of benefit-cost analysis
 
Preliminary benefit-cost analysis in Section II, first on
132 subprojects yielding before-and-after data in the Directorate
General of Food Crops (Agriculture) survey cited in Section I, then
 
on revised target hectariages for 500-plus subprojects, applying nation­wide average yield estimates computed by the Central Bureau of Statistics
(BPS), provides indicators that IRS is on its way toward covering the

social opportunity costs both of the capital invested in it, assuming
a 15% discount rate, and the labor engaged in producing rice on its
paddy fields, assuming shadow wage rates ranging from Rp. 260 to Rp. 460
 
($0.63-$1.11) per day.
 
2. Progress in meeting targets of first AID loan
 
The following summary comments are offered in regard to progress
achieved in meeting the three principal targets of AID's first loan to
 
IRS:
 
i) Increasing rice production. As indicated in Section 1II,
the 132 "mature" subprojects surveyed by Agriculture appear to have
increased annual production of wet unhulled rice by between 37,000
and 49,000 tons already by the 1976/77 crop year. 
This is equivalent
to increased production of 22-29,000 tons of milled rice. 
Using nation­wide yield data the entire set of 517 subprojects surveyed, constituting
about 90% of the subprojects undertaken in the first three years of IRS,

offer promise of increasing wet paddy output by nearly 700,000 tons,
equivalent to about 400,000 tons of milled rice, from project start to
 
completion.
 
ii) Increasingincomes of the rural poor. 
As indicated in
Section IVg the beneficiaries of the program are peasant farmers the
 
vast majority of whom will cultivate less than one hectare of IRS

sawah. 
 Some 80-90% of them fall into income classes below the $150 per
capita level determined by AID as the poverty line. 
A large percentage

of beneficiaries are farmers whose sawahs lie in the lower reaches of

existing communal irrigation systems and who therefore prior to IRS faced
water shortage In the dry season. 
With 80% of IRS projects located out­
side Java, the proportion of landless laborers in the subproject areas is
very small--80% of subprojocts covered in the Agriculture survey reportid
fewor no such individuals. The socio-institutional analysis indicates­thus that no major income groups,are being excluded from the project for
 
structural reasons.
 
III) Strengthening GOI institutional capacity to implement IRS.
 
Resent events suggest that the rate of expansion towards which IRS
 
seemed to be building as AID absistance for the program was agreed was
 
in fact beyond the capacity of the provincial irrigation services to
 
supervise adequ t.ly, both as to planning & design and to construction.
 
Thus, according to figures supplied by the Directoiate-General of
 
Water Resource Development (hereafter Dit. Jen. Pengairan), the target
 
hectareage of major works completed during 1976/77 was the same as
 
that for 1975/76 (about 49,000 ha.), while during 1977/78 it declined
 
drastically to about 21,000 ha, as execution of many subprojects was
 
stretched out over longer periods than originally planned. Meanwhile
 
the Irrigation Service was subjected to increasing pressure from local
 
populations and government bodies to conduct repairs or extend main
 
canals in earlier-year subprojects that were not meeting their
 
objectives; hence the 95,000 ha. "improvement" category covering 75%
 
of thesubprojects included in the1978/79 program.
 
Clearly theprovincial services are facing considerable
 
stress in reviewing contract designs to ensure their adequacy considerable
 
stress in reviewing contract designs to ensure their adequacy to site
 
conditions while at the same time keeping on top of t1ebuilding contrac­
tors. Still, it was the consultants' impression in the course of fild
 
visits to more than 60 subprojects in ten provinces that for the most
 
part the services are responding to this stress and that the manifold
 
increase in man-years of experience accumulated since the start of IRS
 
by provincial office staffs, the kabupaten section chiefs and the field
 
supervisors on irrigation works is beginning to show via better judgment
 
as to what is and is not feasible.
 
From their perspective of two years of experience in the 
field the AID-financed engineering consultants, provided through a 
contract with IECO, report positive changes both in general staff 
capability and in receptivity to the expatriate engineers' recommenda­
tions on subproject planning and design. The enhanced interest in 
integrating the consultants into the irrigation services' provincial 
structure (see Section below) is as much a sign of incresing 
absorptive capacity as it is of recognition of the services' own 
weaknesses. In some provinces lying on the outer fringes of the
 
"regions" which the foreign consultants are assigned to serve the eva­
luation team heard what appeared to be sincere complaints about the
 
brevity of their periodic visits.
 
It has proven unexpectedly difficult to secure data from "
 
DIt. Jen. Pengairan's Jakarta headquarters about numbers of staff assiglied
 
to URS activity in the provincial services, and the increase therein
 
since the start of IRS. Data was still being sought at the time this
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report was due.
 
VTurning to the agricultural side, one again there are
 
indications of a growing awareness in the provincial services of
 
Agriculture's important role in assisting the farmers, individually
 
and through water users' associations, to make optimum use of new
 
irrigation water supplies. In most provinces agricultural staff have
 
prepared tertiary layouts for a subset of projects and at the very
 
least held initial discussions with farmers about installing them.
 
Like their IECO Counterparts in the irrigation services the SINOTECH
 
advisors in Agriculture cite concrete evidence of enhanced capacity
 
of their counterparts. It is clear that in a number of locations
 
junior agricultural staff have given substantial amounts of time that
 
can exclusively be devoted to Sederhana related activities.
 
The deky in achieving targets regarding institutional
 
formation and the implementation oZ tertiary development activities
 
should in part be understood as reflecting these staffing problems.
 
In contrast to Dit. Jen Pengairan which has been involved with the
 
Project for over 4 years, Agriculture's direct involvement has been
 
limited to two years. An important factor in initial delays, was the
 
fact that the construction on major works was sometimes incomplete,
 
deiaye. or beset with technical deficiencies Tbreover, the carrying
 
out-of land development and construction activities at the farm level is
 
a more labor intensive process, involving consultation with farmers.
 
In this regard, while the delay in agrici't,.-al follow-up may have
 
slowed the pace of improvements in water v_.igement, it has not forestalled
 
the realization of substantial benefits from IRS by farmers using tra­
ditional methods to put the water to use.
 
t_qppears that tUSAID expectations with respect to the
 
devel2pment of formal institutional capability for operatoiad
 
_mantenan-ce, wHdh-er the rrgitiiH'srvices,on epa-6f-the'provincla-
.aerusers'assoc-1ations,__o some other agency, have alsd-no been' 
met. It iis explained to the team by none other than the Director 
Ti-iiral himself that any expenditure by his organization on O&M of IRS
 
projects now must be funded within the framework of new project expendi­
ture. Thus, a significant share of the 95,000 ha. of "improvements" 
on old schemes included in the 1978/79 capital budget should more
 
correctly be regarded as maintenance and repair, and should in theory
 
be covered out of current revenues of the subprojects in question. I
 
Nevertheless, the absence thus far of any special provisil
 
for O&M of IRS subprojects in Dit. Jen Pengairan's financial system,
 
otnthe whole has not prevented these projects from being maintained-- ;
 
where technically and financially feasible--by the com nunities involved
 
Lack of 06M by the local irrigation service provides incentives for
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ofi going community initiative which has characterized village systems
tFroughout Indonesia historically. The results may not be as elegant

s a western irrigation engineer would want to see in his own country,
but the system may be the more economic precisely for that reason.
 
Where it would undoubtedly make sense to institutionalize
 
some 	capacity for O&N is in regard to -.
iajor 	works, notably those whose
 
construction and repair involves the use of masonry and cement. 

some 	locations visited and studied, imperfections or deterioration 
In
in

existing structures had complicated maintenance and water delivery,
 
at least temporarily.
 
3. 	 Improving current procedures of p-oject implementation and
 
follow-up.
 
i) Feedback on m:,jor works design. The evaluation team had

reached the conclusion, based on discussion with provincial irrigation

officials and engineering advisors, that perhaps the greatest single
improvement in the prepara(ion of major wocks could be achieved by

requiring design contractors to return to the field with preliminary
layouts and finalize these in their home offices only after consultation
in situ with local engineering staff. 
In many cases this implies raising
the design allocation per hectare above t1he present Rp. 7,000, but the

additional expenditure should have an cnormous pay-off by way of saving

staff time now devcted to correcting the contractors' mistakes, not
 to mention improving the efficiency of structures and channel.
 
ii) Operation and Maintenance. Recognizing that it is desirable
 to leave responsibility for a major share of O&M in the hands of local

communities, we nevertheless feel that Dit, Jen. Pengairan should insti­tutionalize a capability for routine handling of maintenance and repair

of major works. 
This would be designed to enable the provincial irriga­tion service to respond quickly to situations beyond the control of the
farmers, in lieu of having to wait to include a subproject in the ensuing

year's DIP (Dafter Islan Proyek or project funding document). The team
 
recommends that a general provision for O&M designad to enable a pro­
vincial irrigation service to move rapidly on emergency repairs of

major works on IRS subprojects (perhaps catering jointly to similar

needs on Sedang/Kecil and other types of projects as yet lacking

flexible arrangements for such work) be instituted on a trial 
basis
 
in at least one province during the next fiscal year.
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iii) Monitoring and evaluation. The evaluation team was
 
concerned to learn that Survey Agro-Ekonomi's monitoring program
 
of'Irrigation schemes had been discontinued before it had yet reached' 
the stage of yielding results by way of before-and-after comparisons. 
They feel that such work should continue under the auspices of one 
government agency or another, on the basis of return visits to sub­
projects for which a good deal of baseline data have now been assembled.
 
SAE's contribution could be improved by focussing their data collection
 
on a small range of parameter that serve as the primary indicators of
 
subproject success or failure, first and foremost these being the change
 
in annual gross cropped hectareage of samyah land. Through a scientifit
 
sampling procedure SAE could fill the present gap in reliable data on
 
this key measuie. We understand that BAPPENAS has taken the position
 
that it is up to Agriculture rather than Pengairan to sponsor such ­
survey activity. Accordingly , we recommend that either Dit. Jen Pengairan
 
or USAID pursue this matter with the Directorate General of Food Crops,
 
Ir order to prevent a lengthy hiatus in the collection of sample survey.
 
data.
 
4. Future IRS investment policy.
 
I) Subproject selection procedures. Much thought and effort
 
have gone into establishing the current computerized system, and the
 
continuous evolution of procedures appears to have led to a steady
 
improvement in subproject selection. All agree that there is still
 
room for improvement. In some provinces visited by the consultants
 
Agriculture officials have a largely passive role in the process,
 
although in principle an active input from Agriculture is indispensable.
 
The consultants suggest that Dir. Jen. Pengairah should encourage an
 
expanded role for the BAPPEDAS (Provincial Development Planning Agencies)
 
as a coordinating agency between Pengairan, local government, the Direc­
torate General of Food Crops and other agencies interested in the location
 
of IRS subprojects. Ideally, no proposed location should be accepted
 
for consideration by Dit. Jen Pengairan/Jakarta until the BAPPEDA certifies
 
that the necessary local consultation has taken place.
 
N !he consultants also feel that the computer ed questionnaire
 
for project selection (latest revision) has become unwoe1'y, soliciting
 
respondents' impression of a whole range of socio-economic yariables
 
where the lack of data is such that a comparison of answers among sub­
projects and provinces is more likely to mislead than to promote ra­
tianal selection. The consultants feel that a revamping and simpli­
flation of the questionnaire is called for.
 
The team agrees with the
i.) Subproject selection criterla. 

Vasic benefit-cost approach underly.fng the current selection criteria,
 
however itshould be applied in such' a way as to allow benefits perceived
 
by different population groups to beweighted differentially, the
 
lSelative degree of soclo-econoiric
weights increasing according to the 

a givn group. It should be noted that
deprivation currently faced by 

weighting of benefits to give prefer'nce to activities favoring poor
 
and/or isolated classes of society is supported by modern benefit­
a weighting procedure implies deviating
cost theory. Adoption of such 
from the former emphasis given in IR')subproject selection to maximizing 
production of rice. Following that ewhasis, IRS tended to favor lo-

Now, however,
cations with pre-existing comiunal irv.gation eystems. 

we understand that the goals of social',justice and regional equity
 
in growth will receive greater emphasis )inRepelita III, starting in
 
1979. This implies a corresponding change in emphasis for IRS selection.
 
There is a need to develop special selection criteria ap­
propriate to different classes of subproject investments, (a) extension
 
of existing subproject areas, (b) improvement of old projects not yet
 
functioning properly, (c) continuation of uncompleted projects from
 
the year immediately preceeding and (d)new subprojects.
 
Iii) Supplemental investments in existing IRS subproject areas.
 
a. Introduction. It was indicated earlier that IRS already
 
appears to be giving a favorable return on investment prior to the 
realization of sdbstantial additiunal public investment in tertiary/
 
quarternary network development, land-clearing and sawah-formation.
 
We believe that additional investments in IRS subproject areas should
 
not be dictated by an imperative to bring all the initial target hec­
tareage into production within X number of years, within the frame­
work cf a complete tertiary/quarternary delivery network. In other
 
words, execution of such investments should not be regarded as 
an 
essential condition for making each IRS subproject "functional".
 
In many areas the data available on water discharge
 
and efficiency of conveyance are too uncertain to guarantee the feasi­
bility of irrigating the full stated target hectareage from the major
 
In other areas the costs of land-clearing
works as initially planned. 

and the availability of manpower to work additional sawahs within ­
given period of time are uncertain.
 
We therefore recommend that an incremental benefit-coot
 
:upproach should be taken in planning such investments. At each point
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ifi time only those investments should be undertaken that will generate

sufficient additional net benefits, compared with the situation that
 
w~uld prevail in their absence or under some alternative arrangement,
 
to ensure a positive Net Present Value at the prevailing social op- .
 
portunity cost of capital (say 15%).As suggested above, these benefit
 
-cost calculations too should take into account appropriate income
 
weights for disadvantaged and isolated groups in society.
 
b. Land-Clearing. Specially with regard to land-clearing,

direct government intervention in a subproject area should proceed
 
only following careful investigation of the question as to why the
 
local population has not previously felt a need to bring the area at
 
least under dry-land cultivation, not to mention rainfed sawah. We
 
question whether in most IRS subprojects with uncleared land included
 
in the target hectareage a justification exists for undertaking mecha­
nized land-clearing. We suggest that any governmaent intervention in
 
this area should be restricted initially to a pilot approach, aimed
 
at experimenting with, and establishing the cost parameters associated
 
with, a series of alternative techniques. (Note: Selection of an
 
area for Transmigrant settlement increases the likelihood that govern­
ment intervention in land-clearing will give a more favorable return
 
than other alternatives.)
 
c. Sawah formation. With regard to sawah-formation we
 
suggest that any program of capital assistance from government should
 
take note of the fact that in many IRS subprojects farmers are already

shaping sawahs with their own resources, group of farm families helping
 
out succe ssively on each other's plots. In areas where sawah-formation
 
has apparently been delayed notwithstanding the delivery of irrigation
 
rater, the causes for this delay should be examined and means sought
 
to remove obstacles to the farmers' own initiative. For example, in
 
cases where questions of land tenure creafte a bottleneck, the local
 
government authorities and Dit. Jen. Agra-ia should be pressed to
 
give priority to land titling or some intermediate measure that will
 
give farmers adequate security for theWr investments. If the delay

i attributable to the fact that the local population prefers to stick
 
with alternative means of livelihood, and apparently considers the
 
opportunity cost of sawah formation to be too high, evidence should
 
be sought as to whether manpower will be available to farm the sawaha
 
once they are formed. (The Survey Agro Ekonomi reports testify to
 
cases where prepared sawahs have returned to bush notwithstanding the
 
availability of water, essentially because of the high opportunity cost
 
of the labor required to farm them. In these cases plantation crops

typically presented a more attractive source of livelihood to the peoples)
 
17
 
Before promugating a broad program of assistance for
 
sayah-formation the government should consider carefully the possibility-­
that a substantial number of farmers who would otherwise form sawahs
 
with their own resources will not sit back and wait until the govezn­
ment assistance comes through. Without adequate follow-up in terms
 
of concrete assistance such a policy might conceivably slow down the
 
overall rate of sawah-formation, rather than accelerate it as intended.
 
Moreover, the creation of potential dependency relationships is obvious.
 
d. Tertiary/Quaternary Development. Finally, with regard

to tertiary/quaternary distribution netwroks, it should be kept in
 
mind that Indonesia has already attained higher national average rice
 
yeilds than Philippines (cf. FAO Ibnthly Bulletin of Agricultural

Economics and Statistics, Nov. 1975), while growing rost of her rice
 
without the benefit of such systems. Tertiary/quaternary systems

should be viewed not as an essential link in the chain of investments
 
required to yeild a favorable return on the cost of IRS major works,

but rather as an opportunity for additional investment aimed at further
 
expanding irrigated area by making limited water supplies cover larger

hectareages, as well an enhancing yields by facilitating improved water
 
management and creating a corresponding stimulus to increase the use
 
of modern inputs. Our own obserjations in the field indicate that
 
many IRS subprojects offer attractive opportunities for public and
 
private (the farmers') investment in this respect, but it should not
 
be assumed that such will be the case in every subproject in the immediate
 
future. Thus, for example, evidence should be gathered with respect to

the degree of incline at which the additional cost of canals offset
 
higher yields associated with improved water management, and the target
 
area for completion of delivery networks should be recalculated to
 
eliminate such areas.
 
The recent government decision to transfer responsibi­
lity for design and const:uction of tertiary/quaternary systems onIRS subprojects to the Directorate General of Water Resources Development(Dit. Jen. Pengairan) poses both an opportunLty and a danger : an 
opportunity in the sense that Dit. Jen. Pengairan has a 
higher .
demonstrated capacity than the Directorate General of Food Crops (Agri­
culture) to implement works on the ground, but a danger in the sense
 
that Dit. Jen. Pengairan has less capability than Agriculture to
 
comprehend local farming systems and determine how to lay out each
 
network with the maximum positive and minimum disruptive impact,

Based on experience in the execution of IRS major works (see above),

the consultants see a likelihood that design of the tertiary/quaternary

systems will be assigned to contractors working under budget constraints
 
that deprive them of the opportunity to develop their lay-out in close 
-
consultation with the local population and Agriculture officials. 
The
 
risult is likely to ba a set of designs not adequately fitted to local
 
Cw
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farming systems and land ownership, whose imposition will face
 
ra6istence from the local population. The consultants urge that
 
Dit. Jen. Pengairan's design contractors be required to review
 
their preliminary lay-outs in the field, and obtain formal
 
clearances of local village chiefs and Agriculture staff before
 
finalizing the designs in their home offices. Budgets for design
 
work should include liberal provision for such consultation,
 
otherwise far larger sums are likely to be wasted.
 
The policy of complete subsidization of the construc­
tion and completion of tertiary layouts also raises some questions.
 
It leaves out the possibility of voluntary contributions of labor
 
from farmers, and tends to establish tbr principle of reimbursement
 
for any activity taken. Senior Departunt of Agriculture policy
 
makers also have expressed concern about the tendency for the
 
government to ascume too much of the costs of such activities.
 
Doing so may dampen future community responsibility for O&M. Such
 
policies in large part are based on analysis of major lowland
 
systems which have different organizational parameters in comparison
 
with most IRS locales, and which have less demonstrated capacity to
 
undertake ongoing O&M. Future evaluation of such policies in the
 
Sederhana context would be appropriate, leaving open the possibility
 
of modified approaches tailored more to IRS community capacities and
 
needs.
 
5. Staff Development.
 
The consultants were impressed by the detailed evaluation
 
which several provincial irrigation chiefs were able to provide
 
concerning the adequacy of the pre-service education and in-service
 
training obtained by different levels of their staff. These officials
 
gave specific rec6mmendations for lengtheining the periods of training
 
provided by the Directorate-General's training institutions and for
 
strengthening various components of different course curricula. The
 
consultants feel that these recommendations add up to a need for an
 
expnaded training investment. At the time of completion of this
 
report we were still repeiving data needed to draw up a comprehensive
 
training proposal.
 
6. Principles of future USAID assistance.
 
The consultants feel that USAID has already made a
 
onstructive contribution to the IRS program, primarily by virtue 
onf the technical assistance it has financed, since there is no 
evidence that the expectation of receiving its capital assistance, . y
of which none has been disbursed thus far, has so far affected the 
,pgram's scale or content. They regard it as important to distinguish.
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between the priority attached to a particular activity associated
 
with the program, and the possibilities for AID loan assistmce for
 
that activity. For instance, a potential problem arises in the
 
case of institutional development--specifically as it concerns water
 
users' associations. Support for the formation of water usere
 
associations is a high priority activity of the greatest social
 
importance, and one i1 which tbl'car-marking of external financial
 
assistance may provide useful incentives for internal activity.
 
The procedureal con3traints within which AID operates, however,
 
may pose some difficulties in allocatin capital assistance to this
 
project activity. Essentially, AID usually attributes its money
 
to end-uses that can be followed concretely by its auditors. The
 
question of how effectively a specific water user's association .s
 
functioning is a difficult matter for auditors to pursue, if that
 
were to be a measurement criteria. On the other hand, support for
 
the extension and training activities associated with forming and
 
upgrading the capcity of local associations would seem to be a
 
worthy undertaking. It is hoped, therefore, that some means may
 
be found to accomodate this objective.
 
i) Technical assistance
 
Engineering. The evaluation team saw indications in
 
the field that the contributions of the IECO/Sinotech engineering
 
consultants to project desing and execution are becoming increasingly
 
valued by their Dit. Jen. Pengairan counterparts. In consultation
 
with USAID it has now been tentatively agreed that this assistance
 
be expanded and reorganized in such a way as to amalgamate it more
 
effectively into the Directorate Ceneral's own structure. Our team 

supports this request, and offers two additional points to be taken
 
into account in programming the assistance in future:
 
1. It is imperative that the engineers to be
 
stationed in Indonesia acquire a working knowledge of the Indonesian
 
language before they arrive in the country. This matter is too
 
important to be left to individual preference, or to be handled via
 
part-time or after-hours lessons while the individual works on
 
another assignment. We recommend that USAID and the contractor
 
accept the principle that substantial resources have to be allocated
 
to language instruction, including the candidate's full salary while
 
he undergoes a full-time course of instructior lasting not less
 
than, and possibly longer that,, two months. Before being finally
 
cleared to come to Indonesia each condidate should have to attain
 
an acceptable score on a languege test administered by an independent
 
b6dy. A system of financial incentives and penalties should be
 
established to ensure that both the candidate and his employer are
 
motivated to have him complete the language course successfully.

Likewise, resident consultants would be expected to undertake such
 
training, to the degree feasible, to bring language skills up par.
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2. The contractor's present terms of reference

require its staff to 
inspect completed sub-rojects and certify

whether or not they meet reasonable standrds. 
An AID Implementation
Letter requires that it receive a copy of the engineer's certification

along with each application for reimbursement in respect of a

subproject. De facto the engineers are placein a position of

certifying projects on behalf of USAID. 
To the Evaluation team they

expressed a wish to have this link between themselves and USAID

severed, feeling that among other things the current procedure
detracts from the time they can devote to assisting in earlier
 
stages of subproject implementation (i.e. it diverts staff resource
from higher-priority "preventive" wo-k to "curative" activity.)
Our team feels that the requirement also puts the engineering

contractor in a delicate posirion half-way between two clients in
the respective roles of lender and borrower, and thus hampers the
engineers' integration into the Dit. Jen. Pengairan organization.
Wepropoe that the certification role be dropped from the contractor's
 
terms of reference, and that USAID accept a correspondizg burden on
its resident direct-hire staff to carry out whatever degree of inspection
it consldera necessary to ensure that subprolects accepted for

reimbursement will stand up to scrutiny by AID auditors. 
If our
 
recommendation on AID reimbursement procedures (see below) l; accepted,
the additional staff burden will be less than would be the case under
 
current procedures.
 
Agriculture. 
As in the case of the IECO engineers the
consultants heard generally favorable reports in the field concerning

the contribution of the Sinotech staff assisting the Land and Water
Conservation subdirectorate of the Directorate General of Food Crops.
There was some concern expressed, however, about the lack of integration

of come of the technical staff--in part stemming from communication
problems. 
As in the case of Engineers, resident and prespective staff
should be required to reach an Indonesian language proficiency level­sufficient to participate in situations where the usage of English is
not an option, 

Some major questions were raised by Indonesians about the
utility of short-teram consultancy assignments. They also noted the
need for greater attention and sensitivity to existing community

organizational modes. 
The tendency 
of the outside consultants hasbeen to Dushanidealized erson of orpanization notalways in
accord with Indonesian realities. 
The short-term consultancies should
probably be down.pressed Sino-ech staff members themselves believe
that the agency could profitably use some technical assitance from
agronomists, however staff members of the subdirectorate have indicated'.
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to the evaluation team that they do not see the need for such
 
assitance and do not expect to request it. Indications are,,
 
hcwever, that Sinotech will be asked to provide another technician
 
to work in the Central Region, considering that the team manager
 
now assigned here is alone and has to devote much of his time to
 
administrative duties.
 
Tralning. The consultants feel that far-too small
 
a portion of the technical assistance provided thus far has been
 
devoted to strengthening the training institutions involved on both
 
the engineering and agricultural sides of IRS, including preparation
 
of comprehensive proposals for lengthening and upgrading the curricula
 
of several of the courses currently offered. We recommend that the
 
next phase of USAID assitance provide for a full-tim, training adviser
 
with c;zrtise both in the field of technical education itself and in
 
estimating requirements for and programming expansion of this sector.
 
One of his tasks should be to prepare case studies based on IRS
 
experience for use as teaching materials, consonant with the guided
 
self-teaching approach, in the training institutions involved under
 
both Dit. Jen. Pengairan and the Department of Agriculture. Departin
 
and resident IECO and Sinotech advisers might be brought back on
 
short-term consultancy visits to contribute to this process of case
 
study preparation.
 
Social Science. Preliminary indications from some
 
of the involved Indonesian parties is that there might be a useful
 
role that could be exercised by a rural sociologist and an agricultural
 
economist. This would be to work on a full-time basis with government
 
officials concerned with 1) institutional development of irrigation
 
water management, and 2) socio-economic monitoring of both IRS and the
 
Sedang/Kecil (medium-and small-scale) irrigation development program.
 
Assistance in the second category would enhance the government's
 
capcity to provide date needed to support future applications for
 
foreign assistance, among other objectives. Experience heretofore
 
with a succession of brief consultancy visits, including that of the
 
present evaluation team, suggests that this is an inadequate approach
 
to the task of helping to monitor such a complex development activity
 
as 2RS. 
At the same time it is up to the Government of 
Indonesia to decide whether such assitance would be useful, and nn 
outsiders should try to cajole the Government into accenting lt. 
If the Government agrees with these proposals, the three full-time 
advisers concerned with training, institutional development of 
irrigation water management and socio-economic monitoring might be 
provided as a team by a contractor separate from those now providing 
assistance on the technical side, although alternative options, 
should also be explored. 
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ii) USAID reimbursement procedures
 
The consultants agree with views expressed on both
 
the government and AID sides that current reimbursement procedures

ari so cumbersome as to impose a high opportunity cost in terms
 
of scarce administrative and technical talent that has to be devoted
 
to their implementation. At the same time it is not clear that any

corresponding social benefit flows from the current system. Dit. Jen. 
Pengairan's decisions to return, in 1978/79, to half of the projects

from IRS's first three years and conduct "mopping-up" operations

clearly results from pressure by local populations, government

authorities, irrigation officials and other government personnel to
 
deliver the promised water to the sawahs. It is not clear that USAID
 
reluctance to approve certain subprojects for reimbursement has had
 
a constructive impact on program implementation apart from those
 
pressures.
 
By way of simplifying the reimbursement procedures

we propose that AID capital assistance be attributed to a sub-set
 
of projects involving less complex technical problems, easier access
 
by AID staff for inspection purposes, and/or relatively large investments.
lwith a view to accelerating the process of drawing down/attributing
 
1Ithe AID funds. This might be accomplished by targeting AID capital

assitance tor ma o rks construction on the basis of coveriiig say.

65% of the cot oxf two-thirds of the subprojects, rather than the
 
current Intended 42k7.of capital costs of all subprojects.
 
Again, it is important to note that the question of 
how AID's assistance is attributed is entirely distinct from that of 
what specific subprojects are actually carried out. The fact that 
it is administratively simpler to attribute AID money to subprojects
meeting the conditions listed above need in no way lessen the chances
 
of inclusion in IRS of subprojects aimed at raising the living standards
 
of populations in remote mountainous areas.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
 
A. 	General
 
.	 o the FSC pro re to: (1)assist + 
farmers' or-anfIonsin the creation of small 

(Irrigator's Service Associations--ISA's) around the
 
shared input water; (2)help such organizations plan 
and construct irrigation systems; (z) help farmers 
through .uvariety of training proga.;s; (4)help to
 
finance the irrigation system and various machinery;
 
(S)heil to promote better agricultural practices 
not exclusively--on rice; (6) helpprimaril-al though 
to improve marketing practices by ISA farmers; (7) help 
to create regional federations of ISA's; a (8)pro­
mote ISA-owned agro-industrial enterprisesJ 
In the three, years of, its. existence'.&-AILLr9s,' have /T2. 	 t/ 
initiated to irrigate approximately 90,000 , been 
30,000 farmer members. ne - .J_hectares serving over from 	riyers, although- "­;4rojet_ are,--ms 
 projects. For 1978 there are approximately _0Q.rav7i 

on 123 pump projects and 187FSDC 	 plans to start work 48,000 hj---.. ­gravity projects to serve a total of over Additionall ,and. approximately 36,000 farmers). 	 438 
ISA's will be organized involving approxinatel3-~new 	 e i i~~42,000 farmers. 
AID has been involved with the program since the 
begin­
3. the 	first phase terminates at thening 	of FY 1976 and 
on.ists of $6,500,000
end of FY 1978. The AID 	 Pro_-q--ra 
1' fr~c irs -hirP slarle .=
-used I
f-d ar by 	 . 
for
 
. ..
f i a n dfor,*tontract. techn _aL.sistr,.. ~-aan 
i] d f =h_andeve-Iopme _nnLan 
tems , for construction of irriqaion sys
funds are used 
are several:4. 	The strengths of the program 
(a) The ISA is an extremely viable concept around 
share a valuable input (water)­which farmers can 
excellent organization(b) 	 FSDC has been--to date-an 
in terms of attracting good staff, giving them 
appropriate responsibilities, keeping channels of 
and adjusting management ­open,communication in response to perceivedstructure and methods 
needs.
 
The work of FSDC with individual ISA's has been
W(c) 
"good, especially through the institutional officer
 
(10).
 
The FSDC Program is targeted for--and appears to(d) (the-po.-a
reach--the relevant AID target group 
small farmer). 
o. 
There are several aspects of the program about which we
 
were unable to obtain clear impressions. They are­(a) The ability of ISA's to survive as organizations '.I

of small farmers in the absence of reliable irriga.- "
iV
tion 	deliveries to farmer members.
(b) 	The ability of FSDC to continue to attract excel­lent personnel and then to keep them sabisfied as
the organization matures. 
-_
(c) The ability of some ISA's to meet past debt service
 (amortization).

(d) 	The adequacy of agricultural advice given to-ISA
 
farmers. 
(e) The adequacy (primarily in terms of program scope)
 
..
of financial advice given to ISA's.
 
6. 	The problem areas of the program would seem to be the
 
following:

(a) The extension of financial management advice to
ISA's is probably adequate now, but itwill become
 
more troublesome aspect as ISA's aove from a pre­
occupation with establishment of the irrigation
system to enterprise developm.nt and modern agri­
cultural practices. I (b) 	The ability of FSDC to act as a 
catalyst across a
broad range of necessary agricultural services as
production and marketing take on added significance

in the ISA's.
(c) 	The ability of FSDC to adequately monitor the pro­duction performance (as distinct from progress inbuilding-the irrigation system) of the ISA's. Thisis related to the previous point and will require
special attention by FSDC.
(d) 	The ability of FSDC to adequately work with ISA's
 
on improved water management practices modernasagricultural practires imply better performance
from 	the water distribution network.
(e) 	 The ability of FSDC to adequately work with ISA's
 
on 
 the full range of problems facing farmers fromharvesting and storing crops through the marketing
of same. 
(f) 	The willingness of AID to rectify past shortfalls 
in counterpart technical assistance to FSDC.(g) 	 The comnitment of AID to help FSDC in those areas
of increased importance: (1) improved agriculturalpractices; (2) improved water management;(3) improved methods of handling crops after har­
vest; and (4) improved marketing.(h). 	 The appropriatemess of the "Project Goals" and
'Project Purposes" in the first AID Project Paper(May 1975). These are listed in Section II-BI
and III-B2 of this report. They should perhaps be 
redefined as follows:­
- -
Project Goals
 
1) Increase inc,'i of small farmers.2) Demonstrate value of cooperative action by

small farmE-s through developing farm systems

organized around shared irrigation, machinery,

other inputs, and marketing.
 
Project Purpose
 
(1) Increase rice yields to 53 chvans/ha with
 
irrigation, and to 70 cavans/ha with produc­
tion 	packages.
(2) Increase yields of vegetables by 30-40 percent
 
over their 1975-78 average.
(3) Increase intensity of land use through double

-QRpplof rice or reliable (dependablEJ
­
rotations of rice and vegetables.

J4 	 Reduce post-harvest losses. 
Help farmers to learn methods for better 
utilization of agricultural inputs and 
improved marketing. 
B. 	Recommendations
 
AID should: /
 
1. 	Provide long-term funding for technical assistance in 
the following areas:
 
a. 	Project Officer (direct hire)

b. 	 Irrigation Engineering 
c. 	Financial Management

d. * Water management
 
e. 	Training
 
f. 	Agricultural Production
 
g. 	Mechanization
 
h. 	harketing
 
2. Change title of program from Small Scale Irrigation to'Small Farmer Organizationsu,/Small Farmer Development. 
or
3. 	 Assist FSDC in acquiring office space, transportation, 
and office supplies and equipment for the 5 area offices.
 
4., Revise ProJct Goals and Project Purposes
 
"SDC 	should:
 
1. 	Develop better methods for monitoring production performance 
of ISA's
 
2. improve its program of assistance to ISA's in financialmanagement, agricultural production, water management,
mechanization, and marketing. 
3. Improve its ability as a catalyst to bring various GRP 
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F. Purpose: To assess the impact of the Small Scale Irrigation, and follow-on 
project (Small Farmers System). The team visited 23 project sites in 9 provin 4 
They looked at Irrigators Service Associations (ISA's), at the quality of 
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farmer and his family. Als. talked to farmers about the extent to which
 
irrigation had contributed to improving their lives.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
 
In 1976, A.I.D. 
began support of a Philippine Government
program to 
expand village irrigation systems. 
 Since then, over
1000 systems have been built 
or rehabilitated. 
 Irrigation pro­vided the opportunity 
to grow two crops each 
year, increasing
rice production and gross 
farm income. 
 On-farm employment has
grown with the demands 
of double cropping. Local 
irrigaticn
associations are functioning with support from the national Farm
System Development Corporation, 
the A.I.D.-funded 
implementing
agency. Thus, many of 
the project's immediate 
objectives have
 
been met.
 
The project's sustainability in 
terms 
of real income bene­fits for small farmers, however, may be 
a problem. Increased
gross incomes from double cropping and high-yielding varieties of
rice have been substantially offset by increasing costs
duction, debt 
 of pro­burdens 
from capital investments, 
and persistent
technological and water management problems. 
Of crucial import­ance is the performance of 
pumps. 
 Floods, electricity fluctu­ations, and wear and 
tear have resulted in 
 high maintenance and
repair costs; frequent brown-outs interrupt critical water supply

schedules.
 
With more 
intensive agricultural practices, more 
family
labor is required to produce crops, 
reducing the 
opportunities
for off-farm employment. Unless the farm is 
exceptionally prof­itable, net family income may be lower, as 
off-farm employment is
discontinued. 
 Thus, an anomalous situation results: 
 farm in­
come rises, but family income drops.
 
National policies 
are equally important 
for those moving
from subsistence 
to commercial agriculture. Recognizing 
that
many features of national policy positively affect small farmers,
several aspects of 
Philippine agricultural policy make 
it dif­ficult for the small farmer to compete. National procurement and
price policies are export-oriented, demanding quality standards
for rice that most small producers cannot meet. 
 If they cannot,
they do not 
receive the favorable subsidized price and must de­pend on 
lower private prices. 
 Since most cost-benefit project
assumptions were 
based 
on the government-subsidized rice price,
farmer income projections have not been met. 
Small producers re­main in a precarious economic condition. 
 To rerei-e the higher
price, farmers would have make
to additional 
investments 
in
 
rise.
 
post-harvest machinery, while energy and other input costs
They often cannot afford it. 
 The national credit system has also
constrained 
farmer income, not providing adequate 
and timely
credit. 
Farmers must often rely on usurious private lenders.
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Although progress has been made in land reform, most 
farmers
 
or share tenants without security.
remain either leaseholders 

These farmers must still pay for and maintain the new irrigation
 
reaps the benefit from his share in
 systems. The landlord 
 in the costs. The share
 increased production, without sharing 

makes the greatest relative
 tenant, the most underprivileged, 

investment of capital and labor.
 
clearly focused on increasing total
are
Government policies 

rice, assuming increased production will improve
production of 
 increased, but
 
the incomes of small producers. Production has 
 on
 
long term, sustained improvement in farmer income will 
depend 

factors beyond irrigation. Increasing the producer rice 
price,
 
or reducing input costs would immediately improve farmer 
income.
 
to urban consumer
 the present, government policy responds
For 
rural producers. This situation is not
 demanas, not those of 

rigidity, farmers may pur­likely to change. Faced with this 

to improve their position: reduce
 three basic strategies
sue 

on rice and the rice pricing system and invest
 their dependency 

in more profitable crops, diversify farm activity by developing
 
other farm-related enterprises, or seek more lucra­livestock or 

tive off-farm employment.
 
The irrigation system leadership works with, and is part 
of,
 
Existing authority patterns
local leadership.
the established 

in the short run. The irrigation association
 are reinforced 

little used for overt partisan political purposes, and its
 seems 

effectiveness does not extend beyond the irrigation system.
 
does not necessarily translate into
 Improved farmer income 

Rather, the farmer's priority is to
 improved family nutrition. 

pay for school fees. Social mobility is seen to be a product 
of
 
families have neither benefited from
farm
education. Women of 

nor been harmed by the project. The Philippine Government has,
 
however, been innovative in using energetic female extension
 
Over half of the Institutional Officers are women and
 workers. 

their involvement seems to reflect regional patterns of 
female
 
the islands.
vary considerably throughout
participation, which 

Their role could be emulated in other projects and, perhaps,
 
other countries.
 
A.I.D. developed this project as a commodity loan, focusing
 
on engineering components and geographic expansion of irrigation,
 
on maximum gain to the individual farmer. Although 
gross

not 
 the
 
farmer income has been improved, net income has not, 
and 

its present form. It is recom­system cannot be sustained in 

mended that any future support to the competent Farm Systems 
De­
velopment Corporation should concentrate on technical assistance
 farms in
the productive capacity of 
to improve and develop 

than continuing geographic
existing irrigation systems, rather 

a fragile undertaking.
expansion of what is 

IV. CONCLUSIONS
 
A. Major Findings
 
1. Providing water to 
the small farmer to improve
production and income has been effective because of its visible
and immediate benefit. However, 
to increase income beyond
current subsistence levels to allow farmers to carry their debt,
maximum use must be made of the 
total farm resources.
includes supplementing farm This
 income by raising livestock, i.e.,
pigs, poultry, and fish, and engaging in complementary off-farm
enterprises, miximizing 
 production to improve 
 quality and
decrease post-harvest losses by using small farm machinery, and
being provided adequate and timely credit for production.
 
2. 
The price of rice and the conditions under which it is
sold are often inadequate 
to raise farmer income more than
marginally above subsistence levels in many parts of the country.
It is, however, sufficient 
to motivate improved production which
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is the primary cause of increases in gross income. It is
 
unlikely that the price paid to farmers for their crop will rise
 
significantly, nor 
is it likely that farmers can receive the
government-subsidizpX price additional
without investment in
 
post-harvest machinery, the credit for which they may not get and
 
an investment they clearly cannot afford. The cost of fertilizer,

although subsidized by the government, is draining income,
 
increasing debt, and in some cases decreasing yields when farmers
 
cannot afford to buy adequate amounts. Relief from this price­
cost spiral is necessary if personal (farmer income) and national
 (quantity/quality of crop) goals are to be achieved.
 
3. Marketing support to small rice farmers provided by NGA
 
has not kept pace with the increase in rfce production over the
 
past 
 few years. Its facflities are inadequate, its
 
administrative capacity strained, 
and its cash flow has shown
 
signs of weakness. It is uncertain whether NGA will be able to
 
purchase enough of the farmers' crops and whether farmers can
 
meet NGA standards for quality.
 
4. A significant number of associations will not be able
 
to meet their amortization payments because of the cost of
 
continual damage to the pumps. As long as this 
method of
 irrigation remains the sole economic means to provide water,
 
repayment problems should be expected.
 
5. Few farmers can carry existing debts or obtain
 
additional credit given current production income. The delicate
 
balance between investment and debt could easily become
 
negatively skewed if careful financial management is not provided
 
at both the farm and ISA level. The risk of tke investment in
 irrigation must be considered against potential income and debt­
carrying capacity, a simple principle which has gone unheeded.
 
A.I.D. projections Ohat ISAs would be at the breakeven point

after three years do not now seem accurate.
 
6. The Irrigators Service Association is valid and
 
effective because it has built on existing local leadership and
 is focused on a specific and immediate goal that is important to
 
the farmer. It is not perceived by the villagers as having a

role beyond improved agricultural production, because other
 
organizations at the village level may be more representative of
 
the village as a whole.
 
7. Those farmers being assisted under the FSDC program are
 
the appropriate beneficiaries of A.I.D. assistance under the New
 
Directions. Although 
not the lowest income groups in rural 
areas, they are--or have been--subsistence farmers whose income
in cash and in kind places more than half of them below the 
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poverty level as 
defined 
in the Philippines.
groups able to make best use 
They are also the

of development assistance
their own lives and to improve
the lives of
scale their children.
farmers These small­are also excellent 
 candidates
significantly to the development of the country itself.
 
to contribute
 
Because 
most farmers 
invest 
 in the education 
of their
children, and because primogeniture

growth of governs land inheritance, the 

-
an educated, young rural population will intensify the
need for off-farm employment opportunities 
as these persons enter
the work force.
 
The beneficiaries 
 id not mention
income for the use of 
additional
better food although it would 
be unwise
that this to concYude
was never done. Programming which assumes
link, however, this direct
is unsound. 
 The role which crop diversification
could play in nutritional improvement should also be considered.
 
8. 
 Thequality and coordination ofGOP extension
will 
become increasin l important services
 as the program expands both
its Iiatlon and Integrated farmsystems.
not be able These services may
to be provided by
Agriculture. the hard-pressed 
Ministry
Coordination of
 
agencies of of the FSDC program with
the government other
occurs 
at the apex,
little evidence but there is
that it is effective 
at the
believed farm level. It is
that the expansion of the FSDC program into other types
of productive activity and its
irrigation continued and rapid expansion of
may well 
 tax the 
 Corporation's
administrative technical
capacity and and
overburden 
the t&i.ents 

and young staff. 
of its fine
 
9. 
 A.I.D. analysis inproject papers
unnecessarily optimistic hau beenoverlyand
and 
 has resul
expectationsforperformance. in unrealistic
 These were 
related 
to the price
of rice, the hectarage that could be double cropped, the internal
rate of 
return, and 
the efficacy of the 
ISA as 
an organization
having an impact beyond production.
 
A.I.D. participation in this project has resulted in needed
engineering adjustments. 
 However, there was an 
overemphasis 
on
commodities and infrastructure and too little on the agricultural
technical 
assistance 
necessary 
for improved
addition, farm systems.
financial In
analysis 
of the elements
development of farm system
were not 
carefully 
and realistically
Project monitoring formulated.
must be 
improved, 
particularly
direct hire staff who by A.I.D.
can provide the 
continuity necessary 
to
encourage effective programming decisions.
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B. Program and Policy Implications
 
The program and policy implications of this study center
 
on three que.,Lons of importance to the A.I.D. program in the
 
Philippines, and by inference, 
to A.I.D. programs elsewhere.
 
These are: (1) Should A.I.D. continue to support the FSDC, and
 
if so, in what way and for what purposes? (2) How might the
 
policies of the Philippine government affecting the beneficiaries
 
be improved? (3) What arc zhe implications of this project for
 
A.I.D. activities in other countries?
 
1. Should A.I.D. continue to support the FSDC, and if so, in
 
what way and for what purposes?
 
FSDC has effectively demonstrated its capacity td form ISAs
 
as the first step in the development of farm systems. Their
 
greater need is for technical aosistance in developing more
 
sophisticated and complementary elements of farm systems.

Therefore, the team recommends continuing assistance to FSDC, but
 
shifting the project focus to consolidation of existing farming
 
systems in operational irrigation areas. (For specific project
 
recommendations, see Appendix B.) Any assistance provided by

A.I.D. should not emphasize commodities such as pumps.

Innovative possibilities should be explored to allow the
 
Irrigators Service Associations to accumulate sufficient capital
 
to make productive investments. (See Appendix A, Capital
 
Formation.)
 
Should FSDC consider major new projects outside of the
 
irrigation field in areas of A.I.D. priority, such as 
energy and
 
ecological programming (tree farming, etc.), then technical
 
assistance might be provided. 
 Such technical assistance should
 
focus on the links necessary to reach the rural poor.
 
2. How might the policies of the Philippine government affecting
 
the beneficiaries be improved?
 
The Philippine government has evolved a series of policies
 
that impinge upon farmer income, some of which effectively limit
 
his capacity and the capacity of the rural development process.
 
A.I.D. should analyze Philippine national policies to determine
 
the extent to which these policies may adversely affect the
 
totality of the rural development effort and our A.I.D. program.

A.I.D. should then decide whether to approach the Philippine
 
government on any of these policies to discuss what might be done
 
to alleviate rural development bottlenecks, either with or
 
without A.I.D. assistance.
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a. Rice Pricing and Procurement Standards
 
If the government is interested in improving farmer income,

the rice price policy and procurement conditions are obvious foci
 
of reform. Without considering the marketing and pricing of
 
farmers' products, A.I.D. investment cannot achieve their
 
,urposes.
 
b. Fertilizer Pricing Policies
 
The Philippine Government 
currently subsidizes the sale of
fertilizer. Nevertheless, rice 
prices over the past several
 
years have not kept pace with 
increases in the cost of
fertilizer. With increasing prices, that
oil it is likely

fertilizer will continue to 
rise even if the government subsidy
is maintained. Are there ways 
in which A.I.D. could intervene
 
with the Philippine government to ensure that farmer income is
 
not adversely afficted and productivity does not decline? (See

Appendix A, Capital Formation.)
 
c. Land Tenure
 
The share tenant has no guaranteed right to remain on the
land. ISA membership, the 
team feels, should guarantee security

of tenure for share 
tenants. This recommendation is founded on
 
the need for equal standing for all members of the the
ISA,

willingness 
to invest in the long-term effectiveness of the ISA,
 
and the incentive to take risks.
 
d. Landlord and Rent
 
The project has resulted in increased yields for the farmers
 
and windfalls for the landlords. The landlord's 
percentage

traditionally 
remains the same even if the farmer harvests one
 
or two additional crops a year. 
 A change in government policy

limiting the rent on land to one crop payment 
calculated by

averaging annual yields would 
be a more equitable arrangement.

Thought should be given to landlord investment in the irrigation
 
systems themselves.
 
e. Off-Farm Employment
 
The Philippines is 
 faced with increasing population
 
pressures that have in the past resulted in the fragmentation of

agricultural land and reduced the size of 
farms to near minimum
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standards. 
Yet the population pressures continue, with resulting

migration into urban 
areas, and unemployment and underemployment
in rural areas. Improved farmer income cannot 
be met from
increased rice production alone except to 
a limited extent
is rapidly being approached 
that
 
in parts of the country. Non-rice
farm income 
and other farm-related 
activities 
will assist the
farmer and should also be 
the focus of A.I.D. attention. Beyond
farm income there is 
a growing need for a determined government
policy to disaggregate 
 light industrial 
 and agro-business

employment opportunities. 
 The Korean model is one that should be
explored by 
the Philippine government. 
 Off-farm employment is

essential in the Philippines.
 
f. Credit Policies
 
Timely amounts of credit 
with reasonable charges directly

affect the farmer's ability to 
 have sufficient production
resources and 
materials. 
 Under the existing official credit
systems, obtaining 
credit may require collateral, e.g., land
ownership. Otherwise, 
it may only be available from private
 
sources at high interest rates.
 
The subject of rural 
credit should be analyzed in its

entirety as to availability, terms, 
and repayment scheduling to
see if the present system of 
credit and credit servicing is, 
as
farmers contend, a deterrent to optimal farm production.
 
3. What are the implications of 
 this project for A.I.D.
 
activities in other countries?
 
It is too early 
to draw too many implications from the
assessment 
of this project for A.I.D. 
activities in 
other
countries. However, 
 some tentative conclusions 
 should be

explored as 
other projects are reviewed.
 
a. 
 Village-level organizations, be effective,
to 
 should
only be introduced when they focus around a clear and perceived

need of direct benefit to the population.
 
b. Irrigation systems are not 
primarily the domain of 
the
engineer. The comprehensive agricultural implications 
of such
systems must be included early in project design if they are 
to
be successful. 
 Although engineering is necessary for effective
irrigation, it is not sufficient. 
 Irrigation projects should not
be considered quick and easy means 
to expend program funds.
Irrigation projects 
 should not be developed in capital
development 
offices, but in agricultural offices. 
 As long as
capital development offices 
exist in the field, there will 
be
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pressures to regard the spending of funds 
as more essential than
 
their effective utilization.
 
c. Field-level monitoring 
for rural projects should,
whenever possible, 
be conducted by A.I.D. direct-hire staff, 
so
that the knowledge and insights gained remain within the Agency.
Contractors may be 
required as operating expenses become tight,
but the Agency loses in the long run as 
a result of 
the lack of

continuity in the monitoring process.
 
d. The intermediate links between any project objective and
the goals to be achieved must 
be clearly identified and included
as an integral 
part of the project strategy analysis. It is
clear from this project that assumptions concerning these links
in the design phase 
 can very quickly become constraints as the
 
project is implemented.
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F. Purpose: 
 Assess progress achieved to date by interviews, visiting program

activities in Manila and eleven provinces and 
 provide AID with guidance

for future nutrition program design.
 
H. Evaluation Team:
 
The AID Review Team was composed of the following:.
 
Mr. Sol Chafkin, Ford Foundation (Chairman, NAS Committee on International
 
Nutrition Programs) 

.Mr. James Pines, New Transcentury Corporation (Consultant to AID/W, Office of 
Nutrition
 
Dr. Gerald Keusch, Mt. Sinai Hospital, N.Y.C. (Member, NAS/CINP)
Dr. Barbara Underwood, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (Member, NAS/CINP)
Mr. Robert Pratt, Office of Nutrition, AID/W

Dr. James Brady, Office of Technical Resources, Asia Bureau. AID/W
 
SUMMARY
 
A.I.D. has provided technical and material assistance to the
Philippine Nutrition Program and predecessor programs since 1968.
 
The current USAID project expires in August, 1973 and a follow-on
 
project is being considered. In view of this, AID/TW requested

that a review be made of the Philippine Nutrition Program, in­
cluding A.I.D. assisted elements, to assess progress achieved to
date and to provide A.I.D. with guidance for future nutrition
 
program design.
 
The review was carried out in the Philippinesduring February 13
to 24 by a six person team of two AID/W staff and four outside
 
experts. Team members interviewed numerous individuals and visited
 
program activities in Manila and eleven provinces. The USAID and
National Nutrition Council made the review possible by providing

complete access to program personnel and information. The team's

conclusions are the product of their own observations and extensive
dialogue with and feedback from the Philippine and USAID counter­parts. Nevertheless the team remains solely responsible for them
 
and for any errors of fact or judgment. The recommendations are

made in the hope that they will be useful for our Philippine and
A.I.D. colleagues to consider in planning new nutrition activities.
 
Conclusions and recommendations are included in sections IV and V
 
of this report. The team's overall assessment can be summarized
 
as follows: Excellent progress has been made in identifying mal­
nutrition as a national problem, establishing a sound policy and
institutional framework for attacking the problem and initiating
imaginative measures for that purpose. 
Local level comitment to

the program appears'to be strong. Initially, the program empha­
sized supplementary feeding to reduce more severe cases of malnutri­
tion but is now placing high priority on local-level planning and
preventive, outreach interv7entions centered in the municipality

and village or barrio (barangay). Integration of nutrition concerns
into economic ai agriculture planning has not yet been achieved.
 
Notwithstanding the fact that there is much more to be done, the

Philippine Hutrition Program stands out as one of the best national
 
nutrition programs with which the team is familiar and AID's suD­port for the program has apparently contributed materially to
 
that success.
 
"L 
IV. Conclusions
 
A. 
Excellent progress has been made in identifying nutrition
as a national problem and in establishing the policy and institu­tional framework for attacking the problem. 
A national coordinating
mechanism has been established (the NNC) and provided with an im­pressive physical facility for its central operations. There
remain needs to strengthen ties between NNC and other key agencies
and to complete and implement current NNC activities to improve
planning and information processing systems.
 
B. 
Local level commitment to nutrition appears to be strong,
probably as 
the result of the NNC's efforts to intimately involve
local governments in the planning rnd implementation of nutrition
activities and as a result of the support of the President and
First Lady. The establishment by ANC of the Barangay Nutrition
Scholar (BNS) system provides a unique linkage of national efforts
to barangay needs. 
 It also exemplifies voluntarism, but by the
same token, raises questions aLout the viability of the voluntary
approach when the program matures and some of the initial enthusiasm
inevitably diminishes.
 
C. The Director and staff of the NNC, as well as the Council
members, deserve praise for their 
success in promoting a national
awareness of nutrition problems and operational solutions to these
problems. 
This should not be overlooked in efforts to carry the
program on from its organizing and program development phase into
the next stage of consolidation and refinement of approaches and
the expansion of field outreach efforts.
 
D. The food assistance effort of AID, the GOP, and the PVO's
has been well targeted to malnourished children. 
The feeding pro­gram does appear to have produced 
some element of dependency among
rezipients which needs to be addressed by new programs directed
toward nutritional self-sufficiency at the community level. 
 The
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NNC and others are aware of the problem and are commited to re­
ducing the role played by donated foods, but action to achieve
 
this goal needs to be undertaken on a broader scale. Finally,

it should be recognized that the supplemental feeding program

has had a significant impact on reducing the prevalence of
 
severe malnutrition among Philippine children.
 
E. There has been a rather heavy curative bias in the feeding

and health activities and more attention now should be given to
 
strengthening preventive activities of the NNC and the DOH. Moza
 
attention might thus be given to monitoring of growth, immunizations,
 
oral rehydration for acute diarrhea, refeeding for "catch up" growth,

improved sanitation and water, etc.
 
F. Field implementation of programs appears to be generally

good, but performance varies according to the strength and dedi­
cation of local leaders and the nutrition action officers at
 
various levels. At the provincial and municipal levels, the
 
part-time officials detailed to this assignment from central
 
agencies (DOH, DEC, et.al.) need more training on the leadership

and program management aspects of their jobs. The use of such
 
part time action officers has been successful in the initiation
 
of activities in many localities, but like the BNS, there needs
 
to be an assessment of the longer term effectiveness of part-time
 
persons.
 
G. The technical and financial aid and food support provided

by AID has played a significant role in reducing infant and child
 
malnutrition and in dstablishing the current program. USAID was
 
involved in nutrition activities before these became a major con­
cern of the GOP. It is hoped that USAID will continue to give

priority to assistance for the nutrition sector, although the
 
types and styles of such assistance may have to be different from
 
those of the past. The NNC apparently looks forward to close
 
cooperation with USAID on solving some of the current problems

facing the program. USAID and NNC should also continue their
 
efforts to piggy back nutrition improvement activities onto other
 
USAID-supported activities in agriculture, provincial development,
 
water systems, health development, etc.
 
H. While considerable verbal support is being given to the
 
desirability of integrating nutritional concerns into other sec­
tors, such as agricultural production, there appears to have been
 
little real substantive progress in the achievement of this
 
objective. Part of the problem may be a fear of diluting efforts
 
in other sectors if nutritional concerns are added. There also
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appears to be a lack of knowledge about workable models for addres
 
sing nutrition problems through macro-level measures. This is
inevitable since we are aware of no perfected models to date.
 
Consequently,hlt may be necessary to test different combinations
 
of models at the micro or community level to find out what might

work best for the Philippines.
 
V. Recommendations:
 
A. The NNC should continue to strengthen the local nutrition
 
delivery system by such means as: (a) fielding additional Barangay

Nutrition Scholars, (b) providing better role definitions and per­
formance criteria for all local action officers, and (c) continuing

technical and program management training at all levels.
 
B. The UNC should continue to strengthen its own central manage­
ment capabilities by establishing an effective management information
 
system (MIS) which: (a) encourages field personnel to analyze and

utilize the data they collect (rather then simply passing it on up

to NNC). (b) reduces required field reporting to the absolute
 
minimum required for program planning, implementation, and evaluation,

and (c) provides feedback to the field on performance. It is recog

nized that a new MIS system is now being designed by NNC with the
 
cooperation of Dr. P. Wesselkamper, a USAID/VPI consultant, so this

recommendation may have already been taken into consideration by

the NNC.
 
C. Consideration should be given to alternatives for maintaining

the viability of the Barangay Nutrition Scholar system over the long

run. The NNC has successfully initiated this critical linkage to

the Barangay, but field contacts indicated that the very nominal
 
allowance (10 pesos a month) and the other fringe benefits 
(insurance,

T-shirt, bags, etc.) would probably not suffice to sustain the en­
thusiasm which now exists. Alternatives suggested to the evaluation
 
team include: (a) expansion of the Barangay Scholar's functions and
 increased remuneration (with appropriate local cost sharing), (b)
provide a more stable basis for part-time positions through some type

of civil service recognition, and/or (c) use the BNS as the channel
 
for selling certain goods (vegetable seeds, contraceptives, etc.).
Consideration riust also be given to the possible impact of other
 
proposed Barangay positions on the BNS program. These include the

Barangay Health Workers being considered under the IBRD/GOP

Population Project and the USAID Panay Unified Health Services
 
Pr6ject.
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D. The GOP (NEDA, NNC,NFAC, et. al.) should continue to seek
 
more concrete ways of linking nutrition to other development sectors.
 
The general issues here have been identified by the NNC s Technical

Advisory Body on Integrated Nutrition-Oriented Development Planning
(created in August 1977).
 
There may be an urgent need to seize special opportunities which
 
now exist for pilot-testing of an integrated approach at the community
level. Dr. Solon has indicated that such an opportunity exists in

the proposed IBRD-supported rural development project for Samar

and Dr. Alba of NEDA suggested that such schemes might be incorporated
into its new Integrated Area Development Project for Region VI
(Central Visayas). 
 This micro approach would test such alternatives
 
as linking agriculture production to the needs of nutritionally vul­
nerable groups in an effort to effect nutritional self-sufficiency

at the municipal level.
 
The NNC should also analyze opportunities for macro-level
 
changes through the sponsorhip of applied research into existing

national policies on agriculture production, food exports, income

and welfare laws, 
etc. While groups such as the new Philippine

Institute for Development Studies could conduct the research, the

NNC needs to have at least one economist on its staff to provide

the essential linkage between external researchers and the officials
 
concerned with policy formulation.
 
E. There should be consideration given to the establishment
 
of closer formal and informal 6rganizational linkages between the

NNC/NCP and agencies such as NEDA, NFAC, POPCOM, and the Population

Center Foundation (perhaps through exchange of council memberships).
 
F. More attention needs to be given to specific action measures
 to decrease the role played by foreign donated foods. 
 NNC policies

have already been promulgated to this effect, but higher priority

needs to be given to actual implementation steps. Some communities
 
are already operating on a self-help basis and this pattern should
 be expanded. The school and community gardening effort being con­
sidered for the new USAID/GOP Food and Nutrition Project could be
 
one of the elements in a new initiative to achieve self-sufficiency

but team contacts generally doubted that the garden strategy would
 
have a major impact on nutrition. Nonetheless, gardening and

multiple cropping are elements that should be considered for in­
clusion in tb. pilot projects, mentioned above, aimed at community

nutrition sufficiency. It is recognized that some degree of wel­
fare feeding may be required for the poorest element of the
 
community, but the GOP still needs to ascertain the costs of
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continuing such feeding should foreign donations of food be ter­minated. In this connection, there appears to be a need for 
more
precise data on the relationship between malnourishment and family
income. While it 
was generally felt that a strong correlation
exists')etween malnourishnent and low income, some observers felt
that there may be a number of fa-ilies in the feeding programs who
could afford to share a larger rortion of the costs of such efforts.
 
G. 
The NNC, DOH, and other bodies concerned with the delivery
of basic health services should review the current health outreanh
effort with a view to moving toward a more preventive and promotive
program and toward an expansion of services to the Barangay level.
The Barangay Health Centers established under the IBRD-supported
project and the BNS should have a major role to play in the pro­vision of improved health information and services. 
This effort
could incorporate the introduction of the home-based growth chart
and health record, use of oral rehydration techniques, and increased
immunization coverage. 
Special programs might also be included to
combat goiter and vitamin A problems in affected areas.
 
H. USAID and NNC 
should closely collal'orate during the coming
weeks on the areas wherethe new proposed Foo and Nutrition Project
can have the greatest impact. 
 This project' resources can be used
to help strengthen the NNC's ability to conduct more policy oriented
eesearch and demonstration activities, expand and continue to upgral
the field staffs and operations (including volunteers), and play a
major role in the design and testing of new ways to achieve nutri­tional self-sufficiency at the community level. 
 USAID should also
assist the NNC, as appropriate, in devising plans and time tables
for replacing foreign food donations with other resources.
 
I. 
If the proposed Food and Nutrition Project is to be imple­mented in a dynamic and maximally effective manner, it appears
important for USAID to have a direct-hire nutrition specialist on
its staff to serve as 
Project Manager and, perhaps, as senior
advisor to the GOP on nutrition matters. 
 It is recognized that
staffing constraints may make the use of contract employees more
feasible for this role, but it would seem more appropriate to use
contract personnel to provide more direct and specialized advice
to the GOP. It is also suggested that any U.S. contract advisors
be located at the NNC on a regular basis.
 
J. 
The NNC and USAID should agree on the time frame, objectives,
and resources needed for future reviews of the new USAID proect and
related nutritional activities. 
The team feels that the information
from such reviews could be very useful to AIi 
 in planning nutritiou
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projects in other countries. The Philippines does have the in­stitution-building and program experience needed to exercise a
positive influence on countries which are only beginning serious
efforts to cope with malnutrition.
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F. Purpose: This is the 3rd joint U.S.-BDG evaluation and though broadin scope, it.is intended to provide the basis both for significant changes
to the current Agreement and for future Title III Agreements. It also 
includes visits to 8 of the country's 62 subdivisions. ­
II. Summary Findings and Recommendations 
A. Findings! ?oduction,Food Distribution and Prices 
(1) Stability and adequacy of production - Foodgrain Produc­
tion in Bangladesh is relatively stable on a year-to-year basis. From 
the Mid-1960's, and excluding the war years of 1971-72, production has 
not dropped more than a million tons (8 percent) from any one crop year
 
to the next. The more important problem is the perennially inadequate 
level of production and its failure to increase significantly over time, 
Per capita foodgrain availability, i.e., production and imports com­
bined, is 6 to 7 percent lower than in the late 1960's. Thus, given the
 
countr-'s marginal subsistence level, even moderate year-to-year pro­
duction declines can assume a significance of crisis proportions.
 
(2) Seasonality of production - Unlike the situation in most 
countries where the total crop is harvested in two or three months of 
the year, Bangladesh farmers now harvest foodgrains virtually the 
year-around. Instrumental in this situation haa beea the rapid growth 
of boro rice and wheat which are harvested during February-May and 
now account for about 20 percent of total foodgrain production. (Aman
 
rice, which is harvested during November-January, accounts for about
 
55 percent of the total and aus rice, harvested during July-October,
 
for the remaining 25 percent.)
 
(3) Need for crop diversification - Given the year around pro­
duction potential, small farmers in most (but not all) areas can protect 
themselves from seasonal shortages and crop risks through crop diversi­
fication. The need is for improved cropping systems, including new 
crops (potatoes, vegetables, oilseeds, etc.), and increase6 access to
 
inputs, especially irrigation.
 
(4) Price patterns - Despite the relative stability in the 
long term production trend, there have been extremely wide year-to-year 
price swings in which crop shortfalls, low stock levels, and anticipa­
tion of reduced stock levels have all played a role. Thus, prices rose 
by 170 percent between 1974 and 1975, and by 70 percent between 1978 
and 1979. On the other hand, as would be expected from the pattern of 
near year-around foodgrain production, seasonal price variations in 
Bangladesh have been relatively modest. The natural tendency is for 
prices to be highest, to about an equal extent, during the "lean seasons" 
of March-May and August-October. In fact, owing to the consistently 
higher level of offtakes under the Public Food Distribution System (PFDS) 
during August-October, prices have been highest during March-July. 
(5) Farmers' liquidity - Many farmers are in their best cash 
position of the year during August-October when they have just marketed' 
their jute and mesta crops. Others have either just sold or are holding 
for consumption their aus rice. 
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(6) Stock levels and offtakes - Decisions with regard to off­take levels have been based mainly on stock availabilities. Thus, dis­tribution has sometimes been high even when crops are good and prices
low. 
As a result, strategic reserves do not accumulate; and since donors
tend to base their allocations on stock levels, there is little incentive
for the government to seek their accumulation. 
(7) Rice demand vs. wheat demand - Cross-elasticity of demand
between rice and wheat has been generally strong, with wholesale wheat
prices averaging about 65 percent of coarse rice prices. 
 However, the
relationship is relatively weak during March-My when both the domes­tic wheat harvest and substantial supplies from the Food-for-Work (FFW)
Program arrive on the markets, and tends to be especially close during
periods of generally reduced purchasing power.
 
B. Title III Program
 
(1) Incentive prices to farmers - Effective procurement programs,based on generallyadequate incentive prices to farmers, were carried out
during both the 1977/78 and 1978/79 rice harvests, and in the wheat harveit
of 1979. 
 The Government has shown itself to be more interested in procure­ment for meeting the perceived needs of theration system than 
in the more
appropriate objective of providing adequate incentive prices.
 
(2) OHS Poram 
- Evaluation of the OS Program may be consideredin terms both of program performance and of the appropriateness of program
objectives. 
(a) Performance 
1. Although coarse rice prices were well above thatarget price of rice in most areas during most of 1978-79, OMS sales havenot approached the intended levels (total sales of 126,000 tons during
Sept. 1978 
- Oct. 1979 vs. the 400-600,000 tons allocated for the full
24-month period), 
 Low stock levels were partly responsible (given the
Title III provision that OHS need not take place when foodgrain stocks
fell below 500,000 tons); yet stocks were adequate to support MR sales

of 503,000 tone during the same period.
 
2. A high proportion of OMS zales was to flour mills.Such sales, while noc prohibited by the terms of the Agreement, did notcontribute to the main program goal of constraining coarse rice prices. 
3. 
The obiective of coarse rice price constraint was
not achieved 
 Low stock levels and highly unusual market conditions had
much to do w:L., the program's failure in this respect, but so too diderratic program management and the evident preference of BDG officialsfor NR a., i means of moving foodgrains to the rural areas.
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4. Even nnder favorable conditions, it is unlikely
 
that the rice price constraint abjective could have been achieved to
 
any significant degree. Seasonal differences in cross elasticity of
 
demand between rice and wheat rqquired a degree of fine tuning of the
 
rice/wheat pricing structure that was not allowed for in the Agreement

and would have been extremely difficult to effect n practice.
 
5. As market prices of wheat and atta rose far above
 
the OHS price, the BDG established rigid operati6nal controls. Dealers
 
who purchased wheat at Tk.87/md. could resell at Tk.100/md., or in some
 
areas, rk.95/md. Individual qllotments were restricted tc from 2 to 5
 
seers per person, depending on the area. Licensing and selection of
 
dealers became increasingly controlled and even politicized. In some
 
areas, only MR card holders could purchase OHS wheat. Justified as a
 
means of preventing "windfall profits", the effect of these measures was
 
to turn OHS into another ration channel.
 
(b) Objectives Reconsidered
 
1. The program was designed to moderate seasonal
 
price swings. As noted above, the more important problem is large
 
year-to-year fluctuations caused by major crop shortfalls or stock
 
shortages.
 
2. As far as seasonal price swings are concerned,

these can and in the past have been influenced by appropriate variations
 
in the pattern of offtakes through the various channels of the PFDS.
 
3. A long term objective of the program was reduc­
tion of the highly subsidized ration system. Constraint of rice prices

through OMS would presumably obviate the need for controlled sales at
 
artificially low prices. In fact, given the low, fixed, price of OMS
 
wheat, the immediate result was to add yet another subsidy channel to
 
the existing system.
 
4. While the Title III Agreement called for the
 
promotion of private enterprise in the wheat trade, the establishment
 
of an OHS price only barely above (later, below) the procurement price

operated to preclude attainment of that objective. Private traders
 
were not provided a margin within which to procure, store and later
 
resell wheat.
 
5. If the basic objective is the increased avail­
ability of a reasonably priced foodgrain, wheat (or atta) should suffice,
 
for the purpose. From that point of view, the constraint of coarse rice
 
prices should not be a matter of great concern.
 
(3) Use of Local Currency Proceeds; Loan Forgiveness - Following
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are the principal findings with regard to the local currency use and loan
 
forgiveness aspects of the Agreement.
 
(a) The BDG has reported depositing the local currency
equivalent of $16,100,000 of Title III wheat sales (OHS and MR) to the
Title III Special Account. 
Further, they have reported "allocating" some
$15.1 million of this amount to USAID's Fertilizer Distribution and
Improvement Project. 
However, there has been no indication that proceeds
have been transferred to the Project Account, let alone disbursed from
that account for project uee.
 
(b) In allocating funds to the Fertilizer Project, the
specific intended use appears to be financing of the fertilizer subsidy,as opposed to construction of fertilizer godowns or other more tangible

aspects of the Project.
 
C. Goals and Obiectives
 
(1) The major objectives of the Title III Programaccelerate agricultural development and to should be tohelp provide food security.The latter may he defined as having a nutritious foodgrain available
throughout the country at a price within a reasonable range above the
procurement (support) price to farmers.
 
(2) Major price surges reflect supply shortfalls arising from
periodic events (such as the 1979 drought) to 
a greater extent than
seasonal supply variations within the 
course of a single year. Hence,major emphasis should be placed on responding to year-to-year supplyrather than seajonal variations. In meeting the food security objective,fullest emphasis should be placed on wheat (and atta).
 
(3) Foodgrain production should be encouraged by the establish­ment of procurement prices announced well in advance of planting seasons.
The primary objective in the establishment of procurement prices and
their implementation should be the provision of incentives to farmers.
As a by-product, the grain being procured by the Government will contri­bute to the augmentation of its food reserves, but the Cavernment should
not seek procurement for other purposes.
 
(4) In implementing the price support program,use full and adequateshould be made of private Intermediaries, especially in order to
reach small farmers and remote areas that would otherwise not be served.
 
(5) Farmers, dealers and consumers should be encouraged to store
for off-season use to reduce the load on Government facilities. They will
undertake to do so to the ex' .nt they can foresee a margin between the
procurement and market price of wheat sufficient to cover costs of pur­chase, assembly, storage and resale. 
 The OMS price should be high enough
to cover the procurement price plus dealers Istorage and handling costs.
 
(6) Foodgrain subsidies should be reduced and ration operations
increasingly directed to the benefit of the poor. To this end: 
(a) Distribution to Statutory Rationingessintial categories should (SR) and lessbe reduced, and increasingly shifted from

rice to wheat;
 
(b) Modified Rationing (MR) should be directed to the poorest
by making assets and income the sole criterion of eligibility;
 
(c) Food-for-Work (.-W) should be used when and where it can
economically and properly supplement productive employment for the verypoor;
 
d) Relief should be directed to those unable to earn aliving; 
(e) Ration prices st.uld be progressively raised. The near­term objective should be ration prices equal to the procurement prices of
rice and wheat. 
The longer term objective should be prices sufficient to
cover costs of procurement and distribution;
 
(f) Food distribution should emphasize low-cost alternatives
acceptable to the lowest income groups, products not strongly competed for
by people who can afford to pay more, e.g., wheat rather than rice; wheat
as atta rather than refined wheat products; Aur rather than refined sugar;
lower cost oils, etc
 
(7) Taka proceeds from the sale of PL 480, Title III coummodities
should be used for development projects which directly impact on increasing
foodgrain production in the next five years.
 
D. Recommended Actions
 
Following are the principal recommendationsAmendment to for inclusionthe current Agreement. A complete listing appears 
in the 
in SectionVI.F.
 
(1) OHS 
(a) Eliminate the rice price constraint objective;
 
(b) Establish the ONE price of wheat at a
above the procurement price to provide private traders a 
price sufficiently

margin for the
storage, handling and resale of wheat;
 
c) Base OMS sales on an atta Prigger price and sell wheat
in any subdivision when the trigger price is exceeded; 
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(d) If the market price rises above the trigger, raise the O.1
 
price accordingly.
 
(e) Eliminate dealer restrictions and make a positive
 
effort to sell to atta dealers;
 
(f) Eliminate resale price and volume restrictions on OHS.
 
(2) Local Currency Use
 
(a) Permit loan foregiveness upon proof of disbursements 
from project accounts;
 
(b) Eliminate the Fertilizer Project from the list of 
projects qualifying for loan foregiveness. 
(3) Supply and Attribution of Wheat
 
(a) Add 200,000 tons of wheat already budgeted for Bangla­
desh in FY 1980 to the existing Title III allotment of 742,000 tons, 
making a new total for FY 1978-80 of 942,000 tons;
 
(b) Of the 942,000 tons, 400,000 tons may be attributed to
 
MR; the remainder to OHS or, to the extent not needed, to BDG stocks.
 
Provided that terms of the Agreement are complied with, Title III wheat
 
not used (i.e., attributed to HR or sold through OMS) may be treated as 
having been sold, and that amount of the loan eventually written off. 
(c) It is to be understood that the terms of the Amendment 
to the current Title III Agreement are to apply to all of the wheat 
supplied - the original 742,000 tons as well as the 200,000 tons being
added from U.S. FY 1980 availabilities. Since attributions from wheat 
already received have not approached entitlements under the terms of the 
original Agreement, this will not pose a problem in accounting terms. 
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Purpose: Examined the use of the food by four volags (CARE, CRS, CWS, LIVR),
in the 3 program types (Maternal Child Health(MCH), School Feeding (SF), and
Food for Work (FFW . Emphasized assessing quality and impact of the programs,
recommending appropriate changes to increase their efficacy and identifying
constraints to program success. "The report examines the often conflicting

and confused objectives of the Title IT program, as they are perceived, stated

and demonstrated by various U.S. Government agencies, Governments of India

and the volags. Criteria are proposed for the review of future Title II
 
requests and a 
strategy is recommended for future program monitoring, management

and evaluation activities. The authors suggest that USAID and the volags identify

the minimal data needs for these functions." page vii
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Xl. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
 
Before presenting our set of recommendations, 
we would like to recognize
the generally excellent efforts which the volags and their collaborators
-have made and are making in using Title II food to good advantage. 
They
have been bent by the winds of AID policy changes, sapped by bureaucratic
information demands and pecked at by an endless stream of evaluators,
auditors, visiting firemen and miscellaneous dignitaries. 
 In spite of
these, they manage to operate programs which reach nearly 20 million
needy Indians, most of them children. 
They are usually aware of the
deficiencies of their programs as well as 
their strengths.
 
For this reason, we are directing our recommendations primarily at AID
and USAID in the hope that they will further facilitate volag operations
and, like the Title II food itself, act as an incentive for the volags
to remedy their own recognized deficiencies. 
We have already rejected
as 
inappropriate the idea of making recommendations to theGOI. 
The
highly capable and motivated Indian officials with whom we talked were
fully able themselves to sort out their prioritles concerning feeding
programs based on costs and benefits.
 
Our conclusions and recommendations provided in this section fall into
two categories. 
Some are restatements of the comments found in other
chapters concerning the three major program types. 
 The second group
are made at the general policy level and reflect upon detailed discus­sion of issues in preceeding chapters.
 
A. frogramLevel 
1. MCH Program 

-
Our conclusion is that the major objectives of
Title II food inMCH programs, that of improving health and
nutritional status of the target group, are largely not achieved.
The basis for this finding is,that according to our observations,
the conditions necessary for the achievement of the health and
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nutrition objectives (see pg. 37) are not consistently fulfilled.
 
A much larger ration would be needed to counteract the effects

of sharing, substitution and losses due to poor health. 
This

'finding is confirmed by much of the research done by Indian
 
institutions which failed, inmost cases, to find any but
 
marginal nutritional impact of MCH programs.
 
A second conclusion is that the food does have the potential 
to

act as an incentive for receiving other health services. 
 This
potential can only be realized if the otler services are avail­
able.
 
We therefore make the following recommendations, recognizing

that many of these ideas are not new and that some of them are
 
already being attempted.
 
a. Programs which provide food alone should be upgraded to

provide other health and educational services. 
 Programs

wnich do not do this should be actively discouraged.
 
b. It should be recognized that few children under three years
 
are being reached by the program. 
 Either new delivery

methods should be investigated, or 
the emphasis on the
 
objectives of reaching this target group should be reduced.
 
c. 	Beneficiaries should be selected on the basis of economic
 
and nutritional need. 
 (For example if mothers in the pro­gram have low birth weight babies, these should be given
 
a high priority for food supplementation.)
 
d. Coarse cereal grains should not be provided as a nutritional
 
supplement for children under three. 
 Low 	bulk, high

nutrient-density food should be programmed for this group.
 
e. 	If the food is 
to be consumed by a given individual, it
 
should be prepared and eaten on site for maximum control.
 
4 
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f. A greater consideration should be given to the need for
 
improved environmental sanitation to reduce infection and
 
infestation, along with nutritional supplementation.
 
-2. FFW Program --The existing FFW projects are not neutral in their
 
effects. Those which involve the granting of assets to selected
 
individuals or to a community without requiring their participa­
tion in planning their contribution of labor or resources, run
 
the risk of perpetuating a dangerous attitude of dependency on
 
outside charity. Furthermore, if projects promise benefits
 
which are not received because of poor planning and lack of other
 
inputs, or if a project's benefits are clearly allocated unfairly
 
and without regard for genuine need, then people will become
 
cynical, skeptical of the value of development programs.
 
In contrast, projects which use the availability of food as an 
incentive to organize the community and educate it in planning 
and problem solving, as well as to create income-generating 
assets and skills, can have an important positive long-term 
effect on economic and community development. The nutritional 
impact of such an effect may well be greater than that of any 
direct feeding program. 
In order to ensure that FFW projects result in these positive
 
economic and nutritional changes, we have made the following
 
recommendations regarding project design. These suggestions
 
are based on observations of successful existing proyranis, which
 
means that they are not new ideas and that their feasibility
 
has been demonstrated. While local conditions of unemployment
 
luw income or lack of food may justify undertaking some projects 
which do not fulfill all of the recommended criteria, it is our 
suggestion that these conditions be given greater emphasis In 
future FFW projects.
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a. 	If possible, the project should be one that promotes
 
community-wide self-reliance as well as economic growth.
 
This can be achieved if project beneficiaries are involved
 
in planning and execution of the project, if they take
 
responsibility for it,and if they are required to provide
 
some of the project resources themselves.
 
b. The project should be planned with food as a resource with
 
time-limited availability and qith specific criteria for
 
the eventual termination of the food input. (Intraining
 
programs the time limit could be applied to individudl
 
trainees.)
 
c. 	The selection of project beneficiaries (those who receive
 
assets created by the project) should be based on established
 
criteria of economic need. Ideally, from the point of view
 
of community participation, the recipients (those who receive
 
the food) should be the beneficiaries as well. It would be
 
best if the whole community participated in selection of
 
beneficiaries as well as of the project. Recipients of
 
course should also be selected on the basis of need.
 
d. A project should not be undertaken unless all the resources
 
are known to be available. Otherwise, those resources which
 
are used will le wasted, and people's confidence will be lost.
 
e. A project should address an existing constraint on economic
 
development in the community, responding, if possible, to a
 
felt need of the people.
 
3. SF Program - We have considered the high priority that the GOI
 
has mandated for the universalization of elementary education
 
and the compelling role played by SF in attracting and retaining
 
children in school, especially from the neediest groups - tribals,
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low castes and landless. 
 The team strongly supports any efforts
 
by the GOI, the USAID and the voluntary agencies to continue,
 
improve and expand the primary school feeding program utilizing
 
both Title II commodities and locally produced foods. 
 We also
 
concur with the GOI's perception that basic education and human
 
resources development are essential factors in social and economic
 
development. 
The use of Title II food as an incentive to contri­
bute to this long range development goal isworthwhile ard
 deserving of support. 
 Furthermore, the ease with which Title II
 
commodities can be targeted in an on-the-spot feeding program

persuades us to accept the MDM as a relatively effective (as the
 
infrastructure exists and is functioning) means of providing a
 
nutrient supplement to children to meet the program goals of more
 
education. 
More specific recommendations are as follows.
 
a. Headmasters and teachers responsible for the management
 
of the MDM programs should receive special training to
 
enlighten them on the objectives of the feeding program

and to demonstrate to them ways by which the program could
 
be made more effective for the benefit of the target groups.

This training should explore the myriad ways that the teacher
 
can play a .catalytic role in the village or hamlec in social
 
action and community development. 
 Inthis way the Title II
 
food could serve as an innocent entre in
a whole series of
development spin-offs culminating in people learning to 
solve their own problems. 
b. In any expansion of the MDM program with Title II and local
 
stocks, first consideration should be given to the present

client schools to realize a more rational head count for the
 
inclusion of all children in need.
 
c. Second order of expansion should be to new primary schools
 
serving children from tribal, scheduled caste, or landless
 
families. 
 Related to this expansion should be a special
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focus on the eight states where 70% of the nonenrolled
 
primary school 
ace children live. 
Other areas which
 
should receive special consideration for MDM intervention
 
are city slumt and drought-prone rural areas.
 
d. The team recommends that all such expansions of the MDM
 program should be made conditional on significant local
participation in the management and support of the programs.

This participation could be spontaneous if the matching

nature of the expansion is well publicized. Likewise the
training envisaged above should lead to fomenting such
 
local Initiative.
 
e. Our own observations confirmed what has been noted in several

research papers, namely that the school children suffer from

vitamin deficiencies. 
 For this 
reason the team recommends
 
that the responsible authorities explore the possibilities

of providing vitamin supplements or vitamin-fortified foods
to the MDM program. 
There was a particular need for vitamin A
 
and the B-complex vitamins.
 
B. General Policy Level
 
1. For this recommendation, 
we refer to a recent background paper of
the Presidential Commission on World Hunger. 
"Eliminate rank
priorities: 
 (1)MCH; (2)FFW; (3)SF on a 
world wide basis and
allow greater flexibility for individual programming which

coincides with the specific needs of various countries."12
 
We do not deny the importance of eliminating childhood malnutri­tion. 
We do question the validity of numerous unstated assumptions

which underlie these targeted feeding efforts. 
Until these are
verified, it would be inappropriate to continue pushing volags and
collaborators to increase MCH feeding, especially at the expense

of FFW and SF.
 
12. 
 Food Aid Discussion Materials, Staff Discussion Paper No. 1. Presidential
Commission on World Hunger, 1979.
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2. In a hierarchical decision making structure there are decisions
appropriate to each level. 
 In the interests of good management,
higher, more aggregated (i.e., with less detailed knowledge)
levels should refrain from remaking decisions already made at
lower, more knowledgeable levels. 
 The corollary is that the
higher levels must set the broad policy limits within which
programs can be developed.
 
If the higher level decision-makers 
feel the need to revise
lower-level decisions, it usually means that they were not clear
in their objectives 
or role when they set broad policy and imple­mentation guidelines.
 
3. USAID and AID should support and encourage the volags to develop
alternative methods of programming Title I food.
is used in If food aid
new ways, they must accept that such experimentation
may entail a "risk of relinquishing 
some control over the pro­
grams."13
 
4. As a first step in sncouraging experimentation and confining
decision making and review to the appropriate levels, AID/W and
USAID should rview their Title II reporting requirements with
the objective of making such reports the minmum, logical products
of their own information needs and of volag management systems.
Specifically, USAID's intent to undertake such a review with the
volags, should be funded and serve as a pre-requisite 
to develop­ment of ary managemet information system. 
5. We recommend that Title I program data collection efforts inIndia be separated according to their two functions: on-goingprogram monitoring and periodic evaluation of purpose and goalachievement. 
The data collection system for program monitoring
should be developed based on the minimal data needs of the three
administrative levels (volags, USAID, AID/W) as stated above.
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The system should be based on random sampling of programs within
 
each major category (MCH, SF, FFW), and geographically stratified.
 
It should be planned as a continuous effort. 
Spot checking by

the USAID and the volags should be a part of the plan.
 
If further program evaluation is desired, it should start with 
the identification of all 
expected benefits of a given program,

and of the assumptions underlying the expectation that these
 
benefits will be obtained. A decision can then be made whether
 
it is
more efficient and economical 
to test the assumptions
 
first, or concurrently with the assessment of purpose and goal

achievement. Evaluation can be performed on a small sample of 
programs purposively chosen to be representative of particular 
variants. 
6. We believe that the smooth operation of the Title II program in 
India depends on a close relationship between USAID and the volags,

based to some degree on mutual trust and respect. Feelings play
 
an important part in determining how a person will 
act in a given

situation and thus, what his institution will or will In
not do. 

our qualitative assessment, we have found that some volag people

do 
not feel good about USAID. 
Thcse feelings were described 
variously as "being taken for granted,,, as being viewed as "an 
extension of USAID," as "suffering from the whims of USAID," 
and
 
of being the unwilling children in
an institutional parent-child

relationship. 
We hesitate to make firm recommendations on this
 
point, for obvious reasons. Nevertheless, we feel that it would 
be useful to deal with these feelings openly and constructively.
 
To deny that such feelings exist and reject this suggestion

would probably be a good indicator of the need for just such an 
effort.
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
 
Despite Sri Lanka's extensive health, education and
 
transportation .systems compared both1 to other Asian coun­
tries and to countries of comrarable per capita GNP, malnu­
trition is a problem documented by most nutrition surveys
 
Intakes of calories and proteins are inadequate,
since 1970. 

particularly fcr low income groups, while intakes of other
 
are inadequate for all
 nutrients (calcium, vitamins, etc.) 

The problem is pervasive, both geographically
income groups. 

and sectorally (urban, rural, estates).
 
The full eradication of malnutrition requires a com­
bination of health, nutrition, water and sanitation, 
educa­
with benefits accruing only in tion and employment programs, 
for more short or medium run purposesthe long run. However, 

feeding programs are warranted.
and goals, supplementary 
or is not
 
Despite a controversy over whether malnutrition is 

a serious problem, there is a consensus among 
all relevant
 
program

foreign and domestic agencies that the Title I 

operated by CARE is adequately fulfilling this need. 
Thus,
 
no other agencies are considering any involvement 
in this
 
area, nor is there any need for another voluntary 
agency to
 
become involved. It is generally agreed that the 
CARE
 
program is fully utilizing the logistic capacity of 
Sri
 
Lanka to support such a program.
 
3.
 
/ 
4.
 
program in Sri Lanka is composed 
princi-

The Title ii 
(MCH) and School Feeding
 
pally of Maternal Child Health 

The MCH organizational concept, 
however, is weak
 
projects. 

primarily due to weaknesses in 
the extensive but inefficient
 
Meanwhile, the commodity emphasis
 health delivery system. 

is contrastingly strong because 
of CARE's intensive orienta
 
Impressive progress has
 
tion of the program in this regard. 

been made in the very recent but 
successful introduction of
 
'l throughout
 
a virtually new blended food product, 
Thriposha
 
much of the country.
 
The School Feeding project has the exactly 
opposite
 
The organizational structure is 
more
 
structural emphasis. 

sound while the total product, 
a biscuit, requires further
 
improvement. 
For program direction purposes, 
the evaluation team
 
be placed on buildingtime and emphasisthat morerecommends and improving
as a spinoff of Thriposha, up the MCH concept 
the quality and nutritional contribution 
of the School
 
The latter is likely to involve 
not only
 
Feeding project. 

improvement of the biscuit but 
also adding more local foods.
 
The overdependence of the program 
on Sri Lankan Govern­
program.
 
ment and foreign inputs further 
weakens the Title ii 
of the programfor more developmentis a definite needThere 
more direct communityi.e., introducingthe bottom up,from 
1. 	Thriposha, meaning "three 
nutrients," is a dry, pre-

Originally intended as a weaning
 
cooked, fortified food. 

food, it is actually consumed 
by all age groups because it
 
-- hot or cold, as a drink, 
or
 
can be prepared so many ways 

mixed with other foods 	and soups.
 
5.
 
The School Feeding project needs more local involvement. 
participation and foods, and MCH 
activities could benefit
 
health workers.of communityfrom the assistance 
One way of increasing local participation 
in the MCH
 
operations would be for community 
workers trained by
 
(a leading community development organization) 
to 
Sarvodaya, 
be used in Title II for organizing 
local communities in
 
and ihputs as well as assisting
 
providihg more local support 

In this way Sarvodaya workers would
 
with food distribution. 

have viable projects with which to become 
involved, and
 
This recommen­
would have the local input it needs. 
Title II 
dation should be followed up by 
the CARE director with the
 
aim of strengthening local support, 
participation and input
 
into the project.
 
The CARE staff has excellently 
managed and operated the
 
It fully controls and
 
Title 1I Program in Sri Lanka. 

evaluates all dspects of the program 
and properly monitors
 
There was
 
all problems and remedies on a 
regular basis. 

little in the evaluation coverage 
of their operations and
 
management aspects which they had 
not also considered and
 
They regularly study various program 
aspects
 
acted upon. 

idf.ntify the principal like the distribution network, necessary
and then implement theand remedies,bottlenecks 
The team was especially impressed 
with CARE's
 
actiun. 

entire planning process.
 
Despite the use of an experimental 
process for producing
 
the Thriposha, CARE has implemented 
an economically viable
 
The distribution of the
 
production and processing system. 

6.
 
foods from the United States to Sri Lanka and 
the
 
Title 1I 

dissemination of the biscuit and Thriposha are undertaken 
on
 
....
 
a regular basis and are not seriously hampered by 
anything 

other than normal daily mishaps. CARE maintains 
proper
 
fiiiancial and accounting records, program statistics 
and
 
data on number of recipients, centers, geographic 
distri-

Finally,
These are updated on a regular basis.
bution, etc. 

CARE has developed a monitoring and evaluation system 
for
 
Thriposha which is well intpgrated i.nto such activities 
as
 
selection criteria for beneficiaries, and charting 
recipients'
 
The multi-functional system
health and nutrition progress. 

makes feasible the planning and implementing of several
 
effectiveness studies to be undertaken within the 
next year
 
or two.
 
The fact that the program is so impressively 
good does
 
not mean that there are not problems or areas 
needing
 
Some were already recognized by CARE and
 strengthening. 

included in their MYP while others evolved on 
the basis of
 
the present evaluation and discussions with CARE 
staff and
 
The evaluation is intended both to corroborate 
and
 
others. 

to criticize peogram content, and to assist 
the managers in
 
dealing with some problems so the program can 
continue to
 
Thus, the team recommended a few management 
and
 
progress. 

operations improvements.
 
The School Feeding project has the most serious weak-

An ongoing monitoring and evaluation system 
should
 
nesses. 

be introduced to enable the identification of 
a hotter
 
selection criteria and the charting of each recipient's
 
progress, to assess the nutritional contribution 
of the
 
7.
 
biscuit." The system is 
also required to evaluate 
ultimately
 
For
 
the Title Ii program's impacts 
at the project level. 

the MCU the principal recommendaticn 
ii to improve the
 
supervision by medical officers 
of the Thriposha distribution,
 
including a check 6hat growth 
cards are being interpreted
 
correctly.
 
It is also recommended that 
CARE continue to maintain
 
program sources on a
 
cost information-for all Title 
1i 

This will serve as a check on 
program effi­
regular basis. 
ciency and become a basis 
for periodic cost effective
 
assessments.
 
Program effectiveness has been 
measured in terms of its
 
outreach, acceptability of 
products, community attitudes,
 
nutritional contribution of 
biscuit and Thriposha, domestic
 
production and consumption, 
and educational improvement.
 
The Title 11 program reaches 
nearly 10 percent of the
 
Eighty percent of the population 
is categorized
 
population. 

as poor, however, and an estimated 
25 percent malnourished.
 
-- preschool and primary
 
Among the Title ii target groups 

school children and pregnant 
or lactating women -- the
 
not
 
A coverage of 10 percent 
is 

percentages are higher. 

Morever, enlarging the program's
 
excessive in terms of need. 
imply that more Title ii foods
 
outreach does not necessary 

are required, at least not 
after the next few years 
as
 
Thriposha can be made entirely 
from domestically produced
 
-
The School Feeding project can and 
should 

ingredients. 

utilize more local food inputs.
 
a.
 
The program has been highly acceptable in most communi­
ties. In fact, the lack of the Thriposha or biscuit is the
 
principal problem in some areas, not too much of it. Commu­
nity attitudes have been highly supportive although this now
 
needs to be translated into more community input.
 
The Thriposha significantly increases the nutritional
 
intake of its target group while the biscuit is not sufficient,
 
even in-the maximum ration,-to fill-the nutritional gap in
 
the primary school children. Additional locally available
 
foods such as bananas or pineapples are warranted.
 
Title II imports do not hamper or help domestic produc­
tion but they have been significant in developing new
 
a step in the
consumption habits.' The shift to ICSM is 

right direction when totally local products will be distributed.
 
There has been no study determining the effect of foods on
 
learning and school attendance, but almost all teachers
 
interviewed thought that attendance was higher when biscuits
 
were distributed.
 
The evaluation team recommends that several studies be
 
Conversations with
undertaken by CARE, MOH and MOE jointly. 

CARE staff indicate these would be feasible in terms of
 
current personnel and budget levels.
 
Because of the controversy over the School Feeding
 
project, the team recommends that a limited nutrition survey
 
be undertaken to (1) substantiate prevalence of malnutrition;
 
(2) indicate whether recipient levels are currently too high 
or too low; (3) get a more Saccurate assessment of which 
9. 
schools ought to be in the project; and (4) assess to the
 
extent possible the effectiveness of the project in the last
 
few years.
 
On an even more limited basis there now appear to be
 
sufficient data to assess the nutritional impact of Thriposha.

Growth cards have been maintained in enough centers to get

an adequate sample and a good cross-section among rural,
 
urban and estate-sectors. 
-
-. 
Most recommendations can be implemented within the next
 
year. However, the team recognizes that for some, more 
substantial shifts in program or project direction, a
 
longer horizon is required. The team makes these recommen­
dations, however, in order that a start on the planning and
 
implementing processes for such changes may be made. 
The
 
team feels especially confident that CARE can handle this.
 
After all, within five years they have successfully developed,

produced, "processe4 and distributed a totally new product
 
beginning virtually from ground zero. 
This is quite an
 
achievement. 
The CARE program is an excellent example of
 
what can be done when there is a strong commitment to reach
 
program goals.
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F. 
Purpose: Through field visits and interviews in Jakarta and rurajL
Indonesia, the team sought to assess AID's assistance to that program and
to identify the lessons that can be learned for the improvement of family
planning assistance elsewhere. Specifically interested in identifying
the reasons for famed program's success, not in evaluating the program

itself.
 
Life of Project Funding:
 
page 24: AID 
 57.9 million
 
Other Donor 45.9 million
 
page iii: AID 43.2 million (grants) + 14.3 million (loans) 
Other Donor 46.5 million (foreign)
 
Host Country
 
counterpart
 
funds 105'0 million
 
208.0 million (?) 
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PART I 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND MAJOR FINDINGS
 
A. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
 
Overview. Since 1968 A.I.D. has provided $43.2 million in grants and
$14.3 million inloans to the Indonesian National Family Planning Program.
During the intervening years, prevalence of contraceptive use in Indonesia
has increased dramatically and fertility has decreased far more rapidly than
 
was predicted even a few years ago. The national program has clearly played
the determining role in this decline. Program achievements on Java and Bali,the two densely settled islands that contain 90 million of the nation's 135

million people, are referred to by respected authorities as a "success story

probably unrivaled infamily planning history." Itiswidely acknowledged
that A.I.D. support has been a 
major element inthe program's success to
 date.
 
Program Impact. Indonesia's population was 40 million in 1900 and had

soared to 117 million by 1969 when the national program was launched. During
the 1970-1975 period the annual population growth rate averaged 2.4 percent.Ithas since been brought down to 1.9 percent. The fertility rate of Java

and Bali, where the program has until recently been concentrated, has dropped
15 percent. Contraceptive prevalence on the two islands 
now averages over
35 percent and reaches 
over 85 percent in some villages. This has been
achieved through voluntary participation and without material incentives for 
acc~ptors.
 
Financial Inputs. Funds provided to the program through 1978 totaled$208 million. Of this the government of Indonesia provided 50 percent, A.I.D.28 percent, and other foreign donors 22 percent. Inthe early years Indone­
sian contributions constituted only a small portion (e.g., 4 percent in 1968),
while A.I.D. contributed the major portion. The Indonesian contributioi, has
climbed steadily to 60 percent in 1978. 
This indicates growing country com­
mitment but also the great importance of A.I.D. funds in the program's

early years.
 
Countr Commitment, Capability, and Context. 
The Suharto government has
been unambiguously committed to fertility reduction as an integral part of

overall national family planning coordinating board, the BKKBN. Extra­
mini:terial yet capitalizing on existing social and political systems, the
BKKBN has developed the administrative capability, as well as commitment, to

achieve measurable impacts. It has done so by providing services atvillage level and by tailoring its program to the indigenous village organization,leaders, and cultural values. Program achievements are especially remarkablein view of the conditions usually assumed to militate against family planning
acceptance 
--a national per capita income of only $180 per year, an infant

mortality rate over 100 per 1,000 live births, 50 percent illiteracy among

adult women, and a wide diversity of Islamic and other intensely religious

and tradition-minded linguistic and ethnic groups.
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A.I.D. Effectiveness. A.I.D. has been successful in helping Indonesia's 
program to reduce population growth because it was able to provide necessary 
resources at the right time; this has enabled the national progr nm to meet
 
and create popular demand to reward and further build political commitment 
at all levels. A.I.D.'s ability to he effective has derived from four 
essential sets of conditions. 
*AID/Washington provided consistent support but delegated authority to 
the mission for virtually all program decisions. It always made readily 
available sufficient grant funds, technical assistance, training, and 
commodities to iteet and even anticipate the needs of the program and 
to permit flexibility in the field. 
*The USAID Mission in Jakarta assigned high priority to population, 
created an Office of Population reporting directly to the Mission Direc­
tor, and made it possible and attractive for key staff to remain in 
Indonesia for three tours of duty. Strong goal rather than procedure 
orientation and effective internal delegation of authority by the 
Mission leadevship permitted the Office the flexibility and support 
necessary for creative inoovation. 
*The mission's population office has relied primarily on direct-hire staff
 
who have been individually selected for their population and Asian com­
petency and who have developed facility in the Indonesian language and
 
familiarity with the Indonesian context. The staff has evolved a stra­
tegy and mode of close collaboration with the Indonesians that permits 
them to tailor A.I.D. resources to the specific needs of the program 
and to direct them to the greatest targets of opportunity.
 
*A mechanism, based nn local-cost programming and project implementation 
letters, was developed by the mission population office tL move resources 
quickly to provincial and rural activities where there is high probability 
that the resources will be used effectively. The ability of the Office 
to provide funding for local initiatives within weeks (rather than months 
or years) has been highly instrumental in stimulating local participation, 
promoting innovation, and building political commitment. It is this 
mechanism, together with the successful mangement-oriented data system
 
developed by the BKKBN and the A.I.D. Mission, that has permitted effec­
tive decentralization. Ifonly oneelement were to be singled out as
 
most i-mportant in explaininC the effectiveness of A.I.D. support to this 
particular program, it would c'rtainly be the use of this funding 
mechanism. 
Lesson Learned. A.I.D. support to Indonesian family planning is regarded
 
as one of the U.S.'s most successful foreign assistance efforts. Many lessons
 
can be extracted and should be transferable to programs elsewhere. Most
 
broadly they derive from putting basic development principles into practice.
 
Inparticular they concern the mechanism for fast, accurate funding. It is
 
the use of this procedure by a technically competent, culturally sensitive
 
goal-oriented staff that most distinguishes A.I.D. support to the program.
 
Legal and administrative provisions for the procedure are standard in the 
A.I.D. system. The exact importance of certain host-country conditions to 
the effective use of the mechanism remains to be determined. Its effective 
use depends, however, upon having a resident staff and upon that staff beini 
given adequate support and authority to act. 
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B. MAJOR FINDINGS
 
Siiteen major findings are presented below as sources of strength

and five as sources of concern.
 
1. Sources of Strength
 
a. Political Will
 
The Indonesian family planning program has been successful in large
part because it has had strong political support from a president and govern­ment unambiguously committed to fertility reduction as an 
 ntegral part of
overall national economic development. AID assistance has helped the pro­gram's personnel to sustain and even increase top-level political support by
providing political leaders with low-cost program successes. Essential to
AID's assistance has been a strong technical office inWashington combined
with flexible field operations.
 
Discussion
 
The Indonesian government's commitment to fertility reduction as an
integral part of economic development reflects a 
set of dynamic conditions
that are the product primarily of internal sociopolitical developments
interacting with worldwide forces. 
 The specific form and content of the
political commitment are purely Indonesian. 
There is little the United States
did or could have done to bring about this initial 
set of conditions. 
Never­theless, the character of AID assistance helped the Indonesian family
planning personnel to sustain and even increase the political support of
their national leaders.
 
The essential element inAID's assistance was the combination of a
strong technical office inWashington and highly flexible field operations.
Flexibility was provided by the willingness of AID/Washington to delegate
operational decisions to the mission's population office. 
This enabled
the mission to use local cost programming to move money and resources
rapidly to 
users and to focus attention on program outcomes rather than on
recognition for AID assistance. 
These conditions enabled the Indonesian
program to request presidential support in the form of public statements
and to follow these with activities supported quickly and unobtrusively
by AID funds without simultaneously demanding additional
president. resources from the
The net results were proqr = 
successes that were of low cost to
national leaders.
 
b. Population as Priority
 
AID's mission directors in Indonesia have taken seriously the Con­gressional mandate to give priority to population. The creation of anindependent office of population reporting directly to the mission director
has made itpossible to attract and retain high-quality staff; the organi­
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zational status of the office has been a
morale.and of the staff's abI1ity to 
major determinant of high staffsuccessfully support this high­priority program. 
Discussion
 
The high priority accorded to population by the USAID mission inIndonesia was reflected by establishing a separate office for populationwith the chief of the population office reporting directly to the mission
director. 
This translated the idea of high priority into effective orga­nizational action inat least three ways. 
 First, the chief was placed in
a position equal to other key administrators. 
 He thus had effective bargain­ing power with financial and legal units, whose natural tendency is to be
concerned with administrative procedures rather than program outcomes.
Second, population was not submerged under another organizational layer,
whose chief would be concerned with a 
wide variety of different projects
and who might have little technical knowledge of or interest in population.
Finally, placing population ina separate office gave it
level decision-makers on the Indonesian side. 
access to higher

This also gave AID
greater credibility inurging Indonesian bureaucratic and political
leaders to accord higher priority to population.
 
c. Goal Orientation
 
Major AID and BKKBN decision-makers v'esponsible for the program have
been intently goal- and outcome-oriented dnd consistently emphasize
that this firm commitment to goals demands flexibility in approaches.
Activities are evaluated on the basis of the specific goal of
fertility reduction, which is estimated directly or through careful
use of surrogate measures.
 
Discussion
 
Program managers have clear goals and periodically assess targets
for meeting these goals. They frequently admit uncertainty as towhat will ultimately be the best means of achieving the goal and
accordingly actively experiment with alternative strategies. 
This isreferred to by the USAID population staff as "guided incrementalism." 
AID and host-country procedures are respected but not permitted
to become ends in themselves. It is recognized that legally binding
contracts are necessary for moving resources but that they by no means
assure or even promote cost-effective goal attainment. Responsibilityis consciously delegated inorder to establish performance- and goal­orientation inothers. 
So strong is this goal orientation that both
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American and Indonesian personnel alike frequently refer to the program
 
as propelled by a special force.
 
Itis true that population activities lend themselves to quantified
 
measures of outcome, but these are by no means a prominent feature in
 
the day-to-day management of most programs. Examples abound of programs

where delays and inaccuracies indata reporting render any cybernetic

application virtually impossible. Nor Is It unusual for program m-,oa­
gers to become distracted by process measures of secondary importance,

such as the number of personnel trained or the number of clinics opened.

Competing value systems may also reduce the emphasis given to a specific
 
outcome and considerations such as loyalty or status can become dis­
tracting factors ina program's management.
 
In contrast, a BKKBN deputy chairman terms his program's predomi­
nant philosophy as management by objective, an orientation consistently

apparent ina variety of program contexts. The timeliness and complete­
ness of the data system, for example, isthe result not only of a
 
practical design but also of a program-wide, ongoing goal of maintaining
 
an effective system. These dmta are regarded as cssential for outcome­
oriented management; budgets, supervision, public recognition, and
 
training all appear to be linked primarily to performance, as expressed

incontraceptive use, rather than to friendship, political influence,
 
or any other arbitrary formula.
 
Certainly, a pervasive political commitment to reducing Indonesia's
 
population growth has also been essential to the present management

style. The USAID mission has also played an important role in fostering
 
a program orientation explicitly directed toward measurable outcomes.
 
The very expression "management by objective" is evidence of the impact

of the mission-funded long-term U.S. participant training. The data
 
system itself was to a large degree a mission initiative. Similarly,

the mission population staff has used its local cost programming

mechanism to direct resources to provincial programs largely on the
 
basis of performance. This emphasis on performance has apparently also
 
influenced the manner inwhich domestic BKKBN funds are budgeted,

suggesting that the present management pattern will be sustained
 
beyond the period of large-scale AID assistance.
 
d. Grants vs. Loans
 
The fact that most of AID support has been provided through grants'

promoted success in two ways. First, it permitted activity that the
 
Indonesian government might otherwise have considered unaffordable,

and, second, itprovided critical speed and flexibility that could not
 
have been achieved through loans alone.
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Discussion
 
For the first ten years of U.S. support to Indonesian family
planning, assistance was primarily inthe form of grants. 
Obligations
through 1978 totalled $57,879,000 of which 75 percent was grant and

only 25 percent loans signed in 1977 and 1978.
 
It is highly unlikely that the Indonesian government would have
been willing to borrow money for family planning at the inception of
the program especially under the extreme economic pressures the
government faced at the time. 
Grant support permitted the government
to develop a major family planning program at little cost to its

other programs. 
Grant support h~s also provided greater flexibility.

Loan negotiation is always a more time-consuming process involving
the national planning agency, and agreements typically carry rigid

specifications for use of funds. 
 Indonesian family planning officers
have often expressed frustration over the delays, complexity, and
inflexibility they have experienced with other donors' loan arrange­
ments. The availability of grant monies, accompanied by the delega­tion of virtually all program decisions from Washington to the field,
permitted the mission to respond promptly and appropriately to local
devel opments. 
e. Fast, Flexible Funding
 
The mission's population staff has developed an extremely impor­
tant process, using local cost programing, to move money rapidly 
--
Inweeks rather than months 
-- to provincial staff. The process

necessarily draws mission staff into close collaboration with Indo­
nesians indeveloping socially sound and cost-effective projects.

Although labor intensive, the process is highly rewarding and permits
AID staff to respond to the government of Indonesia with confidence.
This is perhaps the most innovative and the single most important

element in the support AID has given to the Indonesian program.
 
Discussion
 
Using local cost programming, the USAID population staff has
developed a labor intensive procedure inwhich itworks closely with
Indonesian officials to develop sound project proposals for USAID 
-
funding. Once proposals are developed, the procedure provides for
the movement of money to the provinces that is,by normal bureaucratic

standards, unbelievably fast. The procedure relies upon grant funding
and the extensive delegation of authority from AID/Washington to the

mission and within the mission to the population staff.
 
The value of this process cannot be overestimated. It provides
for intensive interaction with BKKBN officials, in headquarters and
provinces, through which AID staff gain a 
clear understanding of the
needs of the program.. This permits them to selectively support its
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strongest parts. 
 Itpermits funding to be highly flexible, adjusting
activities to the specific field needs, and itfosters a
of local initiative. high degree
Although the majority of projects funded through
this process are based on a standard model of community-based contra­ceptive distribution, a 
wide varipty of small-scale experimental
approaches has also been funded. 
Many of these innovative projects
have proved unworkable. The willingness of the mission to support
unconventional projects with a 
significant risk of failure has been
essential in the rapid evolution of the overall program.
 
Ifthere were only one lesson to be learned from AID support to
the program, itwould certainly concern the utility of the labor­intensive, fast, flexible funding p-ocess the mission has developed.
 
f. Flexibility, Decentralization, and Local Participation
 
The fast, flexible funding procedure developed by the mission
reflects its own decentralized nature and in turn supports the effective
decentralization of the BKKBN program. 
This lodges both authority to
act and credit for performance in the provincial offices. 
The double
support for decentralized programming mobilizes great amounts of human
resources by stimulating local initiative and participation through
demonstrating that such initiative can bring quick and effective

central support.
 
Discussion
 
Most development programs attempt to stimulate local initiative
and participation but fail because they cannot respond quickly and
appropriately to the needs and ideas of local leaders. 
The Indonesian
family planning program and AID's fast, flexible support to ithave
been unusually effective ineliciting initiative and participation uf
provincial and the village leaders. 
 BKKBN effectively delegates
authority for program management to provincial staff, administrators,
religious, and other local leaders. 
 The extensive field travel of
USAID population staff together with Indonesians and the staff's
ability to commit funds and then move them quickly to the provinces
are key ingredients ingenerating local 
initiative. 
This gives local
leaders the confidence that their ideas can be quickly translated
into action and being able to see quick results encourages local
leaders to be more active. 
This has apparently also helped many of
them to resist the lures of the capital and to remain instead inthe­provinces where their talents are so needed.
 
g. Selection Traininq and Tenure
of Personnel
 
The mission and AID/Washington's regional and technical bureaus
have exerted important influence on staffinj the mission's population
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office and the tenure of its staff members has been unusually long

compared to AID norms. 
 This has produced a highly competent team and
permitted deielopment of the collaborative AID-Indonesian relationship
that has been an essential element in the program's success.
 
Discussion
 
It issaid that AID has been effective because the USAID population

office "has had good people." 
 "Good people" are not just circumstance.
The population staff have all been hand-picked for their population
and Indonesian or other Asian background and have subsequently been
given critical support by a mission management.
 
The mission, the Asia Bureau, and AID/Washington's Office of
Population have all been able to play an active role in tho appointment

of personnel to the USAID population office. On several important
occasions this involved overriding decisions made by AID's personnel

system and others whose primary concern was not population assistance.
The resultant staff has commanded complimentary skills in public health,
management and logistics, and social science. 
Nearly all staff have
been direct hire rather than external contractors. Once appointed,

all staff have been given Indonesian language training, as have been
their spouses. 
 Facility in Indonesian has been indispensable to
functioning effectively in Indonesian society and, in particular, to
the collaborative program development which is premised on much field
involvement and verbal negotiation. The mission management has then
helped its key staff to remain with the office for three terms of
duty (i.e., 
six to seven years). This has fostered a cooperative

working style, which constitutes the basis of what iswidely recognized
as the office's successful relationship with the Indonesians. On
 
numerous occasions the team was able to observe how long-term personal
relationships between the population staff and their Indonesian counter­parts clearly facilitated program development.
 
No evidence was found to suggest that long-term residence in
 any way impairs the staff's ability to further U.S. and AID interests.
On the contrary, the effective performance of this staff strongly
indicates the advisability of AID's assignments precepts being
modified to favor three tours of duty when the mission so recommends.
 
h. Mission Director Support
 
The active and genuinely outcome-oriented support of the mission
director enabled the PopUdtion Office to place U.S. money where it

could do the most good. The mission director's support has been

essential for the decentralization and flexibility that made it
possible to adopt the program to local conditions.
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.Oscussion
 
The ability of the U.S. to assist the Indonesian population program
would be severely compromised inthe absence of a
sion director. highly supportive mis-
According to the population staff, this means a 
mission
oirector to whom they have direct access, who iswilling to delegate
responsibility to them and then trust itwith that responsibility, who
isgoal- rather than procedure-oriented, and who iswilling to get involved
inand give time to the program.
 
i. Program Collaboration and Initiative 
The degree to which initiative islodged Inthe mission, the central
BKKBN office, and local BKKBN offices varies widely, indicating a genuinely
collaborative working relationship between the mission staff and their
local counterparts.
 
Discussion 
New program initiatives are developed collaboratively and originate,
alternatively, in the provinces, at BKKBN headquarters, or with AID.
program's data and logistics system isa The
major program element based
prim.arily on USAID initiative. The important "village family planning"
program was otiginally proposed by a
provincial BKKBN office and was
effectiv.ely supported by the mission inthe face of initial opposition
then
 
at the BKKBN cntral level. 
 Inmany cases, mission support for work­shops and training was largely a 
response to provincial- or central­level proposals, as was'true also for the addition of nutrition and
health services to the family planning infrastructure.
 
The local cost funding mechanism, while stimulating local initiative,
does not automatically fund all initiatives. 
 Some proposals are funded
intheir original form, but inmany cases the population office staff
negotiates extensive modifications as a prerequisite to funding. 
 Finally,where the staff regards a proposal as unacceptable, even with modifications,itrefuses to provide support. 
 Further, the team Ouund no instance inwhich
a 
proposal rejected by the mission was subsequently supported with Indonesian
funds. Although the process leading up to a 
formal proposal isbased largely
on verbal exchanges and isnot documented indetail, nevertheless there is
a
consensus among the population staff that the overall acceptability of
provincially initiated proposals has steadily increased. 
This suggests a
subtle but Important institutionalizing influence of AID on the Indonesian
 program.
 
J. Program vs. Project Orientation
 
The mission population staff iscommitted to the overall 
success
of the national program and to tailoring AID assistance to meet its
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U.S'. training have been used to reward BKKBN staff for good performance
while building the technical capacity the program needs for self­sufficiency. 
U.S. training, especially advanced degree programs, has
been especially effective. Virtually all trainees have returned to
Indonesia and now hold key positions in the BKKBN and other governmental
agencies and academic institutions that support the population program.
 
Discussion
 
The mission's population office provides approximately $600,000
annually for short- and long-term population training for Indonesiens.
Both in-country and U.S. training are used foe internal staff develop­ment, which provides additional incentives to work well. 
 High quality
individual performance can lead to advanced training, which helps
individuals to advance in their own careers. 
Existence of these
opportunities helps the program to recruit and retain high-quality
personnel and to draw out their full talents. 
U.S. training, especially
for advanced degrees, has been particularly beneficial. 
 The mission
reports no loss of overseas trainees to developed countries. 
On the
contrary, approximately 50 individuals who have received advanced U.S.training through the USAID population office now hold key positionsin the BKKBN, Ministry of Health, Central Statistics Office, andacademic institutions that support the population program. 
Training
has constituted less than 5 percent of the population office s 
overall
budget, yet it has provided much of the high-quality manpower needed
for a self-sufficient program. 
On these grounds, the training is
highly cost-beneficial.
 
Itwould seem.highly advantageous for the U.S. government to
continue to support training in the U.S. for promising candidates
from those countries that have already demonstrated a high rate of
return. 
The Indonesian program would certainly not be where it is
today without this training.
 
n. Integration of Health and Family Planning
 
Given the Indonesian context, any attempts AID might have made
(but did not) to impose a rigid, preconceived formula for integration
of health and family planning services would almost certainly have
been detrimental to the program. 
At best they would simply have
failed; at worst they would have obstructed the Indonesians intheir
own programming. Instead a 
new alternative for integration has been'
developed 
-- the "piggybacking" onto the mature family planning
program of health, nutrition, and even income-generating activities.
 
Discussion
 
Indonesia's achievements in fertility reduction could not have
been accomplished in so short a time had there been insistence on
a Washington-conceived prescription for integration of family planning
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with health. Infact, at two important junctures decisions were made
 
that have proven critical to program success but that might have been
 
precluded by a rigid formula for integration.
 
First was the decision to establish an autonomous national family

planning coordinating body (the BKKBN) outside and largely independent

of the Ministry of Health. While experience from many developing

nations indicates that cooperation and coordination with the health
 
ministry isessential for family planning effectiveness, clear evidence
 
also exists that health ministries are often among the weakest of any

country's ministries and they tend to be especially ineffective at
bridging the gap between the ministry's professionals and the country's
 
poor majority.
 
The BKKBN was fortunately established outside the Indonesian
 
Ministry of Health, although it has worked very closely with that
 
ministry. Ithas in fact experienced integration-inprocess without
 
integration in structure. Some observers argue that the cooperation

has been achieved because of rather than in spite of the lack of
 
structural integration. Inthe provinces, family planning services
 
are delivered through the health system down to its lowest existing

levels, the sub-district health centers (puskismas) and the maternal
 
and child health clinics (BKIAs). At the national level, it is signi­
ficant that BKKBN's chairman since 1970, Dr. Sowardjono Surjaningrat,
 
was appointed by President Suharto in 1978 to simultaneously serve as
 
Indonesia's Minister of Health.
 
The second decision that defies a rigid integration formula was
 
the decision in 1976 to break out of the static puskismas and BKIA
 
clinics inorder to bring family planning services and information to
 
the villages where approximately 60 to 70 percent of the Indonesian
 
population was not yet effectively serviced by the government health
 
system (and still isnot).
 
USAID and BKKBN decision-makers, when deliberating

the optimal relationship between family

planning and health, have made certain important distinctions. These
 
are distinctions infunction (services as opposed to planning, adminis­
tration, or data management), in timing (initial start-up as opposed to
 
later expansion or maintenance phases), and inlevel (urban, where
 
health facilities exist, as opposed to rural, where they are either
 
non-existent or relatively ineffectual).
 
All those with whom the question of integration was discussed
 
agreed that progress in curbing population growth would have been
 
possible but immensely slower and more difficult had family planning

responsibility been placed inthe health ministry or had family

planning services been restricted to an integrated health care
 
package. The key variable in permitting the vigorous forward movement
 
of a family planning program not formally integrated with health
 
appears to have President Suharto's -- and thus the Indonesian
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government's 

-- active, unqualified, and unswerving commitment to
reduction of population growth as a ­top national priority.
 
The U.S. Congress has mandated AID to work toward the goal of
reducing population growth.
tion, not as a Toward this end ithas put forth integra­goal itself but only as a 
suggested means toward achieve.
ment of the mandated goals. 
 The Indonesian family planning experience
suggests that U.S. decision-makers would do well to remain similarly
goal-oriented intheir foreign assistance program development and
review.
 
o. Incentives and Voluntary Acceptance
 
The careful handling of incentives at all levels of the program
has been critical 
to its success.
material Voluntary participation without
incentives for acceptors has been a key feature of the
program. 
Symbolic and psychological incentives have proven more
effective instead for recruiting and maintaining acceptors and, more.
importantly, for maintaining high staff effectiveness. High staff
performance is also elicited through important career development
rewards.
 
Discussion
 
Considerable attention is peid inAID/Washington to the ethics
and utility of incentives for acceptors infamily planning. 
Relatively
little attention has been paid to staff incentives for effective
programing or to creating non-material incentives for acceptors.
 
The Indonesian program provides performance incentives at all
levels from the president on down through the BKKBN and USAID mission
to informal groups in remote villages. These incentives are premised
on both cooperation and competitiveness 

-- cooperation among membersof given units to out-perform other units at the same level.
evident as Indonesians This is'
ingeneral have begun to talk about becoming
number one inthe world infamily planning" and as governors, mayors,
village chiefs, hospitals, and clinics and family planning fieldworkers
and provincial chairmen seek to out-rank each other inthe BKKBN's
monthly performance reports.
 
Staff incentives come in such forms as trips for outer-island
midwives to Bali for IUD-insertion training. 
Similarly, high performing
village chiefs inBali are awarded visits to the successful East Java
program. 
Incentives for program managers exist in the public recogni­tion and the sense of accomplishment that accrue from being able to get
funds from Jakarta and to produce immediate results of benefit to the
local constituency. 
It isquite likely that this isone of the most
powerful incentives available in the administration, in part because
its rewards are so rare. 
Administrators in Indonesia as elsewhere
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commonly grow accustomed to frustrations and delays that sap their
energy and initiative. 
When a program isable to deliver resources
rapidly, to help officials generate real activity Intheir locality,
and to help solve the problems they see daily, it provides rewards and
incentives that are as certain and powerful as they are difficult to
quantify.
 
Direct 
aterial incentives for family planning acceptors have
been experimented with and found not effective. 
Some small community
reward systems have apparently been somewhat effective, but these
have been locally developed. 
While some villages are thus proud to
have received communal rewards for high performance 
--machines or television sets such as sewing

-- incentive schemes designed outside theIndonesian context (e.g., the IBRD's proposed commuunity incentivescheme) have made little headway. 
It isthe policy of both the Indonesian and the U.S. governments
that participation in family planning be voluntary. 
Nevertheless, the
sheer rapidity of the program's accomplishments, together with certain
observations earlier ot.,
be achieving its 
have led to allegations that the program might
successes through the use of coercion. 
For this reason
evidence of possible coercion was consistently pursued by the study
teaih. 
 The team concludes that the Indonesian family planning program
success isbased on voluntary acceptance. The Indonesian government
has neither the commitment nor 
the means to achieve widespread fertility
reduction through coercive measures.
 
p. Contraceptive Supply
 
Fully adequate supplies of oral contraceptives have nearly always
been available to the program, including early on before there appeared
to be demand. This was a 
critical precondition for and even stimulus
to the village family planning take-off. 
Abundant supply permitted
central managers to keep local distributors well-stocked with contra­ceptives.
 
DLiscussion
 
Facilities established for the distribution of oral contraceptives
appear adequately stocked and provincial personnel at all levels say
they have never experienced shortages of oral contraceptives. 
Mission
staff maintain that the large supply of oral contraceptives that AID/
Washington's Office of Population recommended and made available in
the early 1970s was an essential element inthe rapid expansion of
village family planning.
 
An important part of the supply success has been the BKKBN logis­tical system. 
This is an example of an important program element
created with AID technical and financial assistance but now an inde­pendent Indonesian program activity. 
Because of this system contraceptive
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shortages have been infrequent inJava and Bali. 
 More importantly

the system appears capable of keeping up with the rapid increase in
demand and extension.of services now occurring inmany parts of Indo­
nesia's outer islands.
 
The logistical system includes effective linkages between the
program's data system, warehousing, inventory systems and procurement
procedures. The logistical system isdivided into two components,
however, one for consumables and one for equipment delivery.
 
Inthe outer-island province of South Sulawesi, for example,
there isconsiderable local interest inthe IUD and there isalso

staff trained for insertion; there are very few IUD insertion kits.
however, despite a backlog of these kits inJakarta.
 
2. Sources of Concern
 
a. Organizational Memory
 
The mission's population office faces the imminent prospect of
 an 80 percent reduction in its memory. Staff turnover implies a

reduction from over 7 years to less than 2 years indirect personal

experience with the Indonesian program. 
Despite extensive routine
documentation over the years, retrieving information about the past
decade of AID population assistance to Indonesia isdifficult. 
A
system of brief annual reports might provide an organizational memory
that could transcend the personal memories of staff and thus be less

subject to the fluctuations that occur with turnover.
 
Discussion
 
The current chief of the population office isscheduled to leave

Indonesia this month, to be replaced by an officer with no previous
experience in the country. 
The two remaining regular population office

staff have 18 and 8 months' experience respectively in Indonesia.
Although extensive program files exist, retrieving specific information
from more than two years ago is a formidable task. Inaddition to the

official project docUments, actual project activities have been recorded
in a large body of population office weekly reports, field trip reports,
and memoranda of conversations. 
 Many if not most of these, however, have
been discarded or made functionally inaccessible by AID's policy of
removing documents older than five years. Moreover, there isvirtually

no way to obtain from the files any descriptive summary of the office's

experience inthe Indonesian program. 
Little organizational memory

exists, memories are largely personal and thus subject to fluctuations
indepth and content with staff turnover. It isdifficult to say how
detrimental this is,but a simple mechanism for developing such an
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organizatibnal memory can b2 suggested. 
Annual reports by each office,
which would provide summaries of major activities, problems, plans,
and yearly expenditure levels, could provide the mission with substan-
tial organizational memory. ..
If the reports are simple and brief they
need not be costly. 
They would induce officers to take stock of plans
and progress ina systematic, periodic fashion and provide new appointees
with a ready access to some of the more important events in the history
of their office.
 
The Jakarta mission has made a laudable attempt to use AID's
evaluation system ina constructive manner and increating a library
of usefutl documents and reports. 
The reports suggested above could
be one important part of this growing mission memory.
 
b. Urban Program Failure
 
Family Olanning program services have not been effectively extended
to the country's urban areas, particularly Jakarta. 
 Extending effective
services, especially to the urban poor, poses a serious problem for
BKKBN and for AID support.
 
Discussion
 
The considerable family planning success inJava and Bali has
occurred largely inrural 
areas. 
It has not yet been possible to
adapt the successful village family planning strategy to the cities
and espo-cially not to servicing the urban poor. 
Unless effective means
are found to reach the urban populations there will :,e 
a growing service
gap that will be costly inboth human welfare and social tension. Much
of the service gap appears concentrated inJakarta, whose five million
people constitute about 20 percent of Indonesia's entire urban popula­tion. 
 Effective attention to the Jakarta problem could provide both a
pilot for other urban programs and a substantial solution to the overall
problem.
 
c. Geographic Expansion to the Outer Islands
 
Family planning success has been largely confined to Java and
Bali where program activities have been concentrated until only recently.
The 50 million people in Indonesia's outer islands have a low level of
contraceptive use (less than 10 percent of fertile age women) and are
widely scattered and ill-served by basic health and communication
infrastructures. 
Extending family planning services to the outer
islands constitutes a 
major, immediate challenge for the national
program and for AID assistance.
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Discussion
 
There has always been a 
deep division between 1Idonesia's Java-Bali
heartland and its outer island periphery. With only 7 percent of the
total land area, Java and Bali contain about 65 percent of the total
population, 
The consequent differences inpopulation densities are
imnense: 
 600 persons per square kilometer inJava and Bali and less
than 50 persons per square kilometer inthe outer islands. 
The family
planning program has concentrated on Java and Bali until only recently
and its successes remain limited primarily to these two small islands
with large populations. 
 Services have not yet been extended to all
the other islands, although this isa
major feature of the program's

expansion plan.
 
The problems ahead are formidable, 
With less than 10 percent
contraceptive prevalence and with population growth at about 2.4 percent
per year there ismuch to be done inbasic service provision. Outer
island prevalence rates are about the same as on Java when the program
began there. Nevertheless, with the other islands' low population
densities, widely scattered settlements, and poorly developed health
and transportation infrastructure, the monetary costs and organizational
demands will be immense.
 
d. Expansion of Scope: Nutrition and Health
 
Family planning success inJava and Bali has led to an expanded
scope for the program, adding nutrition and health activities to the
family planning service delivery system. 
The rationale for this expan­sion issound but the expansion itself will pose serious problems.
Management, technical capacity, logistics, and the data system will
require sensitive adjustment to meet the needs of the new activities
without simultaneously weakening the family planning services.
 
Discussion
 
The success of village family planning inbringing effective
services to rural Java and Bali has led to an expansion of the program
scope. 
The plan isto add nutrition and health services to the delivery
network through which family planning reaches the rural population. It
isargued that because this service network has shown capability for
reaching the isolated rural population itshould thus be used to provide
a
wider range of services. 
 Itisalso hoped that the new services will
prevent personnel from becoming complacent through increasing routine
activity. 
Finally, Itisargued that success inmotivating families to
reduce fertility makes it incumbent upon the program to protect the
smaller number of children acceptor families now achieve.
 
These are all well-taken arguments, but the expansion of scope
will pose major problems. Family planning workers must be trained in
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nutrition and health; new logistical problems will arise inthe movement
of foodstuffs, medicines, and additional equipment; the data system must
be extended to include additional forms of information; and management
will be faced with new problems of integrating a larger number of
activities under one structure. 
 The BKKBN isaware of these problems
and ismoving to address them through field experiments. 
However,
current plans for rapid extension to broader coverage will constitute
a major challenge for both BKKBN and AID.
 
e. USAID-BKKBN Relations
 
Relations between BKKBN and the USAID mission have been very
 fruitful to date. 
BKKBN's major reorganization, the current increase
of other foreign donor funding, and the very success of the program,
however, may pose problems for continuing collaboration.
 
Discussion
 
The successful AID support of Indonesian family planning has been
based upon highly collaborative relationships between USAID and BKKBN
personnel. 
 Several 
new and pending conditions may challenge the
future of this relationship. 
The BKKBN has recently undergone a
major reorganization and expansion of top-level professional staff
and its chairman has recently been appointed Minister of Health. 
The
full import of these changes isnot yet clear, but itwill undoubtedly
present USAID staff with both new opportunities and new problems.
 
Both the IBRD and the UNFPA have greatly increased their financial
conmitments to the Indonesian program. 
This promises expanded
resources to the program, yet it also greatly increases BKKBN adminis­trative work. 
 Even now BKKBN staff express frustration over the
complex, intricate, and different accounting demands of these two
major donors and the former is already experiencing difficulty in
disbursing its obligations to Indonesia. 
 It isunclear how this will
affect BKKBN's need for USAID financial and technical assistance.
 
Finally, program success itself presents its own peculiar
problems. 
It brings both a flood of new participants seeking asso­ciation with success and a retreat of others who feel support isno
longer necessary. 
Itcould also bring unwarranted complacency to
both program personnel and external associates causing them to
prematurely shift concern from expansion to "simple" maintenance.
The success to date will undoubtedly present other new problems that
will affect USAID 
- BKKBN relations, and it isnot by any means certain
what the outcome will be.
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I. INTRODUCTION 
This report represents a review of the first year of operations 
(OY 1, July 1977 to March 1978) of the Population Planning II 
Project, the project under which the U.S. Agency for Inter----­
national Development provides financial support for the Philip­
pine Population Planning Program. Because the project sup­
ports the major areas of program activity, this evaluation 
unavoidably touches upon broad issues of population policy and 
overall program effectiveness. 
Also, because the program activity which was initiated during 
OY 1 continues into the present, this evaluation has relevance 
for decisions today and in the immediate future. We make 
thi,. point because this evaluation report is being issued at a 
time when the Government of the Philippines (GOP) is wrestling 
with difficult questions of far-reaching significance for the 
population program- -questions pertaining to levels of financial 
support and future directions, including program organization 
and structure. These issues were raised during the course of 
the current review of the Philippine Population Program per 
instructions by the President of the Philippines. We believe 
that the findings and recommendations contained in this report 
have considerable relevance for the decisions the Government 
must make in the future. It is for this reason that the report 
may from time tp time appear to reach beyond the narrow 
confines of PP II. 
This evaluation was carried out by a team of 18 people repre­
senting the Commission on Population (POPCOM), the National 
Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) and USAID Manila 
and AID/Washington; their names are listed in Annex A. The team 
was divided into four field teams wbich visited and prepared 
reports* on the following areas: Northern Philippines (Regions 
II, III, and IV); Central Philippines (Regions V, VII and VIII); 
-The reports follow the outline provided in the "Evaluation 
Guidelines". See Annex B. 
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Southern Philippines (Regions IX, X and XI); and Manila (central agencies and Metro Manila Outreach). The reports
of the four teams are attached to this opening summary and 
represent the principal "data" upon which our findings and 
recommendations are based.* The report was reviewed in 
its present form by the entire team of 18 and in being pre­
sented to the three participating agencies for review and 
consideration. 
Each field team spent two weeks in its assigned region. The 
teams then convened in Manila where a week was spent pre­
paring and reviewing the individual reports. A fourth and 
final week was spent reviewing and consolidating the four 
reports into this final report. The reader wil note that the 
final recommendations may occasionally exclude or contradict 
an individual recommendation in a field team report. This 
reflects the fact that perfect consensus is not possible in such 
a complex undertaking and that some recommendations were 
too operationally specific to be included in this summary.
Nonetheless, we are extremely pleased to note the high degree
of consistency between the field reports which gives us confi­
dence that this final report is accurate in its findings and 
responsible in its recommendations. 
II. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Program Support and Local Government Accountability 
Findings: 
All four field teams found fairly high levels of political 
support for the populatioh planning program. There are 
strong additional indications of positive efforts by local 
governments to assume an increasing share of program 
*Also attached as Annex C is a checklist of OY I accomplish­
ments. Annex D is a memorandum from the POPCOM Executive 
Director to Regional Population Officers outlining their responsibili­
ties in assisting the field teams. 
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costs. Teams which travelled outside Manila found a 
particularly gratifying response on the part of local go­
vernment officials (provincial governors and city mayors). 
However, there were indications that these same officials 
do not regard themselves as being responsible for prog­
razi performance in their areas. Several implied that 
because they could not afford to assume the full cost of 
outreach operations, they should not be held accountable 
for program performance. The evaluation team believes 
quite strongly that these officials must be made to feel 
accountable for program performance in their areas if the 
Outreach Project is to work with maximum effectiveness. 
We understand those local officials who argue that they 
should not be held accountable where they do not have 
control of the resources through which performance is 
achieved. Therefore, we urge that steps be taken to 
assure that the resources are available for local officials 
to acquire control consistent with the responsibility we 
feel they should assume for program eff6ctiveness. Hence, 
to the extent the local governments are unable to provide 
the resources required to support 100 percent of local 
costs over the time period stipulated in -the original 
project plans, the National Government should be prepared 
to make such funds available on grant-in-aid basis. The 
population effort is so important, that to the extent neces­
sary, the National Government should be willing to divert 
resources from less essential areas of activity to assure 
that the population program is adequately funded. Having 
done so, the National Government, at the highest level, 
should make clear to local government officials that they 
will be held accountable for the quality and the impact of 
the programs in their areas. POPCOM, through its 
Board of Commissioners, should present a plan for pro­
gram monitorship which produces information that can be 
available to political leadership and that can be used to 
**See Annex F which provides a detailed breakdown of local 
and national government contributions and a linear projection to 
1980. 
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alert local leaders and administrators to the fact that 
considerable interest exists at the highest level in local 
populatio i program implementation. 
The evaluation team believes it is extremely important for
the Government to assume as large as possible propor­a
tion of cost of the population planning program by 1981-82. 
However, we believe that AID and other donors should be 
prepared to provide support for specific areas of program
activity should there be clear evidence of the Government's 
inability to shoulder the full financial burden of the program. 
Recommendation: 
It is recommended that the POPCOM Board of Commis­
sioners should continue to comnunicate to the highestpolitical level the need for sustainedj l4iItical and financial 
support for the population program. Furthermore,_ it is 
recommended that local political officials should be held 
responsible and ultimately accountable for program per­
formance. 
2. Future of Outreach Program 
Findings: 
As will be noted in their report, the Manila-based evalua­
tion team reports a fairly widespread view among central 
policy-makers that the Outreach Project, as presently
designed, may not be financially viable in the long run. 
Due to financial and budgetary constraints, local govern­
ments will find it difficult to assume an increasingly larger
share of program costs. Members of the POPCOM Board 
interviewed by the team reported that of the three options* 
*See preliminary printed copy, "Report of the Special Committee 
to Review the Philippine Population Program", (Manila, Tune 1978), 
pp. 139-140.
 
outlined in the Special Review Committee's rtpr.rt, the first 
one- -continuation of the program as planned--iio longer 
cippears feasible. Therefore, they said, the Board is con­
sidering whether to recommend retrenchment or integra­
tion with other barangay-based social service activities-­
or some combination of the two. The evaluation team feels 
that "financial viability" is dependent upon more fundamen­
tal resource allocation choices. If the program is import­
ant enough, it can be afforded at the expense of other, 
less important activities. Since few development expend­
itures can be regarded to have as high an economic rate 
of return as an effective population program, we suggest 
the Board thoroughly review data on program impact and 
effectivenesa before a decision concerning the future of 
Outreach is made. The evaluation upon which this report 
is based suggests that the program, despite some weak­
iiesses, is being quite effectively implemented. Outputs 
are being achieved more or less on schedule and it is too 
early to know whether or not purpose is being achieved-­
i.e., whether or not contraceptive use prevalence is 
increasing and the birthrate declining. 
Data on acceptor rates that are presented in the team 
reports below ar,! encouraging but based on too few cases 
to be representative. Also, they are based on data from 
a Management Information System which is of questivable 
reliability. (See.finding and discussion No. 5 below.; 
Within the next four months, however, preliminaiy data 
will become available from the nationally representative 
Community Outreach Survey and the Philippines portion of 
the World Fertility Survey. These data will yield reliable 
estimates of current contraceptive use prevalence ani 
crude birthrates which can be compared with data from 
the 1977 Area Fertility Survey in order to get accurate 
information on overall Outrea.1, program effectiveness at 
the halfway point in implemewa Lion. 
Recommendations: 
Considering that a systematic assessment of program 
effectiveness in terms of contraceptive use, and perhaps 
ovl 
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demographic impact, has not been completed, it is recom­
mended that the design and field implementation of the 
Outreach program should not now be substantively changed. 
3. Institutional Coordination 
There is a consensus among fieldworkers, implementors, 
managers, and policyniakers that there has been inadequate 
coordination at all levels of operations in the initial stage 
of program implementation due to the rushed pace of pro­
ject development and initial operations. This lack of co­
ordination resulted in poor program linkages at the FTOW 
and clinic levels where major problems were reported. 
This has considerably hampered the smooth delivery of 
services. 
In spite of the problems in coordination, there is a strong 
sentiment among the people interviewed, especially POPCOM 
staff members, that POPCOM should largely remain a co­
ordinating body. One major advantage cited is that 
POPCOM is able to draw upon resources of the participa­
ting agencies to assist in the implementation cf a program 
which is to be integrated into the local governne nt struc­
ture. 
It is generally acknowledged that coordination can occur at 
different levels, but most people interviewed were quick to 
add that it is at the regional level that institutionalization 
of the coordination process is greatly required. 
The Regional Population Offices (RPOs) find it difficult 
to coordinate program implementation due to the different 
thrusts and objectives of participating agencies at their 
level. To answer this problem, the RPOs implement vary­
ing strategies ranging from a relatively personalized 
approach, as in Region IX, to a more formal institution­
alized approach as embodied in the organization of function­
al Regional Population Committees (RCPs), composed of 
participating agencies in the region, which meet monthly 
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to discuss policy, program direction, and integration. 
Problems related to operations are discussed in this forum 
with the goal of paving the way for smoother implementa­
tioD of program activities. 
From the PPO/CPO down to the FTOW level, integration 
and coordination takes place in a personalized manner. 
It was further suggested that the Regional Population 
Offices should be given some sort of leverage, such an 
funding, in orking with participating agencies in the 
region. This is deemed necessary to strengthen the co­
ordinating function of POPCOM and to improve the working 
'relationship with the agencies directly involved in service 
delivery. 
Recommendation: 
POPCOM should initiate/continue institionalization of the 
coordination process with participating agencies. 
4. Planning and Implementation Strategy 
The general opinion of the RPOs visited as that the plan­
ning and implementation processes between POPCOM/Central 
and the RI-Os needed to be strengthened for more realistic 
planning and target setting. Clearer policy guidance and 
improved lines of authority and communication seem to be 
the most important areas of cone ern of the regional staffs. 
POPCOM is one of the leaders among government agencies 
in decentralizing operations, yet several problems still 
exist which are slowing down the development of a more 
effective planning and impl.m,. ntation strategy. These 
include inadequate financing, lack of consensus concerning 
the Outreach program by members of the POPCOM Boa-i, 
pressures and demands from external donor agencies and 
other GOP agencies. Each problem is serious enough by 
itself to hamper increased effectiveness and taken as a 
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*whole they have caused a certain confusion among regional
and local structures. Solutions theseto problems should 
be found as quickly as possible to give increased impetus 
to the Philippine Family Planning Program. 
It is the opinion of the evaluation teams that POPCOM
 
should strengthen and fully implement 
its present planning
and implementation strategies. These include having

POPCOM/Central 
 set the broad family planning programdirections. These are based upon inputs made by the
 
RPOs from information 
gathered from the local structures
and other regional sources such as the Regional Develop­
ment Councils, the Regional Population Committees, and 
regional research studies. The regional input6 are coupled
with GOP national policy declarations, national research,

and other national and international inputs and developed

into a national program strategy. The RPOs are then
given the responsibility to plan their progranu and 
 set their 
targets based upon regional needs. 
Both POPCOM/Central and the RPOs feel that "top down"
 
planning would place unrealistic demands on the program

and would 
 force target-setting and program implementation
that would not meet the needs of the Philippine Family
Planning Program in general and, more important, the
 
objectives and targets of the individual 
 regions. 
Recommendation: 
Strengthening of the "bottom up" planning concept is recom­
mended to effect a more realistic planning and target­
setting process. This includes clarification of lines of
authority and areas of responsibility between POPCOM/
Central and the Regional Population Offices (RPOs). It
also involves the strengthening of the planning capabilities 
at both levels. 
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5. 	 Program Impact and Management Information System (MIS) 
All four field team reports note the questionable quality of 
the MIS. There were cases where apparent double counting 
of acceptors was noted and also cases where apparently 
there was confusion of program employees about how the 
MIS should operate. In one instance a City Population 
Officer was unable to properly fill out the basic form that 
is used for aggregating national data (the OP-6).# Our 
basic findings are six: 
a) 	 Program employees from the Regional Population
 
Officer/City Population Officer level down to the
 
Barangay Supply Point Officer (BSPO) need basic
 
training in operating the MIS.
 
b) 	 This training should include not only "how to" inform­
ation, but also the "why" explanations. 
c) 	 Outreach and MOH officials at the provincial and national 
levels need to acquire a better understanding of the 
meshing of the Clinic Information System and Outreach 
Information System in order to prevent double-counting 
of current users. 
d) 	 An internal system of checks and audit needs to be 
instituted iA order to assure MIS accuracy. 
e) 	 MIS data needs to be fed back more quickly than the 
three month average turnaround cited in the field reports. 
f) 	 Management level Outreach and clinic employees need 
training in both the management and evaluative uses of 
the MIS. 
*See Northern Philippines team report. 
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Overall, the evaluation team urges POPCOM to give sexious 
attention to establishing the integlity of the MIS so that it 
can be effectively used both to monitor program perform. 
ance and to identify specific areas in need of short-term 
attention. Feedback to the field of accurate program data 
is an important part of insuring the integrity of the entire 
program. 
Recommendation: 
POPCOM should take immediate steps to imrrove implement­
ation of the system of reporting and the flow of information 
regarding Outreach program and clinic impact and effective ­
ness. Both the timeliness and the accuracy of the Manage­
ment Information System need to be improved. 
6. Outreach Salaries and Travel Allowances 
Finding s: 
In all structures visited, delays in payment of salaries and 
travel were reported during the first two quarters of OY 1. 
The delays were minimized, however, during the third 
quarter (equivalent to the first quarter of calendar year 1978) 
because local government support was rrade available. 
Local government auditing regulations caused problems re­
garding releases of travel allowances. The reimbursement 
scheme for travel allowances has caused serious delays in 
the release of travel money. Consequently, the mobility of 
structure personnel has been negatively affected. In spite 
of these difficulties, the structure personnel, in most cases, 
continued to perform their responsibilities. 
Information gathered from field visits indicates that field 
allowances for CY 1 were inadequate. In the provinces 
visited it is estimated that the FTOWs need from P150 to 
PZ00 per month to cover all expenses related to fieldwork. t 
In areas %Nherethere is regular transportation, the PI115 
alloNuance is enough to cover purely travel expenses but does 
not meet the other expenses incurred such as meals and 
lodging. In areas where there is irregular transportation
the V115 allowance is not enough to meet even travel 
expenses. 
It is suggested that standard procedures be discussed 
and agreed upon among POPCOM, local governments, the 
Department of Finance, and the Commission cn Audit to 
allot for the smooth disbursement of salaries and field 
expenses.
 
Recommendation 
To avoid recurrence of delays in salaries and travel, it 
is recommended that standard operating procedures be 
established for releases of travel funds. The levelf 
travel allowances should be carefully reviewed with a view 
toward establishing a more equitable systerr, of travel 
support. 
7. Operational Year 3 Program Funding 
Findings: 
The financial plan in the Project Agreement, specifically
the Fixed Amount Reimbursement (FAR) system, remains 
a matter of contention. POPCOM has felt the need of 
working capital' to initiate activities which were delayed
in OY 1 because of initial problems regazding the work­
ability of the disbursement scheme. 
The problem was felt at the field level where there were 
delays in the release of funds fnr payment of salaries and 
travel allowances. These .iclays ranged from two to ten 
weeks. Some Outreach personnel had to resort to borrow­
ing money. During the third quarter of OY 1 the delays 
were not so great beca-e local government support began 
to be made available. 
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Recommendation: 
To 'avoid future short-term problems of liquidity, it is 
recommended that POPCOM and USAID should carefully 
review OY 3 funding requirene nts and develop a plan to 
avoid short-term funding short-falls. 
8. FTOW Training 
Finding s: 
During their basic 21-day initial training, the FTOWs' 
general expectations had been that they would spend more 
time working in community development than in family 
planning. In reality, most FTOWs spend more time work­
ing in family planning. Because of this, additional training 
in contraceptive techniques, human sexuality, and family 
planning program management is needed by the FTOWs 
for meeting their job denands. 
During the initial stages of the Outreach program when the 
training modules for the basic FTOW training were being 
developed, it was generally assumed the FTOWs would need 
community organization skills to help facilitate the accept­
ance of family planning. Only 25 percent of the training 
sessions were devoted to family planning skills. This 
apparently was a carryover from the forerunner of the 
Outreach Project, the TIDA (Total Integrated Development 
Approach) Program. Almost immediately it proved to be 
a misconception. 
Almost every FTOW intervi,,..ed by the field teams indica­
ted that he or she needed additional training in family plan­
ning skills. The vast n-a jority of their time (75 to 95 
percent) is spent directly in dealing with family planning or 
family planning related activities. Because of the lack of 
training in family planning technology, the FTOWs feel 
restricted in implementing the Outreach program. They do 
not fully understand the advantages and disadvantages of the 
variuus contraceptive methods and thus cannot pass on to 
/ 
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perspective acceptors the proper advice. An example of 
this is the dispensing of pills. The FTOWa cannot yet 
adequately explain the effects of pill usage on a womads 
body and consequently, many users drop out with real or 
imagined side effects.... 
Some efforts have already been made to correct this situa­
tion. Most RPOs have or are now conducting basic pill­
dispensing courses for the FTOWs. On the national level, 
11 Family Planning modules were developed and pre-tested. 
These modules, however, have yet to be approved by the 
POPCOM Board and cannot be implenmented nationwide 
until Board approval is received. These efforts are laud­
able but need to be expanded in order to increase the 
FTOWs' competence and confidence. 
Management training is also needed. The RPOs are be­
ginning to decentralize the planning and implementation 
processes by giving the local structures the responsibili­
ties of planning and implementing their individual programs. 
The FTOW, being the closest to the target group, has to 
understand basic program planning and implementation in 
order to manage the program in his or her area of res­
ponsibility. 
Recommendation: 
Additional training for Full-Time Outreach Workers 
(FTOWs), particularly in family planning and management 
skills, is needed to better equip them in fulfilling their 
roles as family planning program implementors. 
. Side-Effects 
Finding s: 
Information received from all levels indicated numerous 
types of problems regarding contraceptives. Problems 
regarding pills .%ere the most numerous, followed by IUDs, 
and then sterilization. The re were also some complaints 
about condoms. 
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Side-effects that women reported experiencing or fearing

from pills are expressed in terms of physical discomfort
 
such as dizziness and nausea as well as 
amnesia, sterility,
and premature senility. The genuine side-effects are elabo­
ted upon through an active, informal communications network 
that gives rise to and spreads -utuwrs in the attempt to under­
stand this recently introduced innovation. There are also
complaints because the brands of AID-provided pills originally
accepted by the clients are no longer available to them. Many
such clients have dropped out the program or switched to a 
less effective method because of the real or perceived side­
effects of Norinyl. Availability of Norinyl in two dosage levels 
does not solve the problem. 
The Outreach personnel do not yet appear to have enough

understanding of actual pill-induced changes and, 
 therefore,
 
are not yet able to provide adequate information to clients
 
regarding their use. Even the primary-level health person­
nel (especially midwives) i.f the rural health units do not
 
appear to fully understand pill-induced physiological changes
 
or to be adequately informing clients regarding their use.
 
Likewise regarding IUDs, there is not yet sufficient informa­
tion provided 
to clients regarding potential complications.
Occasionally, improper-sized IUDs are inserted and many

clients are not informed of the importance of follow-up.

Consequently, 
 many women who do experience discomfort
 
present themselves at clinics to have the IUD removed.
 
Regarding sterilization, some vasectomy failures have been
documented. 
 These and the male worry that sterilization 
will inhibit sexual performance impede greater acceptance
of this method. Problems reported concerning tubal ligation
derive from pain experienced bl some women upon whom 
the procedure has been performed under local anaesthetic. 
Project personnel are aware of the problems caused by the 
rumors and are taking steps to counter them within their 
limited means. Full-Time Outreach Workers use barangay 
assemblies and, to the extent possible, trace back the source 
of.the rumor and undertake face-to-face communication. In 
Region IX, a booklet entitled "Family Planning Methodsi 
Rumors and Misconceptions" was locally produced and dis­
tributed through the Outreach structure. It is the opinion 
of the review team members that basic IEC campaigns and 
materials should be developed to counteract the rumors and 
misconceptions. Additional funding to initiate or improve 
IEC programs at the regional level should be provided. 
Recommendation: 
Immediate and serious attention be given to the problems 
of contraceptive method side-effects. This should include 
improved training of Outreach workers in dealing with 
side-effects and rumors about them and the formulation of 
IEC materials and campaigns that focus on the facts about 
different contraceptive methods used in the program. 
10. Information/Education/Communication (IEC) 
Findings: 
POPCOM Central Office assistance to the field is both 
financial and material. Material support is in the form 
of films, centrally-produced print materials, and equip­
ment. All the regions visited expressed the need for 
increased general support from the Central Office such 
as equipment, films, technical staff assistance, and con­
sultants as well as specific financial support for production 
of easily-comprehended materials in the local dialects. 
While IEC capabilities vary from region to region, inadequate 
funding is seriously hampering IEC activities of regions in 
planning, developing, producing, and distributing materials 
to support program needs. Among the regions visited, only 
three are considered not in a position to develop and produce 
their own IEC materials. 
16 
Participating agencies invdlved in both the preparation and 
dissemination of IEC materials have been reported to be 
generally supportive of the IEC activities of regional offices. 
Foi example, major IEC agencies such as the Ministry of 
Public Information, Ministry of Education and Culture, and 
the National Media Production Center in coordination with 
the RPOs, have been conducting seminars and programs 
integrating family planning messages. 
Re commendation: 
IEC capabilities at both Central and regional population office 
levels should be strengthened and additional funding should be 
provided at the local level for personnel and materials. 
11. Incentives for the Barangay Supply Point Officer 
Findings: 
In the various reviews and evaluations of the Outreach Pro­
ject that have been conducted in the past several months, 
the problem of maintaining the interest of the BSPOs has 
been raised. Since the BSPOs are the key in the whole 
Outreach service delivery scheme and are expected to work 
on a voluntary basis, this concern is very real. The ques­
tion is whether or not it is possible, to maintain a highly 
motivated group df workers over a long period of time with­
out incurring unsupportably high expenses. 
All four field teams recommended that some kind of incentive 
may be necessary if the Outreach Project is to continue to 
rely on the BSPOs as the major service delivery point. 
Several people interviewed by the Manila-based team suggest­
ed it would be necessary to provide monetary incentives. 
All four field teams report that bome sort of non-monetary 
incentives is needed. People interviewed in the field stated 
that monetary incentives would be too costly and would place 
an unaffordable financial burden on the national and local 
governments. One team also reported that providing mone­
tary incentives could be counterproductive because it would 
0A
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undermine the spirit of volunteerism and "service to the 
nation". 
Some of the local structures have already developed certain 
incentives. These include providing the BSPO with a sign­
board identifying the BSP, presentation of recognition 
awards and certficates by local officials, presentation of 
storage boxes which are brightly decorated with family 
planning slogans, and the distribution of Tshirts with 
family planning slogans. 
Since the program is now nearing the end of its second 
year and many individuals are participating as BSPOs, it 
is important that a committee or task force be organized 
to carefully study the question of BSPO incentives and 
make recommendations on types of incentives that are 
within the financial capabilities of the local and national 
governments but which retain the basic spirit of volunteerism. 
Operations research funds should be considered for this 
purpose.
 
Recommendations: 
A high level task force or committee made up of members 
from local structures, RPOs, and POPCOM Central, 
should be organized to study the question of incentives for 
Ba-.angay Supply Point Officers (BSPOs) and to make recom­
mendations on what forms these incentives, if deemed 
necessary, should take. 
12. BSPO Training 
Findings:
 
Except in a few places where formal BSPO training has 
been conducted by local structures, there has been no 
organized POPCOM effort--mainly due to the lack of funding-­
to formally train the Barangay Supply Point Officers in the 
necessary family planning skills and management techniques. 
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It was observed by the field evaluation teams that the
 
quality of record-keeping is generally higher and the level
 
of motivation greater among BSPOs with formal training
 
than among BSPOs who have not undergone formal training.
 
Formal BSPO training was scheduled to begin during OY 1. 
Because of the lack of funds, this plan did not become 
reality and most FTOWs resorted to training their BSPOs 
informally on a person-to-person basis. Although this 
gave the BSPOs some basic knovledge of the program, it 
was not sufficient to give them an understanding of family 
planning and the importance of accurate record-kecpig. 
The BSPOs have, therefore, been identified by the RPOs 
and the local Outreach structures as one of the high priority 
groups for immediate training. It is important that suf­
ficient funding be made available to meet this need. 
Training designs have been developed by POPCOM Central 
and all RPOs have planned training programs. Some of 
the innovative local structures have been able to draw upon 
these resources and have found local funds to implement the 
training plans. Their funding has come from provincial 
government sources with municipal governments often -.on­
tributing a portion. The BSPO training includes some basic 
family planning technology, records management, rnotiva­
tional skils' and an orientation to the population program 
as a whole. The local managers who have held this type 
of training believe it is -ary effective in increasing BSPO 
motivation and competence. It also serves as one type of 
incentive in maintaining the BSPCs' interest in the program. 
Recommendation: 
An adequately funded trainin . program institutionalizing 
formal BSPO training should be implemented in order to 
equip BSPOs with the n -cessary skills for family planning 
motivation and promotion. 
-A
 
19 
13. Sterilization Suosidy 
A particularly bright aspect of the program is the increa­
sing acceptance of sterilization among eligible women. 
However, the problem of an inadequate subsidy and the 
delayed payment of this subsidy unnecessarily hinders this 
part of the program. It is generally agreed that the 
present subsidies--92 and 50 pesos respectively for tubal 
ligation and vasectomy--are not enough to cover the supply 
and materials costs incurred by the hospital or clinic and 
the honorarium for personnel performing the procedure. 
The rising cost of pre and post-sterilization medications 
has contributed to the expressed need for a higher service 
subsidy. 
Complaints about the delay in reimbursement were also 
expressed by agencies and physicians participating in the 
sterilization program. While the problem is procedural 
in nature, every effort should be made to speed up payment. 
Prolonged delays in reimbursement may affect performance 
of participating physicians and diminish enthusiasm and 
project support. 
R ecommendation: 
Consideration should be given to increasing the subsidies 
for steri lization. Furthermore, reimbursements should be 
expedited. 
14. Sterilization Certification 
Findings: 
The certification procedures for sterilization recently agreed 
upon by POPCOM, USAID and NEDA are producing both con­
fasion and resentment on the part of Ministry of Health 
personnel. 
The four evaluation teams reported that the new FAR pro­
cedures are causing many unnecessary problems and tensions 
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in most of the regions visited. The Manila-based team was 
told that the certification of sterilization procedures by the 
RPOs is not acceptable to the MOH for professional reason­
and that the submission of duplicate consent forms to 
POPCOM is considered a violation of patient privacy, and 
thus unethical. 
The Northern Philippines team was told that regional coordi­
nators of the MOH National Family Planning Office are capa­
ble of certifying the requests for reimbursements and that 
that they prefer to maintain the old system (NFPO certifica­
tiun). The Central and Southern Philippine teams did not 
encounter such direct criticism of the certification proce­
dures but were told the procedures were creating confusion 
in all but one region, Region IX. In this region there was no 
problem because of the personal relationships between MOH 
and POPCOM personnel. In the other five regions visited, 
the procedures were causing unnecessary delays and problems. 
Recommendation: 
POPCOM, USAID, and NEDA should seriously consider the 
modification of sterilization certification procedures to 
allow the MOH.National Family Planning Office to certify 
procedures perlormed in MOH-NFPO hospitals and clinics. 
15. Variety of Program Contraceptive Methods 
Findings : 
It has been program policy to offer a "cafeteria" approach 
in the delivery of family planning services. While this 
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approach strengthens the non-coercive nature of the pro­
giam and is seen as a critical element in achieving wide 
acceptance by the different sectors of the community, it 
could result In training and logistics complications at the 
field level. 
Although the program makes available to the clientele 
various methods of contraception to effect this approach, 
it does not prov.-,e multiple brands of orals at the BSP 
and clinic levels. 
The clinic and field personnel interviewed reported a 
, rowing demand for other brands of pills and other types
of contrac,.'ption (such as' contraceptive jelly and foaming 
tablets). This may be necessary to minimize the occur­
rence of pill side-effects and, thereby, also the nurrber 
of drop-outs from the program. 
Ideas advanced by the evaluation team members include 
exploring the possibility of tapping other donor agencies 
and the use of the contraceptive loan to be provided by 
USAID to procure other brands of pills and other contra­
ceptives. 
Recommendations: 
POPCOM and USAID -should jointly study the level of demand 
and the implication of providing additional brands of orals 
and other types of contraceptives and the means of 
acquiring them. 
16. Operations Research 
Findings: 
At the reional level, there is increasing awareness about 
the need for operations research types of activities to 
support program implementation. At present, small-scale 
research activities are being undertaken by the Regional 
22 
Population Offices (RPOs) and/or research institutions con­
trected for this purpose. This was considered to be a good 
indication that regional capabilities, including the presence 
of regional and provincial research institutions, are get. 
ting stronger. 
POPCOM Central Office should respond by providing the 
necessary direction and financial support to this type of 
activity and should undertake contracting its own research 
activities to provide immediate solutions to implementation 
problems. In almost all regions visited, research leads 
and projects were identified and formulated with the assist­
ance of Outreach personnel and research institutions. 
Forums like the Regional Outreach Manager nt Conferen­
ces, Regional Population Committee meetings, Secretariat 
Management Conferences, and consultative meetings with 
research institutions are being used to discuss ideas related 
to operations research. 
Recommendation: 
POPCCM Central Office should provide the direction for 
Operations Research, strengthen Central and regional 
capabilities to meet the growing demand for operations 
research types of activities, and coordinate with the 
regional staffs in order to assure the program relevance 
of the research. 
17. Transportation Support 
RPOs emphatically expressed the need for additional new 
vehicles. While there are around 300 units in the field, 
70 percent are rehabilitatec' tnd only 30 percent were new 
when acquired. Since most if these vehIds were delivered 
in 1974 after undergoing extensive repairs, continuous 
operation of the present fleet of vehicles has become un-. 
economical. Should there be no replacements, nearly the 
entire secretariat would be immobilized. 
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With the implementation of the Outreach Project and the 
fielding of FTOWs, the problem of lack of transportation 
in becoming more acute. Considering the different places 
and areas to be covered, demand for different types of 
transportation should be met. It is the opinion of the 
review team members that other forms of transportation 
for the FTOWs should be provided (such as pumpboats and 
horses) to redice costs and increase effectiveness. The 
need for these types of transportation is felt throughout the 
country.
 
Recommendation: 
POPCOM should develop a transport plan that can be pre­
sented to donor agencies as the basis for a request for 
additional transportation assistance. 
18. POPCOM Salaries and Status 
The field teams were told that, compared to some other 
government agencies, or even compared to its participating 
private agencies, the prevailing salary rates of certain 
categories of POPCOM personnel are low. Since these 
salaries are not competitive, it is difficult for POPCOM 
to retain trained and experitnced personnel and to attract 
highly qualified, new recruits. 
While attempts have been made consistently to upgrade 
POPCOM salaries, they have been mostly unsuccessful, 
Nunetheless, the problem is sufficiently serious to warrant 
action at the highest levels possible to retain and rec'uit 
the best available talent for the population program. 
Recommendation 
Consideration should be given to salary adjustments in the 
POPCOM structure there indicated. To this end a salary 
survey should be undertaken. 
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19. POPCOM/AID Coordination 
The Mnalali-based team reported wideupread discussion of 
strained AID/POPCOM rolations during OY 1 of the Out­
reach Project. Several teams noted that these tensions 
seriously impaired OY 1 project implementation. With. 
out belaboring the point, the evaluation team notes signi-
Licant improvements in the relationship in recent weeks 
and expressions of desire to further improve collaborative 
working relations through the remainder of the project. 
(Indeed, the team notes that the process of carrying out 
this evaluaton has helped to speed the process of recon­
ciliation. ) Such remaining irritants as those relating to 
certification of sterilizations and the FAR system disburse­
ment of funds can be handled without rancor if the current 
atmosphere of reconciliation persists. The persistence of 
such an atmosphere could be facilitated by a regularly 
scheduled meetings to discuss project problems and issues 
of mutual interest. A special meeting to deal with special 
issues should also be held as needed. 
Recommendations: 
To bring about continuing improvement in the bilateral 
relationship. POPCOM and AID should resume the con­
vening of regular meetings tf, discuss program progress 
and the resolution of specific problems. 
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F. 	Purpose: 
 The main objectives of the evaluation were:
 
A. To determine the demographic impact of NFPP since the previous

evaluation
 
B; 	 To determine if the NFPP has met all of its targets as indicated in
 
the 4th plan

C. 	To determine what difficulties, if any, the NFPP will have in

attaining its goals for the 4th Plan (1977-1981) and to give NFPP
 
some guidelines for the preparation of the Sth plan.

D. 	To examine the inputs being provided by the Royal Thai Government

and all foreign donors to ascertain their effectiveness and needs
for 	further inputs in the future.
 
H. 	Evalbation Team Composition:
 
Faculty of Public Health, Mahidol University
 
Dr. 	Debhanom Muangman, Co-team leader, Dean of Faculty of Public Health
 
Dr. Yawarat Porapakkham, Head, Biostatistics Department

Dr. Orapin Singhadem, MCH Department
 
DTEC (Department of Technical and Economic Cooperation, Prime Minister's Office)
 
Mr. Pichet Soontornpipit, T.S. Division
 
Mrs. Sumontha Thanyapon, Ext. Coop. Officer (AID Program)
 
NESDB (National Economic and Social Development Board, Prime Minister's Office)
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Dr. John Knodel, Assoc. Prof., Department of Sociology, Research Associate,

Population Studies Center, University of Michigan
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II. SUMMARY OF MAJOR FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
 
While the complete findings and recommendations are detailed inthe text
to follow, the essence of this evaluation may be summarized in
a few words.
 
It is clear that the NFPP has successfully achieved its targets to date,
and that the resulting reduction in the population growth rate is virtually
certain to reach the goal of 2.1 percent per annum set by the Fourth Economic
and Social Development Plan. The evaluation team feels, moreover, that if this
record of achievement is to be continued through the Fifth five-year plan (1982-86) in­creasing levels of support both from the RTG and the international donor community

will be required.
 
The major recommendations arising from this evaluation (with reference to
the relevant text in each instance) are as follows:
 
A. G~eneral REPORT
 SECTION
 
1. The NFPP should continue to focus its efforts III.
 on all regions of the country, including Bangkok.
 
2. The NFPP should give priority to those geographic 
 III.
 areas and segments of the population where family
planning acceptance is low and/or availability of
information and services are not fully developed.
 
3. Targets should be set in terms of a combination IV.
of new and continuing acceptors in the next five­year plan. (With emphasis on percent of eligible

couples practicing contraceptives).
 
4. Greater emphasis should be given to management

and supervision at the village and health center 
V.
 
levels.
 
5. The international donor community should give full 
 VI.
recognition to the necessity of maintaining a level

of direct support for the NFPP to assist the RTG in
achieving the goals of the Fifth National Economic

and Social Development Plan (1982-1986).
 
B. Information Education and Communication
 
1. IE and C activities of the NFPP should be extended V.
from the present emphasis on providing information
 
to an approach which combines information-giving with
 
a focus on interpersonal communication and assistance
 
in decision making.
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REPORT
 
SECTION
 
V.
 
2. Healtlr education provided incontext of primary health 

care services should include family planning related
 
IE&C.
 
C. Training
 
V.
 
1. There should be more emphasis on training of at least 

one supervisor at the provincial level inproper pro­
cedures for reporting service statistics. This person
 
should ensure that persons incharge of service statis­
tics at all service units are properly trained in
 
reporting and recording procedures.
 
V.
 
2. The training department of the Family Health Division 

should undertake operations research on the effective­
ness of its various programs, especially those for
 
lower level paramedical personnel, i.e., TBA's, Tambol
 
Doctors, etc.
 
V.
 
3. The Family Uiealth Division, Training Division, 
and the 

Rural Health Division of MOPH should coordinate their
 
training courses, materials, and other efforts in
 
order to maximize effectiveness.
 
V.
 
4. Formal training inthe theory, practice and planning 
of 

health education should be assured for all personnel
 
responsible for health education inthe expanded rural
 
health and family planning delivery network.
 
D. Voluntary Surgical Contraception
 
1. The RTG and international donor agencies should 
continue 

to support each component of the present package of
 
combined public and private sector activities inthe
 
field of voluntary sterilization. Moreover, given antici­
pated higher annual VSC acceptance inthe 1980s, the
 
levels of total support should be increased.
 
V.
 
2. The subsidy to health facilities for Voluntary Surgical 
subsidy
Sterilization should be continued, as well as a 

differential between urban and rural sterilizations.
 
The subsidy for both male and female sterilization 
should
 
be the same. Hence, the additional subsidy for vasect­
omies beyond the target should be dropped.
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V 
REPORT
 
E. Evaluation and Research 
 ECTION
 
1. Frequent assessment of fertility and contraceptive
prevalence should continue to be made and greater
 
III.
 
attention be given to dissemination of the findings.
2. Evaluation of the impact of'the NFPP should be ex-
 IV.
tended from a largely demohjraphic focus to an
analysis of its micro- and macro-level effects on
the quality of life inThailand.
 
3. The impact of the NFPP on the health status of the
people should be investigated. V.
Specifically, the
effect on maternal and infant mortality and
morbidity attributable to alterations infertility
resulting from family planning practice should be
ascertained.
 
4. The evaluation team supports the MOPH policy of 
 V.
carrying out pilot projects inorder to determine
the use of various categories of non-physician
personnel inthe delivery of certain family planning
services. 
The team recommends that pilot projects
be continued and that careful selection cf trainees
inreasonable numbers and adequate prerlutions regard-
Ing supervision and medical consultation be given
high priority.
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SUMMARY
 
Overview of Goals and Achievements. 
 The Potable Water Project 
was imple­mented between 1966 and 1972 for $4.8 million ($2.9 million A.I.D. funds and
$1.9 million Thai funds). 
 Its goals were: 1) to

win loyalty help the Thai government
thi of rural populations in 
the Northeast
threatened by communist and other areas
insurgency; 2) to 
help develop 
a Thai capacity to
plan and administer 
a National Potable Water Program
piped potable water in 10,000 aimed at providing
to 12,000 rural communities during the coming
30 years; and 3) to 
improve health in 600 "security sensitive" communities
through provision of potable water. 

1) that insurgency Now, about a decade later, it appears:
is considerably diminished, although much
political changes than more due to
to this single project; 2) that
zation has an effective organi­planned and built some 
800 systems and has
administering a national proved capable of
piped water program; 
and 3) that most communities
perceive a health 
improvement, 
even though many people do not drink
water. For villagers served the
by the project, however, the greatest impacts
are economic benefits, outcomes not anticliated by project personnel.
 
Project Implementation. 
 The 
project was implemented by the Sanitary En­gineering Division of 
the Thai Ministry of Public Health
contract with (MOPH) through a
a New York engineering firm. 
 The water system installed in
each community consisted minimally of 
a water treatment 
plant with storage
tower and piped distribution system; 
all the systems included chlorination.
Systems were installed in two 
types of communities:
districts" (rural market towns). villages and "sanitary
Communities selected for the systems were
supposed to be willing to 
assist in construction 

structure that and to develop a rate
would pay for operation, maintenance, and future expansion.
In most villages, villagers 
did makb financial 
and labor contributions;
sanitary districts, in contrast, 
contributed 
treasury 
funds but residents
did not make direct contributions. 
 In each community a person was chosen to
be trained as 
plant operator and thereafter to maintain the system and col­lect water fees.
 
Evaluation Sample. 
A two-person evaluation team visited a stratified random
sample of 52 systems over the 
course 

December 4, 1979. 
of five weeks between October 29 and
The 52 systems serve 133 
communities 
with a combined
population of approximately 110,000 persons.
 
Project Effectiveness. 
Most of the systems built under the project continue
to function more than ten 
years after the first systems were installed.
those visited, only Of
seven were 
not functioning. Provincial 
governments,
sanitary districts, 
and village committees each generally provide the
necessary fiscal 
and operational management 
for their respective systems.
Most systems are 
financially self-sufficient, with 
users paying full costs
of maintenance and operation. 
With only a few exceptions, operators qppear
cowpetent and motivated and have received consistent support and supervision
from the Rural Water Supply Section of the MOPH. 
 In nearly all cases where
systems have 
not continued to 
function, the 
problem appears to have been
 
managerial rather 
than technical. 
 The piped systems installed
project have been by this
 more effective than 
the handpumps installed by earlier
projects, relatively few of which have remained operative.
 
Health Impact. 
 Given the absence of initial baseline data and of village­specific health data 
today, no statistics exist 
to confirm improved health
in project communities. 
 Health officials assert, however, that
status health
has improved, 
even where villagers do 
not drink 
the water because
they dislike the taste. 
 Local perceptions are 
that improvements have
sulted in re­large part because the increased quantity and convenience of pipedwater permits more raising of vegetables and 
small livestock for home con­sumption and 
for sale, more frequent bathing 
and washing of clothing and
cooking utensils, and increased use of water-sealed privies.
 
Economic Impact. According to villagers' responses, tie 
project's greatest
impact has been economic. Villagers are 
enthusiastic about ample quantity
of water being reliably provided 
close to their homes. This results in
increased water 
use as well as time-saving, which in 
turn permit increased
gardening, livestock raising, and crafts production.
 
Benefit Incidence. 
 Initially, community-wide 
access 
to the piped water was
provided by public taps, with flat fees being charged per household or per­son. 
 Virtually all socioeconomic groups benefitted equally, but not enough
revenue 
could be collected to 
sustain operations. Consequently, most sys­tems changed to metered 
private connections 
and closed most public taps;
they thereby gained financial viability but no 
longer served all the poorer
villagers. There has 
since been 
a steady increase 
in the number of new
metered connections. addition, many
In systems are extending distribu­tion lines areas
t,, previously unserved. 
 The systems
physical burdens of village have eased the
 women and children--principal bearers of 
water
in Thailand--and have given them more 
time for income-gentrating activities.
In the 
sanitary districts, however, it is primarily the commercial 
sector
 
that benefits.
 
Spread andReplcability. 
 About 250 systems were irntalled under the pro­ject, and 
the Thai government has 
continued to bu.Ld similar piped sys­tems, about 550 since project completion. Thai authorities say that 17 per­cent of the rural population is nowi 
served by piped potable wa-er 
as com­pared to only 3 percent prior to the project.
 
Lessons and Recommendations. 
 The evaluation found that successful village
water systems were characterized 
by a set of non-technical 
characteris­tics. These include: initial 
community contribution of 
time; labor and
funds; 
training and subsequent support for local operators responuible for
maintenance; and 
tne 
gradual evolution, on a community-by-community basis,
of viable rate structures for delivery 
of water to individual households.
It is additionally recommended: 
 that piped water projects should be planned
so that intended beneficiaries perceive 
them as 
bringing improvements in
convenience, water 
quality, 
or water quantity; and that water 
projects
should be considered not just for possible health gains forbut their
economic benefits at wpll.
 
•J
 
V. SPREAD AND REPLICABILITY
 
In additloh to the above findings, it should be noted that the Thai govern­ment 
has adopted the goal of Installing piped water systems in rural vil­lages throughout 
the country. 
 Since completion of the 250
installed under A.I.D.'s or so systems
potable water project, the Thai National Potable
Water Program has brought this to nearly 800 systems, of which a large pro­portion were built Rccording to 
the A.I.D. contractor's basic designs. 
 As
already noted, benefits are now spreading within the earlier A.I.D. project
communities as more and inore people continue to hook up privately to the now
largely financially viable and effectively functioning systems.
that 17 percent of rural Thais It is said
 
viding chlovinated watir, 
are now served by piped systems, most pro­in contrast 
to only 3 percent prior to tho
project.
 
VI. LESSONS LEARED 
A. Sources of Success
 
1. 
Prior sectoral activity and training. A.I.D.'s previous health activi­ty in rural Thailand, especially its support 
to village health and sanita­tion, was 
a major element in this project's achievements. 
 The participant
training in U.S. institutions given to Thais under this atnd the earlier pro­jects provided an important cadre of highly motivated; well-trained profes­sionals eager to work with A.I.D. and committed to Improving health and the
 
quality of life in rural Thailand. 
Of Thais 
sent to the U.S. for training
related to sanitation, virtually ioo percent have returned.5 
 J
2. Community participation.

stantial Systems for which communities contribute sub­amounts of money and labor generally succeeded, whereas those for
which contributions were 
only minimal,
tended to fail or were made by government bodies,

ficers appear to 
or to meet needs of only the community elite.
have played key roles District of-
In stimulating the interest of vil­lage chiefs, which then resulted in participation of villagers.

3. Supervisionand support. 
 The high continuation rate of community opera­tors has been critical. 

systems. Essential for this have been decentralized support
This includes both the regional field headquarters established for
systems design, personnel training, water tasting, and warehousing of 

sanitation, com­
modities, and also a hierarchy of district, provincial, and regional health,
and 
local government offices with good
from which the operators can secure communication networks
advice, assistance, and equipment. 
The
Rural Water Supply Section of SED has been extremely effective in providing
support and Is probably responsible for the improvements that have occurred
since previous evaluations.
 
4. Appropriate Technology. 
 Appropriate technology does
"low-level" technology. Complex water not always mean
treatment 
and distrih,-tion
are working while few handpumps provided under a previous project 
systems

functioning. 
 are still
One reason why the relatively complex technology succeeded and
a simpler solution failed is perceptions of the users;
seen as an improvement over more remote sources whereas few users regard the
handpump as an improvement over the commonly used rope and 
 bucket.6
 
the piped systems are
 
5. Local initiative 
 and innovation.
demonstrated Many project
considerable innovativeness villages have

various 
credit, sharing, and 
in coming up with and sustaining
distribution
motivation was schemes. Villagers' 
primary
the potential convenience and economic gain of piped water.
Both this 
Innovativeness 
and the underlying
unanticipated motivation
by project 'planners but were apparently
were crucial
weaknesses in project design described below. 
in offsetting 
the
 
5Throughout, the present evaluation was assisted by Thai graduates of U.S.
degree programs. Conversation over tea 
one morning in an
Bangkok outpost north of
found eight U.S. universities represented by Thais present.
noted that sanitation is They
a field in 
which trainees studying 
in the U.S.
return, whereas those sent to the U.S. in medicine frequently do not.
6For a 
 more complete 
 disscusion 
 of the subject,
"Suggestions to A.I.D. for Future Water Activity in Thailand."
 
see Appendix 
I.
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B. Negative Findings
 
Equiment, 
The A.I.D.-furnished Ovan engines proved to be a disaster.They broke down, and spare parts were difficult to obtain.
been replaced by Japanese Many have since
 or British engines.
 
2. Maintenance. 
 Failure 
to include 
an
the project adequate maintenance componentdesign resulted inin failure or inferior performance of systemsthat were essentially technically sound.
 
3. Financing. 
 Failure to base projectpost-project financial design on any reasonableviability also resulted in plan for of systems that were technically the inferior performancesound.
costs The assumption
could be met by collecting that operating
revenues
wishful thinking. from public facilities
It resulted provedin difficultconverted to periods for communities as theydeprived private metering to achieve financial viability, which in turnpoorer villagers of access to the water that originallymade available to them by the project. had been 
4. Beneficiaries. 

by 
In the market towns systems wereexternal authorities frequently superimposedwith the result thatmunity elites captured the commercial sectorthe benefits and com­of the systems toof the poorer majority. the virtual exclusionPoorer villagers were also excluded when wealthier
villagers captured the benefits during conversion to individual metering.
 
VII. RECOMMENDATIONS
 
A. General Recommendations
 
1. T raining. The value of U.S. participant training should be assessed ac­cording to 
established "rates of return"-e.g., nearly all Thai sanitation
trainees have returned (and are active
cians have not. At 
in the sector) whereas Thai physi­
taining operations 
the community level, personnel responsible
must be adequately for sus­trained.
time event. Training cannot 
be a one-
Levels of performance after training must be monitored.
 
2. Communityparticipation. Vague statementsreplaced by strategies, based in project papers should beon 
firm socioeconomic
decision-making and resource allocation, for ensuring that community members
 
analysis 
of community
 
will actually perceive there 
 is something to be gained by giving time andmoney to the project.
 
3. Supervision 
andinstitutional 
suppor.
must be supervised at all levels. 
Functioning and effectiveness
Supervisors should be equally prepared to
praise good performance as to correct inadequatemust be performance.regular and frequent. SupervisionGiven thatSED no longer has supervisory the Rural Water Supply Section ofresponsibility,,tinued functioning of the piped water 
those interested in the con­systems should monitor effectivenessduring the transition to management by the Provincial Water Authority.
 
- 13 ­4. Commodities. 
 U.S. commodities furnished should 	be equal tothan their equivalents 
manufactured in other 	 or better
countries; 
otherwise A.I.Do
should allow purchase of foreign commodities.
 
5. Impact. 

is frequently, if not usually, too soon to be able to 

A.I.D. and Congress should recognize that project termination
ficiaries. Time 	 see impacts upon bene­lapse is necessaryselves and .become 	 for project outputspart of community 	 to adjustimpacts be obsered, even life; only then can 	 them­if not directly 	 more definitivemeasurable. This means recog­nizing the need for ex-post evaluation.
 
6. Institutional 
memor 
 Missions
libraries 	 should be
such 	 encouraged
as USAID/Thailandis 	 to develop
End-of-tour
reinstitutionalized 	 reports
not as 	 should 
 be
an onerous requirement,
Improve professionalism and learning from past experiences.
but as a means 
to
 
B. RecommetionsSpecific to 	WaterProect
 
-1. Convenience. 

be more convenient 
Water provided by A.I.D.-supported systems should always
than sources 
already in 
use. 
 Likelihood
ability is otherwise low.	 of accept­
2. 	Quantity. 
 Abundance of water should be recognized as 
a major benefit
that permits improved diet and 	sanitary practices leading to better health­even if the water is not used for drinking.
 
3. 	Evaluating health impact. 
 While the health of a population may improve
 as a result of a particular intervention, the difficulties and cost of ac­
curately measurIng the improvement are certain to be great.
impact will remain impossible unless data Proving health
village-by-village 	 are systematically gathered
basis 
rather 
than only at 	 on a
the clinic 
or health 
post
level.
 
4. Rationale for water
project 

.
ing rural water supply projects on 	
The present A.I.D. rationale for financ­the grounds of improved health should be
 
reexamined given the difficulty 	of accurately proving health impact.
be 
that economic Impact may be 
a 	 It may
stronger justification 
and that water
 should be considered instead as 	an investment in rural infrastructure.
 
5. Financing 	and 
Equ .
 All project papers 
for A.I.D.-installed
systems should include carefully detailed plans that will assure the meeting
 
water
 
of recurrent costs after A.I.D. 	funding has terminated.
 
These plans should also ensure 	not only the necessary funds for operation of
should consider 
the system, but 	also assure that the entire community is serviced.
universal metering 	 Plannerstariff 	 coupled with anschedule, which 	 increasingwould provide 	 block rateand increas ng 	 costs per 
the first units of water at lowthe unit 	for increased pricescommunity would 	 volume delivered.thus receive service 	 The poor ofwanted and used 	 at low priceslarger amounts would pay 	 while those whothe major part of the costs. 
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Credit programs permitting poorer community members to partially defer pay­ment for meter installation should 
also be considered as should metered

water-sharing schemes.
 
6. Incremental Steps. 
 Planners should seek 
to develop projects in which
the technology represents an incremental improvement over the existng level
and can offer' the prospect of further step-by-step lirogress. 
 Any system
that would offer an incremental improvement would need to displace a present
source and be perceived as offering either better quality, greater quantity,
or more convenience. 
 It may be, for example, 
that hand pumps for shallow
wlls are not perceived as enough improvement to warrant the effort to keep
them fvnctioning-in contrast 
to the systems installed by this Thai water
 
project.
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METHODOLOGY
 
This evaluation report is based on observations made by the authors
 
during their field visits in Harch-April 1980. All four areas where
 
SCF/CDF is operating were visited. -In each area interviews were
 
conducted in a number of households within each villagd.
 
first met with the field staff to gain an
On arrival, the authors 
In these meetings the field staff gave a
overview of the area. 

summary of the program from its inception, including the various
 
activities in each village, tho work of the individual sub-committees,
 
their achievements and problems.
 
The
 
Afterwards, the authors visited the VDC office in each village. 

objective of these visits was firstly, to talk with the VDC members
 
of SCF/CDF in their village, their orientationabout the activities Secondly,

with SCF/CDF principles, and the future of the program. 

to discuss in detail the documentation of the various activities,
 
the accounting procedures, loan repayments, and the self-help com­
ponent of the different development projects.
 
After spending some time with the VDC members in each village, house­
on average 10-12 houses in each village.
to-house visits were madei 

The purpose of these visits was to obtain the local people's opinion
 
of the program, their grievances, if any, against the VDC, and pros-

These visits proved to be very effective and
 pects for the fdture. 

revealed details which would not have emerged from any other source.
 
e v!aes h= been covered in a particular area, the
Once 2 t'2 

authors completed the evaluation by sharing their experiences and
 
observations with the field staff and discussinF the future of
 
the program.
 
In addition to these visits and discussions the authors also made tioe
 
to meet some thana-level government officials in two different
 
areas. The activities of the ScF/CDr, the field staff, and more
 
importantly, the future of the SCF/CDF in their respective areas were
 
Many of the ideas that are incorporated in this report
discussed. 

from these meetings.
originated 
INTRODUCTION
 
This is an evaluation report of Phese I of the Save the Children Federatiol
 
Community Davelopment Foundation (SCF/CDF)* Program, and not an historical
 
review of the program. Therefore, no attempt has been made to give a
description of all projects, their expenditures, self-help contributions
 
or loan repayments. 
 After giving the sum.ary and rzcommendations the
 
conditions laid down in the internal evaluation of the SCF/CDF program

in 1979 are discussed. Those conditions are expected to be fulfilled by
J11'ly. 1980, at the end of Phase I. Then the special issues arc examined.
 
This is followed by a brief analysis of the different kinds of projects
 
and other issues.
 
SUMMARY
 
1. The structure and organization of the program are now firmly

established. VDCs are set up and functioning in all 17 villages and their
 
representative nature is guaranteed by th, member-selection procass.
 
2. 
A sound system of financial management, record-keeping and project
 
monitoring is functioning at all levels.
 
3. Earthwork and construction projects arc the only ones for which a
 
self-help component can be accurately computed.
 
VI 	 4. SCF/CDF has demonstrated ability for providing support staff and for
 
inzreduc.ng appropria:,_ technical inputs. Howevcr, agricultural improve­
ments and programs particularly for small farmers, are lacking.
 
5. No plan has yet been proposed to phase out the program and give legal
 
status to the VDCs.
 
V 	 6. The expens.2 of the program makes the CBIRD mode! unsuitable for
 
widespread replication. It requires a social motivation on the part of
 
the village leaders which is lacking in pres'nt-day Bangladesh and which
the program does not provide although VDC technical capability can be and is being developed. Villagc resources and personnel arc gradually being
utilized and village funds arc replacing SCF/CDF funds.
 
7. SCr/CDF still has much to loarn from oth,-r NGO programs, and could 
also benefit fron closer cooperaLion with governcnwt piograms, espc-ciolly 
*SCF/CDF is i t-rin which was uscd earlior for this organization. In 
Bangladcsh it is nIow idcnrifi,d ms Save .th.Childr-n, (USA). 
2 
in adult literacy and irrigation cooperatives.
 
Mirzapur and Rangunia are relatively privileged areas and are not as
 8. 	
One village in each
 
much in need of assistance as the other two areas. 

area could be phased out on a trial basis. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
SCF/CDF is now in a position to begin planning to phase out its1. The 
This might include all the villages
activities from some of the areas. 

of Rangunia; Rashideohata of Mirzapur; and Kunda of Nasirnagar.
 
2. In the remaining areas, SCF/CDF presence is needzd a little longer.
 
The basic groundwork has already been comp]et-d and now more effort is
 
necessary to achieve the desired objectivcs. Probably two to three more
 
years should pass before the question of ohasing out from these areas
 
could be raised.
 
3. 	Before phasing out the program an advisory committee should be formed
 This
in the respective areas to supervise the activities of the VDCs. 

can consist of government officials at dictrict, sub-division and thana
 
levels, union council members and respected persons of the area.
 
4. In areas where Gram Sarker or Swanirvar movement is very active, the
 
phasing out of the SCF/CDF activities may be followed by an amalgamation
 
of the VDCs with the Gram Sarkar or Swanirvar movement.
 
Once the SCF/CDF has phased out from a particular village, the
5. 

respective Field Coordinator may remain thpre for some time as an
 
During this period he can carry 	out action research on the
observer. 

functioning of the 7:C :n the absence of the SCF/CDF.
 
6. 	To encourage the VDC sub-committees to be more effective, some finan-

This will not only create more
cial authority may be given to them. 

awareness among the sub-committee members, but will also allow an uniform
 
pattern of development of the various sectors.
 
7. 	For an uniform and phased development of the various SCF/CDF areas
 
The master plan should have two related
there should be a master plan. 

elements: an overall plan and a separate micro plan for each area.
 
While the former should define the nature of development, sectoral prior­
ities, and a projected timc schedule, the latter should utilize and
 
develop the resource endowment of the respectiv areas, and select the
 
target socio-economic groups.
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8. The present system of classifying families as landless is not
 
effective. The notion of landlessness does not necessarily indicate that
 
a family is really poor. 
Therefore, one possible alternative would be
 
to classify families according to their levels of income, e.g., very
 
poor, poor, rich, very rich, etc. Already, in some of the villages this
 
method is being practiccd.
 
9. To further accelerate the level of development and the degree of
 
uniformity between areas, the Program Officers should specialize in
 
activities rather than in areas, as 
is currently the case.
 
10. The training program for POs, FCs, SDCs and the VDC members should
 
be intensified. 
The VDC members should receive nrientation courses in
 
rural development, project management and bookkeeping, and an attitude of
 
awareness should be developed which recognizes the need for equitable
 
development.
 
11. The experiences of the differcnt voluntary organizations and the
 
analysis of their income generating activities should be studied so that
 
some of these ideas can be introduced in th, SCF/CDF areas. Ideas which
 
are being disseminated through the ADAB newsletters could provide a use­
ful and informative discussion between the field staff. 
 Greater emphasis

should be given towards mobilizing the personal savings of th: various
 
socio-economic groups in the SCF/CDF areas.
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NTRODUCTORY COMMENTARY*
 
In addition to explaining the background of the accompanying 
_..case study, this introduction attempts to view the experiences and
lessons of the CBIRD project in South Korea in a broader Internation­
al perspective. 
WHAT IS CBIRD? 
CBIRD (pronounced sea-bird) is the acronym for a development

concept devised in the early 1970s by the Save the Children Federa­tion/Community Development Foundation (SCF/CDF) on the blas of
their many years of experience with helping the underprivilkgbd in
a variety of developing countries. * CBIRD, though often referredto as such, Is actually not a "model" in the strict sense; it is morein the nature of a particular strategy, based on a certain set ofprinciples and goals, that can be flexibly applied In different situa­tions in a wide variety of ways. 
The CBIRD Idea was first Introduced in South Korea where
SCF/CDF had operated for many years, 
 but it is not limited toSouth Korea. In recent years SCF/CDF has sought to introduce the 
*Prepared by Philip H. Coombs in behalf of ICED. 
**Save the Children Federation (SCF) began as a voluntary
children's relief organization in the USA during the Great Depressionof'the 1930s. After World War IU,SCF extended its child relief acti­vities overseas to several developing countries--one of the first beingSouth Korea in the Immediate wake of the Korean War. After themid-1950s SCF expanded its program scope beyond simple relief toindividual children and began supporting self-help developmentefforts ]y poor families and communities that could bring about morelasting improvements. To promote and implement thesa broder self­help projects in the field,
Foundation (CDF) SCF created the Community Developmentin 1957 and established the first CDF field officein South Korea--which later became the sponsor and manager of theCBIRD Project:. The two names have since been merged-the ofwficalname of the parent organization now being Save the Children Feder­ation/Community Development Foundation (SCF/CDF). But sincemost Koreans still associate the separate CDF name with CEIRD, theauthors of the case study have used this shorthand identificationexcept when referring to the parent organization (as SCF/CDF). 
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same strRtegy--though in very different specific forms and on a more
modest scale--in 17 other less de-veloped countries in Asia and thePacific, Africa, the Middle East and Latin America. The South Koreanversion, however, represents the most comprehensive, sophisticated
and ambitious application of the general approach thus far. 
THE NEW INTERNATIONAL CONSENSUS 
CBIRD in South Korea held special interest for ICED becauseit is a living embodiment of the new international consensus on ruraldevelopment that has evolved since the early 1970s and is receiving

wide attention today. This new international consensus advocates
 
a more "integrated" and "community-based" approach to rural develop­ment and in particular a concerted effort to improve the conditionthe poorest of the rural poor, of the status and role of women, and thewelfare of young children. This appealing rhetoric has now beenadopted a-ad Is being actively promoted by virtually all United Nationsand bilateral development agencies, by various voluntary organiza­tions, and by top policy-makers in a growing number of developing
countries. 
The big problem everyone faces at this juncture, however, ishow to translate this popular rhetoric into effective actions. Thisis proving to be much more difficult than the rhetoric Itself suggests,and than many people had supposed. The diffic.ilties arise in partfrom the inherent complexities of traditional rural societies and the
stubborn obstacles that stand in the way of trnnsforming them--even
in such an economically prosperous and rapidl7 modernizing societyas South Korea. Equally serious difficulties also arise, however, fromthe fact that the unccnventional strategy and goals espoused by the 
new consensus run directly counter to the conventional doctrines and

approaches to rural development that have prevailed almost univir­sally over the past 25 years, and 
.,the way national and internationaldevelopment agencies are structured and accusto"ed 'o thLiling and
 
operating.
 
Most government rural programs--ranging from agricultural
extension and rural credit to health, nutriton, faully planning andeducational grvices-have been and still are operateU independentlyby various specialized agencies, each with its own "delivery system"and cadre of field agents. As a result, rural programs ara highlyfragmented--the very antithesis of integration--and the bureaucra­
cdes that run them are disinclined to yield any of their autonomy inthe interest of better integration. Furtler, these rural programs are
structured and operated in a hierarchical, top-down fashion, leavinglittle room or incentive for participation by the rural people andcommunities they are meant to serve. Unfortunately, also, theseprograms--less by design than by force of circumstances--havegenerally by-passed the poorest segments of the rural population.Such benefits as they may provide accrue mainly to the better-off,thus widening the already large socioeconcnic gaps that exist within 
many villages and often actually worsening the plight of the mostdisadvantaged. In like manner, what are euphemisticaLj labeled
"women's programs" and "children's programs" often turn out onclose inspJection to be little more than token gestures. 
3introductory cernnentury 
- CBIRD'S RECORD IN KOREA 
The architects of CPIRD believed that these serious deficiencies 
could bd substantially remedied, if not entirely overcome, by creating 
an integrated, bottom-up development system, managed by local com­
munity committees, that could be linked, close to the grass roots 
level, with the top-down government services. 
In the context of South Korea, the new CBIRD nitiative happily 
coincided with a strong commitment by the central government to 
promote and invest substantial amounts in rural development under 
the aegis of the Soemoul Undong (New Community Movement). This 
strongly top-down campaign put great pressure on all the lower 
echelon administrators of various bureaucracies to coordinate their 
rural activities. It also, parado.ically, put great pressure on the 
villages to engage in bottom-up community planning and extensive 
self-help efforts. The new CBIRD initiative also coincided with an 
extraordinarily dynamic national economy that provided an unusually 
favorable climate for rural development. 
The promoters of CBIRD took skillful advantage of these circum­
stances and tailored their strategy to harmonize with the Government's 
efforts, but going substan'ialy beyond them by establishing much 
stronger and more sophisticated mechanisms for local planning and 
development management. 
The evidence in the case study portrays an impressive record 
of accomplishment. The CBIRD community-based system, all things 
considered, is working remarkably well in the six selected rural 
"impact areas." It has clearly contributed significantly to increased 
productivity and income and to improved living standards in these 
areas. Its largest and most visible achievements have been on the 
economic side. The main weakness in the performance record. 
according to the case study's evaluation, are in the area of social 
welfare services and help to the poorest 20 percent or so of the 
population. But this, according to the analysis, was not for any 
lack of trying on the part of CBIRD's sponsors and field personnel. 
The main causes of the imbalance between Income-increasing projects 
that would benefit mostly the middle and higher level farmers, and 
social welfare and other efforts designed to benefit the poor, the 
women and the young children, were rooted in the traditions and 
social structure of the communities themselves and reflected the felt 
needs and ordering of priorities as seen by the loctl decision-makers. 
This phenomenon is not unique, of course, to the Korean 
context; it can be found in a great many rural societies. But it 
happens to be unusually well analyzed and brought into focus by 
this particular case study. 
SOME WIDELY APPLICABLE LESSONS 
The findings of this case study, though confined to South 
Korea, lend support to the following general propositions that have 
zvlevance for rural development planners in many developing 
ctuntries. 
. / 
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(1) If any externally designed rural development model ishave a reasonable chance of success, toits original basic assumptions,goals, and strategy must come to terms with the traditional valuesystem, human relationships and felt needs of the rural society intowluch it is being introduced. This requires a process of sensitivearld skillful compromise and adaptation; otherwise the alien schemowill be rejected like an incompatible heart or liver transplant fromthe human body. The CBIRD experience in South Korea offers use­ful lessons on how surh a process can be successfully conducted,on why the necessary compromises and are likely to result In a significantgap between the originally proclaimed goals of the imported model andthe realities of its actual accomplishments. 
(2) It would be unrealistic to expect an intervention of thissort in a few pilot areas to bring about, all by itself, a fundamentaltransformation of the existing socioeconomicvalues, structure, traditionaland pattern of human relationships in these areas. If proper­ly adapted to locally felt needs, preferences and mores, as well asto prevailing government policies and programs, such an intervention­as the CBIRD experience demonstrates--can result in impressiveimprovements. But a fundamental transformation of existing villagestructures and behavior patterns can only be brought about bybroader and deeper nationwide economic, political and social changes.South Korea in the 1970s was a textbook example of such broad
dynamic changes and provided a highly favorable climate for the
CBIR.D projects.
 
(3) The rate and extent of local improvements that can bebrought about by an innovative rural intervention--such as CBIRD-­also depends heavily on the development potential of the particularrural areas to which it is applied. This potential is determined bya combination of factors such as topography and natural resources,
social cohesiveness or divisiveness, physical 
access to markets, thenature and strength of local institutions and traditions of coopera­tion, and the availability of dynamic local leadership. 
 The importanceof these factors, as well as their geographic variations, are wellillustrated by the different CBIRD impact areas. 
(4) Achieving a sizeable and permanent improvement in theposition of the poorest families in virtually any rural area--asdistinct frord"temporary infusions of charitable relief-is a far moredifficult task than the currently popular rhetoric suggests. Thisproved to be the case even in the unusually prosperous circumstancesof rural South Korea in the 1970s, despite the best efforts of CBIRD'ssponsors. This in no way dimiishes the importance of the goal ofhelping the rural poor, but it does caution against creating unrealistichopes and expectatlons that in the end can only lead to disappoint­ment and disillusionment and to making the task even more difficultthe next time around. 
(5) The pressures from many quarters on the managers ofrural development projects to produce quick, visible and quanti­tatively measurable results tend to create prograni distortions andto become a major obstacle to achieving equally important qualitative 
5 Introductory Commentary 
There is a crucial message here forclianges and improvements. 
program analysts anddfecisionmakers and quantitatively-minded 
evaluators of major funding agencies. 
way intended as criticisms ofThe above observations are in no 
On the contrary, the fact thatthe CBIRD program in South Korea. 
able to cope with the realities of the situa-CIBRD's managers were 
tion, to take such good advantage of the favorable factors in the 
South Korean context, and to navigate so sillfully around the 
obstacles, is a tribute to their sensitivity, ability and devotion.-
HOW THE REPORT WAS PRODUCED 
This report is the result of a collaborative effort by two social
 
scientists--an American social anthropologist and a Korean rural
 
exceptionally well-qualified for the assignment.sociologist--who were 
R. Brandt had studied Korean society for manyProfessor Vincent S. an years and just prior to the present case study had engaged In (New Commurifty Move­extensive case study of the Scemoul Undong 
an important part of thement) mentioned earlier, which forms 
context of the CBIRD program. Dr. Ji Woong Cheong, Professor of
 
Community Development at the College of Agriculture of Seoul
 field studies ofNational University, had done numerous previous 
rural development in both Korea and the Philippines and already had 
a first-hand acquaintance with the CBIRD program. 
These researchers were encouraged by ICED to give special
 
attention to qualitative evaluation of the CBIRD projects In terms of
 
organizational and interpersonal relationships and environmental
 
adaptations. At the same time they have included extensive
 
quantitative evidence of improvements in productivity, income and
 
Of the six CBIRD rural impact
social welfare in the impact areas. 
areas in Korea, four are described here in some detail. Each of thi 
authors, while responsible for writing about two areas, visited all 
four in order to obtain a general, comparative perspective. 
The data on which the report is based comprise extensive 
numerous interviews withpersonal observations at the village level, 
local leaders and ordinary farmers and fishermen, and long discus­
sions with CDF Coordinators in the field and with the Director and
 
Staff of the SCF /CDF office in Seoul. In addition the authors
 
have Consulted and drawn upon the large body of descriptive and
 
statistical documentation compiled by SCFICDF. 
The field research was carried out over several weeks between 
August and October 1978, during which time the researchers worked 
closely together exchanging data and observations and discussing 
conclusions. For logistical reasons, however, the report itself was 
drafted mainly by Professor Brandt, working on his own, after 
Thus, while Dr. Cheong contributedreturning to the United States. 

importantly to the substance of the report, Professor Brandt has
 
asked that it be made clear that he personally accepts final
 
responsibility for the views and interpretations expressed in it.
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CHAPTER 9
 
SOME LESSONS 
AND OFEN QUESTIONS
 
In examining the operational record of CBIRD in search of
useful lessons, 
 this report has stressed certain special character­istics of the Korean setting that provide a generally favorable context 
..for rural development, as well as certain other characteristics thatplace practical limits on the CBIRD approach. Both sets of factors­positive and negative--need 
to be kept in view In considering thefuture potentialities of CBIRD in South Korea and the feasibility ofreplicating some or all of its special features. 
This final chapter recapitulates some of the special contribu­tions the CBIRD program has made in the Korean context and suggests
some considerations that will determine its applicability in other

countries. It also addresses two outstanding questions of Importance
to many countries, and a third concerning the survival and futureinfluence of CBIRD in South Korea. 
-Since 1971 the pace of change In virtually all of South Korea's36,000 villages has picked up dramatically, as village economies havebecome more and more tightly integrated with that of the nation aswhole, and as bureaucratic influences a on almost every aspect of farmlife have deepened. From this standpont the CDF program must be seen as an effort to fine-tune and accelerate the process in a fewcarefully selected areas. The rural populations of the CBIRD impactareas are particularly fortunate in that the kinds of benefits, train­ing, and experience they are receiving will hav long lasting effects,enabling them to compete more effectively in the materialistic sweep­
stakes that are now going on in South Korea. 
Korean rural development In recent years has taken place
under the influence of the Saemmul Movement with its emphasis onpaternalistic guidance and material aupport from above combined withthe mobilization of popular cooperative effort under local leadership.CBIRD has supported the Saemaul efforts but has gone beyond them,cnabling faimers, fishermen and others In its impact areas to exer­cise a greater degree of control over the development process. Wble 
1G6
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one general effect of both Saemaul and CBIRD initiatives has probablybeen to reinforce a realization by these local producers of theirdependence on outside institutions and the linkage of their livelihoodwith the national economy, the CBIRD approach has clearly demon­strated better ways to plan, finance, and direct further progressin accordance with villagers' own goals and needs. It has furnishedthe mrlti-viflage area with a set of institutions and a methodologythat enables the local population to make the most of their availableresources. Most importantly it provides them with a workable meansof acquiring those essential factors of production that are everywherein short supply: capital, technical know-how, and management skills. 
So far, particularly in the mainland impact areas, the CBIRIDinitiatives have produced impressive results in increased productivity,incomes, and local living standards. On the islands there have beensome initial problems and delays, but a wide variety of projects Is nowbeing implemented, and given the fact that some of the island programsrepresent much smaller per capita investment by CDF, the benefits
already achieved are significant. 
APPLICABILITY OF CBIRD EXPERIENCE 
TO POORER COUNTRIES 
In a report such as this It is not possible to reach any E=conclusions regarding the extent to which successful CDF programsin Korea are replicable elsewhere. Nevertheless, it seems useful toask some leading questions that might help to establish a comparativebasis for exploring the possibilities, 
1) How Important is the relatively egalitarian distribution
of land ownership in determining the outcome of theCBIRD experiment in Korea? 
2) Has the strong demand for agricultural and fisheryproducts from prosperous urban centers been a necessary
condition for raising farm income? 
3) To what extent does the success of CBIRD's non-formal
educational program depend on popular attitudes towards 
learning? 
4) How much has CBIRD depended on the effective operationof local administrative agencies and Korean governmentinputs In order to achieve its planned goals? 
5) To what extent does CDF's concentration on areas with a
"good potential for development" account for the program'simpressive achievements? Or, conversely, would theCBIRD experience be more relevant for less developod
countries If there were greater emphasis on "hard cases"? 
There can be no doubt that the first four factors listed above­the relatively equitable distribution of land holdings, the profitableand expanding markets for agricultural and fishery products, the 
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high value traditionally pluced cu education and bParning In the 
Koruan culture, and the aggressive promotion of rural development 
by the government--have all contributed importantly to the effec­
tiveness of the CBIRD program. It would seem to foilow, therefore,
that the absence of any one or combination of these positive factors 
in another country setting--especially a very low Income country
with a low economic growth rate--would constitute if not an outright
barrier at least a sarious impediment to replicating the successful 
CBIRD experience in South Korea. 
- As to the fifth question concerning CDF's concentration on -­
areas with a "good potential for development," we can give only a
speculative answer. CDF was undoubtedly well advised to choose
such promising areas as Sanbuk and Chunsong in which tolaunch its experiment because it required testing out a complicated
and untried approach that would inevitably present sizeable problemi
and risks even under relatively favorable circumstances. To have 
started with the hardest cases could well have doomed the expermenl
to failure from the outset. In moving on from these initial areac
 
to the island areas of Wido and Yaksan, CDF did indeed take on'
 
-some relativaly "harder cases." Yet even these areas had a good

' deal going for them, especially in terms of prospering markets and

rising prices for marine products, and the availability of substantial 
local savings--albeit concentrated in relatively few hands--for 
reinvestment in development. 
There are, however, some much "harder cases" in Korea,
particularly Isolated mountain villages with only poor to moderatedevelopment potential and still lying outside the mainstream of 
the dynamically growing Korean economy. It is reasonable to sup­pose that if the CBIRD approach were now to be tried out on some 
of these truly "hard cases" it would encounter much greater diffi­
culties and would probably have to be modified substantially in

certain respects in order to achieve significant results. But the
 
experience thus gained would undoubtedly offer much poorer

countzies to the south a wider range of useful lessons--both positive

and negative--thian the present C3IRD experience. 
This observation is not intended to imply, however, that theCBIRD approach and the lessons of Its experience in South Koreahave no relevance to less prosperous countries. On the contrary.
it may well be that certain features of CBIRD's strategy and
methodologfes--for example, its way of dovetalling local planning
and implementation with broader nationwide planning and develop­
ment efforts, Its technique of recycling outside grants into local 
revolving loan funds, and its successful effort, to link rural
communities with outside sources of know-how and technical 
support--may well have considerable applicability to other countries,provided, of course, that they are properly adapted to the quitedifferent circumstances of these countries. Indeed, no one can 
really know until it has actually been tried. 
What is very clear, however, is that CBIRD's unusually favor­
able environment in South Korea, especially th3 extraordinary 
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economic dynamism, cannot readil7 be replicated elsewhere. There­fore, the expectations of what a modified CBIRD approach mightachieve under much less favorable economic circumstances should beappropriately modest and realistic. In other words, inflated rhetoricand false hopes should be studiously avoided. 
THREE OUTSTANDING QUESTIONS 
The discrepancies noted earlier between CBIRD's more intan­gible goals--particularly concerning social change and welfare--andthe actual program accomplishments pose a few important unresolvedquestions that merit brief review, especially since they apply to
 
many countries.
 
1. Can the Poor Really be Helped? 
It has been pointed out in previous sections that most of the
benefits from CDF investment accrue
farmers, to middle level and well-offand that relatively little can apparently be done to changethis pattern despite the best intentions and efforts on the part ofthe CDF staff and Coordinators. In the Korean case seemsit evidentthat except for outright charity, attempts to help the poorest sectorof the rural population must depend mainly on the trickle-down effectof generally increased village prosperity.
society The goals of restructuringso as to change the distribution of wealth, and of establishinga new welfare-oriented mentality among local elites, are simply beyondthe capacities of the CBIRD program--or any other program for that
matter, shoit of a thoroughgoing political revolution 
or an Ideological
revitalization movement. 
T;,a question then inevitably arises: despite tne widespreadinternational consensus on the need to improvepoor, he lot of the ruralto what extent is this goal really practicable? Perhaps thereis something. wrong with our perceptions of the problems. Have wetaken adequate account of the very solid and durable social/
structural obstacles to the kinds of change that 

as 
are so widelyregarded desirable? Or,

strategies, Is it 
to put the matter in terms of practical
possible to redistribute wealth or focus effortsmainly on aiding the poor, while at the same time promotizg self­sustaining rural development? We must conciude here that, in Koreaat least, the answer seema to be no. Further, our assessment of
the CBIRD programs suggests that, regardless of its statements
of basic principles and objectives, SCF/CDF--at the level of actualoperating procedures--has implicitly reached the same conclusion. 
Unloes a rural society is in
upheaval, which has not been the 
a state of chaotic demoralizatio or case inSouth Korea, an effectiveintegrated davelopment program must be based on
values, and institutions. existing traditions,
It may be possible to modify their operationin gradual and subtle ways,
compels but if the change agent's commitmenthim to confront and try to do something all at once aboutsuch Intructable problems
practices, as the role of women, child-raaringvillage authority structures or hierarchies of wealth andstatus--all in addition to technical agricultural innovation-then 
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truly his program's failure is assured. In Korea, at any rate, effec­
tive self-help efforts depend on strengthening and improving village

institutions and leadership in accordance 
with generally recognized,
traditional standards--not on undermining or radically transforming
them. The community worker can never afford to lose sight of the
social mechanisms through which people interact and organize their
 group efforts, no matter how dedicated he may be to certain 
over­
rfding objectives.
 
Hard questions must be asked: is the ideal of Integrated 
economic and social development always valid as a worldng strategy?The CBIRD experience in Korea suggests that this issue should be
approached through carefully p!anned stages, with the major pushin social welfare projects coming after effective improvement in the
economic sector and after extensivo Indoctrination through non­formal education. Such an approach reflects two particular character­istics of the Korean context. First, while rural health care is grosslyinadequate by Western standards, health problems are not so severe 
as to impair either village morale or wark output. Second, the Fpreanfarmer or fisherman gives highest priority to economic dsveJopmant. 
CDF Coordinators and Community Committees have arrived at
reasonably successful compromises on this issue In the actual worklng
out of a viable mix of projects in the impact areas. The social welfare
effort has been concentrated mainly on women's training, day care 
centers, and actions to reinvigorate and supplement e.,sting familyplanning programs. Except for the day care centers, however,
amounts invested have been minor compared 
the 
to other kinds of projects.And, as has been pointed out before, even with these kinds ofprojects it is the better educated, more confident, and more aggxes­
sive women from economically secure households who receive most
of the benefits. 
Another lesson here, then, is that if "bottom up" participation
and decision-maldng has any meaning, it is that under the CBIRD
approach local leaders will determine the direction that development
takes-in accordance with their own (and the local administration's)
ordering of priorities. The Coordinator has considerable influence 
on the Committee's deliberations, but any serious effort to alterlocal priorities would be self-defeating, which Is to say that any
major and direct effort to improve the lot of the lancless and help­
less poor will have o wait. 
2. Will Villages Work Together? 
Another major objective of the CBIRD system has been theformation of multi-village communities as the focus for development
efforts. Here it is useful to make a distinction between a true
sociological community and a set of villages that are able to plan
and work together under unified leadership for mutually agreed upongoals. The distinction can be Illustrated by differences in thedegree of solidarity and the manner in which CBIRD institutona are
operated in the different impact areas. Only in Sanbuk does there 
appear to be a strong and broader sense of community In which 
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feelings of mutuality and social responsibility--a concern for thecommon welfare--go beyond village boundaries to encorpass the
whole Impact area. 
 The impression is inescapable in Sanbuk that
farmers not only participate energetically, 
 they also take pride inoperating the CBIRD machinery for their own purposes. This samesense of proprietorship is popularly reflected in the frequent,
everyday 
use of the Community Center, where, for example, asteady stream of people conduct their business with the credit union.-
In the other CBIRD areas the same general formula is beingfollowed, and there is widespread and grateful recognition of thebenefits derived from it. But for most people the activities remainsomething that is being done for them by outsiders in accordancewith externally imposed rules and procedures. In terms of theirassociations, loyalties and economic goals people continue to identifythemselves with a particular village or kinship group. Or, wheresuch ties are weakened, they are likely to migrate to the city.other words, the CBIRD spirit has not yet become In an integral, deeplyrooted part of the local sub-culture and social system.here would seem The lessonto be that while the advantages of larger scale, inter­village cooperation are self evident, the erus!on of village solidarityand the formation of an expanded rural community La likely to be avery slow process. 
CDF's goal of establishing multi-village development units on alarger scale Is impeded by other factors as well. The Idea of thenatural village community as the focus of social life and (now) ofdevelopmental aspirations is deeply ingrained in Korean mentality.
Intimate, long 
term personal association is regarded as the proper
and natural basis for both rural leadership and cooperative effort.
Accordingly the Saemaul organizers (reportedly including President
Park), while recognizing 
 the importance of planning and coordinatedeffort on a regional basis,
village, both 
have ccntinued to emphasize the individualas the local decsion-making unit and an the basis oflabor mobilization. Coordination of larger projects beyond the village
level is regarded as 
the function of local administration. 
Is It likely that the demonstrated effectiveness of the CBIRDmethodology will change official thinking on this issue?of the present study it On the basisseems highly problematical. The emotionalassociations of the village as a social and political unit have beenmentioned above. In addition there are powerful bureaucratic andpolitical forces influencing the direction of development of ruralinstitutions. The Korean admir2itration'spragmatic: approach is eminently1) any concasions and adaptations to foreign organiza­tions that are necessary in the short run in order to ensurecontinued flow of outside assistance are readily made; 2) there 
the 
Isa genuine eagerness to learn new techniques and technologies, whichif useful will probably be incorporated somehow in future practices.In the longer run, however, the prestige, authority, and ubiquityof Korean governmental agencies will determine the form and mannerof operation of all local institutions. 
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3. W/hat are CBIID's Long Term Prospects? 
Today the social and economic horizons of Korean farmers are
rapidly expanding, and CBIRD projects are accelerating the process.Local leaders are actively participating in guiding the development of
their communities. But the Korean Government depends on the docile
support of the rural population. It does not look idndly on the form­
ation of any independent, private associations at the local level that
might be in a position to challenge the authority of official agencies

or serve as 
a rallying point for demands for greater local autonumy.It would be highly misleading to assume, as some have done, that 
the organization of local decision-making for economic development
represents a significant trend in the direction of grass roots politicaldemocracy. Korean tradition, current governmental practice, and
the gee-political situation in Northeast Asia all oppose such a ten­dency, at least in the immediate foreseeable future. 
Thus it seems unrealistic to expect that a set of model orpilot communities implanted in Korean rural society can eventually

transform that society by example in accordance with a particular
ideal vision. Rather it is the other way around. As CDF phase3

out Its operation, 
 the model will inevitably be transformed by theparticular condition.; and popular attitudes of each area and by the

ubiquitous and growing influence of the buieaucracy.
 
But even if the present CBIRD model seems unlikely to spread
spontaneously throughout South Korea, will it survive in the present impact areas after CDF nthdraws? Without occasional

capital inputs and at least periodic encotragement and supervision

from the outside, can the CBIRD 
program sustain itself in anythinglike its present form? The answer, in our view, will depend heavily

on 
whether by then the CBIRD system has achieved a sufficientlyhigh degree of integration in the sense of being supported and

sanctioned by local values and customs, 
 in addition to achieving the 
sense of proprietorship referred to earlier. Given these conditions,
the survlval prospects seem promising, but lacking this, there seems
little likelihood that it 
 will be perpetuated after the Coordinator and
his capital are withdrawn.
 
One promising possibility that merits consideration, even Ifit may seem remote at the moment, Is that the myon level coopera­
tives might take over the local CBIRD role of promoting and coordin­
ating integrated rural development. But before this can be
regarded as a serious altgrnative, there will have to be some drasticchanges in the structural organization and operating style of the
cooperative system, and in the attitudes of Its officials. Localbranches of the National Agricultural Cooperatives Federation inKorea are cooperatives in name only. The parent organization Is a
centralized government bureaucracy with a strong "top-down"
orientation. It is extremely powerful, veth great resources and
authority in the fields of rural credit, farm input upplies, and Inthe collection, storage and distribution of agricultural products.
There have been many changes for tl,. better in its operations as 
a result of the Saemaul Movement, but :,o one believes that it 
'\ 
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represents the farmers' views or interests. 
At the tVme of this case study discussions were reportedly
 
going on at high levels in the Korean Government with a view tp

restructuring the cooperative system to achieve a greater degree

of active local participation and greater responsiveness to local
 
needs. Were this to occur, the national organization would then
 
play more of an advisory and facilitating role than, as at present,
 
a strong-handed directive role as executor of government policy.

In such a climate, the seeds of local planning, management and
 
self-help that CBIRD has planted and nurtured would have a real
 
chance to thrive. Whether such a vision is utopian or not, it
 
appears to us that the local cooperative is in fact the logical focus
 
of integration and the most promising successor to CBIRD.
 
In any event, there can be little doubt that in the long run 
the CBIRD innovations will leave some useful and enduring impacts 
on the Korean rural scene. But Just what form they will take and 
how extensive they will be, only time can tell. 
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INTRODUCTION
 
The Mini Regional Rural Development project (No. 498-13-899-251) inKorea isbeing successfully implemented. Evaluated against itsLOGFRAME this project with its Community Based Integrated Rural .......
Development (CBIRD) method, has met or is well 
on the way to
meeting a 
high proportion of its objectively verifiable indicators.
 
An excellent impact evaluation of this project has just been published
by the International Council for Educational Development of Essex,
Connecticut. 
This report, PLANNING FROM THE BOTTOM UP: 
 Community
Based Integrated Rural Development In"Sou!ora y
V~i~inct S. H.Brand-tand i Woong Cheong, is
an in depth analysis
of four of the project's six impact areas. 
 Their study, conducted
from August throv'y5 October, 1978, found this to be a successful
 
project.
 
Unfortunately, the draft of the Brandt-Cheong svudy was not available
until the current evaluiation was already underwy. 
When the Brandt-
Cheong study became aveilable the implications *for this evaluation
were abundantly clear. 
Therefore, my aim became verification or
refutation of the Brandt-Lneonq fIndings, updating their statistics
where possible and doing complementary economic analysis.
 
I generally endorse the findings of the Brandt-Cheong paper and
commend their paper to the reader. 
The Brandt-Cheong findings
appear to be currently valid and based on sound research. The
insights of the authors, should stimulate discussion and even
controversy. 
Whether or not they are controversial, the findings
are indicative of what isactually occurring in Korean participatory

rural development.
 
A caveat on the applicability of the Brandt-Cheong findings to
other areas which was consistently discussed has been that working
in Korea with Koreans is indeed a fortunate circumstance for those
involved in any developmental activity. 
I can only agree with the
caveat for Korea's development effort appears to the marginal
i5sere such as myself to be noteworthy for its success. 
 While the
lever for this success has been well directed policy, the fulcrum
upon which that lever rests can only have been the people of Korea
themselves, whether rural or urban. 
 However, I believe the caveat
is
an indicator of degree rather than an absolute limitation.
Methods used in Korea with Koreans probably can be applied successfully
elsewhere, albeit with particular modifications. This remains Co
be proved and the SCF/CDF activity in Western Sumatra may be a
valuable proving ground.
 
U)
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The analyses discussed inthis memo are admittedly crude and depend
upon data gathered by SCF/CDF's very effective internal evaluation

system. The data were discussed inSeoul with USAID and ROKG
officials as well as Dr. Cheong. 
 In the impact areas, I received
briefings as detailed as 
I wished them to be by CBIRD participants.
was free to wander about and discuss activities of the program

with whomever I wished but, since I do not speak Korean, it is
valid to question whether or not 
I got correct information. I can
only reply that what I 
was told did not conflict with what I saw in
the three CBIRD areas which I chose to visit and the Brandt-Cheongfindings bore out what I saw and heard. It should also be pointedout that officials of the ROKG and SCFiCDF were quite insistentabout pointing out activities and projects which had not met their
expectations or, in which there was a great deal 
more to accomplish.
Thus, I did not lack for examples of things which could reasonably
be critized. 
But I have no reason to suspect these actions as
being anything more than effective examples of self-criticism.
 
The SCF/CDF data may not be enti-ely accurate but are at least
reasonably indicative of what is happening in the CBIRD areas. 
As
to this analysis, it ismeant to supplement the far more scholarly
work presented inthe ICED publication of the study by Drs. Brandt
and Cheong. As a suggestion, I would like to see their socio­cultural study followed up in about one or two more years by an
interdisciplinary team (hopefully including Drs. Brandt and Cheong)
which has an institutional economist among its members. 
There are
further valuable insights to be gained and, given the data base
available, an cconomist could be a useful 
resource in ferreting
them out. 
 If this work can also be pursued in Indonesia with a
similar team I believe that important lessons about methods of
participatory rural development can be surfaced.
 
Discussion
 
In the six CBIRD impact areas the surveyed income per household,
according to SCF/CDF and the Brandt-Cheong data, increased significantly
Faster than those households' share of GNP from 1975 to 1979. 
The
lifferential in the indexed growth ranged from slightly over 17% in
ranggu to just under 200% on Wido Island (see Table I). This would
 seem to indicate that the terms of trade between these areas and
'he rest of the Korean economy are improving. This is consistent
fith the general trend in the Korean economy (see Brandt-Cheong
)aper) but further study is needed to determine whether or not the

•ates of change in %he CBIRD areas differ from other rural 
areas.
:nowledgeable observers of the Korean economy and the CBIRD program
!stimate that these areas are experiencing faster economic growth

,han surrounding rural areas and are therefore reducing the gap
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cooperatives. 
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PART I 
INTRODUCTION 
The National Electrification Administra- 2. housing conditions and facilities;tion was set n5) in 1969, replacing the previous 3. coverage, use and cost of electricity;
Electrification Administration, with a reinforced 4. substitute power sources and cost in
mandate to provide electric service to the rural non-electrified and electrified house- ­population on an "area coverage" basis through holds;
rural electric cooperatives. 5. availability, accessibility and use of corn-
Under this concept, electric service is to be munity facilities;
extended to remote and distant areas, supported 6. household income;
by the dense loads and 
 revenues, from more 7. perception of the impact of electricity
densely-populated central areas. NEA has been on the community; and
assisted in this task by generous budget alloca- 8. attitude towards and reactions to electri­
tions from the National Treasury as well as by city cost and service. 
substantial foreign loan assistance, primarily

from the United States Government through B. SUMMARY OF MAJOR FINDINGS
 
U.S. Agency for International Development
(USA ID). 
 The results of the survey shows that: 
As of January 1978, NEA had organized96 electric cooperatives distributed among 1. Households served by cooperatives have 
the country's 72 provinces. The ultimate goal a lower socio-economic status than thoseof the program is total electrification of the served by other electric utilities. 
country by 1990. In June 1976, USAID provi­
ded a $75,000 grant for a series of economic 2. Electrified households have higher socio­
and social evaluation studies of this program, economic status than non-electrified
 
the highlight of which is this nationwide evalua- households.
 
tion survey. Inasmuch as the beneficiaries of the
 program are rural people, the grant provided 3. Cooperative electric utilities are more
 
for a survey to describe and measure 
the socio- successful than private electric utilities

economic impact of electricity on 
rural house- in terms of availability of service and theholds. number connecting among those accessi­
ble to electricity.A. SURVEY OBJECTIVES 
4. Cooperative electric utilities are moreThis study is the first of a series of nation- succesriful than private electric utilities
wide surveys, to be repeated every three or five in peretrating remote areas and servicing
years, to evaluate the Philippine rural electrifi-
 "poor" people. They have also reached a
cation program. While the study is exploratory signifiQnt proportion of food producers.
and primarily designed to provide baseline infor­
mation for future comparison, analysis also 5. Rural households use electricity prima­focused on socio-economic and attitudinal dif- rily for lighting.
ferences between identifiable groups, impact
of electricity on the household, and the manage- 6. The strongest perceptions of indirect 
ment of electric cooperatives. benefits of electricity were in improved 
peace and order and increased educa-The main areas of investigations are: tional activity. 
1. sociological characteristics of the house- 7. In cooperative areas, neighborhood-shar­
hold; ing is stronger and tl., benefits of electri­
12 
city to non-electrified households are 
more widespread than in non-coopera-
tive areas. 
8. Approximately half of all electrified 
.households feel that cost of electricity is 
high. The extent of this opinion, how-
ever, is less in cooperative areas than in 
non-cooperative areas. 
9. Electric service interruptions were com-
mon in both cooperative areas and non-
cooperative areas. 
10. Households in cooperative and non-
cooperative areas have favorable atti-
tudes towards electric cooperatives, 
C. 	 STATEMENT OF LIMITATIONS OF 
STATISTICAL INFERENCES FROM THE 
SURVEY ESTIMATES 
The estimates in this report are based 
on a "quasi-experimerLtal design" described in 
Appendix B. A probability sample of coopera-
tive barrios was selected, and each sample 
cooperative barrio was matched with a non-
cooperative barrio of similar size and electrifi-
cation status. The households in each sarple 
cooperative barrio and matching non-coop-
erative barrio were listed and categorized into 
two strata - electrified and non-electrified. In 
cooperative barrios a sample of 1,013 electrified 
households and 1,973 non-electrified house-
holds was selected and in non-cooperative bar-
rios a sample of 303 electrified households and 
694 non-electrified households was selected, 
Since the non-cooperative portion of the sample 
was not selected under scientific rules of proba­
bility, the population or universe for the "expe­
rimental design" is hence taken to be the collec­
tion 	 of households in the sample cooperative 
and 	 non-cooperative barrios. The observations 
are 	 inflated to the barrio level to compare.esti­
mates in the four "experimental design" strata: 
cooperative-electrified, cooperative-non-electri­
fied, non-cooperative-electrified and non-coope­
rative-rion-electrified. The non-cooperative por­
tion 	of the experimental design is not generaliza­
ble to the country as a whole. 
The 	standard error described in Appendix 
B i3 a measure of the precision of a survey esti­
mate although it does not measure any systema­
tic biases in the data. It should be noted that 
although the standard error of a survey estimate 
is a measure of the sampling error, it does not 
necessarily measure the several important 
sources of non-sampling error, such as interviewer 
variability and errors introduced in coding, edit­
ing and tabulating the survey data. Standard 
errors were computed for the "experimental 
design" estimates in the tables in this report, 
which are mostly percentages. Table B1 in 
Appendix B shows the sample size of each "ex­
perimental design" stratum and tha standard 
errors for a range of percentage estimates in 
each stratum. Included in the appendix are the 
formulas which can be used to calculate the 
standard errors for the different types of survey 
estimates. The standard errors for the "experi­
mental design" estimate3 are small, since each 
stratum has a fairly large sample size and the 
over-all sampling rate within the sample barrios 
is high (7 percent). 
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Summary
 
1965 marked the beqinning of A.I.D.'s involvement in rural electri­
fication in the Philippines when it financed a power survey which
 
recommended testing the feasibility of extending electricity to the 
rural areas. Following the feasibility study done by the National
 
Rural Electric Cooperative Association (NRECA), A.I.D. assisted the
 
Government of the Philippines in creating two pilot cooperatives,
 
MORESCO and VRESCO. 
Since these first steps, $3S2 million have been
 
invested in rural electrification in the Philippines. A.I.D. has
 
contributed more than $92 million to finance equipment, engineering

consultant services and extensive technical assistance provided by
 
the NRECA. This large investment has resulted in the establishment of
 
the National Electrifivation Administration (NEN), which is planning
 
and implementing an ambitious program with the following targets: 
- Completion of backbone (main distribution lines and key
 
lateral lines) systems and qnerization of all towns and
 
cities by 1980;
 
- Energization of all barrios by 19851 and
 
- ."btalenergization by 1990 (recently shortened to 1987).
 
As of February 29, 1980 the following physical accomplishments had
 
been recorded by NFA:
 
117 cooperatives registered
 
101 cooperatives energized
 
844 municipalities energized (59% of total)
 
9,088 barrios energized (27% of total)
 
1,159,434 households electrified (20% of total)
 
The team found the impact of the rural electrification program on
 
both the process of economic development and the rural poor to be
 
limited. There were, howeqer, enough examples of positive effects
 
to permit the team to draw conclusions about the conditions which
 
must exist and criteria which must be met if a rural electrification
 
project is to have positive impacts on development and the poor.
 
Those areas where electricity had a posit.ive effect on development
 
were characterized by a concentrated popul'tJon, diverse markets,

availability of capital and technical skills, and proximity to a 
larger market. These were places such as market towns and areas
 
near to Manila where there were more opportunities to use power 
productively and which were at a relatively more advanced stage of 
development. The team also found positive effects on economic devel­
opment where investments and proj ects in power-dependent activities 
were actively promoted.
 
The tear observed that a large segment of the oor were unable to 
make productive use of electricity. Of this group, a substanitial 
portion could not afford to have their houses wired. They recoived 
only the benefits of community lighting such as greater secur! y aid 
increased communit- and social activity if their barrio had pr' .­
v 
lighting. Mother portion could afford the wiring but could only

afford the monthly cost of one or two light bulbs. This group re­ceived the social and community benefits and also saved money because,
in most places, kerosene lighting is more expensive. rcamples of
the use of electricity to break out of the poverty cycle were found 
as one moved up the socio-economic scale. 
 The people in this group
often had skills and savings or access to family resources to use
 
with the electricity.
 
Rased on these observations the team drew the following conclusions:
 
1) The introduction of electricity does not automatically stimulate 
economic growth. The contribution electricity can make will depend
on the level of development of the area and the programs and projects

which utilize power. 
2) The r--.or 
derive social and community benefits from electricity

and aome obtain cheaper, safer, better lighting. The most important
benefits of electricity should be 
new employment opportunitien, higherlevels of productivity, and extended and improved public and social

services. These benefits iill flow to the rural poor only if electri­city is used as an element of the development process and the develop­ment process, itself, is directed to meeting the needs of the poor. 
3) The use of cooperatives for distributIMq electricity does not
 
guarantee democratic participation of the members. 
 The selection
of an appropriate organizational form should give greatest weight to
the need for effective management rather than other criteria such as
the participation of beneficiaries or democratization of the develop­
ment process.
 
4) The financial viability of rural electric distribution systems is
difficult to achieve if they expand rapidly into far-flung, thinly
populated rurai areas. rinancial problems are further exacerbatedby rising energy costs. Conversely, encouragement of the productive usesof power and slower rates of systems expansion should improve the chances 
of achieving this goal.
 
5) Rural electrification does not substantially increase energy de­mand because the additional demand for energy caused by electrifi­
cation is small and electricity is often subetituted for other fuels.
 
Based on the above conclusions, the team urges cautious and careful
study in programming for ruralfunds electrification. The availabil­ity of alternative proj ects, the desire and commitment of the host 
country and other country-specific factors should affect the Agency'sdecision. Future studies and evaluations of rural electrification
should focus on identifying the pre-existing conditions and comple­mentary programs which must exist to ensure that electrification has 
a positive impact. 
/(
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Life of Project Funding F.Responsible Miton Officles1. AID. (Loan or Grant) 15,000.000 1. Mission Director not stated2. Other Donor 2. Project Officors (Name, Position)Host Country Counterpart Funds 3.Other
 
TOTAL $ 

G.Project Design H. Implementation1. In-House (Name. Position) 1. Host Country AgencyUe) 
not stated 
 not stated
 
2. Contractor (Name. Firm, Contract No.) 2. Contractor (Name, Firm, Contract No.) 
not stated 
 not stated
 
I. Previous Evaluations (include Title, Type and Date) 
not stated
 
II. BASIC EVALUATION DATA 
A. Evaluation Title B.Evaluation Date C.Type of Evaluation 
. D. Project Period Covwed by EvaluationRural Roads Evaluation
Report 
 June 1978 
 Interim Evaluation 
 October 1975-June 1978
 
E.Evaluation Cost F. Purpose(s) of Evaluatlon G. Initiated By1. Direct Hire not stated "Economic and social benefits not stateda. travel from the six roads." (Roadsb.par diem representative of the roads
 
Zo.trat built under the project and
.. ther completed during the first
TOTAL S one and half years of implemen ation.) 
f. Evaluatlon Team Composition 
1. Direct Hire 
a. Name b. Present Position c. Area of Expertis 
"Rural Roads Office of the Department of Local Government and Community Development
(DIGCD/RRP) and USAID's Provincial Development Division."
 
_ 2. Co.r : a.Name OnAxlatn INmy) b.Contact No. 
r. Naie(s) of Persona d. Area(e) of Expet tie 
I. Other Responsible AID ms HHoCOunt 1William Sommers% 1. EvaluationCoordniomrI*MnnnI (Name. Position) Chief, Provincial Dep't; 
Rick Arnaldo, Connie Canoza for analysis, Signature
writing and secretarial services. Also,
Lucy Supleo, Director, Rural Roads Office
(stRff gathered the data) -. . _ _ _ _
Governors _ _of Position _ _ 
_lo, Pangasinan, La Union, Bataan, Daft

.les andMisamis Oriental
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Sumary of the Rural Roads Evaluation Report in the Philippines
 
Bill Anderson, PPC/E/PDES
 
This evaluation was done jointly by personnel from
U.S. AID Philippines' Provincial Development Division and
the Rural Roads Office of the Department of Local Government
and 	Community Development. 
This report analyzes the impact

of six rural roads built as 
a part of a larger rural roads
program in the Philippines that was financed by the RuralRcads I Loan (492-T-035) made to the Philippines government
by U.S. AID. The roads evaluated in this report were com­pleted within the first year and a half of the loan construction
period, which began in October 1975 and ended in December 31,
1978. 
 This report is an interim report because the period of
use of each road was one year or less at the time the evalua­tion was conducted. The six roads evaluated in thie report

were selected according to certain criteria:
 
1. 	The projects were constructed or rehabilitated with local
 
funds.
2. 
The project rights-of-way were titled to the province.
3. 
The projects were part of a continuous road system linking
agricultural or fishing areas of predominantly small farmers
 
or fishermen with the closest market town.
4. 	The projects were linked with a road of equal quality

which in turn was connected to a good road leading to the
 
nearest market town.
5. 	All of the structures 
(bridges, culverts, etc.) between
the 	project and the nearest market town were of at least equal
load capacity or were scheduled for replacement under the Rural
 
Roads Project.
6. The road system was directly connected to at least 2barangays (smallest unit of local government) within itsinfluence area. 
The 	 primary data Zor the report was obtained from householdsurveys and interviews with local government officials. (secondarydata was gathered from various government offices). The roads'influence area 8,086was hectares that supported 4,684 householdswith a total population of 27,953. This area was largely agri­cultural. 
Before the Rural Roads Project, the six roads were

"narrow, uneven, full of potholes, slippery in the dry season
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and 	often impassable in the rainy season." 
 M4oreover, the

river crossings were mostly old timber bridgers or coconut
trunks. 
After the road systems were improved: a) the

right-of-way was widened significantly; b) side ditches

and dulvert pipes were installed for better drainage; c)
reinforced Derk Girder Bridges were constructed over the

river crossings; d) wider shoulders were provided on both
sides of the road; 
e) also, parts of the roads were surfaced

with gravel. The cost of constructing or improving the road
systems was 7,800,000 pesos; 5,200,000 of which was 
reimbursed
to the respective provincial covernments upon completion by
the 	DLGCD and USAID.
 
Findi:gs of Report 
A) 	Economic Benefits-- (resulted from or may have in part
been caused by the improvement of the six roads.)
 
1. Reduction in transport costs and increased availabilitx 
of reliable transportation services. 
"In 	the six roads, passenger charges fell by 54% 
between
1975 and 1978. 
 This was in the face of an 87% increase in
the legal transport rate set by the Board of Transportation

during the same period."
 
Total no. of transport Before After Percentageunits 
 RRP RRP 
 Chanae
l)-Jeepney 15 81 440) Tricycles 	 26 
 95 	 265
3) 	Buses 
 2 12 	 500
 
4) 	Cargo Trucks- 20 
 55 	 175
5) TOTAL (all vehicle
 
types) 63 
 242 	 284
 
2. 	Increase in the Production of Major CroDs
 
"in 	the surveyed area the production volume of 7 major
marketable crops raised within the roads' influence area
increased by nearly 40% 
during the last 2 years." (76-77)
Vegetables increased by 62% and fruits increased by 46%.
 
"Road improvement, while not 	the only factor, has been 
a significant factor in inducing increased production by
improving market access, inducing visits by extension workers,

and affording easier and cheaper access to farm inputs.
 
3. 	Increased in Farmaate 
(price farmers receive from

merchants at the farmsite) and Market Prices ofMajor
Agricultural Crops
 
"For the 7 major crops raised within the roads' influence
 
area, average farmgate prices rose by 59% while market prices
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increased 26% 
a year after the completion of the project."
The decline in transport costs were 
probably a major cause
of the increase in farmgate prices because t6he 
farmers would have
to pay the merchants less for shipping costs. Also, house­hold-interviews indicated that farmers were able to bring
more of their produce directly to the market (nearby town)

.after the completion of the road projects because of improved

roads and faster traveling time.
 
Perc. of Production
 
Volume
 
Marketing Before 
 After Difference

Practices of 
 RRP RRP
 
farmers in pro­ject area 
______________
. . .. ...
 
A verage figures for 

all six roads 
 a. Sold at farm 69 41 28
surveyed 
 b. Sold at market 31 59 28
 
4. Increase in Gross Annual Household Income
 
-Annual Gross 
 %
 
Bgf~reRodHousehold income Incre-ase
 
Improvement 
 5,706 pesos
 
After Road" 

-

Improvement 
 7,286 pesos 28%
 
The increases in income are due primarily to increased
production within the area. 
 "Also contributing is the
farmer's ability to sell at higher prices while paying lower
 
transportation charges."
 
5. Entrepreneural Increase
 
"Data on the 6 roads' influence area show that commercial
enterprises have grown from 78 before the road project to 166
after the road project was completed. While a variety of
reasons can be marshalled to explain these increases, they
are, in one way or another, tied to the road improvement.
Sari-sari stores 
(variety stores), for example, depend on
regular and timely shipments of perishables while rice and
corn mills grow in concert with increased agricultural pro­duction."
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Economic Enterprise RRP r Difference 
 Perc.
(No. of units) Before RRP 

_ Chance 
a. Sari-sari stores 
 100 65 186b. .Drug stores 
 6 
 1 20
c. Tailoring/Dress 
 4 
 7 175 
d. Beauty Shops 
 1 50 
e. Rice/Cornmill 
 22 34 38f. Storage Fa& ities 
 2 350
 
g. Cottage In stries 
 1/ri 
B) Social Benefits 
1. Increased Mtobility 
Road improvement, particularly the construction of stabile
bridges over rivers and creeks, has enabled people in the
influence areas 
to travel year-round on roads that were fre­quently impassable during the rainy season before the road
project was initiated. 
As a result of the road improvements,
people in the influence areas have increased the number of
trips they make per year. 
Outbound- rips Percentdays/year Increase 
Before (Road)
 
Improvement 58 
After (Road)
 
Imorovement 
 123 
 114%
 
2. Accessibilit? to Health Services 
Better roads have made it easier for the rural population
in the survey area to travel to obtain Health Services.
 
by 
household 
== 
A. Frequency of 
consultation 
with medical 
Before After 
RRP RRPJ 
Dif. Perc. 
Change 
personnel 
averagefigure 
obtained 
from survey 
1)i[ 
2) 
dortors/nurses/
de.tists 
herbolarios 1318 25125 
126 
I 
9233 
taken in all 
six road 
-influence are 
B. Place of 
Consultation 
Before 
RRP 
After 
RRP 
Dif. 
1) at barrio/
residence 69% 52% 166 
2) at Doblacion 31% 48% 16% 
16%
 
0 
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"Village people are beginning to 	increase their efforts
 
to get better health protection. The government has apparently

recognized this fact since it has recently moved to increase
 
the -umber of health facilities and programs within the
 
influence areas of the improved roads. Fourteen new health
facilities (rural health units, clinics, etc.) were inaugurated
to which 10 government health personnel were assigned.
 
3. i~prroved Accessibility to Educational Facilities 
Educational Defore After Chang Perc. "Better roads
 
services 
 RRP RRP Chance 	 and cheaper,
 
faster and more
No. of educa-
 reliable trans­
tional institu 12 13 1 8 portation enable 
tions 
 students to com­
mute, elim-natir
enrollment 3,154 3,455 301 10 the expenses of 
drop-out/ d .-jboard and lodgi 
transferees
 
to outside 137 61 - 76 55
 
schools 
-

Avg. no. of
 
household
 
members 2.2 2.7 0.5 23
 
enrolled
 
4. Increases in Recreational Activities 
"Since most recreational activities occur away from the
 barrios, good roads also open up the rural recreational scene."
 
In 1975 the average frequency with which the people was 36 times
 per year, but towards the end of 1977 (after the six roads had
been completed and were being utilized) the frequency jumped to 
72 times annually."
 
5. Increased Accessib _ity to Publications 
"With better roads come more of the printed word on a 
regular schedule."
 
Communications 1 Before After Percentage 
Media . RRP RRP Chance 
No. of publica-
Average tions reaching 9 33 267 
for all the area 
six == frequency of 
roads availability 45 260 478 
surveyed 
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6. lThroved Availability of Government Services
 
"Poor government service on the barrio level is often
aggravated by the lack of good roads. 
Government performs

at the barrio by visitation from extension workers. 
 Thus,
good roads are the sine qua nom in the government's effort
 to get to the people.4"
_
 
G6'vernment Services Avablability_

A. 	Farm :,ianaaement 
 Before After Percentage
Techn_c! ans 
 RRP RRP 
 Chance
 
1. 	Number 
 14 29 
 107
 
2. 	Frequency of
 
service 
 50 156 	 212
 
B. 	 ::edical Befor After Pecntg
 
Personnel 
 RRP RRP Chance
 
1. 	Number 10 
 21 	 110
 
2. 	Frequency of 
 56 156 179
 
service
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, , r. r'uM ij':L;IAL EVALUATION 
r. BASIC PROJECT IDENTI FICATION DATAA. Country B.Project Title C.Project Number D. Active Life of Project:Philippines Bicol Secondary Feeder Roads 492-0281 1. ProjectAgreement SignedFV±2. Approved Project Conmletlon Date (PACD) FYE. Life of Project Funding
1.AID,(Loan orGrnt F.Responsible Mision Officlalp10,00,000 (PES) 1. MissTon Director (Acting) Dennis Barrett2. Other Donor , 
3. Host Courtry Counterpart Funds 2. Project Officers (Name, Position) Ralph Bird3. Other
 
TOTAL S
 
G. Project Dusign 
H. Implementation 
. .. 
.. ....1. In-House (Name, Postion) . Host Country Agn )
• not stated 
. ot Co n r Ag n y i­not stated
 
2. Contractor (Name, Firm, Contract No.) 2. Contractor (N&ima, Firm, Contract No.) 
not stated 

not stated
 
i. Previous Evaluatrons (include Title. Type and Date)1977 Revaluation Study of the Bicol River Basin Development Project Secondary and Feeder
Roads
 
1978 Evaluation Summary 
 (see page 9 of report) 
II.BASIC EVALUATION DATAA. Evaluation Title B. Evaluation Date C.Type of Evaluation D. Project Period Covered by Evaluation1979 Evaluation 
. 
Bicol August 1979ondaryand FeederRoad 
(July 23-Aug 16) 
on going project 
 July 1978-July 1979
 
E.Evaluation Cost F.Purpose(s) of Evaluation G. Initiatad By1. Direct Hire not stateda. travel (SEE attached sheet) not statedb. per iem
 
Contract
 
Other
 
TOTAL S 
H. Evaluation Team Composition 
1. Direct Hire (SEE attached sheet)a. Name b. Present Posltlon r.Area of Experdo 
2. Contract: a. Narm of OrganIzation (ifany) b. Contrct No. 
, -.Name() af Permes d. Area(s) of Expwta 
. Oth ponsible AID nd Host Country J.Evaluation Coordinator
 
Personnel (Name. Position)
 
Signature 
not stated To No
 
Poltlon
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F. Purpose: 
 The primary purposes of the evaluation were to document construq
progress; assess the potential socio-economic impact of the project roads;
review the analysis that led to the upgrading of design standards; assess 
the
er -3ctiveness of the maintenance training program; identify problem areas,

and, propose remedial action.
 
H. Evaluation Team: 

"Participating were: 
 members of the Project Management Office (PMO) under the
Ministry of Public Highways, engineers of the Bicol River Basin Development
Program Office (BRBDPO), the Roads Evaluation Program personnel of the BRBDPO,

AI6/IV/Asia/PD, Civil Engineer, DOT/11 Transportation Economist, and concerned
USAID technical personnel."
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13. sJmARY 
Though somewhat be-hind :,hedule and plaued by significant cost overrums,it appears that the project goal and 1 -pose will be achieved. Because
of excellent supervision, the construction work is of superior quality.Along with the increa--s in cost, benefits also increased and preliminarytraffic count on those roads near coapletion indicate that they will be
economically feasible. The will befinal contract finished in 1981. Intotal, the project is now 1%behind schedule, not including the initial 
one year delay discussed in the 1978 evaluation report. Barring surprises,
no further delays are anticipated. As discussed below, the estimated 
total construction cost of the project as it will be completed in 1981 ismore than triple the $11,945 mill.on estimated in the Projoct Paper. y1ocal
,-empioyment impact of the project has been. disa nnint g, and Is est1ma 
- at only 20% of the level projected in the PP. The contruction contracts 
did not give emphasis to the employment of labor intensive methods for
cost, timing, operating and management reason-. 
Though a GOP Road Maintenance Training Program administered by RoyJorgensen Assuciates, Inc. has been very successful, considerably moreeffort will be required to change current unsatisfactory maintenance
attitudes and practices. The EvaluationBicul Roads Project (HREP) set 
up to monitor and evaluate project impact is thehampered in t=ecution
of their vitally important role by lack of technical experience. 
Review of the decision to upgrade road design standards from DoubleBituminous Surface Treatment (DBST) to Portland Cement Concrete (FCC)
reveals that the upgrading was not fully Justified on technical or econo­
mic grounds. 
1U. EVALUATION METHODLOGY 
The evaluation was conducted in the Bicol Region frm JW7 23 to August 16,1979. The primary purpose cf the evaluation was to document construction progress, assess the potentipl socio-econcmic impact of the project roads,
re- the analysis that led to the-up-ading of design standards assessthe effectiveness of the maintenance training program, identify problem
areas, and propose renedial action4 Participating were: members of theProject Management 0±fice (iY) under the Ministry of Public Highwaysengineers of the Bicol River Basin Development Program Office (ni- 5,* the Roads Evaluat u Program personnel of the XRBDPO, A!D/W/ASIA/PD ' Civil Engineer, DOT/W Transportation Economist, and concerned USAZD tech­
nical petsonnel. Visits were made to all 22 road contracts under con­
struction. A re-resentative of each contractor was interviewed.Acco=panying the team on these interviews were orone two personnel fromthe A&E consultant firm responsible for the qulity control on each par­ticular contract. Traffic counts were taken on two of the almost cam­pleted roads and a survey was made of the project impact on local
Unemployment in construction activities.
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. xT1'IAL FACTOnS 
a. U09rading of -esign Standards 
A review of the analysis performed by t',e ME in Justil-ying the changein design standards revealed that u~'rading to Portland Cement Concrete(PC) or Asphalt Concrete (AC) pavement could nob be -justified oneconomic or technical grounds. Given the relatively low traffic levelsof less than 600 vehicles per day projected for the opening year, the---Double Bituminous Surface Treatment (DBST) pavement for the projectroads has a higher Net Present Value (NMV) of benefits over costs thanthe PCC and AC, unless a total absence of futre maintenance is assumed.It is estimated that the additional construction cost due to upgradingexceeds 147 million ($6.3 million) and that the upgrading had only aminor effect on benefits. This will be the subject of7 further GOP analysis. 
b. Administrative Delays 
The most important factor in the substantial delays in starting theactual construction work was the Presidential Decree specifling that
all contracts in the Philippines exceeding a value oft2 million must be approved by a Presidential Review Committee.According to data collected by the evaluation team, the time con­suming review in Manila caused an average delay of 5.3 months betweenthe date of contract award to the notice to proceed, with a minimm of2 months and a maxi== of 10 moths. The &.econdmost important delay
was caused by the bid processing in the PM. It took an average of3.5 months between thi time a contractor's bid was received and thetime of contract award, with a minimum of 1 month and a maxin m of 
10 months. 
As a consequence of these administrative delays, a minimum of almost6 months of valuable dry-westher months per contract was lost. Actuallosses are higher due to the unpredictable nature of the delays (the
nvtice to proceed could arrive anyvhere between 2 to 10 months after
contract award), and contractors often were not ready to imtuediately
cry-ence work after receiving the nobice to proceed due to other commit­ments. It is estimated that the total cost of delays amount to 124million (t3.2 million), or approximately t million (4533,OO) per dry
month lost. 
c. Shortages of Fuel and Cement 
Though numerous contractors claimed shortages of fuel and cement asan important reason for slippage, the Praluation team believes theslippage caused by these shortages was minor, especially when ccmpared
with the administrative delays discussed above. 
d. Weather 
The weather condit- ons during the evaluation period were normal and
 
did not cause any significant cost over-runs or slippage.
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16. IFJTS 
a. Costs 
Efforts are being made to keep construction below $40 miltion, bnt thetotal construction cost of the project as it will be complet-d in 1931is estimated at more than triple the $12 million estimated in theProject Paper. Primary reasons for this large co: t overrun were theunderestimation of construction costs in the Project Pamci- the higher­than anticipated rate of inflation, and the upgrading of the road andpavement design standards by the vailippine Government. Me average
cost of the Double Bituminous Surface Treatment road, including the
cost of the additional earthwork required to raise it to a sufficientheight above the vaterline, is nov Per km.;1636,650 ($8[,887) TheAsphalt Concrete road costs t912,741 ($121,699) per km. and thePortland Cement road costs tl,249,256 (4166,567) per km. In total,the upgrading of the pavements over the DBST type has imrosed an
additional cost of aproximately t47.25 million ($6.3 million) f.r 
the GOP. 
b. Maintenance
 
Assuring adequate maintenance of the project roads will be a mostdifficult goal to achieve. In general, none of the existing roads inthe project area show signs of preventive mainte"Ance and very little
of periodic maintenance. Current attitudes and practices are to re­habilitate road sections only after they have deteriorated to an almostimprassable condition. The causes of this poor maintenance performance
are complex and interrelated and moreare fully discussed in thebody of the meain report. Though t.re Road M irtenance Training Program
administered by Roy Jorgensen Associates, Inc. has been very sccess­ful in training 91 persons, or 25%more personnel than initially proj­
ected, considerably more effort viJl be required to change current
maintenance attitudes and practices. The program is scheduled toterminate in December of this year, and it Is recommended to extendthe program for at least another year in order to provide continuity
and increase the probability of field implementation of the training 
program.
 
17. FMDIIK ABOUT PROJEMT OUTPUT 
a. Schedule
 
The project is almost t-wo years behind the original project paper
schedule, but we do not foresee any further delays for the majorityof the 25 contracts. One of the contracts vill be completed this
calendar year (the imortan- San Isidro-LibmAnan-Cabusao sub-project).Another 17 are now estimated for c~orletion in 1980, and the balance
wi.l be fnished in 1981. The primary reasons for the initial delay
of almost one year (GOP fiscal year changeover, insufficient initialbudgetary allocations, and lack of adequate staff levels for effectiveproject management) have been discussed in the 1978 evaluation report.The additional year's slippage in schedule is rainly due to delas
staffing by the A&E supervising contractors 
in 
and the slow pace of 
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processing and approving the contractors bid documents (an
 
average of 9 months delay mostly in Manila). A minor part of
 
the slippage can be attributed to fuel and ceent shortages.
 
In total, the project is now .1%behind schedule measured from the
 
time of the first contract notice to proceed.* This does not in­
clude the initial year delay discussed in the 1978 evaluation 
report. 
b. Employment 
The project impact on local employment is less than orig.nally
estimated. Due to the capital intensive approach'taken by the 
contrectors, tie local employment is estimated at onlv about 
20% of the 9000 manyears estiiated in the Project Paper. 
18. EVAjUATION FYo DGS A30UT THE PROJET GOAL 
The project goal is to "Bring about a self-sustaininrg rise in income
 
levels of the rural poor in the Bicol River Basin and increase their
 
perceived quality of life."
 
Since the project is not yet complete, insufficient information exists
 
to fully assess project impact on the project goal. Additionally,

the role of the project roads in increasing income levels is closely
 
linked with the realization of complementary agricultural and rural
 
industry growth in the project area. This will take time. However, 
preliminary traffic counts on two of the roads indicate that, though 
the roads are not yet completed, they are already used by substantial,
 
amounts of traffic and provide promise that the project goal ill be 
achieved.
 
The current efforts by the BRDPO to monitor achievement of the project

goal and purpose are not sufficient. Unless corrected, this may impede
 
the final evaluation after comletion of the project. 
In addition, the 
office is not informed in a timely manner of lack of propcess and rro­
blem areas. The Bicol Roads Evaluation Project (BRP)has beei estab­
lished to monitor and evaluate the implementation phase of road con­
struction and the effectiveness with which maintenance capability is
 
being upgraded. It is also to document socio-economic benefits %ccruing
in the project influence areas. Flever, though a considerable moaunt 
of vork has been accomplished and the unit is staffed 'byhardworking,
dedicated, and well educated personnel, they are hampered in the exe­
cution of their vitally importait role by lack of technical exerience. 
Technical consultancy is recommended (Filipino-U.S.). 
19." Ffl MS ABOUT PROJECT B? CIARI.S 
Though the project is still far from complete, there bwe indications
 
that the rural poor in the zones of influence of the roads will re­
ceive significant benefits from the project. 
 In the small barrio of
 
Baliwag Viejo at the end of the partly ccpleted and already useable
 
Pili-Matacroc secondary road, the 3-hour walk (no road connection
 
existed before) has been reduced to a 15-mi.nute tricycle or jeepney ride 
at a cost of L.50 per passenger. A very substantial traffic of abou 
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50 tricycles and 50 jeepneys per day has been gene-ated on this
 
rood. Transport cuats for shipping a sa:k of rice to th-e market 
place have dropped from 3 per sack (by .nirm.l and boat) to i.t50 
per 	sack by vehicle. Also, on the almosz completed San Isidro-
Libmanan secondary road, the geneated traff Ic in jeiepneys and mini­
buses has exceeded the original estimates and iniggests a substantial
 
increase in mobility of the low income category of -thepopulation.
 
Confirmation of these favorable trends ill, however, ha%- -,o wait
 
for 	completion of the post-project Panel and Traffic Survev. 
20. LESSONS LEAMUM 
a. As stated in the nArrative of the report, the original one year
 
project implementation slippage was due in part to the GOP change 
in fiscal year, shortage of funds, and other budgeting probles
 
during 1976. If USAID had provided for progess payments to the
 
GOP 	 to cover the cost of funding AE contracts, a ami== of 
6-8 	months may have be-en saved in the preparation of final designs. 
Thus, the entire bidding process would have been advanced, con­
struction started, etc.
 
b. 	If the GOP bid evaluation procedures are to remain as presently 
administered, a 6-8 months processing time has to be built into 
future construction implementation schedules. 
c. 	The project highUghts the importance of determining design 
standards based on both econcmic and technical considerations and 
the need for including a broad spectrum of alternatives in the 
evaluation. 
d. 	Assuring adequate maintenance of the road system is a most
 
difficult goal to achit've. Maintenance training is an effective 
zeans of correcting poor maintenance performance, but the effort mst 
be sustained over a substantial time period to change ma.intenance, 
attitudes and practices. 
21. UNPL=ANED EFTS 
None. 
22. SPECIAL COMMtS OR ROAMS 
Supporting analysis and documentation is provided in the 51-page 
report of the evaluation team entitled "1979 Evaluation, Bicol 
Secondary and Feeder Roads Project" dated August 1979.
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Management Skills
 
February 1, 1980 
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.BASIC PROJECT IDENTIFICATION DATA 
%.Country B Project Title ransfer o technolo- C Project Number D. ActJv Life of Project­f1 o I. Project Agreement Signed Fy 761md and lnanagcmcnt ski 1ls 193-0274 2. Approved Project Corrfpletion Date (PACD) FY ._... 
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__0 
___ 3 Other
 
TOTAL $ 4,00U,UUU 
G. Project Design H. Implementation 
1. In-House (Name, Position) (not stated) 1. Host Country Agency(les) 
DTEC 
2 Contractor (Name, Firm, Contract No.) 2 	Contractor (N.me, Firm, Contract No.) 
I. Previous Evaluations (include Title, Type and Date) 
January, 1977 (First TTMS evaluation)
 
April, 1978 (Second TTMIS evaluation)
 
II. BASIC EVALUATION DATA 
A. Evaluation Title B Evaluation Date C. Type of Evaluation D Project Period Covered by Evaluation(See attached sheet) February 1, 1980 special 	 May 1978-January 1980
 
F 	 Evaliation Cost F. Purpose(s) of Evaluation G. 	 Initiated By 
1. Direct Hire (not stated) (See attached shect) (not stated) 
travel 
per diem 
z. 	 Contract 
3. 	 Other 
TOTAL $
 
H. Evaluation Team Composition 
1. 	 Direct Hire
 
aNat Moldrem b Pw sition 
 c. Area of Expertise 
%ichael Sullivan USAID
 
2 	 Contrect: a. Name of Organization (if any) b. Contract No. 
DTEC
 
c Name(s) of Persons d. Area(s) of Expertise 
Pitchet Soontornpipit
 
Kricngkra Issara-yangyun
 
I. 	 Oth-mr Responsible AID and Host Country J. Evaluation Coordinator
 
Personnel (Name, Position)
 
(not stated) 	 Signature 
Typed Name 
Position 
Data 
ASIA/DP/E: 6/80 
nale two 
A. Evaluation li tic: l'hird I valuation-- Transfer o& Technoloqv and 
Mbanaqemcnt Sktill Project 
F. 	 Purpose. l']hii evaluation concentrates first on the roject'n progres' 
andiadv inrv activities and the l il.elihood orin implementing training 
and 	 second, on the project's impact in meetingachieving_. targeted outputs; 

the project purpose of "improved RIIG capabilitics in development polic'
 
and problem analysis, program planning and evaluation" as measured by the
 
four 	end-of-project status conditions:
 
1. 	Analysis performed in prtority areas 
Better defincd, more specific plans of action.2. 

3. 	Accelerated implementation of pro ects
 
number of, and improved evaluation of, projects4. 	 Greater 

and programs.
 
TTMS THIRD EVALUATION
 
February I, 1980
 
Introduction
I. 

first, on the project's
 
This evaluation will 
concentrate, 

training and advisory 
activities and
 
bl m anal sis
 in implementing
achpieng targeted outputs; and 
second, on
 
progress n in meeting the project purpose of "improved
thes ct'soim  
the proje 
 a
the project'S ih 

RTG capabilitls in development policy and problem 
analysis,
 
program planning and evaluation" 
as measured by the four 
end­
of-project status conditions:
 
Analysis performed in priority 
areas.
 
1. 

Better defined, more specific 
plans of action.
 
2. 

Accelerated implementation 
of projects.
 
3. 

Greater number of, and 
improved evaluation of,
 
4. 

projects and programs.
 io s w
 
. A... - - - - - t e re 
asserogres in achieving outputs, we 
will review
To asse ss P rog -es 

l
-the previous two
bed 

We will then look at overall 
progress
 
'project evaluations. 

since the last evaluation 
and estimated future activities

-the hiistry of the7prdJect 
as descri

during the final year and a half of project life. 
Advisory
 
services, participant training 
and overall project administration
 
will be examined separately.
 
,as measured by the above 
four
 
To assess project impa.(1) the=effectiveness of advisory
 at ~ of_project administraton"= 2c

•~~
rl-l-oo1
iwdei: ­
a eectvenL.,,S of participant 
training, and 
k2) teservices, EOPS indicators
 
(3) the extent to which the experience of pro r 
foraPSinicators.

... 
itself has improved DTEC'S 
performUance in thean 

aiia-par ticipa--nts.ai.f.-- of itervief;swith counterparts,Effectiveness of advisory serv es 
and participant training will
 
bsuessed srs, is apl-sete-a~ss~esafrom a suprv 
for the remainder
 
sction offers reconuieindations 
The- f 

of TTMS project life and for 
the Pruposed followon 
project,
 
Emerging Problems of Development
 
April, 1978
to
Project Histort
II. 

The TTMS project was designed 
to give the RTG wide scope 
in
 
determining specific advisory 
and training activities 
under the
 
following major priority problem 
areas:
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kal 	 Coordination and organizaticn of the planning
 
and budgetary process
 
(b) 	improved terms of internal and external trade
 
for agricultural commodities
 
(c) 	Alleviation of rural under/unemployment
 
(d) 	Expansion of rural social services, especially
 
health and education
 
(e) 	Reduction in population growth rate
 
tf) 	 Establishment of policies and practices to
 
conserve Thailand's land resources
 
%g) 	Reduction of urban/rural and regional income
 
disparties.
 
the implementing agency, is given responsibility
DTEC, as 

for selection of activities, identification of competent advisors
 
or training institutions, and contract negotiations. NESDB,
 
Bureau of Budget, Civil Service Commission, Ministry of Foreign
 
Affairs, Ministry of Finance, ard the related technical agencies
 
participate in sub-committees for selection of specific activities.
 
USAID's role is to approve Specific activities once selected and
 
to aid in identifying consultants and training institutions when
 
asked, but DTEC has tried several methods to do the latter on its
 
This represents a major shift in administrative responsibility
own. 

from 	USAID 'both local and Washington) to DTEC.
 
The z.s TTMS evaluation was carried out in January, 1977.
 
Up to that1if-mepro~ect--implementa or-had--been- 2te
 
Through September of 1976 less than US$100,000 of project funds
 
had been expended, none of it on advisory services. The evaluators
 
noted that DTEG had opted not to publicize TTMS to Ministries
 
because it felt that it could not accurately rate priorities of
 
At that time
requests until the Fourth Five Year Plan was issued. 

the national development priorities would be clearly defined, giving
 
DTEC 	a better basis for selection of activities. Of the training
 Li

approved by that time, the evaluation found that a third was 

Activities appeared to be
 areas not considered to be high priority. 

The evaluators concluded that the
selected on an "ad hoc" basis. 

problems were due to lack of procedures for informing Ministriesof
 
TTMS and its uses, and lack of clear guidelines for selecting the
 
most appropriate among a range of proposals and for expediting re­
cruitment and contracting. Recommendations were made to develcp
 
these procedures
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Much growth had occurred in pro3ect implementation 
by the
 
Most of the training funds
 
second evaluation in April 1978. 

The approved training and advisory
had been programmed. 
 The DTEC Training

activities fell within FFYP priorities. 

judged to have done an excellent job in carrying
Section was 

out work pzeviously handled by USAID, instituting direct
 
working reiationships with several countries in the region 
for
 
Long 	delays were being encountered in im­training programs. 

plementation of advisory services, however, of which 
only 43 p.m.
 
The evaluators found that the recommendations
 
.had 	been programmed. ' l ev 
or were no-lorigf re ai nt. 
of the first evaluationl had- bee-taken -
The evaluators recommended 
that 
DTEC 	should be given greater flexibility in
(a) 

allocation of funds among appropriation categories
 
and between advisors and training.
 
(b) 	Efforts should be made to discourage instances
 
of repetitive training.
 
(c) 	Continued efforts should be made to improve con­
sultant recruitment procedures and allocation of
 
training.
 
(d) 	Consideration should be given to dollar-funded
 
local currency expenditures for in-country
 
training by Thai institutions.
 
(e) Logical framework and CPI network chart should be
 
rev se!
 
III. Project implementation since April, 1978
 
Status of 1978 Evaluation Recommendations
A. 

The status of recommendations from the 1978 evaluation
 
is as follows
 
(a) 	There have been adequate funds in all categories
 
thus far to carry out project activities. Some
 
long-term training funds will be reprogrammed for
 
now

short-term training activities, since it is 

too late to schedule any more long-term training
 
under the project.
 
(b) 	DTEC continues to carefully weed out nominees for
 
training slots who have already had overseas
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training experience or are scheduled for other
 
overseas training.
 
(c) 	Project efforts to improve consultant recruitment
 
and allocation of training are described in the
 
sections below.
 
(d) 	USAID and DTEC have recently agreed to allow
dollar funding of in-country training and advisory

services, and aproject amendment to this effect
 
is in preparation.
 
(e) 	The logical framework and CPI network chart have
 
been revised as recommended.
 
B. Project Status Indicators
 
Tables I and II of the appendix summarize annual obliga­tions, expenditures and pipeline under TTMSo 
 Tables III and IV

summarize project funds and person months programmed for training

and advisory services under each funding category. The Tables
indicate a slow but steady annual increase in expenditures over
project life. 
 Only $1.5 million of the total $4.0 million obligated
have 	been expended through FY 79, 
after over four years of imple­
mentatlon. Expenditures do not give the fuli picture, however,

since both advisory services and long-term training require a

significant commitment of funds but involve a rather long disburse­
ment period. Commtted funds total $890,000 for advisory services

and $1,230,303 for zraining as 
of December 31, 1979. In addition,

approximately $400,000 are programmed for advisors now under re­
cruitment and $44,000 for training requests in process. 
 Thus about
$1.4 ±iillion or 32% of project-funds remain unprogrammed with-21

months remaining-_of project life. interms-of project ountputs
Qachieved, 306 p.m. of advisory services and 1,522 p.m. of training

- are completed, out of a targeted 400 p.m. and 2,000 p.m. respectively.
 
C. Planned Activities for FY 81
 
Because of the long lead time required to organize training
programs and recruit consultants,'it is necessary to beginning pro­gramming FY 81 activities immediately. DTEC has begun to give some
thought to FY 81 programming. Potential activities include the
following: (Asterisks indicate that the project amendment mentioned
 
earlier to allow for local cost funding will be required).
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F. Purpose: The special study describes the landlord-dominated agrarian
structure of Bangladesh and its constraining role in development planning.
"Our data make evident the need for rural development programs that are basedon the fact that the majority of people in rural Bangladesh cannot use highyielding varieties of seeds, fertilizers, pesticides and modern irrigationfacilities. They cannot use these inputs because the majority do not
 
have land."
 
Chapter V
 
SU&AY .ND CONCLUSIONS
 
The following propositions summarize the principal findings of
 
our field research in Bangladesh during the last several years, from
 
1975 through 1978. The propositions not only incorporate insights
 
from that research, but also those that come from related study and
 
observation in other regioas of South Asia.
 
Notwithstanding major political and economic events of the 20ch
 
century, including the partitioniag of the subcontinent in 1947, the
 
enactment in the 1950's of agrarian reform legislation, and the es­
tablishment of Bangladesh as a new state in 1971, the agrarian structure
 
of Bangladesh is rooted in antiquity and retains many features that
 
characterized the political economy of the region in the 18th and 19th
 
centuries. 
This agrarian structure, and the institutions that comprise
 
it, constitutes the major impediment to the implementation of a range
 
of rural development programs that would promote economic growth within
 
an environment of social justice.
 
The agrarian structure of Bangladesh is defined by a complex set
 
of arrangements governing the relationship of people to the land. These 
arrangements, supported both by custom and by law, have not been altered 
in any substantial manner by means of the application of state policy in
 
the period from 1948 through 1978. 
This means that landlordism, a
 
commonly disparaged element in the old za-mindari system of undivided
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East India, persists in 1979 in rural Bangladesh. The landlord, of
 
the present differ little from those of taie past in their relations with
 
those who are below them in the agrarian hierarchy. While their rights

and prerogati'Ls have been somewhat diminished over time, 
 landlords
 
continue to determine the nature of rural Bangladesh's political economy.

Their control of land determines the local structure of power. 
Their

control of land determines who will benefit from rural development pro­
grams and who will not; and their control of land is the critical
 
variable in determining what is produced, by whom, and for whose benefit.
 
As long as this system of relationships persists, the prospects for
 
economic progress are dim.
 
While landlords are a persistent feature of rural life in Bangla­
desh, they are seldom alluded to in print. 
This fosters the impression
 
that landlords disappeared 
when traditional zamindars ceased i'n 
the
 
1950's being revenue farmers 
 for the state.1 
 The illusion that land­
lordism is 
a diminished phenomenon gains credence also by the use of
 
the term nalik to refer generally to owners of land who have a perma­
nent occupancy right to the land in their possession. While the term
 
malik may not be used consciously to obscure reality, the term is 
not
 
useful in describing the precise nature of a landowner's relationship
 
either to his land or co the people who till it. Maliks may be large
 
lAs noted in Chapter I, the zamindars had been emoowered by thestate to act as the state's intermediaries in the collection of landrevenue. 
The East Pakistan State Acquisition and Tenancy Act of 1950
put 
an end to the era during which zamindars served as the state's
intermediaries in revenue collection.
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landholders or small. 
 They may be absentee landlords who sublet their
 
land to others. 
They may be resident landholders who till the land
 
using the services of landless agricultural laborers. As emphasized
 
earlier, 
 they may be classified even as owner cultivators or as 
small farmers. But, their most cormon characteristic as a group is
 
that they are divorced from direct agricultural operations, particularly
 
those operations of low status that involve what are perceived of as
 
dirty or menial tasks. As landholders, they also attempt to mimimize
 
the assumption of personal risk in connection with agricultural opera­
tions. 
 This means in practice that landowners in Bangladesh have
 
traditionally sublet their lands in order to limit their direct respon­
sibility either for providing agricultural inputs or for assuming a
 
share of the costs of such inputs used in cultivation by others of 
their land. 
This means in practice that the lessor (sharecropper) has 
customarily assumed all of the risks and most, if not always all, of 
the costs of production. No matter how much or how little the share­
cropper produces, the maliks are guaranteed at least fifty percent of
 
the product. 
Thus, the degree to which ownership of land in Bangladesh is 
separated from labor and direct investment on the land is only suggested 
by the data from our field surveys. The data, nonetheless, do not
 
contradict the thesis that landowners in Bangladesh, whether classified 
as landlords, maliks, owner cultivators, small farmers or bona fide 
cultivators, are more representative of a tradional system of agriculture 
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than a modern one. They address the economic problem in terms of tradi­
tion and conmmand. Because they occupy the apex of the agrarian hierarchy 
of interests, they are in a position to dictate what is produced, by

whom, and how the product will be distributed. Characteristically, such
 
landowners are less concerned with agricultural innovation and the pro­
ductivity of their lands than in holding on to their traditional rights 
and prerogatives. 
Landowners are loathe to admit publicly, in interviews conducted
 
by representatives of the state, the extent to which they sublet lands
 
and delegate responsibility for agricultural operations to others. 
Though

the data from our field research do not disclose landowners' reasons
 
for not reporting fully the extent of subletting, it seems evident
 
to us 
 that landowners have an obvious interest in emphasizing to out­
siders that they exercise direct control over all agricultural operations
 
on their land. 
To admit that their lands are actually tilled by others
 
(usually sharecroppers) il to risk either having someone else recorded
 
as the "actual tiller" of the soil, or establishing in the public
 
record that the owner takes no direct interest even in the management
 
of his land. To minimize the factual record of subletting is one means
 
by which a landowner 
 can attempt to maintain an uncontested claim to 
his land. In interviews then, landowners or maliks commonly prefer to 
emhasize their nominal roles as owner cultivators, small farmers, or 
bona fide cultivators, rather than their actual roles.
 
As emphasized above, the persistence within the agrarian structure

of Bangladesh of landlordism implies the Maintenance of the traditional
practice of subletting land to tenant cultivators. 
Yet, the subletting

of land is explicitly prohibited by law. 
Fortunately for those who

wish to sublet by another name, the law has been written to include a
facilitating loophole. 
The law makes plain that peasants who cultivate
the land of another on the condition that they deliver a share of the
produce to the owner are not "tenants". 
They are sharecroppers (or
bargadars). 
 As such, though they may appear 
to be lessors of land

sublet by an owner, they occupy an anomalous place in the agrariam

structure. 
There are no provisions in law that are protective of
their interests. 
They are outside the scope of the law and therefore
 
subject to arbitrary eviction from the lands they till. 
 Thus, a share­cropper who takes in land from a landowner neither has nor can acquire
delure right to that land. 
By contrast, sharecroppers in undivided
 
Bengal, prior to 1947, had greater scope within the law to acquire a
permanent occupancy right to land than do sharecroppers in contemporary
 
Bangladesh.
 
The data from our field surveys are consistent in indicating that
sharecroppers in contemporary Bangladesh customarily have primary respon­sibility for producing crops on 
 the lands that they have taken in fromlandowners. As we have earlier emphasized, this means specifically
that they must assume the full risks of production; they are responsiblefor all labor on the land; they cannot in the general case acquire
 
/V) 
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credit for agricultural investment purposes, except from non-institutiona
 
sources at usurious rates of interest. 
Moreover, sharecroppers take
 
in land for purposes of cultivation under terms and conditions that
 
are generally specified orally, rather than in writing. 
The terms and
 
conditions governing the sharecropping arrangment are not established
 
in negotiations between equals. 
The landowner is in
a position to dic­
tate terms, and he does so. 
 The sharecropper, because he occupies a
 
lower position in the agrarian hierarchy, has no means of questioning
 
or debating the proffered terms. 
 If he attempts to do so, he risks
 
losing the opportunity to take in the land he seeks to till. 
 Given
 
the density of population in Bangladesh dependent on the land for sub­
sitence, the supply of potential sharecroppers who would be prepared to
 
accept terms considered unfavorable by others is, for all practical
 
purposes, unlimited.
 
Our research indicates that sharecroppers in Bangladesh can expect
 
to give at leasv fifty percent of a crop to landowners. But, the terms
 
and conditions governing the division of the produce vary.from region
 
to region, and sometimes from village to village and from para (hamlet)
 
to para. Some shazrcroppers will provide landowners sixty percent or
 
more of the final prodvct. 
 Others will provide landowners fifty percent
 
or more of the final product plus fifty percent of rice seedlings at a
 
time prior to transplanting operations. 
Furthermore, the terms are
 
often stiff and specific enough to require sharecroppers to deliver to
 
landowners the rice straw (used as fodder for cattle) following the 
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harvest. 
In sum, the terms and conditions that apply to a share-

I 
­
cropper's cultivation of a landowner's land reflect the relative power
 
positions of the sharecropper and the landlord. 
In Bangladesh in 1979,
 
this means that the terms and conditions that apply to sharecropping as
 
an institution reflect exclusively the interests of landowners.
 
The data from our field surveys also indicate that the number of
 
landless households in rural Bangladesh is large and growing. 
In 1979,
 
more than fifty percent of all rural households in Bangladesh are
 
functionilly landless. 
And, while the data do not establish the number
 
of such households that derive income primarily from agriculture, it
 
can be assumed (given the overwhelmingly agrarian nature of the Bangla­
desh economy as a whole) that the vast majority of landless rural
 
households derive the largest percentage of their income from agriculture.
 
As mentioned earlier, state policies have not altered the agrarian
 
structure of Bangladesh. 
Indeed, state policies in the region have 
seldom been predicated on the notion that the transformation of the 
agrarian structure would be instrumental in providing new incentives 
to people whose status in the agrarian hierarchy places limitation! on
 
their participation in programs of rural economic development. By
 
showing the relative proportions of owner households, owner-cum-tenant
 
households, pure tenant households, and landless households, our data
 
make evident the need for rural development programs that are based
 
on the fact that the majority of people in rural Bangladesh cannot
 
use high yielding varieties of seeds, Lertilizers, pesticides and modern
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irrigation facilities. 
They cannot use these inputs because the majority
 
do not .have land. 
And, many who have land are no more able to use
 
modern technology than was the sharecropper in the South of the United
 
States in the 1930's able to apply (on his own volition) the advice of
 
a county 
extension agent to revive his soil by rotating crops. 
In
 
Bangladesh, in 1979, as in the American South in the 193 0's, backward­
ness in the agrarian sector is a derivative of an agrarian structure
 
that severely limits the options of the majority of people who
 
actually till the land.
 
We have stated that the agrarian structure of Bangladesh is 
an

obstacle to economic progress, and that change in the agrarian structure
 
is essential to rural economic development, as we have earlier defined
 
it. We have also stated that those who would change the agrarian struc­
ture by means of agrarian reform can derive the long-term political
 
benefits that are the logical derivatives of such a reform.
 
Ve have recorded the failure of earlier legislative attempts

to transform Bangladesh's agrarian structure, but we have also noted
 
that changes in the agrarian structure are inevitable and have already
 
resulted in part from:
 
(1)the continuing rapid growth of population dependent on the
 
land for subsistence;
 
(2) the subinfeudation of existing landholdings as families
 
grow and change in composition; and
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(3) other phenomena (including, for example, indebtedness and
 
loss of land following crop failure) that can cause land­
holders to sell or otherwise give up lands they have cus­
tomarily tilled.
 
These unplanned changes in the agrarian structure are important be­
cause they are associated directly over time with people's perceptioL,
 
of their rights, prerogatives and obligations within that structure.
 
These unplanned changes 
are part of an historical process - a process
 
that portends radical transformation of the agrarian sector.
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F. Purpose: This is a" Project to Help Practitioners Help the Rural Poor,
 
Case Study No. 9", and, s,2eks to "unearth significant operational lessons-­
both positive and negative--from the experience of selected innovative rural
 
programs that may have value for policymakers, planners, and program operators 
in all developing countries and external assistance programs." This is an evaluti.. 
of those activities of the two Kosbad insitutes that deal with the relatively* .. 
small tribal population in their immediate vicinity--not an evaluation of the 
institutes' total activities. The two institutes are the AI and GBSK. 
ICED COMMENTARY 
This is the ninth in a series of case studies under ICED's coop­
erative international project aimed at helping practitioners to help the 
rural poor. The practical purposes of these case studies is to unearth 
significant operational lessons--both positive and negative--from the 
experiences of selected innovative rural programs that may have value 
for policymakers, planners, and program operators in all developing 
countries and external assistance agencies. 
This particular report from the State of Maharashtra in India 
tells the story of two large and highly respected voluntary organiza­
tions--the Agricultural Institute (AI) and the Gram Bal Shiksha Kendra 
(GBSK)--whose roots go back to the Independence Movement and its 
humanistic Gandhian principles. These organizations, along with their 
wider-ranging activities, have been working devotedly for more than 
20 years to help their Warli tribal neighbors around Kosbad Hill to 
extricate themselves from their age-old bondage of exploitation, 
cultural isolation and dehumanizing poverty. The case study focuses 
on this particular aspect of their overall programs. 
It would be difficult to find anywhere a rural poverty situation 
more severe or more resistant to change than that of the Warli tribals 
in the Rosbad area. But it would also be difficult to find in the real 
world any organizations better suited by commitment and competence 
to tackle such a hard case. Consequently, anyone concerned with 
improving the lot of the rural poor in India or any other developing 
country will find this a highly instructive--if somewhat disquieting-­
story. 
The story is told by three knowledgeable Indian social scientists-­
an agricultural economist, a sociologist, and a student of Indian tribal 
life. Their research plan was shaped in cooperation with ICED's own 
Indian staff member, Pratima Kale, a broad-gauged educational 
sociologist well acquainted with voluntary organizations in India, 
during an initial joint visit to Kosbad. Subsequently, the authors 
made further visits to observe various programs in action, to survey 
and assess the impact of these activities, and to conduct extensive 
interviews with the leaders, staff members and students of the two 
institutes and a sample of Warli farmers and other local people. As 
social scientists, the authors kept in check their strong sympathy and 
*Prepared by Philip H. Coombs, director of ICED's international 
project of which this case study is a part. 
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respect for the leadership, aims and achievements of these institutes,and their deep compassion for the Warli tribal people themselvei, andproduced a highly objective and critically analytical report.may disagree with some Othersof their interpretations and conclusions, butfew would deny that they have given us a very substantial and
stimulating account. 
THE RESULTS
 
It should be evident 
even from the above very abbreviatedsketch of their activities that the two Kosbad Institutes have made adiversified and persistent effort, extending over 20 to 30 years.to uplift their Warli neighbors. The question the case study investi­gators sought to answer was: What have been the practical results?What discernible impact have all these efforts had on the agricultaralpractices and productivity of the Warlis; on their traditional beliefs,attitudes and behavior; on the development and upward mobility oftheir children; on their community cohesion, cooperation and 
X 
participation; and on the general quality of their family life? 
The short answer--which is elaborated and documented in the 
report--is that there have been significant results, including a number 
of outstanding individual "success cases"; yet, taken overall, the 
impact must be judged as disappointingly low, at least in terms of 
earlier expectations and what ine might reasonably have anticipated. 
The GBSK's educational work with young children and mothers 
has clearly yielded some good results. The strong earlier resistance 
of mothers to -ermitting their children to attend the creches, bai­
wadis and elementary schools has melted away. Many mothera today 
are not only willing but anxious to send their children to school, 
The attitudeand the children arrive much cleaner than they used to. 
toward education has discernibly changed. And some of the children-­
though still only a small minority--have climbed further up the education 
ladder. A number of the teen-agers interviewed, particularly the 
girls, reflected a new freedom from some of the confining and stulti­
fying traditional beliefs and attitudes of their tribal culture, and a 
critical view of some of the less constructive behavior of their 
parents, such as excessive drinking. 
Despite these encouraging advances, however, the overall 
progress has been limited and there is still a long way to go. The 
old cultural barriers and constraints are still strong; even the 
educated Warlis still display a lack of self-confidence and a tendency 
and gainedto withdraw. Although GBSK has "reached the poor" 
their acceptance, it has apparently had little success as yet (though 
not for lack of trying) in stimulating active community participation 
and direct involvement in the operation of its activities. It seems 
a number of tribals areparticularly significant that although 
none has everemployed by GBSK as farm workers and office peons, 
applied for a position as office clerk and only one among nine 
elementary teachers is an Adivasi. 
Changes on the -agricultural front are, of course, more tangible, 
visible and measurable than with education. The case study investi­
gators conducted a revealing survey of 45 farms run by the only 
Adivasi farmers actively using any of the 100 individual dug wells 
referred to earlier. Since they are unuoubtedly "above average" 
farmers in the area, any agricultural revolution that may have occur-
But there has notred would undoubtedly be apparent in their fields. 
as yet been any real agricultural revolution. Nor could the case study 
investigators find much evidence that the innovations under the 
"Better Living Program" had taken hold. There have been, however, 
significant breakthroughs in terms of crop diversificationsome 
through the adoption by these selected Warli farmers of non-traditional 
crops--especially various fruits and vegetables that improved their 
cash incomes. 
however, that the AgriculturalThe investigators concluded, 
Institute's three-cycle year-round agricultural scheme had not 
For the first (rainy season) cycle most of the 45 farmers,succeeded. 
though they had adopted the recommended high yielding rice varieties 
xi 
on a limited scale, were still devoting more than two-thirds of theirpaddy acreage to the old low yielding local varieties (which yield less
than half as much). The wheat that Al had enthusiastically promoted
for the next cycle was even less popular, though ab indicated above,
fruits and vegetables were proving more popular. The adaptation of 
new types of livestock and sideline activities such as bee-keeping,
 
on the other hand, appeared to have made little headway.
 
EXPLANATIONS AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS 
If significant lessons for the future are to be drawn from this 
rich and lengthy experience, it is necessary to try to understand the 
causes of both the successes and the failures. This, of course, is 
the hatdest part of cuch a case study because various causal factors 
are often so intertwined that it is difficult to sort them out and weigh
their relative importance. In the end it becomes a matter of judgment,
and frequently there is wide scope for differences of interpretation 
and opinion. 
Thus, for example, the farmers and the Al experts had con­
flicting explanations for the relatively low impact of the agricultural
development program. The farmers explained it largely in terms of
 
adverse technical and economic factors, such _s inadequate water

supply, the low-moisture retention of their light soils, and the pro­
hibitive cost of the heavy fertilizer applications required for HYVs.The AI experts on the other hand minimized these technical-economic 
explanations and tended to attribute the low impact primarily to the
irrational fears and other idiosyncracies of the Warlis. They dismissed 
as groundless, for exnmple, the farmers' assertion that "the rains 
wash away the fertilizer"; they pointed out that AI had always been 
ready to provide credit for the purchase of fertilizer, that the farmers 
did not always fully utilize their available water supply, and that Al's
theoretical cost calculations demonstrated clearly that the farmers 
could greatly enhance their income if they adopted AI's recommended 
innovations. The Warlis, it was said, are good workers but poor
farmers; they prefer to work on a large plantation for immediate cash 
wages rather than .ultivate their own small farm more intensively and 
ultimately realize a larger incnme. 
It is impossible to judge from a distance, of course, where the 
real truth lies in this particular debate, but it is perhaps worth 
noting that ICED has encountered quite similar debates between 
non-tribal small farmers and agricultural experts in numerous other 
areas, suggesting that it may not be simply cultural idiosyncracies
that so often cause the small farmer to reject new agricultural
technologies advocated by the experts. Frequently the farmer turns 
out to have his own rational reasons for treating innovations with 
extreme caution, usually baving to do with his meager resource base,
his imperative family consumption needs, the unpredictability of the
weather and market prices, and his very limited capacity to take risks. 
It also involves his weighing of available alternatives--such as spending 
more hours working his own land in hopes of getting a possibly larger
but postponed income, as against working more hours on somebody
else's larger farm or taking some other available employment for 
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immediate though meager cash wages. Seen in this light, the small 
farmer often more closely approaches "the Yational economic man" 
than some o: the technical experts who advise him. Their cardinal 
goal, after all, is increased yield per acre; his is survival. 
This is not tc suggest that the inherited cultural traits of the 
Warlis (described in Chapter 1) were not also an important explan­
atory factor in the relatively low impact of AI's development program. 
What seems clear from the evidence is that a wide social distance and 
communication gap still persists between the Warlis and the mainly 
middle class educated people who seek to help them. Such a gap is, 
of course, found in poor villages all over the world, but in the case 
of the Warlis it is exceptionally wide because of their long and 
continuing (partly self-imposed) cultural isolation. The key problem-­
to which the Kosbad institutes (and many others) have evidently not 
yet found a satisfactory solution--is how to close this gap. For until 
it is closed, or at least substantially narrowed, all sorts of develop­
a low impact, andment interventions from the outside are likely to have 
all the talk about "community participation" is likely to have a hollow 
ring. 
In view of the importance of these frequently neglected social
 
and cultural obstacles to rural development, the authors make a
 
technical
fundamental point when they suggest that, to be effective, 
agricultural research should be accompanied by appropriate social 
science research. Or to put it differently, he who would help the 
poor must first know them, and understand how life looks from their 
vantage point. One must also respect their judgment, for the very 
fact that they have survived this long under seemingly impossible 
circumstances suggests that they are not entirely without wisdom 
and rationality, even though they may be illiterate and some of their 
and practices may be baseless and counterproductivebeliefs, fears, 
in the light of scientific knowledge. 
With respect to the evident lack of "community participation"
 
by the Warlis in the activities of the two institutes, and their seeming
 
the authors note that the
indifference toward advancing themselves, 
approach of the institutes has been strongly paternalistic and that 
this may have discouraged a sense of self-reliance. They question, 
however, as other observers have before them, whether a more 
community-oriented, self-help approach would have been feasible 
in the circumstances. Perhaps people must be helped out of the 
worst depths of poverty in paternalistic fashion before they are ready 
to become their own change agents. 
But here the authors encounter something of a chicken-and-egg 
dilemma. On the one hand they conclude that education is the only 
real means of altering the traditional beliefs and attitudes of the Warlis 
and making them self-reliant. Yet on the other hand thei" findings­
suggest that the long and extensive educational efforts of both 
institutes, although helpful in other respects, do not seem as yet to 
have made any sizeable dent in this respect. Their answer to this 
seeming dilemma is that the institutes should give much greater 
emphasis to the consciousness-raising kind of education that will make 
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the learners--particularly the younger ones--moresocioeconomic awareand political environment, of theirof the basic causes of theirexploitation and poverty, of the strengths and weaknesses of theirown inherited culture and traditions, and of their own capacity andinnate human power to change this environment and their position init. In advocating more "consciousness-raising" education,they caution against a however,purely agitational approach that canproductive, be counter­"to the extent that it makes the clientele believe that alltheir ills flow from sources outside themselves." They also recognizethat the necessary educational approach Is at best a long slow processwith no quick and dramatic pay-offs. 
The authors do not take the position, however,educational approach will suffice. that a purelyOn the contrary, they concludethat the program objectives of the Kosbad institutes have been too
limited in terms of the basic needs,

of the Warlis, interests and potential motivations
and that even within these objectives the variousactivities have been too fragmented. They observe, for example, thatwhile each of the innovative devices for improving family living couldbe justified in its own right, these devices wereimportance to meeting the basic family needs of the Warlis. 
 They
 
of only marginal 
suggest instead that AI's agricultural recommendationsgreater acceptance and ight havesuccess accompanied by acare primary health
program attuned to the critical health needs and problems of
the area. One might also surmise that the Warli mothers would respondsome enthusiasmwith to well conceived activities designedtheir physical burdens, to reduce 
cash, to help them earn some crucially needed
and to elevate their status and self-respect.
 
To ask such a broader and more integrated approach of thesetwo institutes, of course, may be to ask the impossible,confront them with for it would 
on what they 
a difficult choice between continuing to concentrateare so unusually well qualified to do,additional new or takingfunctionb on(such as health care,training, non-farm occupationaland family planning), which would probably force themconcentrate their attention and limited to resources onlimited audience and geographic serving a morearea.important The point is neverthelessone anfor other rural programs, especially newer ones stillin the planning or early development stage, or for older ones that
may be able to form close partnerships with other organizations capable
of rendering complementary family improvement services in the 
same
area. 
FOUR BASIC CONCLUSIONS
 
Viewed in 
a broad international perspective,the Kosbad Institutes over more the experiences ofthan 20 years reinforce the followingimportant conclusions of wide applicability that have also emerged fromother case studies in this series. 
First, evenproblems can 
the best conceived technical solutions to povertybe thwarted by deep-seated social anC cultural factorsand by human communication barriers unless effective ways can be 
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found to overcome these obstacles.beneficial material changes In other Words,to occur, in order forthe perceptions,Outlook of the people themselves must change. attitudes andThus,of rural poverty situations and the successful planning and implemen­
the diagnosistation of corrective measures
-in such fields as agriculture, calls not only for technical expertiseirrigation, health and education but 
also for the insights of such social scientists 
comparatively as cultural anthropolo­
gists, rural sociologists and social psychologists.little Thus farin attacking the problems of rural poverty. 
use has been made Of such social science expertise 
Second,from one to another,
although rural poverty situations differ considerablyapproach addressed to 
they almost invariably requirea combination a multi-prongedindividuals, of the basic needs of thefamilies and communities concernedapproach--as for example in agricultu.iseffective by itself than 
A slikely to be far lessas if accompanied by parallel efforts directed 
at such needs as health,Planning, nutrition, maternal and child care, and off-farm empiloymento succeed, familyit 
components, 
And for each of these efforts
must include appropriate educational 

to say that education should be 
(i.e., learning)
closely integrated with all other components--whichitself but as seen not as a isan separateessential nutrient and lubricant of all 
"sector" unto 
developmentactivities. 
Third, achieving sizeable improvement In rural poverty situations 
requires fundamental social, econOcin the local environment. cultural and political changesThis isdifficult and time-consuming a considerably moreprocess than is complex,larly by external assistance agenciespackaged, often assumed, particu­narrowly-focussed 
 that place their faith in neatlyis urgent need to find more 
three to five years "projects.'leffective alternatives There"project approach" in the whole to this conventional area of rural development.Finally, voluntary organizations,flexibility and capacity because of their uniqueto innovate and test out fresh approaches,leadership 
and because of their potential for attracting able and dedicatedand staff who can get closearticulate their needs and interests,supplement 
to the rural people andcanto larger scale governmental be a crucially important
efforts.this role most effectively they must 
But to performorientation; (2) be permitted to retain(1) aindependent control over 
have a broad developmentsubstantial degree oftheir own programs;sufficient general and continuingfinancial and (3) receivedomestic and international support from bothsources--not simply short term "projectsupport" restricted to some limited purpose of specialdonor. interest to the 
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CHAPTER 8 
SOME GENERAL CONCLUSIONS
 
This final chapter contains several conclusions and lessons
derived from our study of the two institutes at Kosbad that 
we
believe have relevance and possible value for other organizations
similarly striving to improve the status of the rural poor elsewherein India and throughout the developing world. 
On the economic and technological plane the fundamental pro­blem of the Adivasis is similar to that of small farmers allunderdeveloped over theworld. They have too small a resource base, andwith existing technology their chances of survival are meager.this reality, Giventhe question that needs to be seriously considered iswhether the main thrust of a poverty removal strategy should betoward helping the small man on the farm or outside it; and if out­side, what real choices are open.diagnosis of the problem offered by 
We 
V. 
generally agree with theM. Dandekar and N. Rathin their book, Poverty in India, and with their conclusion that wageemployment under government guarantee is the key to the solution.
However, modifications will be needed to suit local conditions,
perhaps part-time agriculturalemployment (for example, and
 in orchardsunder private or public management),
on construction works as rather than relying exclusivelysuggested by Dandekar and Rath,
an important place in poverty-removal programs in areas 
may find
 
such asKosbad. 
If one accepts this view, then it follows that there must be afundamental reorientation in the conventional thinking, approaches
and attitudes of both government and voluntary agencies working in
rural areas. The voluntary agencies will have to do three things:first, understand better the problems of their immediate clientelein a larger national perspective; second, press for adoption of viablenational and state level policies in order that their own efforts maybecome more meaningful; and thi'd, change and broaden theirobjectives and methods of work to suit the requirements of newer buteventually more promising tasks. 
Much of the frustration from which voluntary developmentagencies-suffer is attributable to lack of a congenial and feasibledevelopment framework. The sphere of volur't;ry agencies is boundto be small, and they can never be the nrincipal instrument of socialand economic change in modern societies; but they can play a special 
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Kosbadand very crucial complementary role to government,is an appropriate national policy provided thereand strategy framework withinto operate. The situation today in India is of a 
which 
kind in which suchdynamic national strategy does not exist, a therefore, and voluntary agencies,with all their dedication and idealism, seemrelatively little. to achieveOne important task of voluntary rural agencies,therefore, lies outside rural areas,
pressures for adoption and this consists of generating
of viable state-level and national policiesfor development. 
Given their geographically and otherwise isolated spheres ofaction, separate voluntary agencies can achieve very little by wayof generating political or intellectual pressures of the kind required.What is needed is a forum of such agencies. In Maharashtra such aforum exists called Gramayan (of which all three authors of thepresent study are founder-members and members of the executive),which since 1973 has been trying to perform
to a variety of functionsthe extent that its meager financial and manpowerresources permit. What Gramayan
representatives does is to hold meetings ofof agencies for discussions of mutual problems,of governmental policies affecting the poor and Adivasis; 
and 
city people (i.e., to involveexperts, students and others) in rural developmentproblems and activities; to publish literature useful for workers;to take up projects andon its own. Ways and meansset up organizations like Gramayal must be found to
and make them more effective.
 
As indicated earlier, "smallness"total problem; Is one aspect of the Adivasis'the other is his "Adivasi-ness. In practice thismeans that even an economically viable technology may not be
accepted because of social and cultural obstacles. This applies to
other poverty groups as well. Economiststheories that assume have to be wary aboutthat economic rationality is a universal charac­teristic of mankind irrespective of the stage of culture to which men
belong. 

factor, 
Although our data confirm the importance of the economic
they also underscore the crucial importance of cultural and
social factors. In dealing with Adivasis
communities) (and other backwardthe latter factors assume 
an understanding of them becomes 
supreme importance, and thus 
an important prerequisite ofeffective developmental effort. 
The problems of the rural poor are magnified in the Warlis.In sharp contrast to poorer people from the entire coastal areas
who migrate in hordes to Bombay,

to urban employment. 
the Warlis have not been attracted
Even In their own areas they resist change,no matter how grinding their poverty. Sociological research has notyet found the key to unlock the secret of the Warli's compellingattachment to his traditional values and his self-imposed estrangement.But in a continuing, often frustrating, search anel research,be remembered it mustthat great strengths inhere in those who would holdfast to their birthrights and not alienate their traditions. 
It would seem 
in the Kosbad araa, 
that many social workers, including those workingtend to believe that,removed, once "exploitation" isthe way Is clear; and so they direct their energies primarily 
Some General 
Conclusions 
to agitational programs There is nolong existed and has often been 
denying that exploitation has85perpetuation 
of poverty a root productive, cause in the creation andBut Purely agitational Work cantheir ills flow be counter­to the extent that it makes the clientele believe that all 
from SOUrces OUtside themselves. 
COnstructive 
criticism of the poor themselves 
It would seem 
the lesson to be derived here is that constructive 
activity, that evenone very Popular), (which may not make
is a sine qua non of success.
Of course the ultimate answereducation-education iRes somewhere in continuedactivity. in its broadest sense asIt must be made available an induced learningadult generation under study may well be a lost cause. 
to all ages,sufficiently 
appreciated that the basic problem 
even though the
is a 
human problem if it is(that is, f underdevelopment
 
emphasized with yo un g, '. 
a problem of personality formation) 

almost goes without saying that the process must begin and be 
Istic ch a te sistage of life.a r c swt u 't ' young. e nd v Y,f r ai n , i, , . . . uhildren and YOuth-'a _ a d bthe most impression­
result in taking away 
Education in new values and attitudes, however,culture. must not
modernity is always 
a person's identity and alienating him from his 
To strike the right balance between tradition anda difficult matter;balance has to be struck, yet the realization that athat every individualrs 
culture must be
respected.salutory factorthat his racial pride must not be hurt,n all educational and development 
efforts. 
will prove a 
K) 
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Purpose: Develop and test a methodology to assess impact of improved infra­
'ucture (rural electricity, feeder roads, irrigation and vocational training) on
inful economic activity of 1,000 rural 
women in 2 provinces ("Experimental"= target
of accelerated development program; "Control"= not) of Southeast Mindanao (Region IX).Also, measure increased women's access to socio-economic services because of the
development project. - ..- . 
ABSTRACT
 
Title: ON TIU' RoAD TO DEVELG1-I 2NT 
Impact of Infrastructure on ''corumic Behavior of Women in Region

XI, Southeast Mindanao
 
Author: 
 Beverly Heckart Hackenberg
 
Davao Research and Planning Foundation, Inc.
 
Davao City, Philippines
 
Date: November 20, 1978
 
A USAID-sponsored inquiry was conducted into the impact of improved in­
frastructure on gainful employment of women in two provinces of Region X1,
 
Southeast Mindanao. In the experimental province, Davao del Norte, which has
 
benefited from an accelerated development program, 449 households were inter­
viewed. In the control province, Davao del Sur, where public investment has
 
been lower, 443 household interviews were obtained.
 
Prospective impact variables included roads, irrigation, rural electrif­
ication and vocational training. 
Women's work was measured through the p arti.
 
ipation continuum, a concept developed for this study which reports all income
 
producing activities in which women are engaged. 
 Previous studies have report"
 
ad only work which falls within the scope of conventional occupational titles.
 
Study sites consisted of nine barangays, 5 in Davao del Norte and 4 in
 
Davao del Sur, within which 25S household sanples were drawn. 
In each province
 
aamp e 
barangays were selected along a gradient representing both (1) distance
 
.from the provincial capital and (2) distance from the national highways 
 In
 
thib 
Way, the influence of both urbanization and primary transportation routes
 
was controlled.
 
Data collect d in the study documented the following variables affecting
 
the outcome:
 
a) amounb and date of infrastructure development in each study
 
site;
 
b) utilization of items of barangay infrastructure by each
 
household;
 
c) household socioeconomic interview, including education,

occupation and income data for each household member;
d) e.conomio participation continuum data for each female
 
15 years of age and above; 
 As 
e) perceived barriers to more effective participation in the
 
economy by women respondents.
 
i
 
To analyze tne data, a framework for ia' inz comparisons was constructed
 
along three dimensions: (1) the women in tne viaple, (2) their types of econ­
omic activity, and (3) the study sites within which 
 they pursue them. The
 
-omen 
 in the sample were divided into two groups: spouses and female household
 
,eads (Tables 2-3) representing older perrons, and .heir daughters and other
 
women in the household (Table 4), a dec.dedly younger generation.
 
Their types of work were classified into three groups (Table 10): 
tra-.
 
ditional (related to subsistence agriculture); bazaar (native commercial act­
ivities)l and modern (requiring improved infrastructure). Finally, the study
 
sites within each province were divided into three levels of development reflect­
ing publia investment in infrastructure (Table 1), as follows:
 
Experimental Area Control Area*
 
DAVAO DEL NORTE 
 DAVAO DEL SUR
 
Study Infrastructure Study Infrastructure
 
Level Site Components Site Components
 
HIGH Compostela All weather and feeder Magsaysay All weather and partial

Nabunturan 	 roads; NIA irrigation; feeder roads; cooperative
 
fully electrified; vo- irrigation; partial elec­
cational schools. trification; vocational.
 
J1DIUM Mawab All weather and partial San Isidro Feeder road only; NI.A
 
New Corella feeder roads; partial irrigation.
 
electrification; recent
 
vocational school.
 
LOW Guambogan No development. Santa Cruz No development.
 
The 9th study site, Digos Muslim Village, was included
 
in the Davao del Sur sample for ethnic representation;

it does not fit the 3-level development claosificatione
 
The three development levels are more useful for intraprovince rather than
 
interprovince comparisons since there is 
no actual analog for the high level sites
 
(Compostela, l-abunturan) in the control area. 
The highest development in Davao
 
del Sur, represented by Hagsaysay, is comparable to the medium level (Rawab and
 
Pew Corella) 	in the experimental area.
 
Within this comparative framework, thu major findings of the study, keyed 
to the appropriate appendix tables, are reviewed below: 
 -

l. The priuary differences between the experimental and contiol-areaa
 
are to! be found in the infrastructure contrasts, rather than 4 the 
abilities and characteristics of the women themselves. 
ii
 
'\A '\J 
-- 
Among spouses and female household hw ads (Vables 2-3), seven character­
istics were compared, and 
 two showed d -o nces "orti commenting upon. Mean
 
years of education are slightly higher 
in ....north aiLd infant mortality (ages
 
0-4) iE definitely hiCher in the south. Tht botn 
are better predicted by level 
of development within each province. Therc L. no eviaence from this study that 
education can operate apart from infrastrutui-c projects improve income. Itto 

will be shown, rather, that infrastructure ivart,-es have substantial impact
 
-on 	 earnings in the absence of-educational 
-u-Y.rla ority-
2. 	 Women's economic activity was much hi her 
-­
than expected in all study
sites, provin; thu superiority of the instrument developed for measur­
ing participation. Powever, infraztructure improvement was unrelated 
to the level of economic particiT-ation disclosed.
 
In the 1970 census of Region XI, Sou1hast Iindanao, only 25-35. of women
 
ages 15-64 were reported to be participatin,; in the labor force by age group.
 
In the present study, 72,0 of all women 15 yeArs of age 
 and 	 older, excluding Stu­
dents, were found to be producing income. 
 O)ifferences between experimental and
 
control areas, and development levels with', them, are 
not impressive (Table 5).
 
The participation continuum is a more 
effertive instrument for capturing women's
 
economic contributions than conventional 
 consus concepts.
 
3. 	The impact of infrastructure improvement is disclosed by measures
 
of household utilization, household income level, and women's earn­ings as a contribution to househola income.
 
infrastructure improvements available to individual households may best be
 
measured by interprovincial differences in vehicle ownership and uses of electric­
ity 	(Table 7). Almost 1/8 of the households in the north operate vehicles, com­
pared with 1/50 in the south| 1/3 of the households in the north are served by 
electricity, compared with 1/10 in the south; 1/8 of the househclds in the north 
dioolose a oommeroial use for eleotricity by wnmonq compared with 1/25 in the 
south&, 
There are corresponding differences in household income and working women's 
earnings (Tables 8-9) disclosed below:
 
jxperimental Area 
 Control Area
D,.VAC D3L NORTE 
 jihVAu DEL SUR
 
Develop- Household Women's 
 Household Women's
 
ment Level Income Income 
 Income Income
 
High P1,496.56 P 646.58 
 " 660.35 P 111.88
 
Medium 
.V57.46 281.94 
 319.23 49.34
 
Low 500.16 109.02 
 236.28 59.21
 
All Sites 966.77 381.20 
 466.43 79.92
 
iii 
.The mean income comparisons set forth above reveal substantial interpro­
vincial differences in the predicted direction fo both household and women's
 
income. Also, when household and women's earnitngs are compared within each
 
provinces substantial gains appear with each increment of investment in infra­
structure.
 
4. 	 Modern sector employment for women is generated by infrastructure 
improvement with expected higher income, but women's earnings from 
traditional commerce are also raised substantially by infrastructure ­
investment. 
Jobs held by women were classified into traditional, bazaar and modern sec.
 
tor occ4pations (Tables 10, 11). The proportion of modern sector employment in 
the north (20.8c' of Jobs) was higher than in the south (4.,Y of Jobs). The ex­
perimental area also displayed more than twice the proportion of jobs in nat­
ive commerce, and less than half the proportion of traditional farm work found 
in the control area. Women's incomes by job classification were also compared
 
with the following results:
 
Experimental Area Control Area 
DAVAO DSL ICIC2T DAVAO DEL SUR 
WJomen by Women's Women by Women's 
Class Job Class Income Job Class Income 
Traditional 41*4% P 70.31 79.9% P 58.66 
Bazaar 36.8 237.60 16.1 117.25 
Modern 20.8 602.33 4.0 305.82 
This comparison confirms that infrastructure imprcvementa have the dual
 
effect of (1) raiaing the proportion of employn. nt in the modern sectors and
 
(2) inWprovinr,tho income levels derived from tradtional oommerce in the bazaar 
market* No sienifioant income improvements appear to have reached the lowest 
occupational level (traditional farm work) even in tho experimental area, Mean 
income differences by job class may be further subdivided within each province 
by level of infrastructure (high, medium or low) with predicted results (see 
text, p. 23). 
5e 	 Both education and employment data pertaining to younger women and
 
school children imply that the ne t Generation will derive greater
 
benefits from infrastructure improvements.
 
Young women in the sample households (able 4) show higher means of edu­
cation in the north, higher proportions of employment, and lower numbers of per­
sons both out of school and unemployed, as disclosed by the following figures:
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A fitting conclusion to this study is provided by the evidence (Table 16) 
that it is the interaction between working women and superior infrastructure 
which is responsible for the income gains discovered in the experimental study
 
_sites, and not just the presence of working wives alone.
 
Experimental Area Control Area
 
DAVAO DY-,L NORTE DAVAC DEL SUR 
Mean Income Mean Income
 
Households with
 
Working Wives P 834.65 P 458.21
 
Households without
 
Working V'fives 548.87 452.92
 
The working wives of the southern region have no discernible impact on
 
housebolA-income, probably because of their heavy coLcantration no-yin
 
traditional occupationse In the north, where commercial and moder'sectd6r-alm-­
ployment is available to women, they succeed in contributing to a 66% improve­
ment in household earnings.) )It should be concluded that the Filipina in an 
economically activ-9_momber-of the labor force at all tiles and in all plaoes. 
Where her income-4ontribution-ialess significant, it is beca-use he -art icipa­
tiouj is less effective. The "effectivenezs dimension" in turn reflects the 
level of infrastruotiure improvements
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Eperimental Area 	 Control Area
 
DAVAO D:' L 1101nB D..VAO DEL SUR 
Women 15 and over, not Women 15 .nd over, not 
Spouses or UIM Heads Spouses o- HE Heads
 
.Employed 36.9 22.2
 
45.1la School 	 37.8 
% 	Out of School 25.3 32.7
 
not Employed
 
(cain-	 -B( zat ion B.56 	 7.66 
Yrs. Completed
 
)others' and Daughters' 
Education
 
lothers (idean
 
Yrfs. Completed) 6.65 4.97
 
Daughters (Mean
 
Yrs. Completed) 8.52 . 6.68
 
The comparison of the education of mothers with daughters (Table 14) dis
 
closes that the meal. years of education for daughters (6.68) in the south is the
 
same as that for mothers (6.65) in the north! The daughters in the experimental
 
areag however, have a 2-year advantage over their peers in the control study sites. 
Among proportions of young por3ons (ages 10-24) attending school (Table 13) neith­
er sex differences nor north-south distinctionb can be discerned, 
. .However, the data on grade retardation (Tuble 15) confirms that among stu­
of high school age (15-19)t the proportion who have failed to make normal 
the south (44.4%) than in the north (33-9%). The 
Sdents 
academic progress ip greater in 
indicated aonclusion ic that younger persons are getting a better start toward up­
study area. Thieg in turn$,.ward social mobility in the developed portion of the 

may be attributod to infrastructure improvements.
 
I. Woman in the developed area do not appear to have been deterred from 
work by the presence of young children in the household. On the con­
trary, their economic contributions are responsible for the incoMe 
adantage onoyed by Davao dol Norte. 
In refuting the notion that woman's economic participation is relegated to 
a later stage of their life cycle, it can be observed (Table 16) that (1) the 
median age of working wives is not significantly higher than that of &ll married 
and (12) the proportion of working wiveswomen residiLg in the same study sites; 

with young Childran (eges 0-9) at home is no greater than that founA aMong wives
 
whQ are not employed.
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B. AID has provided more than $2.8 million in grants to private and regional
 
institutions working in the South Pacific from 1977 to date (January 1979)*
 
Purpose: Analyze problems in'Oceania development and dynamics of change,

especially in those Pacific Islands where AID supports projects. 
 It considers the
 
impact of U.S. assistance in the Pacific and develops recommendati6ns concerhing ATD1
 .
 
future (and continuing) development assistance'-in the area.
 
Foundation 	for the Peoples of the South Pacific:
 
Papua New Guinea 
 $ 548,240
 
Tonga 
 350,000
 
Western Samoa 
 350,000
 
Summer Institute of Linguistics ... _. 
Papua New Guinea 
 568,000
 
US/YMCA
 
Fiji 
 33,184
 
Other grants to date:
 
University of the South Pacific-Satellite
 
Communications project 
 475,000
 
South Pacific Commission-Skip Jack
 
Tuna Survey 
 300,000
 
University of Hawaii--Survey of Facilities
 
at Alafua College of Agriculture 47,000
 
Cornell University Seismic Networks Project,
 
Fiji 
 100,000
 
Accelerated Impact Program:
 
Tonga, Solomon Islands, Western Samoa,
 
Fiji, Tuvalu 
 100,000
 
-TOTAL 	 2,871,424
 
I­
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VI. IMPACT OF U.S. ASSISTANCE INTHE PACIFIC
 
Economic development is the current primary issue in Pacific
 
island affairs. 
As of yet, island-life styles and'work ethos, are however,
 
not well integrated with economic aspirations or growth. 
Thus, a primary

impact of U.S. funding may well result in
a heightened expectation that
 
American money and "American know-how" will bring a "better life"
 
to all islanders. 
There are of course, a 
number of pitfalls in cavelop­
mental assistance to Pacific islands. 
 One among them is,that while
 
economic development plans may be very impressive in theory and magnitude,

they may prove for the most part, unrealizable in practice, particularly

in the very small island states of the Pacific. Moreover, in the past

these plans have too often been thought out in a 
kind of vacuum without
 
any real consideration of the actual needs and wants of the general
 
populace in
a given society or the unique cultural tradition of a
 
particular island society. 
As stated earlier in this report, "develop­
ment" in the Pacific may be perforce a 
moot issue if the population
 
problem is not given immediate and serious attention. By virtue of
 
extremely high population growths among Pacific islanders, any improvements
 
which may, in fact be generated by well-intentioned funding, may be
 
negated faster than "progress" can be achieved, by a 
rapidly growing

population. 
Lack of a strong commitment to population control may

seriously hinder the effectiveness of any U.S. project-funding. 
Although

U.S. funding does currently have a BHN bias, funds for "development"
 
in terms of improved technologies, tools, and capital structures are
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easier to Justify and allocate than funds which would help to bring 
about some basic changes inattitudes, such as work ethics. This may
 
be an important point in terms of the impact of U.S. assistance in the-

Pacific. Technology may be perceived as changing ina geometric
 
progression that is,technology "grows" at a rate of 2...4.,16...32...,
 
whereas values, and work ethics among them "grow" at the much slower
 
arithmetic progression of I...2...3...4.... 
 This means in a practical
 
sense that it is far easier to introduce technology into the islands
 
of the Pacific than it is to introduce values that would support, and
 
maintain, this technology. 
In short, one impact that American funding
 
inthe Pacific might well have, is the introduction of ever more
 
sophisticated technologies without a sufficient concomitant comnitment
 
to the introduction With technology, of values that could sustain
 
this new or improved technology. 
That is why at this moment the channeling
 
of American A.I.D. funds through Private Voluntary Organizations like
 
the Foundation for the Peoples of the South Pacific, the YMCA, the
 
American Organization for Rehabilitation Through Training, the
 
International Human Assistance Program, and the Sumner Institute for
 
Linguistics, may well be the most efficient way to aid in the economic
 
development, with emphasis on "Basic Human Needs." 
 This is the case,
 
because these organizations have a 
stated 
--
and through experience
 
proved 
- commitmen 
 to development through relatively small-scale,
 
and applicably value-weighted projects.
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The greatest impact of USAID funded projects in the Pacific
 
ideally should be in terms of upgrading some of the most rudimentary­
requisites of survival inthe islands: 
 food in terms of improved
 
diets, greater productivity in small-scale agriculture, 
aquaculture,
 
and fishing, clothing, shelter, adequate health care, transportation,
 
and a chance for increasing numbers of Pacific islanders to find
 
some
 
If economic development is the current primary issue inthe Pacific
 
island affairs, than "appropriate technology" is primary inPacific
 
islands project development. 
One impact of USAID funding should rest
 
on the fact that all funding is approved interms of adherence to an overall
 
philosophical basis for "Pacific development." 
 It should not be, that
 
a philosophical 
basis for funding must be invented after funds have
 
already been expended. 
Projects should be developed in concert with a
Uphilosophy" and not a 
philosophy invented to justify funding after the
 
fact.
 
For the moment at least, the effect of relatively insignificant
 
USAID funding in the Pacific: 
 $1.5 million in 1978, $2.5 millionn
 
1979, $3.5 million in 1980, $4.5 million in 1981 and $5.0 millidn in
 
1982, presents us with a challenge, yet promises to hold possible
 
false perceptions of Pacific islanders for greater riches for everyone
 
from the United States at a minimum.
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The overall impact of USAID funds in the Pacific should in the long
 
run be measured in terms of how much more self-reliant and self-sufficient
 
have Pacific Islands become because the United States has supported
 
appropriate technology, and appropriate agricultural, and appropriate
 
fishing, and appropriate training/education schemes. How much, it should
 
be asked ultimately in terms of BHN, have Pacific island-life styles
 
changed because of USAID support? If these questions can, in future
 
years be answered in the affirmative,then the impact of USAID funding
 
will have been positive and effective.
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1. 	INTRODUCTION
 
Although no recommendations are included in this report, it
 
is intentionally provocative in hopes of stimulating discussion. Its
 
purpose is to discuss briefly a number of issues pertaining to the
 
Accelerated Mahaweli Development Project which came up during my
 
January 25 through February 8, 1979 mission to Sri Lanka. During this
 
mission, approximately half of my time was spent visiting a number of
 
settlements, including some in System H, Minneriya, Gal Oya, and
 
Uda Walawe. I am tspecia3ly grateful to Jeff Evans, John R. Eriksson,
 
M. J. Perera, and Kapila.Wimaladharma who took time to accompany me
 
into the field and share with me their knowledge and insights. I am
 
alsu grateful to Nanda Abeywickrema (Secretary, Ministry of Lands
 
and Land Development) and T. Sivagnanum (Secretary, Ministry of
 
Mahaweli Development) for their support of my mission, and for the
 
opportunity to meet and discuss settlement issues with a large number
 
, 
and
of Sri Lankan officials, academics and research personnel

settlers themselves.
 
It is important to emphasize at the beginning that I am 'not
 
The expertise that I
 an expert on sett]ement projects in Sri Lanka. 

brought with me pertains to over twenty years experience with river
 
basin development and population redistribution in other tropical
 
countries, with special emphasis on Africa and the Middle East.
 
2 
Throughout the world, settlement schemes have to come to grips with

certain basic issues if they are to become productive and if they are
to evolve into the type of community In,which settlers and the children
 
of settlers wish to live. 
During my visit to Sri Lanka 
my main

approach was to attempt to 
assess the significance of these issues
in the context of the Accelerated Mahaweli Development Project?. The
 purpose of this report is to introduce a number of these issues and
to briefly discuss some of them. 
Since my return to the United States
I have read more deeply in the literature on settlement in Sr' Lanka.

Principal scurce materials are mentioned in the biblLography.
 
At the end of my visit I made no reconwendations, 

my brief
familiarity with Sri Lankan conditions and my troad survey of the
settlement situation in different areas making specific recommendations
 
inappropriate. 
 I did, however, suggest in a February 8 memo that a
high-level Sri Lankan workshop on Mahaweli development policy in
relationship to a small number of carefully selected seLtlement issues
be held in the future, possibly followed by other workshops dealing

with other issues. 
Contrary to the situation In many countries, there
is a wealth of experience emong Sri Lankan officials, scholars, and
retired civil servants relevant to river basin development and, more.

*peclfica]ly, to settlement projects. 
Sri Lankans, for example, have
written at least 8 
Ph.D. theses on settlement policy and on specific

settlements while at least two other Sri Lankans are currently involved
in diSsertation work. 
The knowledge of these people is a tremendous
 resource. 
While some expatriate assistance might be useful in preparing

Position papers for the suggested uork&hop, I continue to believe that
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participation should be restricted to Sri Lankans. with the total
 
nurber attending the workshop not to exceed approximately twenty
 
people.
 
II. BASIC ASSUMPTIONS
 
The discussion in this report has been influenced by two
 
basic assumptions resulting from my own research on new lands
 
settlement projects. The first assumption is that settlement projects
 
are dynamic entities which must pass through at least four major phases
 
if they are to survive as viable communities. The second assumption
 
is that even spontaneous migration from a home village to a new
 
settlement area involves stress which has major implications for settler
 
behavior and community fo-mation. These assumptions are outlined below.
 
If they are as valid as I believe them to be, they have important
 
implications for the design and implementation of policies for
 
expediting the settlement of relatively unoccupied areas and for
 
optimizing the advantages of this settlment for both the nation and
 
the settlement area.
 
A. NEW LATDS SETTLEMENT AS A DYNAMIC PROCESS
 
Government sponsored settlements throughout the world tend 
to Ne viewed as production schemes,.often specializing in the cultivation 
of a single major crop. Where irrigation is involved, the responsible 
a&eacy is usually the Ministry of Irrigation or an agency, like the 
Mahaweli Development Board, which comes out of, and draws Its senlor 
personnel from, the Ministry (or Department) of Irrigation. While this 
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II. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
 
Findinas
 
The following is a brief summary of the APHA team's findings on rural water
 
supply and-sanitation inThailand. (See also Chapter III and tables accompanying
 
Chapter IV.)
 
A. Strengths
 
Many factors in Thailand make favorable a rural water supply and sani­
tation program for villages with populations of less than 1,000. These include:
 
e 	The existence of the Rural Water Supply Division (RWSD)
 
and the Sanitation Division of the Ministry of Public Health,
 
(SD/MPH), organizations with many years of successful field
 
experience. These divisions have an organizational structure
 
reaching to smaller villages in the country; both require the
 
community's participation in the projects they assist and each
 
has staff trained inmotivation and health education.
 
* The success of past and present AID-assisted programs that
 
involve staff of the various divisions of the MPH.
 
e 	An ongoing Primary Health Care Program (carried out through MPH
 
with AID assistance) which is training village health workers
 
and communicators to work in their home villages. This pro­
gram lacks the strong emphasis on environmental sanitation
 
that a parallel rural water supply and sanitation program would
 
provide.
 
* 	The existence of targets, established by Thailand to respond to
 
emphasis on the 1980s as the Rural !ater Supply and Sanitation
 
Decade. Desire for a coordinated rural water supply and sani­
tation program is strong.
 
@ 	The pressing need and desire of the people in the smaller
 
villages for improved water supply and excreta disposal facili­
ties, food handling, solid waste disposal and other elements
 
of environmental sanitation. Basically clean, the villagers
 
welcome an appropriate means to help maintain cleanliness.
 
B. Constraints
 
The constraints encountered are listed below in random order. They
 
are lack of:
 
* 	Trained personnel for environmental sanitation activities;
 
* 	Transportation for personnel;
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* 
Training focused on environmental sanitation;
 
e 	Continuing supervision at all levels;
 
* 	Adequate maintenance for even the simplest hand pump;
 
s 	A coordinated plan and program for rural water supply

and sanitation activities;
 
* 	A data base to plan a 
coordinated program;
 
* 	Understanding of the personal preferences of rural
people for dinking water sources; and,
 
@ 	Sufficient funds to reach the ideal goals that are set.
 
C. Targets of Opportunity
 
The strengths and constraints listed above indicate a number of targets
of 	opportunity that AID should help the RTG address. 
These are:
 
e 
Improving the water supply and excreta disposal facilities,
as well as other environmental sanitation conditions, in­cluding food handling in the poorer, more remote villages
with population of less than 1,000 that are not being
reached by regular RTG programs and that are not included
in other donors' prQposed programs.
 
@ Strengthening RWS and SD/MPH, an organization that has long
been successful in this field and which has contributed

substantially tu improved rural water supply and sanitation.
 
* 	Extending the scope of the ongoing Primary Health Care Pro­gram by supplementing itwith a program to improve

environmental sanitation.
 
* 
Helping the RTG meet its rural water supply and sanitation
 
goals for the 1980s.
 
* 
Furthering the objectives listed in the U.S. Congressional

mandate for rural poor.
 
* 
Stimulating the in-country manufacture of hand pumps, house­hold water treatment units. plastic pipe well 
screens and
other equipment needed in quantity for water supply and sani­tation purposes.
 
a 	Developing competency-based training programs for operation,
maintenance, management personnel and others involved ina
rural water supply and sanitation program.
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D. Recommended Strategy 
below. 
 The various strategies suggested throughout this report are summarized
 
7. Develop a rural water supply and sanitation program to
Supplement the ongoing USAID/T-suported Primary Health
Care Program. Implement the RWSS Program 
 ite same 20
provinces included in the PHC program, 
.,eginning insix
provinces and then expanding to seven more, before finally
including all 20 provinces. 
 Phase the RWSS Program over
three successive three-year periods, anri follow up with a
one-year evaluation and analysis of physical and social
results. 
 Closely coordinate the RWSS and PHC programs and
ensure cooperation efforts.
 
2. Build on the proven capability of the MPH and USAID/T to
develop and carry out cooperative public health programs.
Develop with the MPH a rural water supply and sanitation
project that can be implemented through the Rural Water
Supply and Sanitation divisions.
 
3. Strengthen the RWSS divisions by helping them strengthen
their sanitarian corps. 
Helo develop the supervisory staff
needed to efficiently u, the sanitarians. 
 Provide trans­portation facilities so that sagitarians and supervisors
can fulfill their responsibilities.
 
4. Provide training for newly-appointed sanitarians and re­fresher training for present sanitarian staff, as well as
village health workers and communicators, that emphasizes
environmental sanitation, health education, and community
development and participation.
 
5. Help Rural Water Supply Division s':aff to facilitate com­pletion of the piped water supply portion of the proposed
program by providing necessary supervisory personnel and
transportation equipment. 
Specific training should include
not only staff, but also other personnel, including those
needed at the village level, to successfully implement
the program. 
Emphasis will be on full community partici­pation before, during and after construction, and throughout
the operation and maintenance phases.

6. Help reestablish the RWSS division's former maintenance
responsibility and increase the staff needed to provide
backup maintenance for the water supply systems i; installs,
Including piped systems and those wiFh 'land pumps. 
This will
require setting up provincial maintenance brigades outfitted
with the equipment needed to inspe,-t at least once every two
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monthr the system for which each isresponsible and to
respond to emergency requests from village committees.
These brigades should be charged with providing backup
maintenance support for the systems and equipment in­stalled by the Sanitation Division. 
This will take
advantage of bi-monthly visits and avoid duplication of

services.
 
7. Provide training for two professionals from the RWSS
divisions, one each inthe respective technical programs,
and one each inmanagement, supervision, organization

and logistics.
 
8. Make available several options for both water supply and
excret 
disposal interventions to ensure that the villagers'
desires, needs, and capabilities to participate inthe pro­grams are considered.
 
For estimating purposes, the project universe provides for an average of
100 villages ineach of the 20 provinces, each with an average size of 100
households of six members each. 
 Hence, the program will benefit 1.2 million
people.
 
The water supply options are:
 
Villages 

Number of Villaes
 
AlternatertTerate--
 Alternate 3
With Piped Water Supply Systems 1,200 
 1,400 
 1,400
 
With House Connections 
 600 700 1,000
 
With Public Hydrants 600 
 700 
 400
 
With Cisterns, Convertible to Piped Systems 800 
 600 
 600
 
10 
5 
cm. Water Cisterns for 2 Families 240 180
cm. Water Cisterns for 1 Family 180
560 
 420 
 420
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The options for excretion disposal are:
 
Complete Coverage for 2,000 Villages 
 Number Privies
 
Total
Privies 

Alternate 1 Alternate 2 Alternate 3
Total Privies 
 200,000 200,000 200,000
 
Water-seal Privies 
 200,000 100,000 170,000
 
Pit Privies, Convertible to
 
Water-seal Privies 0 100,000 32,000
 
Support the options with necessary equipment, supplies and materials.
9. Assist ina detailed study of water supply and sani­tation inthe 20 provinces participating inthe PHC
program, using as a 
pilot project the study of the
first six provinces to be included inthe RWSS program.
10. 
 Provide four expatriates to help develop and implement
the program. The expatriates should have several years'
experience indeveloping countries on assignments
similar to those of this project.

11. 
 Arrange for the assignment of 20 Peace Corps Volunteers
to help implement the program at provinciil district
and local levels.
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INCENTIVES, FERTILITY BEHAVIOR, AND
 
I.NEGRATED COMUNITY DEVELOPNENT: 
.N4 OVERVIEW 
Henry P. David
 
After outlining selected psychosocial and economic determinants of fer­
tility behavior and discussing their relationship to qualty-of-!ife consid­
erations, relevant aspects of population policy are noted. The next section 
offers a conceptualization and aefinition of types of incentives and dis­
incentives, plus a discussion of integrated community approaches to fertility 
reduction -ith an orientation to enhancLng community development. Legal and 
ethical conS:--in-.s Sre presented .n terms of legisiative changes, perceived 
constr-ints on ftreedom, and coercion and human rights. The Reg-onal Overview 1/ 
features country capsules summari:ing experience reported from Bangladesh, 
China, India, Indonesia, Korea, Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, and Taiwan. 
The integrated community approach pioneered in 1"ailand is described in a 
separate section. Research findings are surveyed with parzicular attention 
given to sociocultural and methodological concerns as these relate to sug­
gested cooperative pilot and policy research. -k simmary of maIor findings 
plus more than !80 references conclude the overview. 
*1 
Preface 
One of the conclusions of the 1974 World Population Conference was 
that a :olicy advocating fer-4i1., -educ-::on cmnot be isolated from other 
social and econcmic development policies concerned with family and individ­
ual. well-being (U.N., 1974). The multifaceted nature o- these interactions 
is being gradually understood as clarer Linkages are emerg..ng bet-ween fer­
tility behavior and. economic, social, cultural, and political determinants 
and consecuences of national policies. Social scientists have become i-­
c-easingly involved in studies of the modi._iabilit-/ of fert-_lity choice be­
havior, motivation for fertility reduc-ion, and willingiess to li"_"t family 
size for societal well-beL. One of the ob)eczives of :his overview is to 
summarize what is =resently known about the effects of -icent2ves and dis­
incentives, including costs/bene.6its, ethical consideration and integration 
with cammn.y develotment polic:es. 
The general approach of this paper encompasses a cons n psy­
eseociL~nd-ps:rch'cec~nomicd._e.te 
..z_ -=erity ohavior. Not enough_ 
is knownn.lesouTencs miys e ...n. 
der seetdev:. L.cnd:in.FL-cigs acr_=u1at~g --om well­
defined _f.ld st-udes are, however, pr-vad2i_ suggestcons for e-.nical_y ac­
cevtaonle -::atl'es, routed in local -raditions -ith a tumanistzc a.vroach 
designed to inorve the o"i,-fL~eof jaztici:i.ng tllagers. This 
is an encou-_agng evolutzon when it considered that most or-=_-Zed familyLS 
a.-Z..; ;ro=ram i-. :ne ievelcping world are less than 20 ,ears old, that 
millions of couples sta_!! lack access to modern cont-=ceptvie methods, and 
that the right to choose legal pregnancy :e-zrat.on rema.ns a tooc oF 
cansideranle contro.versy (David, 1980). 
fter this preface, there w-Lli be a section reviewLng relevant as-aects 
o fertlity behavior, quality-of-life, and populat:-on :olicy, followed by 
a dizcussion : /.'terse :-ncenti-ves, o-is:ncen-:ves, and zntegar__o:ommuni:t 
a..roacnes. kfter ca.sideratcGn of legal and ethical constraints, the re­
gional overview :resents .nfo.-aton -- m nine ks.in countries, .las more 
extensive obser-a_-ions on the Thai e-xoerience with community-based programs. 
Researc_ _.iin- s are Sueved and su-geszons offered r d-tlng rqeede.e :­
ture zeseaczn :a 2ns' er vec-Fic :uesi~ins. A s.a'-, of na;or f-oid ngs 
and a is-ting of .iore thar. 130 references conclude :ne overvlew. 
'AV>
 
Ascertaining, the sZate-of-t.-he-art on the cominplx topics disc.=.s ed in
 
this pa er is rende-ed ore ditic41: than usual by the cont--oversy that 
has long swirled axatnxd the concept of incentives. Although diverse 
sources were consulted and intensive li-earstu.% -. nducaed, noesc 

claim is made for ccmpleteness, systematic coverage o2 all relevanz aspects, 
or total abjectivity. %fanyof the rezeach findings presentea are "soft" 
in the sense that they have not been cross-validated or replicated in other 
settings. 
The writer's personal experience in transnational research on 
fertility behavior will be appaxrent :in the ccmments anc. conclusions. In an 
effort to ba-ance and/or em.hasize certa.a views, liberal use hzs been made 
of selected cuotations at the beginning aand/or end of each sec:ion.
 
Prenared ,-:h the supporT of. the 
 gency for Internazional Development,
 
this overview is based entirely on materials available to the 7rmisnational 
Family Rese-rch Institute. I am pleased to acknowledge the considerable 
support provided by Hirofzmi Ando, Chai Bin Park, and Paul E. Mason through 
the facilities o-f the United Nations Fund for Populaticn Ac-ivizies, Helen 
Kolbe and PhylI:.s Piotrow, Population Iniormation P-'ro--.., Johns Hokins 
Universit-; Bruce K<na--r, Librarian of the ?ovulaticn Reference Bureau; and 
Laura Olson, Cnief, Clea--inghouse and iaformaticn Seczicn, ?oculazlon Di­
vision, U.N. Econcmic and Social CC=ssian 
_=or Asia and the Pacific. Much
 
valued consultation was graclously given by James T. Fswcetz, 

- st-West
 
?•oculation tnszitue, Honolulu; Cynzha Green, Povulaz:.on C--ss C--mmi-.tee,
 
Washington; 
and S. 3. :eward, Social Science Division, 
-nzerna;:onal Devel­
or'nt~ and ze--t:e, Cttawa. Soeca. :-anks are ex-c.ressed to 
ona; r ho spent several week.3 in -.he field with the Community 
Based Family Planning Service Program in7Thaland and to the seni _C3.
 
staff who took t.T.e au-ing theiz traveico,he United S-ze 
to vIsi: 
Behesc and answer our m:rv uese:ons. .he Poulati:n Ccmunci k:-dly made 
ava-iaole 
-he 'al2.ey proofs of the mono-rann on the SLngziaore exper:ence by 
Peter S. j. Chen ana J=es T. awcet-. 
, It has been said. that "the r .o poi€-cal inac-ion -s oarew,­h:,;.% i),=used resewcn -:enor-s" (,r---, 1976). s ............ me.t­
lit) I 1 ,, ..
ngs and regional sema-ars conFirm that serious -roblems ex:.s "n
-brL.ging
" '" aready available and cogen- soc:_al science research 'ind-igs :to bear in a 
continuous and s-!smatic 
-,ay on :.ne fiig nf:!o:is menza­:-on of poi-_cies, ',netner :ne area oe pccu'ation :olic, Or- zn-enced ado­
"l.escenz oremara-z'0 ," nreinanci
,,escen rez-- - gac. .vn__e researchers sr_-_- "halt shcuiiers acout
 
' 
 the "underutilization" of their findings, policy makers and government
 
planners comrplaln that social science -'eseaxch is rarely relevant to im-
SImediate policy issues, timely, or couched in an "emplovable" fornat. 
The effectiveness of dissem:nation methods and the bar-.iers to the use 
of policy-relevant information by decision-makers have been well reviewed 
(e.g., Caplan, 1975; Batscha, 1976). There is clear need for fostering di­
alogue between policy makers and social science researchers. Involving
 
those close to decision-making in the process of establishing research pri­
orities and the early phases of research planning is likely to enhance better
 
perception of realities and eventual utilization of service oriented
 
recommendations.
 
It is with the hope of advancing the transnational and interdisciplin­
ary understanding of population policies involving incentives and dis­
incentives in stimulating voluntary fertility reduction, fostering "bottom­
up" communit7 development, and enhancing the quality-of-life of acceptors,
 
especially in the villages of developing countries, that this overview is
 
presented.
 
H.P.D.
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flows of assistance to villages and in terms of stimulating mnotivation, in­
cluding peer pressures, for lowering birthrates" (National Security Council, 
1978). 
Summary of Major Findini 
Background Factors 
%I The complexity of fertility behavior requires that both psycho­
social and economic determinants of fertility be_crkidae.d-.
 
Lny aptroaclht 	 o._..hi! r. andomicroeconomic LaL 
initiatives to stimulate fertility_educIt.7;n._.hrough asing incen­
tives, disinc:':tves, or integrated community programs. 
* An incenie is de~ne. as a tangible or intancible reward to an 
individual, couple, or other target group designed to induce 
specified fertility-reducing behavior. - disinjcerive is def ined 
as a tangible or intangible negative sanction incurred by an in­
dividual, counle, or other target group as a consequence of ex­
ceeding specified fertility behav-_or.
 
* 	 Incentives may be d - rec-aiters accetors, and/or oroviders 
of services. T7hey may be small one-tLme cash payments or larger 
amountz :aid it a later date, dependent on accepatanLe of specified 
coc::iic-s.
 
* Disincentive nrourvms should be differentiated from politically
 
organized pressures and g which restrict voluntary choice 
behavior. 
" "egaze -Ferzillty reduction to ccm­
munity develorment, are sensitive to local needs, and involve :he 
community in volunt.ry decision-making. 
* "Tne 'universal human -iaht' of ever/ couole to choose the timing 
and number of children tney .,ill have, is a noole sentzment, but 
there is not a country in the world Nhcre it is not subjec to 
hihly effec:z:ve societal and culzural constraints." 
The ue of incent-.es. d'-sincentices._.-je d-peer. nressure is not 
with 	human rights or-nciples as there .s aincomnatible
"". . .. 	 .."-	 .. ~.. ../ * : -=:= 
V counitv consensus and =Dlementation does not result in discrim­
i in ati-on on qrounds-po£_j-cqmerace.,_ sex.,_lanpuae ort.v, or 
religion.
 
* Most incentive _rograms have been reaorted from ksia, particularly 
from Bangladesh, China, India, Indonesia, Korea, Philippines, Singa­
pore, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, and Thailand.
 
Problems Encountered
 
-om 
should be paid, when, how, and in what form appear to have been 
made largely on the bas:s of conjecture and intuition, seldom as 
the result of field experience. 
* Policy decisions on tie oin . pey, p they. 
Despite the millions of dollars spent on incentives, virtually no 
control studies have been renor-ed. Little "nowledge exists on 
whether incentives Aill lower the birthrate or how large they
 
would have to be to do so. There is a wide gap between the number 
of scihemes proposed and the few that have been implemented with a
 
research component.
 
* There is d!.agreement on whether inc ,e' i-,rson s to 
want feer ch idren or trod them into acceutin&p-airVIp.az.nl ; 
(notaoly sterilization) they Itbefore 	 i oud.. 
has also not been Dossble to establish the extent to wnch in­
centives clcud the judgent of recruiters and ser;ce providers, 
or the info~rmed consent of acceptors. 
* 	 Acceptance of nonpe-a=nent me-a.ds, prcmpted m:ainly D/ a desire 
for a small, one-tine ::_nanc-_al reward, tends to el'cz low con­
tinuationzames. Delaed incentves cr no-birth bonus schemes 
are of too recent oriin :o e-t longer-term. evaluation o­
their efects on Fertli.:t or costs. 
- 5.1 
Ci# 
The same variables which lead to compliance with an incentive/
 
disincentive program may also be highly correlated with economic
 
success, independent of any incentive. Ultimately, the validity
 
of the asstmption that incentive programs are administratively and
 
politically feasible, economically workable, and in keeping with
 
ind.ividual and societal norms can only be assessed by the fertility
 
behavior of the community and society affected.
 
9 

Successful Elements
 
* 	 Delayed inc- ti§.and n-bi- k~ilg et are providing en­
couraier studis je..nud.eu to 
assess effects on fertility and cost effectiveness.
 
* 	 Disincentives reinforce the Public Dercep~t~n-ini-mall._ amily 
norms and encourage rat o.aJde-ci-ion--maing by emp.hasizing cost­
benefit factors without, however, preventing couples from having
 
additional children if they wish to pay the costs entailed.
 
* 	 Disincznti'les are more readily accepted in societ:es Amhere all
 
methods of fertility regulation are easily available, where a
 
strong and stable govenment ha5 a well-established consensual
 
relationshiv with its citi:ens, and ,hen care is taxen to avoid
 
undue hardships for children born in disregard of official
 
policy.
 
* 	 Integrated community programs are positively perceived when fer­
tility reduction schemes are oriented to community development, 
involving local autonomy and appropriate technology to enhance
 
quality-of-life.
 
0 	 The nongovernmental commun2ty-based family planning service pro­
gram pioneered in Thailand demonstrates the zeasibility of util­
izing $;earkg tmagraditional folk humor, and i-zqj-a:,. 
tiv eeder_..tied to economic development goals The more 
cohesive the comnunlt7, the -reater tne orobabiiv of recoy­
nizing -he need for integrazing fertili:y reduction ",wth socio­
economic devlocnment for the =,-nor. benefit 
\-A
 
Suggested Reccmmendations
 
* 	 Rev.ew and reconsider the oresent r_on, be use_ofJ.. Gove-t,. 
ment funds for incentives for fertility reduction, particularly 
for 	integrated community development schemes known to enjoy the
 
voluntary support oi the local population and less subject to 
possible abuse. More than half the world's population resides in 
the rural villages of the developng countr sooAsiA, Their 
needs should be understood within the context of their own percep­
tions of fertility behavior, integrated community development, 
and an enhanced quality-of-life. 
Organize a smalL working_ oa toiden-if_ and reach consensus on 
psychosocial and econ--,znaa determinantsof ei.. behavior in 
seemingly successful incentive programs that are integrated with 
community development, supported by the villagers concerned, and 
focused on fertility reduction and an improved quality-of- ife. 
Another purpose should be to develoo gluidelines for reocrting such 
programs in a transna:ionally use.fal manner -nd making suggestions 
regarding priorities related to prog-ram delifery, the utility o2 
appropriate tecnology schemes for fer- -/:y ser-z­reducton, and 

ice oriented research.
 
0 Convene an .nterdiscinlinazr- re. _onal se afo :olicyn r.i.j -ed 

makers, service 	 and r rcje_. able to repolt.	 q 
and discuss Trog-rams identified as successful by knowledgeable 
persons in the field. Project reporcs presented should follcw 
guidelines suggested by the working a.ty. The obj-ect:.v would 
be to develop a methodology for cooperative, interdisciplinary, 
and transnational research, vielding comparable results on pro­
gram ingredients affeci.ng psychosocal and econcmic determinants 
of fertility behavior, voiuntary local acceptance, and the util­
ity of appropriate technology schemes in assessments of cost 
effectiveness. 
- 5O ­
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a 	 Fund cooperative sudies of about 13 to 24 tonts' duration, 
yielding cross-culturally comparable information that mill permit 
making imvlementable reccnendations to polcv makers for organ­
iZin-g similar programs in other lands ahere administrative and 
political conditions are fa-orable.
 
Provide support for organizing and implementing carefully moni­
tored larger field projcts developed in consultation with
 
directors of programs previously identified as successful and
 
with semiannual meetings to review prog-ress, problems, and plans.
 
* 	 Provide special funds to suppo-t and monitor tne family planning 
services organized by the CBFPS program in Thailand for Cambodian 
and Laotian refugees. 
* 	 To be useful, programs using incentive/disincentive schemes or 
integrated community approaches will have to be formulated in 
consistent, clearly defined, and well-comaunicated policies, 
resoonsive to local needs and values with dynamic leadership to 
obtain and nurture continued oolitical and administrative backing. 
They will have to demonstrate the compementar:ty of fertility 
reduction schemes with socioeconomic develuoment, aesigned 
humanistically to improve the ruality-of-life, especially in 
the impoverished rural vUlages of developing countries. 
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Assessments of Six-AID Supported Projects page two
 
A. Country: Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, Bangladesh
 
B. Project Title:
 
Provincial Water (Philippines)- -Project # AID-DLC/P2020
 
Loan # 492-U-033,$15 million to Local Water Utilities Administration,
 
signed May 23, 1974
 
Libmanan-Cabusao Integrated Area Development (Philippines)
 
# 492-0275
 
1975-1979
 
Loan # 492-T-037, $3.5 million to Government of the Philippines, authorized
 
June 28, 1975- July 31, 1980, extension January 31, 1981.
 
Semarang Steam Power Station (Indonesia)
 
1971-1979
 
#497-0240
 
Loan # 497-H-024, $19.7 million to Government of Indonesia, 1971-October 1979
 
Educational Finance (Indonesia)
 
#4" -0229
 
1975-1979
 
1975 grant funds of $425,715
 
Project began May 1975, completion May 1978 (Conflicting information)
 
Population Planning (Thailand)
 
#493-0283, grant funds of $16,607,000 to Royal Thai Government, FY 1976-1981
 
Small Scale Irrigation (Hand Pumps) (Bangladesh)
 
#388-0019A, April 1976--anticipated completion 1978, yet March 1979 still in
 
planning stage.
 
Loan # 338-T-010, $14 million to the Government of Bangladesh
 
1976-1979
 
Analyzed UNICEF project instead of AID supported project
 
F. Purpose: In order to assess the socio-economic innovations that the projects
 
were designed to produce: (A) reconstructed historical z3tting of each project
 
as well as anticipated impact of the project on intended beneficiaries, (B) focused
 
on project implementation (through documents and interviews), (C) for those projects
 
where implementation had not reached the stage where there was a measurable impact,
 
the interviews were geared to assess the anticipated impact of the project.
 
/
 
METHODOLOGY AND SUMMARY OF ASSESSMENTS 
$ince all of the six projects selected for this study were 
intended to produce socioeconomic innovations, assessment necessitated 
-
conceptualizing a before-and-after situation in order to measure the 

effect of project implementation in producing the desired change. 
The first step in doing this was to reconstruct the historical 
setting of each project. Specifically, this involved investigating 
the problem which prompted the formulation of each projecb and de­
fining the anticipated impact of the project on the intended bene­
done by collecting documentary data (Project
ficiaries. This was 
Identification Documents, Project Papers, and other records) and also 
by conducting interviews with those familiar with each project. 
The next step was to focus on project implementation and determine 
(again through documents and interviews) whether it had proceeded to 
the point where sotme manifest impact had been produced. Where this 
were conducted with intended beneficiarieswas the case, interviews 
to obtain their perceptions concerning the positive or negative
 
on them and their surroundings.effects the project has had 
For those projects where implementation had not reached the stage 
were Reared towhere there was a measurable impact, the interviews 
assess the anticipated impact of the project.
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Applying this method, the resulting 
assessments were attained. 
1,Provincial Water in the Philippines - This proMecti. Proect No. 
effects (Which are
ositive
more
to have produced
was assessed 
are
(which
effects
than negative
to increase)and more likelvpermanent quality,
such as improved water Positive effectsnature).short-run in sources
and more accessible 
a more reliable supply, 
stronger pressure, 

of the intended beneficiaries.
 to the well-beingare contributing 
to socioeconomiccontributingsystems also are The improved water 
such asNegative effects 
the beneficiary communities.indevelopment 

are considered temporary.
rateshigher water 
inArea DevelopmentInte =atednf/Cab~aN. 2,-the Libm2. Proiect 
of the tr etedis that mostconclusion
- The overallthe ?hiliv ines ththo~htis me, _ 
see the protlet faoalt beneficiaries 
uite mixed. It therefore 
is too early to
 
actual results are still 
 beneficiariesIntermediate 
judge fairly what the final impact 
will be. 
on the 
such as laborers working 
unintended beneficies)(including some 
Final
 
project, contractors, and fishermen, 
are relatively content. 

high expecta­have, in general,-the farm households beneficiaries ­
tions about the final outcome 
of the project, although most have
 
Some have ex­
small amount of benefit to 
date. 

experienced only a 

implementation management. 
as a result of pcorcoetsseriousperienced I"sia. 
3. Pr t No. 3 - The Se am 
- Statio "Power 
in getting the first unit of 
the plant
 
Despite the undue delqys 
operating in October 197S, there 
have been some manifestly positive
 
trikiZ
The most s 

results that give the project a promise 
of success. 
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of these results stem from the fact that implementation of the proet_ 
thus far vastly reduces the possibility of blackouts which have been 
the PIN-gid system of Central Java.D1amir 
a large number of new ,gers,This new reliability has attracted 
types of commercial and industrial establishments,among them various 
which previously maintained their own generators (most of them 
new PLN system hasThere are indications that thediesel-ftaelcd). 
expansion of some businesses, which contributes to the attmillated an 
economic development of Central Java and the creation of more Jobs. 
There also is evidence that the reliability of power has improved 
the 
operation of some health facilities (particiularly the larger hospitals).
 
Finally, the addltion of the Semarang Steam Power Station enables
 
expansion of the rural.electrification program in Central Java thereby
 
benefiting villagers and farmers. 
Negative reactions centered on the high cost of service connections
 
conversion to 220 volts, and also the high electricity rates.and 
The lower cost of fuel for the steam plant (.23-.24 liters per watt
 
generators (1-4.6 litershour) in comparison with the gas turbiDe 

should lower overall operating costs, enabling a
 per watt hour) 
reduction of these costs.
 
Our overall
 4. Project No. ,Educational Finance in Indonesia ­
conclusion is that top-level decision-makers in the Ministry of
 
eople directly involved in carrying
Education and Culture and the 

out the roJect are very satisfied with the results to date.
 
4
 
Decision-makers know a great deal more 
about what the country's
 
They are aware
 
educational system is like 
than do other officials. 

of the flow of funds and what must 
be done to improve the system
 
The people trained by the project-­
with the available funds. 

participants in training courses, 
those versed in computer skills, 
in
 
languages, and in research (techniques 
and analysis), those experienced
 
in field work, and those whose 
educations have been financed 
by the
 
all constitute a solid core 
of expertise which Indonesia
 
project --

badly needs.
 
This rject
IinThailandPlanningNo. Population5. Pro.ect 
Seen in historical perspective, 
AID's
 
was adjudged to be successful. 

in 1970 had been catalytic in enabling 
the Royal
 
initial support 

launch family
agencies to (RTG) and private sector Thai Government 

Since 1970,
 
or national level. 
either on a regionalplanning programs 

of the population planning program
 to the needsAID has been attuned 

to be significant.

that its support has continued so 

of this program is
 
mure of the success The most signific 
in 190 tofrom +3.0 percentbeenreduced
that poulation grwth has 
2.1 percent in 1978. 
) BangladeshIrrigation (Iad Pum in No. 6.,SmalScale6. Prolect 
not applY because
 
only rolect to which the methodology 
di 

was the 

been manufactured.program has in the AID-supportedthe hand s none of 
sufficient implementation, the 
alternative was to
 
In the absence of 
similar hand-pump project being conducted 
by 
athe impact ofexamine 

have been distributeP
 
of 1979, some 90,000 hand pumpsUNICEF (as 
5 
On the basis of this research 
the proposed hand-PUMP project
 
of the statedin termsto be promisinAID appearssupported by 
will permit a dry-season 
the positive side, use of the 
pumps 
goals. Dn 
theirto retain title to small landownersenable manycrop, which will 
debttheir ever-increasingconditionsunder previousholdings where 
The simple technologysell their land. 
would eventually force them to 
The flexibility of
 to use and maintain. 
of the pump renders it easy 
foras well aswaterfor householdbe usedthe pumn permits it to 
to thebeneficial 
and the crop rotation it affords 
is 
irrigation, 
little wastesmall, so there isrelativelycommand area issoil. The 

of water.
 
There are questions, however, 
concerning cost effectiveness 
of
 
the project (increased production means 
higher costs to the farmer
 
Also is there a possibility that 
large
 
and lower prices locally). 

of the new pumps (as they did with controllandlords might gain 
us will be the 
some areas)? Then to whatinfertilizerchemical 
on the water table?of pumps
vastly increased number aeffect of 
----------
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DEVELOPING A SCOPE OF WORK FOR AN EVALUATION
 
A clearly thought-out and well written scope of work is essential
if an evaluation is 
to be worth (1) the funds expended on it and
(2) the investment of AID and host-country personnel time that the
execution of a good evaluation typically requires. 
A good scope of
work makes it possible for the evaluation team to concentrate on
substantive matters and to produce a report that effectively presents
che information most needed by project managers and other decision­
makers. 
On the other hand, a hastily drafted scope, or even one
that is vaguely worded or overly general, causes the evaluation
team to fritter away precious time on procedural matters and makes
it highly likely that the evaluation report will be delayed in sub­mission and that, when submitted, it will fail to present clearly

stated and easily utilized conclusions and recommendations. 

these and other reasons, project managers For
 are urged to realize that
an investment of time early on in producing the best possible scope
of work will, in nearly all cases, 
result in a greater time-and-effort
 
savings later on.
 
For the majority of evaluations currently referred to 
in AID as

"special" or "in-depth", the following is therefore suggested as 
a
general framework for 
a scope of work most likely to guide the

evaluation team in producing a report useful to both project

managers and program decision makers. 
It is suggested that the
first version produced be regarded as only preliminary and that it
be circulated within the mission for comment to ascertain that it
most effectively presents what the mission needs. 
 Project officers
are urged, wherever possible, to involve host-country counterparts
in developing the scope so that it also meets 
their needs and
involves them in the evaluation process at the earliest possible

point.
 
C6untry Name
 
"TITLE OF PROJECT (OR PROPOSED TITLE OF EVALUATION REPORT)"
 
Scope of Work for Evaluation
 
I. The Project.* Specify project title, number, cost, andlife-of-project dates. 
 Suggest also state briefly what is
generally known as 
agreed upon regarding the present status of
the project (e.g., lauded as 
successful, delayed in implementacion,
 
or having completed all major inputs).
 
II. Purpose and Timing of the Evaluation. This section should
 
specify the following:
 
*Modify appropriately if evaluation covers more than one project
(i.e., 
a program) or only selected components of a single project.
Note that this out'line can easily be used as an easy guide for

organizing information needed for scopes of work not only for
evaluations but also for other similar investigations such as
assessments, studies, technical assistance analyses, and so on.
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1. Why is the evaluation being done? 
 (To be stated
in terms specific to details of the project and missxon
future activities rather than a generality such as

"Terminal", or "To measure progress in meeting project

objectives.")
 
2. When will it be done and why at this time?
 
3. Who is to do what with its findings and recom­
mendations?
 
III. Questions the evaluation team will answer. 
What are the
main questions that managers responsible for the project want
answers to? 
 What are secondary questions? This section should
state "The report of the evaluation should answer the 
following
major questions" and should then list a relatively small number(no more than 5 to 10 maximum) of major (essential) questions
that the persons responsible for the project want answers 
too.
(Note that some of the major questions might be expanded upon by
subordinate clarifying questions 

-- e.g., 
"What are the circum­stances responsible for this and how might they be changed?")
The scope might then list "Additional (secondary) questions to be
answered." 
 Note that the listing of specific, explicit questions
with an indication of priorities, is important for getting a
report that tells the intended audience what they need to know.
(A scope that merely says "The team shall address the following
subjects, 
--
matters, concerns, or issues 

--" is far more likely
to produce a rambling report that does not pinpoint the aspects
of the project most needing attention or does not effectively

provide useful new information).
 
If the scope is to specify individua. tasks for each team member,
this can also be done here (or in section IV as "responsibilities

of individual team members").
 
For most evaluations it is suggested that the questions posed be
based on a recognition of the present status of the project (as sup­portable by documentation) rather than be stated as 
if nothing
is known about the present status. 
 (E.g., not "Were the original
assumptions valid?" but "Why have so few of the intended bene­ficiaries participated in the project and is it possible to increase
their participation? 
And, if so, how?")
 
IV. Team compositioD. This section should specify the following:
 
1. 
What composition (i.e., host-country government,
host-country contractor, USAID, AID/W, U.S. contractor)

is required?
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2. What expertise and male/female balance is required?
 
V. Methodology and Procedures. 
The scope should provide answers
 
to the following:
 
1. What should be the duration (and time-phasing) of the
 
evaluation? Specify, related to this: ­
a. 
Whether one or more team members should be available
 in advance of rest of team (to do preparatory work such
 
as document or data analysis) or to continue after the
 
rest of the team (e.g., to see report through to early

finalization), and
 
b. If contractors are expected to work (and to be paid)

for six day weeks, and
 
c. 
What should be the appropriate division of time
between capital city interviews and document review,
field site visits, and analysis and report writing?
 
2. What g-aeral methofology will be used? 
 Note specifically:
 
--How will change be measured? (What data exists for
thi team to review to determine actual project impact

to late or projected future impact?)
 
3. What 
documents (e.g., PP, pre-ious evaluatiorn, other donors'

reports, sector analyses) should each team member have reviewed

and be familiar with prior to beginning the team investigation?
(Thes. to be provided by the mission or AID/W.)
 
VI. Fundi-!.. 
 This should include an estimate of the cost of the

evaluEato 
 as well as a statement as 
to how the costs will be met
(i.e., project funds, PDS funds, 
or other source).
 
VII. Reporting requirements
 
1. Format of the report
 
The report will contain the following sections:
 
--Executive Summary (two pages, single spaced, including

statement of purpose of the AID project(s) reviewed and
 
of the evaluation);
 
--Basic Project Identification Data Facesheet (see attached);
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--Statement of conclusions (short and succinct with
 
topic identified by subhead) and recommendations
 
(corresponding to conclusions and worded, whenever
 
possible, to specify who, or which agency, should take
 
the recommended Lction);
 
--Body of reDort (which includes a description of the
 
country context in which the project was developed and
 
which provides thE information on which the conclusions
 
and recommendations were based); and 
-- Appendices as necessary (including, minimally, the
evaluation's scope of work and a description of the
 
methodology used and, possibly, methodological recom­
mendations for future evaluations).
 
2. Submission of report
 
The scope should specify both what portion or version of
 
the report (e.g., preliminary draft) will be presented

to the mission at completion of the field portion of

the evaluation and when the final draft will be submitted
 
for mission review. It should also state that the team
 
leader will be responsible for seeing the report through

to timely, professional-level, completion.
 
3. Debriefing(s). Timing and audience(s) to be specified.
 
AID/Asia Missions Evaluation Workshop, 3/81
 
Facesheet To Be Used
 
for Evaluation Report
 
BASIC PROJECT IDNTIFICATION DATA 
1. Country: 
2. Project Title:
 
3. Project Number (grant and 	loan where applicable):
 
4. Project Dates:
 
a. First Project Agreeent:
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5. PRoject Funding: 
a. A.I.D. Bilateral Funding (loan or grant):
b. Other Major Donors: 
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TOTAL $ 
6. 	 Mode of Implementation (specify contractual 
arrangements and numbers): 
7. Project Design (A.I.D. and contractor):
 
8. Responsible Mission Officials: 
a. Mission Director (s):

b. Project Officer(s): 
9. Previous Evaluation and Reviews 
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10. Cost of Present Evaluation:
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b. Contract:
 
C. Other: 
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I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
 
Problem and Overview. Bangladesh faces a demographic crisis of
 
greater magnitude than nearly any other country today. It is
 
one of the world's poorest yet most populous nations with 90
 
million people crowded into an area only the size of Wisconsin.
 
Among this largely malnourished and illiterate population, 90
 
percent is rural, 50 percent of rural dwellers are landless, and
 
landlessness is increasing. Demand for labor has risen by only

1.2 percent per annum in recent years while the population has
 
been growing at 2.8 percent. Under Bangladesh's president Ziaur
 
Rahman, and with the assistance of AID and other foreign donors,

connitment to lowering fertility has been strong. Nevertheless,

investments have as yet failed to have the desired impact in lower­
ing the growth rate. Despite indications of desire of individual
 
Bangladeshis to limit their family size, the government's family

planning program has been relatively ineffective achieving a na­
tional rate of prevalence of contraceptive use of less than 13
 
percent. Yet, unless rapid population growth can be brought under
 
control all other development efforts to Lenefit Bangladesh's
 
very poor majority will have been invain.
 
U.S. Assistance. Since 1972 U.S. population assistance to Bangla­
desh has totaled some $48 million in the form of relief and rehabilitation
 
funds, two bilateral projects, and intermediary projects centrally­
funded by AID/Washington. The stated purpose of AID's bilateral
 
project of FY 1973-75 was "to help the BOG (Bangladesh government)

make available basic contraceptives to as niany eligible couples
 
as possible and to institutionalize family planning delivery services
 
on a national basis." Its longer-range goal was expressed as
 
"(1) to slow population growth by reducing fertility rates to
 
replacement level with low birth and death rates in 30 years,
 
or as soon thereafter as possible, and (2)to reduce the annual
 
population growth rate from an estimated 3 percent to 2.8 percent
 
over the (BOG's) five-year plan period ending June 1978." The
 
stated purpose of the bilateral project of FY 1976-80 has been
 
"to develop a functioning national institutional structure providing

family planning services and populatijn/fami'y planning information
 
and education on a continuing basis to the people of Bangladesh."
 
This project had a less specific goal, namely, uto reduce the
 
rate of natural population growth as a critical factor in social
 
and economic development."
 
Purpose of the Present Evaluation. Despite several internal evalua­
tions and evaluative studies foc-used on specific components of 
the program, no conprehensive, external evaluation had been under­
taken as of 1980 when plans were being made for three additional
 
years of AID support at a cost of about $65 million. This evalua­
tion was therefore scheduled with the following purposes: (1)

to assess AID's performance to date in helping to reduce fertility
 
in Bangladesh, (2)to make recommendations for improved effective­
ness 
in proposed new family planning and population activities
 
inBangladesh, and (3)to make recommendations for improved effec­
tiveness of AID family planning assistance elsewhere. The evalua­
tion was timed so that its findings and recommendations would
 
be available prior to the review and finalization of USAID/Dacca's
 
new project paper.
 
AID Acconplishments. 
AID has been the principal donor of contra­ceptive supplies and of family planning training for Bangladeshis,
which began under the first bilateral project and without which
the BOG would not have been able to begin nationwide delivery
of family planning services. 
At the same time, through its cen­trally-funded intermediary organizations, AID succeeded 
in launching
an experimental community-based distribution project, research
on the effectiveness of variou; contraceptives under Bangladeshi
conditions, and a commercial contraceptive sales network that
has made pills and condoms readily available throughout the country.
Under the second project, AID has continued to be the major provider
of contraceptive supplies while providing for the nationwide intro­duction of voluntary sterilization services and the launching
of additional private-sector community-based distribution projects.
Also during this time, USAID/Dacca initiated an operations research
program and an innovative project to give Bangladesh's family
planning field supervisors practical training in Indonesia.
 
Effectiveness. 
AID has been an effective supporter of the Bangla­desh program even while it has been only partially successful
in meeting its stated project objectives. 
A "national institutional
structure providing family planning services and population/family
planning information and education on a continuing basis" has
been established, but it has yet to begin to function effectively.
Fieldworkers are not well trained nor highly motivated. 
Organiza­tional issues stemming from the latest attempt to 
integrate the
family planning and health systems will have to be resolved and
fieldworker training and supervision vastly improved before either
AID's project goals or those of the BDG wil}be met. 
 Numerous
private voluntary organizations, several supported by AID, have
proven much more effective although among smaller target popula­tions. 
AID is praised by Bangladeshis and other donors for USAID/
Dacca's competert and cooperative population officers, provision
of contraceptives, medical kits, and participant training oppor­tunities, and the ability to rapidly make available high-quality
short-term consultants. 
 USAID/Dacca and AID/Washington's Office
of Population have played crucial complementary roles in providing
this support. 
 AID is faulted for providing only the Norinyl brand
of oral contraceptives and for impeding Bangladesh's attempts
to meet the active demand for menstrual regulation services which
often serve as 
a means of introducing mor, 
effective contraception.
 
Major Recommendations for Immediate Consideration
1. The USAID/Dacca plan to revise its portfolio to give population
planning first priority should be vigorously supported by AID/Washington.
2. 
In order to effectively implement the greatly expanded measu'es
proposed for its 
new project, organizational and staffing changes
should be made within USAID/Dacca. Ideally, an 
Office of Population
Planning should be established headed by an assistant mission
director. Alternatively, the present Population, Health, and
Women's Division should become a 
Population Division and undertake
only activities that directly support the mission priority on

reducing population growth.
3. Conditions precedent or 
covenants for the project agreement
for the proposed new project should include specification of minimal
criteria for the BOG sterilization surveillance agreement. 
Addi­tional conditions or covenants are 
also suggested.
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BASIC PROGRAM IDENTIFICATION DATA
 
1. 	Country: Bangladesh
 
2. 	Bilateral project titles: 
 "Bangladesh Population/Family Planning"
 
3. 	 Bilateral project nt'vbers: 388-11-580-0001 and 388-0001 
4. 	 Program implementation: 
a. 	First project agreement: FY 73
 
b. 	Final obligation: Ongoing
 
c. 	Final input delivery: Ongoing
 
5. 	U.S. contributions to program funding:

a. 	A.I.D. bilateral funding: 
 $40.9 million (grants, FY 73-80)
b. 	Other funding: 
 $8 million (approximate)
(Relief and Rehabilitation funds plus AID/Washington

centrally-funded intermediary organizations)
 
6. 	Mode of implenentation:
 
a. Project Agreements between USAID/Dacca and Bangladesh Ministry

of Health and Population Control;
b. 	Centrally-funded agreements between AID/Washington (Office of Population)

and selected population intermediaries; and
 
c. 	Agreement between USAID/Dacca and Population Services International
 
7. 	Responsible mission officials:
 
a: 	 Mission directors: Anthony Schwarzwalder 1972-74, Joseph Toner
 
1974-79, and Frank Kimball 1979-present;
b. 	Responsible project officers: 
 Michael Jordan 1972-77, Dallas Voran
1973-77, Charles Gurney 1977-present, and John Dumm 1977-present.
 
8. 	Previous evaluations and reviews:
 
a. 	Project Appraisal Report (PAR), June 27, 1975;
b. 	Project Appraisal Report (PAR), February 18, 1977;
 
c. 
"First Annual Joint BDG-USG Population/Family Planning Program

Review, 17-18 February, 1977;" and
d. 	Project Evaluation Summary covering period 2/77 to 2/78.
 
9. 	Host country exchange rates:
 
a. 	Name of currency: Taka
 
b. 	Exchange rate at time of project: 15 taka = U.S. $1.
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Part II 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
 
The major findings and conclusions of the present evaluationare summarized here, each followed immediately, where appropri­ate, by one or more recommendations that derive from the respec­tive conclusion or "finding." 
 In Part V below, sections with
corresponding headings present details upon which these findings

and conclusions are based.*
 
MAJOR CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
 
1. Impact of the Bangladesh Program.* Ultimately, a successful
population program Is
one that produces a demographic impact
(acutal reduction in the population growth rate) leading there­after to a socioeconomic impact (a better standard of living
for the majority of the population) and a viable, self-sustaining
economy. In Bangladesh, the population and family planning
program has not yet begun to have this ultimate demographic
impact. Prevalence of contraceptive use has increased, however,
from approximately 8.3 percent of married couples of reproductive
age in 1975-76 to about 12.66 percent by mid-1979, and there
has been 
a slight decrease in the crude birth rate making for
an estimated 2.4 million births averted during 1976-1980.
Evidence suggests that the population and family planning program
is
one of the leading causes of this decline. Prevalence levels
above 30 percent have been achieved by intensive community­based distribution projects, which demonstrates that much more
can be accomplished with the right mix of inputs--supervision,
training, community participation, and commodity support.
 
2. Political Comitment of the Bangladesh Government. The
commitment of the government of Bangladesh to a 
policy of ener­getic fertility control is strong and unequivocal at the pinnacle
of government with President Ziaur Rahman forthrightly taking
the lead in setting the tone for oolicy and exhorting the bureau­cracy and citizenry to reduce fertility. This commitment is
 
*Throughout this report "program," when used without further
 
specification, means the total effort inBangladesh to reduce
fertility through both governmental and non-governmental promo­tion of family planning as well 
as 
"beyond family planning"
developmental activities such as female income-generating pro­jects or integrated rural development schemes. 
 Where reference
is to the government (i.e., national) program per se, this

will be made explicit.
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also pervasive within the Planning Commission where the need
 
for unambiguous "population control" and ambitious targets

to reduce fertility form a central part of the 1980-85 Five-

Year Plan. Nevertheless, the well-articulated policy of the
 
President has yet to be effectively acted on by the various
 
parts of the bureaucracy charged with implementation.
 
Recommendation: 
 USAID, the Embassy, and AID/Washington

should continue to provide reinforcing support for senior
 
policymakers in the Office of the President, the Planning

Commission, and the Ministry of Health and Population

Control in their efforts to maintain a strong fertility

control policy and should strive to develop means to reward
 
this commitment and especially its translation into action.
 
In particular, USAID should indicate that it is prepared

to offer technical assistance to the BOG in conceptualizing

and implementing innovative measures in "beyond family
planning."
 
3. Effectiveness of the BOG Program. The government program
is still of limited effectiveness in promoting and delivering

family planning services. In large part this is due to the
 
general handicaps under which any national BOG program suffers:
 
the grappling for a "right" path in the highly politicized

environment of this nation only eight years old, over-centralized
 
and administratively weak bureaucracies, the lack of a "serve­
the-people" orientation among government workers, a weak physical

infrastructure, traditional political patronage relationships,

and a widespread fatalism among the peasantry expressed as

the "will of Allah." In addition, the program has suffered
 
from disruptions and staff disgruntlement through repeated

reorganization. First itwas a "vertical" program, then inte­
grated with health, then "disintegrated," and now again reor­
ganizing to become "integrated" once more. Despite this, it
 
seems generally regarded as one of the most effective of all
 
of the government's programs. A functioning national infrastruc­
ture providing family planaing services and family planning

information isnow in place. 
What remains is to energize it.
 
4. Effectiveness of AID Support. 
While AID has not fully suc­
ceeded in meeting all the ambitious goals and purposes stated
 
in its project papers, it has been effective in its provision

of support. AID was the first donor to have a staff person

working full-time on Bangladesh population problems (1972),
to develop a major project in support of the national program
(1973), and to supply contraceptives on a large scale (1973).

AID is praised for having had competent Dacca-based population

officers able to work effectively with both the Bangladeshis

and other donor representatives. AID/Washington's Office of

Population has also played an important role through its inter­
mediaries and its reliable provision of contraceptives and
medical supply kits as well as high-quality short-term 
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technical advisors. 
AID support to the BOG program will not

succeed inproducing a demographic impact, however, until the
program's service delivery elements become more effective or

unless AID is able to channel resources in ways least likely
to be thwarted by the lethargy and bottlenecks of the government
 
program.
 
5. AID Funded Intermediary and Private Organizations. Achieve­ments 
in the private sector by AID-funded U.S. intermediary

and private organizations have been impressive and of a scale
probably unmatched in any other AID-assisted country. 
The
 presence and roles of the intermediaries are well-accepted
by the government and the people they serve. 
Their enhancement

of community participation is exemplary; their service, standard­setting, training, and ability to undertake innovative activities

constitute an essential mix of actions highly complementary
to government programs. 
Both USAID/Dacca and AID/Washington's
Office of Population deserve high marks for their skillful
and facilitative management of this important cluster of resour­
ces.
 
Recommendations: 
AID should continue to fund and guide
private-sector organizations into areas that bolster the
government program or where high prevalence rates (e.g.
25-40 percent) are 
likely to be achieved. All AID-funded

organizations with conmunity-based distribution programs
should be required to adopt the "prevalence programming"

tool (see below and also Appendix F). as a measure of per­formance and goal setting. 
 Assumin4 it proves workable,

this experience should demonstrate applicability of preva­lence progranning to tne government program and hasten
 
its wider adoption.
 
USAID and AID/Washington should again explore with the
Syntex Corporation the development of special packaging
for both the "Maya" and low-dose "Ovacon" oral contracep­tives supplied by AID through the Social Marketing Project.
 
6. USAID-Proposed Project for FY 81-83. The evaluation team
endorses the new Project Paper and its assistance strategy
for the period, FY 1981-83. Successful implementation, however,

will require greater commitment and effort by both USAID/Dacca

and AID/W than comparable projects in
more rapidly modernizing

countries (e.g., 
Thailand and the Philippines).
 
Recommendations: The following concerns should be specifi­cally addressed in the subsequent project agreement, either
 
as covenants or as formal understandings within implemen­
tation letters:
 
a. Minimal criteria for surveillance of voluntary steriliza­tion activities including service standards and provisions

to assure compliance;
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b. Completion of an emergency contraceptive resupply

action before the next monsoon;
 
c. That those NGOs/PVOs funded by USAID which service
 discrete geographic areas be required to implement the
 
prevalence prograning tool.
 
It is further suggested that USAID continue to tranche
 
population funds on at least a year-by-year basis and
 
do so specifically contingent upon successful implementation

of the sterilization portion of the agreement; the mission
 
should also consider tranching funds according to a more
frequent (e.g., semi-annual) review schedule. As stated
 
elsewhere, if the project is to be implemented with maximal
 
effectiveness, it is essential that the population staff
be expanded with the recriiitment of a public health physi­
cian being first priority. Finally, AID/Washington should
 
be prepared to support creative re-programming, by USAID/

Dacca, of project funds to meet program needs and targets

of opportunity that are not manifest at this time but
 
that arise during the next three years.
 
OTHER CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMIENDATIONS
 
7. Population Growth and Fertility Reduction Goals. Virtually

all development goals adopted by the BOG under President Zia
 
are "intentionally set perhaps unrealistically high, the belief
 being that this is necessary to energize people to bring about
 
the progress that is realistically achievable. Thus, the govern­
ment's anbitious population growth reduction goals, desirable
 
as they may be, 
are almost certain to be unachievable. However,
inpart because they are perceived to be unrealistic, service
 
delivery staff tend to ignora them. Already field staff do
 
not appear to take very seriously targelts that have been assigned

them. 
To the extent that actual economic planning and investment
 
decisions are based on these unrealistic assumptions and projec­
tions of population change, serious misallocations of resources
 
could result and the entire development planning mechanism
 
could be distorted, proven faulty and, over time, lose credibili­
ty.
 
Recommendation: 
 USAID, in consort with other principal

donors (especially the World Bank and the UNFPA) should
 
consider once again engaging in a dialogue with the BDG
 
at appropriate senior levels of the Planning Commission,

the Ministry of Health and Population Control, and the
 
Office of the President to urge an overhaul and revision
 
of growth rate goals, targets for program achievement,
 
and future population size projections.
 
8. Target-Setting and Program Performance Management. 
Much
 
confusion exists among field personnel about how to distinguish
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between "cumulative new a.eptors" and "current users" (or
prevalence). This contributes to a major shortcoming of the

national program namely that inadequate attention is given
to increasing the numbers of actual contraceptive users. Too
often the recruitment of new acceptors assumes nearly exclusive
priority while followup actions are neglected. Related to
this isthe serious and almost universal underestimation at

all field levels of current population size and the present
number of eligible couples. Typically, program managers are
relying for both on 1974 census figures, which understate both
population size and the number of eligible couples by approxi­
mately 21 percent.
 
Recommendations:
 
a. National goals for reduced growth rates (at all organiza­tional levels) need to be translated into goals for increas­ing the prevalence of contraceptive use. USAID/Dacca

should consistently seek means to have this come about.
 
b. Management and field staff at all levels need to be
trained to use prevalence as a measure of program perfor­
mance. 
 USAID could initiate this at once, for example,
by including instruction about prevalence concepts into
the Indoresian training program for Bangladesh field super­
visors. 
 (The Western Consortium group contracted by UNFPA
for fieldworker training could also be-a primary technical
assistance and field training resource for this action.)
 
c. Estimates of population size and eligible couples

must be updated from 1974 figures so that all levels of
the service delivery systems are equipped with current
 target numbers. (The suggestion that this revision be
delayed until the 1981 census results are available should
be rejected because these results will not be in hand

until at least 1982 by which time the currently used data

will be eight years out of date.) Eligible couple registers

should also be updated intandem with this exercise, but
only aTter field staff have been given new eligible couple

estimates and trained inprevalence programming.
preparation of new estimates of population size and 
The
esti­
mates of eligible couples could be quickly accomplished

with electronic hand or desk calculators at the central
 
level and distributed to the field.
 
9. Logistics. Commodity management continues to receive inade­quate government attention at all levels. 
 The position of
Deputy Director for procurement inthe Ministry of Health and
Population Control has been vacant for more than 12 months
and experienced central staff are lacking. 
Supplies at district

and thana (sub-district) levels are typically less than recom­
mended 
--often less than one months's supply 
-- and funds
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frequently are unavailable for moving stocks from district

warehouses to thana storerooms. Meanwhile, the three central
 
warehouses periodically are filled beyond capacity seriously

constraining commodity movement operations.
 
Recommendation: An emergency resupply action needs to
 
be carried out nationwide during the next three months
 (before the six-month monsoon season begins), 
as was agreed

to by the Secretary for Population Control and Family

Planning in November, 1980. 
 This should bring district
 
and thana supply levels up to standard (3months supply

at each). At the same time, supply management forms should
 
again be distributed, field supervisors ("TFPOs") and
 
store-keepers again instructed in how to maintain adequate

stock levels, and "first in,first out" procedures rein­
forced. The warehouse situation also immediately requires

remedy. The Chittagong warehouse is now so full that
 
withdrawal of older stocks is impossible. If one third
 
or so of the present stock can be moved out during the
 
next two or three months, then additional warehouse space

would not be required. The warehouse staff should also
 
be quickly brought to full strength.
 
10. Inadequacy of Training and Supervision
 
a. Paramedics. 
"Family welfare visitors" (CFVs)--clinic-based

female MCH paramedics--are the major clinical support personnel
in the sterilization program and are also responsible for IUD
 
insertion. 
 (There are now 1,500 FWVs who have completed an
 
18-month course following matriculation, the equivalent of
 
10th grade.) While they have considerable factual knowledge,

they receive so little hands-on clinical experience during

their training that many are unable to do the tasks specified

in their job descriptions.
 
Recommendation: USAID should monitor the planned FWV re­
training for its prompt initiation, practical control,
 
clinical experience under supervision, and certification
 
of actual skills--as distinct from knowledge--at conclusion;

at a minimum this necessitates that USAID devote special

attention to the support and monitoring of training that is envisaged as part of the CARE component of its proposed 
new project. So that more extensive actual clinical exper­
ience can he inserted into FWV training, it is suggested
that their training include internships in both ob-gyn
and pediatric wards of busy hospitals. 
b. Fieldworkers. Fieldworkers ("FWAs," "FPAs," 
and "FWWs"),
 
now over some 30,000 in number, represent a major failure in

the delivery system thus far. Their training has not been

sufficiently practical and their supervision is too half-hearted
 
to render them a motivated effective corps of promotors of
family planning and distributors of pills and condoms.
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Recommendation: 
 Given that these fieldworkers have a 
direct
responsiblity for what happens to the U.S.-supplied centra­ceptives, USAID should seek a more active role in encourag­ing and supporting fieldworker retraining and upgrading
for practical skills. AID/Washington should strongly
support USAID/Dacca attempts to render both their training

and supervision more efficient.
 
c. Participant Training. 
Many Bangladeshis in key population
posts have had U.S.-based participant training. 
However, numerous
problems related to this training have led to the USAID-BOG
phase-out agreement. 
In its place the BDG and USAID/Dacca
have initiated an innovative program to give practical training
in Indonesia to Bangladeshi family planning field supervisors.
It appears, however, that many of these supervisors do not
apply lessons learned once they have returned to Bangladesh.
 
Recoamendation: 
 USAID/Dacca should proceed with the pro­posed evaluaiTon of the effectiveness of this training
and with the "fast-funding" grant procedure also proposed
whereby funds would be made available quickly and with
a minimum of red-tape, to support promising projects pro­posed by the field supervisors 
--
as 
is done in Indonesia.
AID/Washington should support this 
as a major opportunity
to make the field elements of the program more effective
(thereby also keeping attention on methods other than
sterilization). USAID/Dacca should also consider sponsoring
the systematic evaluation of its entire participant training

effort.
 
11. Contraceptive Method Mix. 
 Since July, 1977, pill distri­bution has remained unchanged while condom distribution has
increased 30 percent. 
 Emko (foam) use is small and static.
Use of injectibles is small and scattered but expanding. 
Female
sterilization, by those ready to terminate childbearing, is
acclerating significantly. 
 IUDs, long unpopular because of
the unsatisfactory follow-up of the Lippes Loop, 
are gaining
popularity since introduction of the Copper-T. 
In all this,
however, there is little emphasis 
on child spacing.
 
Recommendation: 
 USAID should constantly reiterate the
need to motivate younger couples to contracept for spacing.
Operations research should be directed at the provision
of services to the large 20-to-29 age group.
 
12. An Oral Contraceptive Choice. 
Norinyl 1+53, provided by
AID is the most widely distributed and used oral contraceptive
in Bangladesh. 
However, there is universal discussion of vague
symptoms, real or perceived, that cause a high discontinuation
rate soon after acceptance. High continuation rates have been
achieved in private sector projects that use active, informed
field motivators and supply a small number of maternal and
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child health services along with family planning. Nevertheless
 
there is 
a need for an alternative oral contraceptive that
 
will have the same wide range of distribution as Norinyl 1+50.
 
Recommendations: AID/Washington should initiate a 
discus­
sion of an alternate to Norinyl 1+50. Acceptance rates
 
for various formulations of oral contraceptives are avail­
able from numerous countries. There are fewer, vague,

general complaints about oral contraceptives with estrogen

doses below 50 micrograms, although breakthrough bleeding

and amenorrhea remain problems. 
At the same time, USAID/

Dacca should take concrete steps to see that the planned

retraining of all fieldworkers prepares them to motivate
 
more effectively for family planning and especially to
 
know how to deal with side-effects issues.
 
13. Sterilization. Sterilization is culturally acceptable

to Bangladeshis with an increasing preference being shown for
 
female sterilization. 
Deaths which have occured have been
 
thoroughly investigated. With regard to procedures currently

employed, surgical skills are acceptable; the areas requiring
immediate improvement are the anesthetic regimen, aseptic tech­
nique, preoperative screening, and postoperative surveillance.
 
While no surgical procedure is without risk, inBangladesh

todarthe risks a 
woman regularly incurs through childbirth
 
and abortion are much greater than the relative risks of sterili­
zation.
 
Recommendation: 
 USAID and other donors should assist the
 
BOG to improve the quality of sterilization services.
 
Priorities recommended, in order of importance are:
 
a. Insuring a better anesthetic regimen for female sterili­
zation (to include preoperative sedation-analgesia program,

local anesthetic field block technique, and patient monitor­ing);
 
b. Aseptic technique improvement, especially instrument
 
preparation and handling;
 
c. More careful preoperative screening to rule out high

risk clients; and
 
d. Better immediate postoperative surveillance of women
 
recovering from tubectomies.
 
To the extent that AID becomes more actively involved in the

sterilization program, the following should be considered:
 
a. Preoperative Evaluation (Screening). A sampling of the
 
physical examination charts, an on-site survey of examinations
 being performed, and a random check of actual weights and blood
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pressure measurements were conducted during the evaluation.
 
Omissions and inaccuracies of significant importance to the
quality of preoperative screening were identified. 
The potential
impact in an expanded program is an 
increase in morbidity and
 
mortality of clients volunteering for sterilization.
 
Recommendations: USAID should encourage the BOG to take
 
measures to ensure that paramedics ("FWVs") responsible

for preoperative evaluation are retrained to improve their

clinical skills. History-taking, weighing, taking of
 
vital signs, and physical examination skills should be

reviewed. FWVs should pass a standardized practical test
 
of these skills for accuracy, completeness, and timeliness
 
before returning to the field.
 
b. Laboratory Evaluation. 
A sampling of laboratory examination
 
reports, an on-site survey of laboratory work being conducted,

and a random check of hemoglobin measurements were conducted.
 
Again omissions and inaccuracies were identified that could
 
contribute to increased morbidity and mortality.
 
Recommendation: USAID should encourage the BOG to ensure
 
that personnel responsible for laboratory work pass a
practical examination to verify their ability to perform

the tests within a standard of error acceptable for the
 
procedure.- In addition an on-site survey of laboratory
tools and supplies should be conducted and periodically

re-checked.
 
c. Aseptic Technique. Aseptic technique is chain of steps
a 

no stronger than its weakest link. 
 A sampling of busy steriliza­
tion units at work revealed breaks in technique during prepara­tion and delivery of instrunents and linen packs to the operating

theater.
 
Recommendation: USAID should encourage the BOG to ent ,re

the regular on-site observation of persons responsible

for maintenance and handling of instruments, gloves, and
linen packs. Their precise management of sterile and
 
nonsterile but clean materials, boiling of instruments,

and autoclaving of packs should be monitored from beginning

to end. A recurrent review of the number and condition
 
of sterilization units should ensure that there are enough
instruments to permit time for cleaning and sterilization
 
before the demand for re-use.
 
d. Number of Clients. At several busy sterilizdtion centers,
the patient load exceeds the capacity of the physical facilities
 
and operators to provide quality care.
 
Recommendation: 
 USAID should seek means to ensure that

the BOG attempts to enforce its limitation of 12 procedures
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to be performed by one operator per day. The BOG should
 
also be encouraged to provide better pre- and postoperative
 
areas and sleeping accommodations.
 
e. Supervision of Sterilization Units
 
Recommendation: If AID is to give increased support to
 
sterilization, the surveillance component specified as
 
a condition precedent in the new project paper must be
 
carefully worked out and implemented. USAID should request

the BOG representatives to clarify the chain of command
 
extending from the district level 
to the site of operations.

Specific responsibilities should be clearly stated. Where
 
positions or responsibility are unoccupied, a time schedule
 
for appointment should be agreed upon and an alternative
 
supervisor named. On-site observations by members of
 
the chain of command should be regularly scheduled. A
 
plan should also be made for unannounced periodic third­
party surveys. Survey teams should be made up of Bangla­
deshi professionals who would have the power to correct
 
as well as observe procedures. An expatriate advisor
 
should be an ex-officio member of the team.
 
A schedule of rewards for meeting goals and technical
 
proficiency could be announced to recognize units and
 
individuals who perform exceptionally well. Consideration
 
should also be given to announcing a schedule of censures
 
so that personnel can be encouraged to improve below average

performance of duties.
 
f. Tubectomy vs. Vasectomy. Over the last four years the number
of tubectomies has increased by a factor of three while the 
number of vasectomies has decreased by a factor of four. (In

1977, 66,000 vasectomies were performed while in the first
 
six months of 1980 only 8,400 were done.)
 
Recomendation: 
 USAID should request the BOG to initiate
 
intensive client motivation and physician training activi­
ties to reactivate male sterilization as a viable program

method. Attention should be directed to methtods of communi­
cation which will reach and be understood by illiterate,
 
rural men.
 
14. USAID/Dacca Population Staffing.
 
a. U.S. Staff. The mission has not been adequately staffed
 
to simultaneously and fully meet the objectives of the present

bilateral project while at the same time coordinating, in the
 
most effective manner possible, the numerous centrally-funded

project activities that have been important elements inestab­
lishing contraceptive availability and acceptance in Bangladesh.

The mission's Division of Population, Health, and Women has
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four U.S. direct-hire officers but only two work full-time
 
on population. The present staffing pattern is
even more inade­quate for the t:sk of getting the maximum impact from the in­creased number and greater programatic as well as medical com­plexity of the activities proposed for FY 81-83 funding.
is especially serious given the centrality of sterilization
This
 
in the proposed new project and the fact that USAID/Dacca's

stated program strategy has recognized the need to place first
 
priority on population.
 
Recommendations: The USAID/Dacca plan to revise its assis­tance portfolio to give population planning first priority

should be endorsed and vigorously supported by AID/Washing­ton. To effectively implement the expanded scope of family
planning service delivery and '-beyond family planning"

measures outlined for the extremely complex new project,

organizational and staffing changes should be made within
USAID/Dacca. 
For greatest likelihood of effectiveness,
it is specifically recommended that an Office of Population
Planning be established headed by an Assistant Mission
 
Director. Additional key staff would include 1) 
a deputy
and senior population officer for service delivery, 2)

a public health physician responsible for support to mater­nal child health and voluntary sterilization services,

3) a population advisor responsible for integrating popula­tion concerns into agricultural extension, education,

women's programs, and rural development, and 4) 
an assistant
population advisor to work with private sector grantees.

Recognizing that USAID/Dacca's senior full-time population

officer is scheduled to rotate soon to another post, it
is essential that AID/Washington actively seek a high­quality replacement. Recognizing also that AID now has
difficulty finding, in-house, population officers qualified

and willing to take responsibility overseas for managing

assistance to population programs, it is strongly urged
that AID/Washington develop a plan for again building

up its personnel strength, and thus competence, in popula­
tion planning and program implementation.
 
b. Bangladeshi Staff. USAID/Dacca is serving as a 
talent identi­fication and training ground for young Bangladeshi professionals

who are subsequently hired away at much higher salaries by
foreign firms, other foreign donors, and even by AID-funded
 
intermediaries. 
 Two valuable foreign-service-national (FSN)
population officers have already been lost in this way and
there is nothing to suggest that the most recently-recruited

Bangladeshi professionals will not be similarly hired away.
 
Reconnendation: Washington should recognize the false
 
economy of a FSN salary scale set so far below that of

competing organizations that USAID/Dacca cannot retain
 
many of the talented people itrecruits and should seek
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(\ 
to bring about a more realistic recalculation of the FSN
 
salary schedule. To remedy this, the next local salary
 
survey In Dacca chould also include the plethora of U.N.

agencies which have been excluded from the Department

of State-sponsored survey even though, in Bangladesh,

they--the U.N. agencies--are major employers of scarce

technical and professional talent exceeding by far employ­
ment levels of the U.S. government.
 
15. Beyond Family Planning. Bangladesh's demographic crisis
is already of such great proportions that efforts to strengthen
family planning service delivery should simultaneously be accom­panied by a range of small-to-large scale "beyond family plan­
ning" initiatives, which USAID/Dacca is
now contemplating.

Receptivity exists at government levels and many small-scale
 government and private sector projects are already experiment­ing with alternative approaches to achieving fertility reduction.
 
Reconiendation: AID/Washington should give full, active
 
support to USAID/Dacca's expressed plan to develop a 
FY
 
83 portfolio in which the majority of new project activity
is designed in such a way as to contribute to fertility

reduction. USAID/Jacca should continue to proceed swiftly

with this "portfolio reorientation" via both its operations

research mechanism and by enlisting appropriate outside
 
technical expertise.
 
16. Donor Coordination. Effective cooperation has evolved
during the past three years among AID, the World Bank, and
 
UNFPA (the three major donors supporting the Bangladesh program).
This has been due in large part to the personal efforts, qualifi­
cations, and high professional competence of the three donors'

Dacca-based population advisors. 
The three advisors now routine­ly share information, work together to avoid duplication, and,

when appropriate, adopt common positions on program issues

requiring government attention. 
At six-month intervals, a
larger assembly of donors is convened at a "Local Consultative
Group Meeting" and periodically less formal meetings take place
 
among UNFPA, Bank, and AID headquarters' staffs in the United
States. From the field perspective, pioblems in this area
have arisen due to the large number of Bank missions and with

IOCA's directive to USAID/Dacca to monitor Bank proposals (the

so-called "early warning system").
 
Recommendations: 
 The focal point for donor coordination
 
should remain in Dacca where donor representatives have
 
more curre-it knowledge of program issues than their respec­tive headquarters' staffs. 
Headquarters representatives

should take specific steps to minimize the flow of separate

and special evaluation and appraisal missions which consume
 
an inordinately large part of senior Ministry of Health
 
and Population Control staff time. Specifically, if concerns
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over the future course of the voluntary sterilization
 
program merit further special attention by donors, combined
 
donor missions should be considered as more appropriate

than several separate ones. Also, if "beyond family plan­
ning" strategies are to be explored, combined donor repre­
sentation could be desirable. Previous combined missions
 
in Egypt, Sri Lanka, and Thailand are useful precedents
 
to consider.
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